Method and theory in the psychology of art by Pearn, M. A.
*Frontispiece. Rubens (1577-1640) Elizabeth Brandt
London; British Museum.

- METHOD AND THEORY IN THE -
- PSYCHOLOGY OF ART; - 
■ irth  r3 'P o f o r o n -G-Q - t o  i~hp a t n  nn of ;^ ai-TrTxn?g.
- by -
M. A. PEARN
* * *
*
October 1974
Department of Psychology 
Bedford College 
University of London
ProQuest Number: 10098284
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10098284
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
ABSTRACT
The unsatisfactory state of the psychology of art as a field 
of enquiry is analysed and two explanations are offered. The 
current state of psychology is also analysed and recommendations 
for change are made which should also improve the psychology of art, 
particularly in terms of effectiveness and relevance. This is 
followed by a detailed discussion of three major approaches to 
the subject, viz. Psycho-analysis, Gestalt psychology and 
experimental aesthetics. The empirical approach is further 
analysed in terms of the specific problems of aesthetic measurement. 
Certain procedures and kinds of measurement are strongly discouraged, 
whereas other forms are encouraged. The ideas of the preceding 
four chapters are integrated in chapter five within the frame-work 
of implicit aesthetic theories, which can structure both the 
individual’s and a culture's encounter with art. In addition it 
can be used to structure the field of enquiry, particularly with 
reference to the model of aesthetic perception which is discussed 
in chapter five. In general, an enlightened empiricism is called 
for which is based on a model of man akin to that of 'the man in the 
street'. The psychology of art should deal directly with the 
phenomenal experience of real works of art. To this end introspection 
is regarded as an indispensible source of hypotheses which can be 
tested within an empirical framework. It is unlikely that problems 
in psychological aesthetics can be resolved except through multi­
level, multi-disciplinary explanations. The next four chapters 
contain discussions of major topics in the psychology of art, viz. 
the structure of aesthetic reactions; the influences and determinants 
of aesthetic reactions; the development of aesthetic appreciation; 
and the problem of meaning in visual art. The final chapter 
presents a summary and overview.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Overview
*A frank recognition 
of the difficulties 
in the road is not a 
reason for giving up 
but only for being 
more careful*.
(Whitmore 1927)
I The poor state of the psychology of art
In recent years the psychology of art has been criticised by
a number of writers. In the eyes of Morgan (1930) and Berlyne
(i960), the psychology of art has failed to achieve its objectives.
More recently, McWhinnie (1971a) concluded a review article by
saying that the psychology of art was 'spinning its wheels in the
mud' and in a general survey of the field Hogg (1969a) made a 
plea for a fresh approach, which echoed a similar plea made by 
E. M. Bartlett in 1937* Others have described the field as 
confused (Munro 19&3; Pratt 196I), and as irrelevant to the 
problems of art (Arnheim 1932; Dickie 1962). These are not the
problems of youth which disapnear with maturity for the psychology
1
of art as an experimental discipline is almost a hundred years old. 
As an outgrowth of philosophy it is much older.
The exact birth-date of experimental aesthetics is usually 
associated with the publication of Fechner's 'Vorschule der 
Asthetik' in 1876. This book had a tremendous impact on the 
psychology of art. Not only was Fechner the first person to
1
The psychology of art and psychological aesthetics are inter­
changeable terms. That part of the psychology of art which 
rests solely on experimental investigation is referred to as 
experimental aesthetics.
introduce quantification and experimentation to the study of 
aesthetics, he also laid down several experimental techniques that 
are still widely used today. The psychology of art must have 
attracted a great deal of interest for by 1938 Chandler and 
Barnhart were able to cite 1,739 separate studies in their 
exhaustive bibliography. Of the studies listed approximately 
one sixth dealt with visual aesthetics, whereas a third dealt 
with music. Out of the 332 studies specifically devoted to visual 
art only 33 were directly related to paintings and other works of 
art. The rest concerned colour, form, line and other qualities 
as the elements of paintings. Another indication of the interest 
in the area at least in the early part of the century was the 
formation in 1922 of an Aesthetics Section in the British 
Psychological Society, though it had ceased to exist by 1937*
From its inception in 1927, it is possible to obtain from 
Psychological Abstracts a rough measure of the variations of 
activity in the psychology of art (see Appendix A), Examination 
of the proportion of papers published that are concerned with 
aesthetics, relative to the total number published for that year, 
reveals that interest was fairly high during the late twenties.
This was followed by a steady decline in activity during the 
thirties. It was however during this period that Chandler (1934) 
published the first book in English to provide a general survey 
of psychological and experimental aesthetics. Only three years 
later E. M, Bartlett published his general survey, and because of 
disappointing achievements called for a fresh start to the subject 
(Bartlett 1937). Between 1940 and 1932 there was a slight increase 
in activity though it was not until 1948 that the most active 
period was to begin which lasted for about ten years. From 1938 
interest in the psychology of art began to fall off, though in 
the late sixties activity in the psychology of art seems to be 
increasing once more.
This index of the relative amount of interest in the psychology 
of art compared to the rest of psychology does not take into 
account concurrent fluctuations of interest in other topics in 
psychology. Even so it reflects fairly well the fluctuations of 
activity in the psychology of art. The index does however reveal 
most clearly one very important point. The psychology of art has 
never been anything more than a very minor subject within 
psychology as a whole. The highest proportion of papers devoted 
to aesthetics occurred in 1934. In that year only 1.ÿ4% of the 
9,117 papers abstracted (i.e. 122) were devoted to aesthetics.
The lowest proportion of papers devoted to aesthetics (a meagre
0.24) occurred in 19^4 (i.e. 26 papers). The overall median 
proportion works out at only 0,75%» These figures cover papers 
which were concerned with any of the arts. Since 1930 there have 
been five times as many papers dealing with the psychology of 
literature, and three times as many papers dealing with the 
psychology of music, as there have been papers on the visual arts. 
Overall there has been relatively little interest in visual 
aesthetics.
In view of the importance of art to man it is surprising 
that psychology has paid so little attention to art. This point 
is of particular significance as the existence of art in all the 
three thousand cultures known on earth makes art, alongside language, 
one of the universal distinguishing characteristics of man.
It is one of the aims of this thesis to investigate the reasons 
why psychology has neglected this important area of human activity, 
and in particular to examine why the psychology of art appears to 
have achieved so little. There are very many different approaches 
to the subject, so it is necessary to adopt an un-committed view-point
1
This refers mainly to painting. Studies relating to sculpture, 
architecture, dance, film, interior design, fashion, town planning 
or landscapes are almost non-existent.
in order to be equally sensitive to the virtues and defects of 
the various approaches. By exploring the great variety of means 
and ends that fall under the umbrella of the psychology of art it 
is hoped to formulate a set of principles which can be used to 
evaluate past achievements as well as to guide the future 
development of the subject.
Perhaps the first requirement is to show that the psychology
of art is indeed in a state of ill-health. In the first instance
I propose to show that this is the result of two main causes.
The first is related to the historical development of psychology, 
with special reference to the way in which this has determined the 
present-day structure of the psychology of art. The second main 
cause lies in the traditional antithesis that exists between Art 
and Science. This will be followed by a more systematic account 
of the ways in which the malaise manifests itself,
II The historical development of the psychology of art
The psychology of art is floundering in a profusion of 
competing methodologies. This is largely the outcome of the 
historical development of psychology as a whole. It is not ray 
intention to write an exhaustive history of the psychology of art. 
This interesting topic would justify a whole thesis to itself, 
though Munro (l9o3) bas produced a stimulating though somewhat 
impressionistic survey of the historical background and Fickford 
(1972, Chapter 1) has written a short history of experimenal 
aesthetics in England,
Many writers (e.g. Koch I969, Deese 1972, Child 1973) have 
argued that psychology is not a single coherent science. Rather it 
is a loose collection of techniques and approaches to a general 
problem. Unlike other sciences psychology does not appear to 
progress by shedding old techniques and assumptions as newer and
10
better ones are discovered. Instead it seems to adopt new
methodologies without relinquishing the old ones. Different
methodologies achieve prominence according to the current fashion,
but are never totally abandoned. Today, the anti-theoretic,
experimental tradition of Behaviourism is the dominant methodology,
and the once-dominant methods of Introspectionism are generally
frowned upon. Old methods die hard in psychology, so it is still
possible to find purely introspectionist accounts of aesthetic -
experience (Adcock I9S2 , Mace 1972). There has recently been a
shift away from the more extreme strictures of methodological
behaviourism towards a more flexible kind of psychological
experimentation. Perhaps as Hudson (1972), Joynson (1971) and
others have argued, the time is right for a return of mind to
2
empirical psychology.
It has already been noted that Fechner, the father of 
psycho-physics, was also the father of experimental aesthetics. 
There is today an active interest in the psycho-physics of form 
(shape, pattern, complexity) and colour v/hich stems directly from 
Fechner's work and methods, but this has largely become an end 
in itself as there is now no link with aesthetics or with the 
psychology of art. Among contemporary experimental aestheticians, 
it is possible to distinguish the tough-minded experimentalists 
(e.g. Eysenck and Berlyne), who are influenced directly by 
Fechner's methods and the tenets of Behaviourism. By contrast, 
there are the tender-minded experimentalists (e.g. Child and 
Lindauer) who do not subscribe to a mechanistic model of man and 
who are prepared to deviate from the constraints of the classical 
experiment which derive from the model of psychology as a natural 
1.
Here, Introspectionism refers not only to the standardised 
techniques used by Wundt and Titchener, but also to the general 
introspective approach of Galton, Freud, William James and others.
2
The double meaning of this phrase is intended. It is both 
descriptive and evaluative.
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science..
Alongside Introspectionism, and the Experimentalists the 
functionalist psychometric tradition is an active field in the 
psychology of art and a considerable amount of effort has been 
devoted to the development of tests of artistic aptitude, aesthetic 
sensitivity etc. With the advent of personality theory and multi­
variate statistical techniques, such as correlational measures and 
factor analysis, the study of individual differences and the 
dimensional structure of experience was introduced to the psychology 
of art. The Gestalt school (especially KOhler, Koffka and Arnheim) 
has also had an enormous impact on the psychology of art from its 
earliest days as an approach to psychology.. Similarly the pioneers 
of Psycho-Analysis (Freud and Jung) and their followers (Kris,
Rank) were keenly interested in aesthetics. Today psycho-analytic 
methods and ideas play a very prominent part in the psychology of 
art. More recently the introduction of Information-Theory to 
psychology has resulted in the development of an information- 
theoretic school of aesthetics. Sooner or later almost every new 
methodology or approach to psychology has an impact on psychological 
aesthetics. Each method and approach has different aims, techniques 
and assumptions.
It has not been the practice of psychology to replace old methods 
with new and better ones, but merely to accumulate them indiscrimi­
nately. Curiously the history of psychology parallels the history 
of art in this respect. In the words of E. H. Gombrich: 'The whole 
story of art is not a story of progress in technical prof/iciency 
but a story of changing ideas and requirements' (Gombrich 1930).
'I
It is, however, interesting that there has been no development in 
the psychology of art to correspond to the recent emergence of 
psycho-linguistics, though Gregory (1970) and Arnheim (1969) have 
speculated on visual images as the precursors of language.
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This may well underlie the present malaise of the psychology of 
art. If this is true then the malaise of the psychology of art 
is but one symptom of the malaise of psychology as a whole. 
Consequently a major prerequisite for the re-formulâtion of the 
psychology of art is the determination of a formula for psychology 
as a whole. This will be attempted in Chapter 2. The advantages 
and disadvantages of specific approaches to the psychology of art 
with be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
Ill Science, Psychology and Art
The second of the two main causes of methodological confusion 
in psychology, is the tryadic conflict between Art, Science, and 
Psychology. (See Pig. 1-1). Science and Art have traditionally 
been considered as opposite and irreconcilable poles. The 
experience that is generated by Science is public, objective and veri­
fiable. Art produces experience which is private, subjective 
and not amenable to consensual validation. Science is extraverted
PSYCHOLOGY
^ ARTSCIENCE 4
Fig. 1-1. Tryadic conflict between Art, Science, 
and Psychology.
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and seeks universals in the form of generalizable truths about 
the nature and properties of material things. Art strives for 
universals in the form of experienced meanings concerning man and 
his existence.
In psychology this polarity is apparent in the gulf between
methodological Behaviourism and Psychophysics on the one hand and
Psycho-Analysis and Humanistic Psychology on the other. Commitment
to an approach anywhere on the continuum between these two extremes
entails the adoption of methods and techniques which vary in their
degree of scientific rigour. At present there is no agreement in
2
psychology on the most suitable methods for studying man. It 
would appear that commitment to a preferred methodology carries 
with it a model of man which suits the methodology and vice versa. 
(See Harre and Secord 1972).
In the psychology of art this confusion is further aggravated 
by the fact that the subject-matter is not just man, but man 
engaging in an activity which has traditionally been regarded as 
the antithesis of science. A problem such as this is bound to 
be fraught with confused thinking and emotivism. The antithesis 
between empirical psychology and art has resulted in a large number 
of discussions which have attempted to justify the application of
1
The traditional antithesis between Art and Science may gradually 
be resolved. For instance îîcliellar (1957) has described the 
essential similarity between the creative processes of artists and 
scientists, just as other writers (Bruner 1962, Ch.4; Koestler 1964; 
Boyce 1970; Hudson 1972) have attempted to show that the same 
metaphoric process underliesboth science and art.
^fhis does not imply that there are proper and correct methods if 
only agreement could be reached. Methods are appropriate or not 
in a given context.
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scientific psychology to art, (Bullough 1919» Whitmore 1927» 
Müller-Freienfels 1923;"* Murray 1931; Mainwaring 1941; Brimer 1951; 
Wallach 1959; Westland 19^7; McWhinnie 1971a and Lindauer 1973)*
All these papers have tried to justify the link-up of psychology 
and art, and at the same time have attempted to establish which 
methods are most suitable for tackling aesthetic problems.
A common theme underlying the discussions is the apparent 
paradox of applying objective scientific methods to the 
investigation of something so mysterious and subtle as art. The 
papers cited cover a wide span of time from the early days of 
psychological aesthetics right up to the present. The constant 
recurrence of these discussions suggests that a satisfactory answer 
has not yet been found. For example it will be seen below that 
there have been strong arguments both for and against the use of 
experimental methods in the study of aesthetics. The real argument 
however, is not whether experimental techniques should be applied 
to aesthetics, but what kind and what degree of experimentation is 
required in view of the special subject-matter viz. art and aesthetic 
experience.
Wliilst most workers in the field are committed to one particular 
approach others have recommended multi-disciplinary approaches 
(Bullough 1919; Müller-Freienfels 1923; Lalo 1928; Chandler 1934; 
Schrickel 1938; Pratt 1981; Munro I983). For instance, Bullough 
argued that in order to study aesthetic experience the psychologist 
must use experiment, observation and his own reminiscences. In a 
more critical analysis Müller-Freienfels (1923) discussed a number 
of methods all of which had associated advantages and disadvantages.
His list of methods included experimental and questionnaire techniques.
1The writings, in German, of Müller-Freienfels are discussed in 
detail by Munro (1948).
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idiographic analyses, pathological studies, and what he called the 
objective-analytical method. By this he meant the use of every 
conceivable kind of evidence that is in any way connected with 
the work of art. This would include information on social, 
economic and cultural conditions, as well as prevailing aesthetic 
theories both in the past and in the present. In Chapter 3 
I will develop the notion of individual and prevailing aesthetic 
theories as an explanatory framework for the psychology of art,
IV Manifestations of the Malaise
Before proceeding to an examination of the kind of psychology 
required, both in ^eneral and in its application to art, it is 
necessary to show just how the malaise manifests itself. In general 
this can be most clearly seen in the isolation of the psychology 
of art from both (a) psychology as a whole, and (b) from the 
world of art. It can also be seen in (c) the nature and number of 
recent surveys of the field, and (d) the criticism from within 
and from outside the psychology of art. Each of these points will 
be discussed separately below.
(a) The isolation of the psychology of art.-
Not only is the psychology of art a minority subject within 
psychology, it also suffers the added disadvantage of being 
isolated from the mainstream of psychological research and teaching. 
Hudson (1972) has recently listed some 'topics that are beyond 
the pale of scientific respectability - stereotypes, nypnotism,
LSD, ESP, marriage research, sociology and other unspecified forms 
of intellectual self-indulgence and impropriety'. He might well 
have included psychological aesthetics or the psychology of shyness 
in this list. In a sense this isolation can be seen as both a 
cause and a result of its present troubles. It is difficult 
to separate cause and effect.
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In its twenty-five years of existence the Annual Review of 
Psychology has featured sections on aesthetics twice only 
(Pratt 1981 ; Child 1972) and Koch’s six-volume review, 'Psychology: 
A Study of a Science', contains no discussion of aesthetics.
The isolation of the psychology of art is also clearly seen in 
its conspicuous absence from introductory works on psychology 
and from general texts on perception, thinking, or social 
psychology. Pare exceptions to this are a chapter in von Fieandt's 
World of Perception (1988) and a very brief section in Wyburn,
'I
Pickford and Hirst (1984). Both are general texts on perception. 
Consequently the general body of psychologists are rarely exposed 
to the psychology of art unless they specifically seek it out.
This can result in ignorance or suspiciousness of the aims and 
methodological problems involved. In addition this state of under­
exposure to psychologists in general (including students) restricts 
the range of critical evaluation the field is likely to receive, 
particularly from those working in other branches of psychology.
In this way the field is sheltered from the critical evaluation 
of the broader field of psychology, and is consequently under less 
pressure to examine its assumptions, objectives and methods as 
stringently as possible. This may well explain the existence of 
so much poor work in the area, which was noted by Hogg (1989a).
The isolation of the psychology of art is also manifested in 
the absence of theory in the area. With the recent exception of 
Berlyne the psychology of art has not generated any theory that 
has had links with other areas in psychology. The reverse is 
also true. No general theory in psychology (apart from Helson's 
(1984) Adaptation-level Theory and Psycho-Analytic theorising) has
1
A third possible exception is a book on form perception by Zusne 
(1970). Unfortunately his section on aesthetics ( p p . 8-403) 
does more harm than good to the image of the subject as it is 
purely behavioural, concerned as it is solely with objective 
reactions (e.g. ratings of pleasingness) to simple shapes (polygons) 
and plain colour. There is no reference to art.
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attempted to include the problems of aesthetic experience and 
behaviour within its embrace. Psychology as a whole has neglected 
both art, as a field of application, and the psychology of art 
as a legitimate part of the mainstream of psychology. In view of 
the importance of art to man this neglect of aesthetics by 
psychology is surprising. There is clearly an argument for 
reformulating not only the psychology of art, but also psychology 
itself.
(b) The gulf between the psychology of art and the world of art.
Another way in which the psychology of art is unhealthily 
isolated is its separation from the world of art. This is 
manifested in several ways. Those v/orking in the psychology of 
art are not themselves art-experts and, on the whole, have tended 
to maintain an oversimplified view of the problems involved. 
Consequently art experts (artists, historians, philosophers, 
teachers) have not generally drawn on the findings of art 
psychology. Once again this is with the exception of psychoanalytic 
theories (Spector 1972), and Gestalt theories (Pratt 1969). As 
a general rule the more 'scientific' the psychological approach 
the less likely is it that its findings will find sympathetic 
reception in the world of art*
It is perhaps significant that Z. H. Gombrich, who, in his
influential writings on art has seen the relevance of psychology
(cf. Gombrich I96O, 1972a), has utilised not the findings of art
psychology but those of the psychology of perception, thinking
and meaning. It is also extremely rare for philosophers to use or
accept data from the psychology of art to settle philosophical 
1problems in art.
'I
A notable exception is a study by Gordon (1929) who used empirical 
data she had collected to discredit two of Kant's (1790) criteria of the 
aesthetic, viz. universality and disinterestedness. Similarly,
Charles Morris (1958) carried out experiments to settle the dispute 
concerning the location of beauty (i.e. in the beholder or in the 
perceived object). He settled for a relativist position.
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Although the neglect of the psychology of art by art 
experts can be seen as a poor reflection on the achievements of 
the field, it may also reflect the prejudices of the majority 
of the art world, because of their hostility to the idea of 
subjecting aesthetic experience to scientific study* To complete 
the circle, their negative attitudes might result from the poor 
state of the field and the inappropriate methods that are used.
(c) Reviews and Surveys of the Psychology of Art.
Another manifestation of the malaise is seen in the nature 
of the reviews which survey the field. Since I96O there has 
been an unprecendented number of general reviews. The area seems 
to have become cluttered with general reviews. However, not all 
the reviews have the same aims. Cnly Pratt (I98I) can claim to be 
comprehensive, drawing on all approaches to the subject in a 
useful general discussion. Unfortunately, this article is now 
out of date due to the large amount of recent work. Valentine 
(treating art, music and literature) and Pickford (visual art 
only) respectively concentrate only on experimental aesthetics 
and are traditional in outlook and organisation of their subject- 
matter. Their reviews are presented uncritically, with little 
attempt at theory-building, explanation, or integration of the 
findings. They do not attempt to build bridges between the 
psychology of art and psychology in general. In addition, their 
presentation of the subject is determined by the studies of the
1
Two major reviews of experimental aesthetics have appeared in 
England (Valentine 1902; Pickford 1972), and a more general survey 
of the psychology of art in France (Hussain I987). In addition 
two books have been published which although they represent 
specific approaches to the psychology of art, viz. Gestalt 
(Arnheim 1967a) and Behavioural (Berlyne 1971)» also include 
general reviews of the field. As already noted, two long articles 
have appeared in the Annual Review of Psychology, (Pratt 1961; 
Child 1972) and a 63-page monograph by Child in Volume Three of 
Lindsey and Aronson's Handbook of Social Psychology (Child I969).
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existing psychological research rather than by the intrinsic 
demands of the subject-matter. Both of Child's major articles 
have had slight biases in emphasis. In I969 he deliberately 
excluded reference to rigourous experimental and psycho-physical 
studies. In the later review he tended to concentrate on non- 
experiraental contributions to the psychology of art (Child 1972). 
The most recent reviews of experimental work are contained in 
Berlyne (1971) and Lindauer (1973). There are three points to 
be noticed about these reviews.
(1) None of the reviews has given extensive coverage to 
all approaches to the psychology of art. The most comprehensive 
review was by Pratt (I96I) who managed in only I8 pages to discuss 
philosophical problems, Fechner, the perception of emotion.
Gestalt psychology, Gibson's Perception of the Visual World (1930), 
Arnheim's Art and Visual Perception (1934a), Gombrich's Art and 
Illusion (1980), physiognomic perception, aesthetic meaning, social 
and cultural factors affecting aesthetic reactions, psycho-physics 
and Behaviourism. It is curious, despite this exemplary review, 
that there has been no corresponding multi-disciplinary research
in the psychology of art.
(2) Another feature of the reviews is that they are largely 
uncritical and non-evaluative. There is often criticism of 
specific approaches and experiments, but these tend to be from 
one committed position to another. None of these reviews present 
systematic and unbiased evaluations of all the data and techniques 
available. There is in the field a tendency to take most of the 
findings of experimental investigations at face value, rather than 
to evaluate each study before accepting its findings.
'I
For example Child (1989)» who uses a criterion of 'agreement with 
experts' in his experimental work criticised and rejected Eysenck's 
criterion of 'concensus'. Similarly, Berlyne (1971) rejects most 
experimental studies not employing molecular stimuli. Both these 
issues are discussed fully in chapter four of this thesis.
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(3) Related to the lack of evaluation in the field is the 
almost complete absence of explanation in the reviews, and still 
less in the original studies. This is partly attributable to 
the complexity and subtlety of the subject-matter, the great 
variety of approaches and techniques, and the general reluctance 
of modern psycholo.j^y to grapple with such phenomena.
(d) Criticisms of the Psychology of Art,
I have already referred to the state of mutual intolerance or 
indifference, that exists between experimental and non-experimental 
approaches to the subject. In addition I have noted that there 
are considerable differences in opinion concerning the exact 
nature of experimentation that is needed for the investigation of 
topics within the psychology of art. In order to obtain a clear 
and realistic picture of the present state of the field it is 
necessary to examine these ar, uments and criticisms in more detail. 
They can be classified under 4 separate headings:
1, The psycholOt;,y of art is too scientific. It has been 
argued by philosophers, (e.g. Dickie 1982; Danger 1937) that 
psychological informa^tion is not relevant to the solution of 
logical problems in aesthetics, nor is it relevant to the 
description of aesthetic experience. This attitude is also 
reflected in Jung's (1934) rejection of the scientific approach 
to art in his contention that 'Art is too pure, too unique, too 
other-worldly and intuitive to be the subject-matter for such 
atomistic science'. The basis for this argument is that there is 
an essential contradiction between objective scientific methods 
of psychology and the value-laden world of art. Most writers 
have not questioned whether there ought to be a scientific 
approach to art, but have instead questioned the exact nature of
21
the scientific approach. For example, Munro (1923) v/hilst 
accepting the value of the scientific approach, argued that 
'too rigorous an insistence on absolute reliability and objectivity 
of data, too impatient a zeal for universally valid generalisations, 
may be an obstacle in a field where these cannot be obtained at 
once, if ever'. A similar point has been put forward by 
Mainwaring ( 194-1). He argued that Beauty cannot be defined in 
terras of objective characteristics or in terms of preference 
judgements, and'yet to be comprehensible in terms of an exact 
science this is the only way it can be defined'. His point is 
simple. In order to be scientific, the experimental approach 
may impose restraints on the subject-matter which may render it 
meaningless. In a similar vein, Whitmore (192?) has argued that 
the only matters wnich are amenable to experimental treatment 
must be relatively simple and easily repeatable. This 'amounts 
to saying that they are for the most part rather unimportant 
elements in any aesthetic situation'.
Instead of destroying the subject-matter, the experimentalist 
may simply choose to ignore certain aspects of it. This is 
Arnheim's point that experimental aestheticians tend to neglect 
what they cannot quantify (Arnheim 1932). Several writers whilst 
accepting the value of experimental techniques are also concious 
of the dangers, (Wickiser 1932; Munro 1983; Child 1989). Too 
rigid an interpretation of scientific method might result in the 
experimentalist ridin. rough-shod over the nuances and multiple 
interactions of aesthetic experience. Koffka (1940) and Munro 
(1983) have object d to the experimentalists' equation of reactions 
to artificial (molecular) stimuli with the perception of complex 
works of art under free conditions. They also question the 
experimentalists' tendency to isolate a work of art from its actual 
or usual context and place it in a laboratory setting as this may
22
change or destroy some of its original characteristics, or change 
the way it is perceived,
2. The psychology of art is not scientific enough. Ey 
contrast with those who though they accept an experimental approach 
to the psychology of art also stress the dangers of this approach 
are those who think that even the majority of experimental 
aesthetics is not scientific enough. In particular Berlyne (196O, 
19711 1972a), and Eysenck (1937) have both tried to show that the 
experimental approach to the psychology of art has failed because 
it hasn't been rigorous enough. Their argument is very detailed 
and will be discussed separately in Chapter 3* Berlyne's main 
concern is that experimental aesthetics should avoid what he terms
'pre-operationist and pre-behaviourist assumptions' and should 
concentrate only on the study of observable behaviour. Without 
adopting a strictly behaviourist view-point Hogg (l9o9a) has 
criticised the majority of experimental work before I98Û as 
inadequate, due mainly to poor stimulus and response sampling.
This, he argues, has led to distortions through the intrusion of 
the experimenters' pre-conceptions.
3 . Organisation of the subject. Several writers have been 
concerned at the lack of concerted planning in the field and the 
lack of common boundaries or clearly defined objectives, (Munro 
1948; iratt I98I). Consequently this has resulted in confusion 
over methods, aims, and terminology (McWliinnie 1971). It has 
also been argued that aesthetic behaviour should not be studied 
in isolation from other behaviour (Berlyne I96O), and that the 
lack of contact between psychology and aesthetic theory is 
detrimental to the subject (Arnheim 1932). As Pratt (198I) has 
succinctly put it, 'psychological aesthetics is a field in 
search of a method'. That was true in 196I and is still true 
today, thirteen years later.
4. A question of emphasis. Arnheim (1934) has made the 
point that the superficial relevance of psycho-analysis and its
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readiness to tackle art problems has made the psychology of art 
appear less adequate. This is largely because psychology does 
not possess methods and techniques which are directly applicable 
to art problems. This point has been elaborated by Bloom (1961) 
and by Adcock (l9o2) who both argue that there has been too 
much emphasis on measurable stimulus characteristics and too 
little attention to the ’dynamical context* of a person 
interacting with a work of art. Finally Hogg (1969a) has drawn 
attention to the neglect of the motivational aspects of aesthetic 
perception. Berlyne appears to be the only experimental 
psychologist working in this area. There is thus a strong case 
for criticising the psychology of art for serious omissions in 
the topics investigated.
Many of these criticisms stem from committed view-points 
and there has not as yet been a systematic attempt to integrate 
them within a general frame-work for the psychology of art. All 
these criticisms and the various stand-points they reflect will 
be taken into account in subsequent chapters.
The aims of the psychology of art
Bofar the aims and objectives of the psychology of art have 
not been discussed. As it is the aim of this thesis to explore the 
most appropriate methods for a psychology of art, it is necessary 
to define its aims as neutrally and as generally as possible. In 
this way it should be possible to avoid biases through an a priori 
commitment to a specific methodology or approach to the subject*
The main aim of the psychology of art is clear. It is to employ 
suitable psychological techniques to explore all human behaviour 
and experience that is associated with works of art or other non-art 
objects that, are perceived in an aesthetic manner. In this way 
the art psychologist should strive to describe and explain aesthetic
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behaviour and experience. It is not necessary for the psychologist 
to involve himself in discussions of the exact nature of art or 
beauty for there is a sense in which 'art is what everybody knows 
it to be' (Gombrich 1950; Saw 1973). In other words, art is what 
artists produce, or what any individual or culture chooses to 
classify and respond to as art. As he is required to work in an 
area where he is not himself an expert the art psychologist is 
more in need of guidance than he is when working in the more 
traditional areas of psychology. Consequently the other disciplines 
that have a bearing on art are relevant to his work, viz, art history, 
aesthetic theory, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, etc. It is 
important that the art psychologist should not be naive in any of 
these areas. Zqually he should not be too expert in any of them.
In view of the current discontent with the methods and 
achievements of the psychology of art as a whole, an attempt at 
reformulation will be made in Chapter 2. In the following 
chapter the virtues and defects of the various theoretical and 
experimental approaches will be discussed. Chapter 4 extends the 
discussion of the experimental approach to the difficult and all- 
important area of aesthetic measurement on which much of the 
empirical psychology of art rests. This will be followed in 
Chapter 5 by an integration of conclusions which will form the 
basis of a theoretical frame-work for the psychology of art. The 
remaining four chapters present discussions of important problems 
in the psychology of art.
Preliminary Guiding Principles
These guide-lines derive directly from some of the more 
general points which have been discussed above. They will serve 
as a starting point for the more detailed discussions that 
follow.
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1. Aesthetic experience and behaviour is a distinctively,
(though perhaps not uniquely), human phenomenon.
2. Complex mental processes are involved.
5. There has been too little attention to the nature of aesthetic 
experience.
4. There is a need for more systematic planning in the field as a 
whole,
5. There is a need to combine a variety of approaches using each 
for what it is worth, while acknowledging their respective 
limitations.
6. There is a need to standardise a descriptive terminology and 
vocabulary.
7. There should be more emphasis on accurate description as a 
preliminary to explanation and theory-building.
8. Finally,
’Let us beware of the subtleties and complexities 
of art, lest we distort the problems into over­
simplified caricatures in the name of empirical 
science* (Morgan 1950).
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CHAPTER TVra
Explanation and Theory in the Psychology of Art
I A Definition of the Area
Most of those working in the Isychology of Art publish their 
research findings, and,much less frequently, their thinking on the 
subject, with little or no attempt to define or justify their 
objectives. This has produced an enormous quantity of published 
work which is poorly conceived, ad hoc in nature, and lacking in 
any kind of theoretical unity. Most workers in the field (whether 
they lie at the extremes of the Behaviourist or Psychodynamic poles) 
are 'non-reflective'. That is, they do not criticise or evaluate 
their own work, their chosen methodology or its suitability for the 
problems they are trying to solve. It was noted in the last chapter 
that even major review articles do not appear to be concerned with 
the task of clarifying the basic concepts and aims underlying the 
psychology of art. Many attempt a rather perfunctory definition, 
and then hasten on to review published work in the area. For 
instance among recent books,Pickford in the introduction to his 
Psychology and Visual Aesthetics (1972) does not even attempt to 
define the area, but merely enumerates some of the contributions 
that experimental psychology can make. In his concluding section 
(Chapter 10) he spells out the limitations of psychology as an 
empirical science which he claims 'does not seek to explain the 
nature of artistic values, although it may do a great deal to
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interpret and illuminate the conditions, cirumstances, and mental 
and social processes involved in valuations'. In short, 
'Psychological Aesthetics does not exist in order to tell the 
artist what to do hut to interpret and understand what is done'.
This is perfectly reasonable but it does not indicate which are 
the most suitable psychological methods, nor the exact problems 
and difficulties involved. Pickford's neutral, non-evaluative 
survey of experimental aesthetics to date neither interprets nor 
helps us to understand, particularly in view of the fact that 
Pickford does not define or analyse these two critical words.
An examination of Valentine's book, 'Experimental Psychology 
of Beauty' (I962), which is very similar in organisation and 
approach, shows that Pickford is not alone in this failing. 
Valentine's aims are clearly but broadly defined. He sees the aim 
of experimental aesthetics as the study of individual differences 
in the experience and apprehension of beauty (Valentine I962 Ch.15). 
It is interesting to note that Valentine, unlike Pickford, defined 
the essence of beauty in an unashamedly introspectionist manner 
(see Ch.1, p 9)» and yet in a way that was completely unrelated 
to the majority of experimental studies with which his book deals. 
Child, in his major review, (Child 19o9) had no hesitation in 
claiming; 'As part of behavioural science, aesthetics is the study 
of man's making works of art, man's experiencing works of art, and 
the effects on man of this making and experiencing'. This is a 
global definition of the area, and includes the extremely important 
feature of the effects of art on man, which has been very little 
studied despite the fact that its importance was stressed by 
bhitmore (1927), over forty years earlier. This break-down of the 
subject-matter of aesthetics is best represented by Child's own 
schematic diagram (Fig. 2-1).
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Fig. 2-1. A breakdown of psychological aesthetics. (From Child 1369)
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Unlike Valentine, Child is not solely concerned with Boauty but 
art in general, but like him and Pickford he is largely uncritical 
of most of the psychological methods employed* Although he breaks 
down the subject-matter into four major areas. Child is not 
specific about the actual questions that ought to be answered by 
a psychology of art; he only discusses those that have been 
attempted. As the nature of the questions asked to some extent 
determines what constitutes an adequate answer, neither Child, 
Valentine nor Pickford ^ive any clue concerning what kind of 
description, explanation or theory will help us understand man's 
behaviour and experience in relation to art,
Ci'.ild's later review (Child 1972) which concentrates less 
on purely experimental work in aesthetics and more on what he 
calls the cognitive psychology of art, provides no definition, or 
conceptual frame-work of any kind whatever. Pratt, being less 
committed to an experimental approach in his own work (e.g. Pratt 
1950) is very aware of the conceptual confusion in the area, and 
attributes it to the overlap of common boundaries in the field, 
and the resulting absence of any commonly held set of criteria 
for evaluating work (Pratt 19ol).
Other definitions of the area have been presented by 
researchers in the field who are committed to a particular approach 
(e.g. Lundin 1996) but these need not concern us here. Thomas 
hunro who is not a psychologist, has been critically reviewing 
the contributions of psychology to the understanding of art for a 
very long time (Kunro 192ùa, 1948, 1963)1 and has probably 
provided the best definition of the area which has the charm of 
being free of immediate methodological assumptions. This is 
quite intentional for liunro has for over forty years been arguing 
for a multidisciplinary, multi-methodological psychology of art.
His definition of the aim of the psychology of art is simple. Its 
aim is 'to describe and explain the phenomena of human behaviour
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and experience in relation to works of art' (Kunro I963)» This
will be taken as the expression of the main aim of the psychology
of art in tnis thesis. However, it has already been noted that
expressing an aim, such as that quoted above, does not tell us
(i) what practical questions should be asked; (ii) how they should
be expressed; (iii ) what constitutes an adequate answer; and (iv)
how different answers to the same question should be evaluated,
Hogg (1969a) in a careful, critical introduction to his collection
of readings on psychology and the visual arts was aware of this
problem to some extent. After defining the aim of the psychology 
'1
of art he enumerated four main topics which should be investigated. 
These topics can be expressed as questions, viz. (i) why do we look 
at all? (ii) how is meaning expressed in art? (iii) how is a work 
of art perceived? and (iv) how do people differ in their experience 
of art? These questions correspond to the four topics of aesthetic 
motivation, aesthetic perception as process, meaning in art, and 
individual differences in aesthetic experience. The four questions 
are posed in a way that can lead to almost any kind of research 
or psychological interpretation, though Hogg does not suggest how 
this can be done. In a brief though general theoretical discussion 
of the possibility of an experimental psychology of art, k'allach 
(1939) presents an all too rare attempt to go this one stage further 
and define how the questions, or statements of problems, should be 
translated into empirical investigations. He concentrated on only 
two specific areas, viz. teaching (or inducing) sensitivity to art, 
and the problem of aesthetic motivation. Although limited in 
range V/allach's discussion is an excellent example of the transition 
from problems in aesthetics to empirical psychology of art; the
Hogg's definition refers to the psychological study of the 
production and appreciation of works of art. Munro's somev/hat 
similar definition quoted above is preferable because the word 
'appreciation' has connotations of evaluation as an intrinsic 
component of aesthetic experience, which could influence the 
design and interpretation of research. In this respect Munro's 
word 'experience' is more neutral.
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transition from theory into experiment.
Questions for a Psychology of Art
The word 'understanding* has occurred several times in this
-1
and the preceding chapter. It is a 'voluptuously ambiguous' 
word, with a virtually free-for-all meaning, and yet it is of 
paramount importance, I have argued that understanding results 
from asking the right questions, and having done so, determining 
the rules for the transformation of questions into empirical tests, 
and the possession of rules for evaluating the results of the tests, 
In this section I shall present some of the main questions and give 
examples of subsidiary questions. This arrangement of scientific 
questions ranging from the very general to the highly particular 
represents an open-ended hierarchy, or what Koestler has called 
a 'holon'^, I shall then discuss what kind of psychology should 
be capable of providing answers to the questions. This is followed 
by a discussion of explanation and theory which will lead to some 
rules for evaluating and integrating findings in the psychology of 
art.
The Main Questions
I './hat is the nature of aesthetic experience?
This question involves the description and explanation of 
what is happening when someone is responding aesthetically to a 
work of art. This is an almost totally neglected area in the 
empirical psychology of art.
Underlying concept: Aesthetic experience as process
A phrase borrowed from Medawar (1969).
2
For a detailed discussion o 
Ghost in the Machine (1967).
p
f the nature of 'holons' see Koestler's
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Subsidiary questions: e,g» Does aesthetic experience vary in
quality and intensity?
Are there different kinds of aesthetic 
experience?
II What is the structure of aesthetic experience?
This is a question more familiar to psychologists because 
they have asked the same question of personality, intelligence, 
skills and other hypothetical constructs.
Underlying concept: the structure of aesthetic experience.
Subsidiary questions: e.g. Can aesthetic experience be described
in terms of discrete categories or dimensions ?
Is the structure of aesthetic experience 
similar to that of intelligence or personality?
III Is the perception of a work of art qualitatively different 
from the perception of other classes of objects?
This is another very important question that has not been 
systematically investigated by psychologists.
Underlying concept: the uniqueness of aesthetic experience.
Subsidiary questions: e.g. Is aesthetic perception different from
object perception?
Is aesthetic perception reducible to 
perceptual and cognitive controls?
IV What influences the perception of a work of art?
At a general level this is an area often studied in the 
psychology of art. However there is an almost total neglect of 
specific works or schools of art.
Underlying concept: determinants of aesthetic experience.
Subsidiary questions: e.g. What influences liking for specific
works of art? What influences evaluation 
of works of art? V.liat determines an individual's 
sensitivity to art in general?
Why do some people like Classical as opposed
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to Romantic Art?
V/hy do some people like Eskimo carvings but 
not Naum Gabo?
V How and why does aesthetic experience vary between and within 
individuals?
The answers to this question and its subsidiaries is dependent 
on answers to the main questions above. There is clearly a 
correct order of priority for research in the psychology of art. 
Underlying concept: inter and intra-individual variation in
aesthetic experience.
Subsidiary questions: e.g. How does personality influence aesthetic
preference, evaluation or sensitivity?
What aspects of the context influence 
aesthetic experience?
What role does expectation or familiarity 
play;
What features of given works of art influence 
people in different ways?
VI How much of aesthetic experience is attributable directly to
(i) the characteristics of the observer; (ii) the characteristics 
of the work of art; (iii) the culture of the observer; and 
finally (iv) the interaction between these three.
Underlying concept: dynamics of aesthetic experience.
Subsidiary questions: e.g. V.Tiat is the role of imagination and
projection in the perception of a painting?
Is pictorial perception learned?
How does past experience influence present 
perception of a work of art?
How does an observer perceive meaning in a 
work of art?
What is the role of illusion?
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How far do cultural assumptions influence 
the way a painting is perceived.
VII Why and how are people motivated to look at works of art in 
the first instance?
Underlying concept: aesthetic motivation
Subsidiary questions: e.g. Is the desire to look at works of art
innate or learned?
"hat is the influence of upbringing?
"hat social and cultural factors influence 
the desire to look at works of art?
V.'hy is art held in such esteem in our, or
any other, society?
VIII How can people be trained (or induced) to be sensitive to 
works of art and to be motivated to look at them?
Tiiis is another active area in the psychology of art, but as
with other main questions it cannot be successfully answered until
prior main questions have been answered.
Underlying concept: aesthetic education
Subsidiary questions : e.g. Does mere exposure to art create the
desire and ability to appreciate it?
Does training in artistic style discrimination 
lead to greater aesthetic sensitivity?
Does training in art improve the quality of 
life?
IX How do children develop aesthetic awareness?
Underlying concept: aesthetic development
Subsidiary questions: e.g. Is the aesthetic development of a child
similar to the development of other complex 
cognitive processes such as perception or 
thinking?
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Does the onset of adolescence have a 
critical effect on the aesthetic development 
of a child?
Do children develop aesthetic criteria 
naturally or is it learned?
Is the very notion of aesthetic development 
a valid construct?
X IVhat are the effects of aesthetic experience on the observer? 
Underlying concept: The effects of aesthetic experience 
Subsidiary questions: e.g. Does observation of a painting produce
tranquillity in the individual or is this a 
primary condition for perceiving a painting 
aesthetically?
Does observation of a painting produce 
measurable physiological change in the 
observer?
All these are mainly psychological questions which modern 
empirical and theoretical psychology should be capable of answering. 
Some questions overlap with other areas of psychology (e.g. child 
psychology) and other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, 
art history and so on. To the extent that some questions could 
also be asked wi thin other disciplines then to that extent those 
fields of enquiry are relevant to the answers provided by a 
psychology of art. It can also be seen that even the main questions 
are not conceptually distinct and that many of the subsidiary 
questions are inter-dependent. At this level greater conceptual 
clarification and distinction can only be achieved through 
artificial logical distinctions which have little or no corresponding 
existence in reality. In other words clear-cut conceptual categories 
at this level may well destroy the veridicality of the ideas as 
expressions of reality.
The main questions do not imply value judgements or 
prescriptions for value judgements about art, and do not attempt 
to pose questions about the ultimate nature of Art and Beauty.
The fact that questions on these topics are not posed as part of 
the legitimate aim of the psychology of art does not imply that 
they are irrelevant to the psychologist interested in art. The 
real point is that such topics are not intrinsically relevant to, 
and should not influence, the design of the empirical investigations 
that result from attempts to answer the main and subsidiary questions. 
However, these topics are,or could be, highly relevant to a general 
discussion of the psychology of art. In this sense, metaphysical 
and similar considerations are relevant to the psychology of art 
just as sociology, anthropology, and history are relevant to the 
development of explanation and understanding of man in relation to 
art. Under this scheme there is no contradiction between an 
empirical psychology of art, and Braque's famous dictum: 'You can 
explain everything about painting except for the bit that matters'. 
There is quite enough for psychology to describe and explain, even 
though it may not be possible to explain 'the bit that matters'.
Ill V.liat kind of Psychology
Psychology is not a coherent subject. Ryle (1949) has 
described it as a 'partly fortuitous federation of inquiries and 
techniques'. Twenty-five years later the situation is even worse, 
h'ith every new development in psychology new methods are adopted 
so that more and more techniques and methodologies fall under the 
umbrella of psychology. Consequently the question: Is isychology 
relevant to Aesthetics? really reduces to a more meaningful 
questioning,viz. What kind of psychology is relevant to aesthetics?
It is not really a question of whether or not experimental techniques 
should be used but rather what kinds of experimental techniques 
and what kinds of quantification etc. are appropriate to the 
psychology of art in view of its special subject-matter. This
37
y"
question eau only be ans wered within the context of modern 
psychology in general.
Criticisms of Modern Psychology
In recent years there has been increasing disatisfaction 
with the state of modern psychology. Despite considerable overlap 
it is possible to isolate four main areas of criticism, which will 
be discussed separately below.
a) Two types of psychology; internal versus external events.
he have seen in an earlier chapter that psychology consists 
of a great variety of methods and techniques, many of which are 
opposed to each other. Despite this they all flourish while 
psychology as a whole flounders. Cronbach (1937) has drawn 
attention to the gulf that exists between two basic types of 
psychology vis. experimental and individual psychology. The former 
rests on the assumption of the stimulus determination of all 
behaviour, whilst the latter seeks to interpret behaviour and 
experience in terms of internal events within the individual such 
as his motives, desires, wants, ambitions etc. To use a phrase 
from Bartlett (1932) the experimental psychologist 'stands in awe 
of the stimulus' because his chosen methodology dictates that the 
observable stimulus is the only determinant of behaviour that is 
amenable to scientific investigation. This is because it can be 
observed, controlled and quantified in a way that is impossible with 
internal events. The conflict between experimental psychology and 
individual psychology is a function of differing interpretations 
of psychology as a science. To the experimentalists who see 
psychology as a natural science it is unscientific to investigate 
phenomena that cannot be controlled and quantified; to the individual 
psychologists it is unscientific to ignore these topics.
More recently this issue has been extensively discussed by 
Deese (1972), Hudson (1972) and Child (1973). All three authors
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recognise the double life led by modern psychology. Deese draws 
attention to the fact that behaviourism is the dominant methoo.ology 
of modern psychology, and expresses deep concern over what he 
regards as its pseudo-scientific bent. He rejects the ’curious, 
now nearly universal assumption, that the subject-matter of 
psychology is behaviour ’ . Deese shares with Ilarre^  and decord (1972) 
the view that psychology is anti-theoretical, conservative and 
intellectually unappealing. Child (1973) is less caustic. He 
makes a distinction between hard and soft psychologies that is 
somewhat similar to Cronbach*s (1937). He argues that each approach 
has its ov;n virtues and defects. The ’hard’ psychology of the 
’Research Tradition’ is objective, quantified, precise and 
verifiable. However, it restricts its fields of enquiry to those 
that readily meet the requirements of its scientific methodology 
based on operationism and positivism. At the same time it neglects 
whole areas which are not amenable to the experimental approach and 
the possibility of causal explanations. Consequently the ’hard’ 
psychology excludes experience and awareness, and in its efforts to 
be scientific concentrates on behavioural data. To these may be 
added the more specific defects which consist in a tendency to over­
generalise from experimental data, and an assumption of invariance 
both between and within individuals which is a direct result of the 
assumption of stimulus determination. By contrast, the ’soft’ or 
humanistic kind of psychology embraces many of the areas neglected 
by experimental psychology (e.g. aesthetics, personal ideals, 
fulfillment, moral responsibility) and emphasises rather than 
suppresses the uniqueness of individuals. However, its defects 
lie in the vagueness and ambiguity of its concepts and a general 
disinterest in empirical verification. This is allied to a general 
smugness about their special ’insight’ to human experience. Child
-1
cf. The definition of psychology as ’the science of behaviour’ 
given by Broadbent (19^1) and by I-iarx and Hillix (19&3).
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is obviously concerned to characterise the extremes of the two 
positions. However, it is just this polarization towards 
irreconcilaole extremes of a barren but scientific experimental 
study oi behaviour anu an unrestrained, unscientific but 'relevant' 
psychology of human experience, that puts the future of psychology 
in jeopardy unless there is a change of heart and these poles 
begin to merge.
b) The dchu’-.anis-tion of modern empirical psycholo.n:y
The dominant methodology of scientific psychology is 
Behaviourism. This has led to the criticism, already referred 
to above, that psychology in its scientific form is not human 
enough. This is not something that should be passed over as a 
necessary consequence of choosing a particular scientific methodology. 
It is a fundamental weakness of modern psychology, and deserves 
further discussion.
In his attack on behaviourism, Koestler (196?) has argued 
that it is absurd to deny the living organism even that degree 
of unpredictability which modern physics accords to inanimate 
nature. In an earlier discussion Koestler (1964) argued that the 
self-transcending emotions,(e.g. grief, hope, worship, aesthetic 
pleasure) tend to be neglected by modern psychology because they do 
not tend toward overt muscular activity,but rather toward quietude.
His statement that psychologists tend to think of all emotions as 
of the 'active, adreno-toxic, hit-run-mate-devour kind' may be an 
exaggeration, but it is one which is grounded in truth. While it 
is an oversimplification, it can usefully be regarded as an attempt 
to hold up a mirror to psychology. The value of this kind of 
overstatement especially when pitched at the right level is that 
a more moderate statement is usually accepted. This is often the 
ploy used by fashion designers who exaggerate their own drawings 
in the sure knowledge that the watered-down version that is 
eventually accepted will be closer to their real intentions.
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From a different point of view Sanford (I963) and Hudson 
(1972) have argued that psychology's obsession with objectivity 
anu ope^ationism inhibits the experimenter from considering his 
own experience as relevant to the design and conduct of his 
research* Ihis reduces tne psychological insight and sensitivity 
v.hich the experimental psychologist brings to bear on his work, 
as he is wor ...in,^ within a methodological straight—jacket * Sanford 
and huason make a plea for a more human psychology which has also 
been made by G. A. Miller (1964), KcKellar (i960) and Warr (1973). 
Anereas these authors argue for a human psychology that is still 
empirical, Koch (I969) is so disillusioned that he rejects 
empiricism. This reaction is too extreme. It is essential to 
the future of psychology that it be both human and empirical within 
the same overall methodological frame-work.
c ) Ah it price c:..riric ism?
..'e have seen that scientific psychology (as manifested in 
behaviour*^ ,;.ethodology) tends to ignore what is distinctively 
human, whereas a more humanistic psychology tends to be unscientific.
It wouli seem that because the notion of empiricism has been badly 
interpreted by experimental psychology it has been rejected totally 
bg extreme humanistic psychology. Miller (1964) has argued that 
there is a general scientific ethos shared by most psychologists, 
i.e.'they expect to base their image of man on empirical knowledge, 
not upon political dogma or traditional opinion or divine revelation 
or aesthetic appeal'. This is a reasonable ground-work for a 
scientific psychology. However, modern psychology's interpretation 
of empiricism consists in the exclusive attention to overt 
behaviour and the use of a methodology culled from the natural 
sciences (cf. Watson 1924, Kimble 1967). This interpretation 
also assumes that no other interpretation can be considered scientific. 
Joynson (1970) has criticised the various attempts of psychology 
to study internal events whilst still maintaining scientific 
objectivity, viz. the intervening variable approach, psycxiometric
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approach, and cybernetic feed-back models. All these are indirect 
attempts to get inside or control for events inside the traditional 
'black box'. They are indirect because their self-imposed 
methodology does not accept as scientific the more direct study 
of experience (e.g. by means of introspection). It is the apparent 
irapossibility of producing scientific validation of statements 
concerning personal experience that led to a disinterest in mind. 
This is the narrow view of empiricism and scientific psychology.
An alternative view is needed which will reconcile the need to be 
scientific, whilst at the same time enabling psychology to cover 
its field, viz. the experience and behaviour of man.
d) V.liat model of man?
This is the final area of criticism of modern psychology. It 
will not be possible to reconcile the need to be scientific and 
the need to do justice to the subject-matter of psychology unless 
a suitable model of man is embraced. Killer (1964) has interpreted 
the history of psychology in terms of changing models of man.
He points out that psychology's first model was Man as Knower.
The empirical psychologies of Wundt and Fechner were still largely 
philosophical in orientation as they were concerned primarily 
with the source and nature of man's conscious knowledge. The 
behaviourists replaced this model with Man as Animal, and introduced 
suitable experimental techniques. This became Man as Social 
Animal, and eventually it was the difficulty of dealing adequately 
with man's symbolic processes that brought about the return of 
Man as Knower, but nov/-v/ithin a vastly expanded context of new 
methods and theories. Miller does not however share with Deese 
(1972) the view that the mechanistic model of Man as Animal is 
still the dominant model of psychology. While behaviourism 
dominates psychology the mechanistic model of man dominates 
psychology, despite recent developments in cognitive psychology 
and psycholinguistics. Burt has presented a view of psychology 
which must not be taken less seriously because it is so amusing.
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'As a cynical onlooker might be tempted to say, "Psychology having 
first bargained away its soul, and having gone out of its mind, 
seems now as it faces an untimely death, to have lost all 
conciousness "' (quoted in Koestler I967).
Many writers have rejected the mechanistic model of man that
underlies most of experimental psychology. Most of them have
already been mentioned above,and many others, including a regular
flow of articles in the British Psychological Society Bulletin.
The majority of these papers lean towards what Child (1973)
calls the humanistic model of man. This is the view that is
faithful to and aware of the 'immediately felt reality of human
experience'. It embraces the many-faceted reality of cor^ious
experience and the dynamic diversity of the integrated person as
he is known to himself and others. With this as its subject-matter
scientific experimentation is difficult but not impossible.
Psychology should seek to meet the challenge of its true subject-
matter rather than to distort or neglect it so that it fits into
an inappropriate methodology. Psychology should cease following
the example of Procustes who stretched or topped-and-tailed his
guests so that they fitted the exact length of his bed. Psychology
needs methods and techniques that are appropriate to its true
subject-matter.
This may sound like a rejection of scientific method in 
psychology. This is not the case. All that is being rejected 
is the narrow view of scientific method that destroys the subject- 
matter of psychology. My main concern has been to support the 
overthrow of the domination of psychology by (a) the mechanistic
For a complete list of the sixteen papers discussing the nature 
of psychology which have appeared in the Bulletin or its equivalent, 
the American Psychologist, since 1970, see Warr (1973), p. 1.
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model of man; (b) the obsession with causal relations; and (c) 
the philosophy of positivism. Two further points must be made at 
this stage. First this view is not new. There have always been 
those in the broad field of experimental psychology who have 
resisted the narrow view. The personalistic tradition of Kelly, 
Allport, Kurphy, Bannister and Laing have all maintained a model 
of man that has not been forced out of all recognition by the 
rigours of scientific methodology. The second point is that there 
are occasions when a mechanistic model is sufficient for the 
purpose at hand. There is a danger that the current anti-rationalisi 
Zeitgeist, and the reaction against scientism,that now seems to 
be emerging, may result in a swing away from experimental methods 
in psychology towards the intuitive, non-empirical humanistic 
camp or to the excesses of phenomenological psychiatry. This 
would be a retrograde step» ‘With such persuasive and eloquent 
writers as Broadbent (1973) and Eysenck (1972) defending the 
'hard' kind of psychology, it is doubtful that the pendulum vâ 11 
swing too far. Perhaps this point can best be summed up by a 
quotation from V.arr (1973): 'The argument is not that all
psychologists should change their professional value system but 
that the average value system within the culture should shift 
to redress the irnbalence which at present clearly exists'. He 
argues that psychology, overall, should be less pure, individual 
and experimental; instead it should become more social, experiential 
and applied.
The Methodology of Psychology: The return of Kind, Arm-chairs and 
Philosophy
If a psychology of art is to succeed it must be empirical in 
an enlightened sense. To be empirical do^nôt mean to be 
experimental only. It certainly does not mean to be operationist 
in the sense defined by Stevens (1939). There is a lot of data 
that can be obtained that is not amenable to quantification, or is
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only destroyed or distorted by being quantified or inappropriately
quantified» As Deutsch (1964) has pointed out, one of the dangers
of premature quantification (of which there is a great deal in
psychology) is the fact that it can conceal weak or inadequate
1
conceptualization. He argues that it is necessary to verify a 
system before quantifying it. Quantification can give a spurious 
sense of confidence because of the sophistication of the procedures. 
Clear systematic conceptual analysis must precede empirical 
investigations.
There is a strong need for a return of introspectionist 
techniques. Harré and Secord (1972) have argued that it is the 
only direct method of studying personal experience. Sanford (1963), 
McKellar (I968), Hudson (1970) and Joynson (1972) have put forward
a.
a similar case for the return of mind and introspectionism.
liunro (I963) and Osborne (1964) (both philosophers) have argued this
specifically in relation to the psychology of art. Killer,
Galanter and Pribram (I96O) postulated a kind of 'subjective 
behaviourism* which represented a compromise between introspection 
and behaviourism. This approach enabled them to formulate a 
decision-making mind inside the black-box. Their book represents 
a clear demonstration that introspection can lead to insights which 
are amenable to empirical evaluation and confirmation. Their book 
is also important as one of the first signs of a recovery from 
methodological behaviourism.
Poyce (1970) in a discussion of the possible theoretical 
unification of psychology has reminded us that there is more than 
one legitimate road to knowledge. In addition to the r,mpiricism 
that results from sensing, there are two other inter-dependent 
episteniologies, viz. the Metaphorism of symbolising and intuiting.
^This is all too evident in attempts to measure aesthetic 
reactions. See chapter four of this thesis.
2
See footnote overleaf.
Footnote 2 from page 44.
The term introspection embraces a variety of techniques.
At one extreme there is the 'systematic experimental introspection' 
developed by Kiilpe, and at the other, the casual observations 
of untrained observers. In between lie the interpretative self­
observations of psycho-analysts, and the systematic interrogation 
of children and adults. Almost every nineteenth century psychologist 
held that the study of immediate direct experience was the main 
purpose of Psychology, and introspection was the most favoured 
technique of investigation. In the early part of the twentieth 
century behaviourism emerged as a protest against the over- 
deoendence of sychology on introspection, and the consequent 
tendency to regard psychology as the science of consciousness.
It is being argued here that introspection should be allowed back 
into the fold of respectable, acceptable methods of psychological 
investigation. The lesson which was learned from Kû'lpe and the 
.Vurzburg school and which still applies today is that if introspec­
tion is used at all it should be thorough and systematic.
The draw-backs to the technique are well-known. They can 
be summarised as follows: when experience per se is being studied 
(a) it involves the observer in an artificial double-task of 
experiencing something and observing the experience at the same 
time; (b) the subject doesn’t know what it is exactly that he 
has to observe and distortions easily arise; (c) language is 
inadequate to describe all that a person experiences; and (c) bias 
is likely to occur through the effects of differential verbal 
ability in different observers, the nature of the instructions, 
the use of scecial training, and each individual’s expectations 
an'i interpretation of the task.
There is a sense in which it is impossible to give complete, 
accurate, reliable phenomenological descriptions of aesthetic 
experience per se. On the other hand the free verbal introspections 
(or written theories and comments) of .artists and non-artists may 
give the empirical researcher clues or insights which he would not 
otherwise obtain. These can lead to the formulation of hypotheses 
which can be checked by means both experimental and introspective.
The methods are complementary and are not antagonistic unless 
extreme positions are taken. Ideally, there should be no 
experiment or factor-analytic study in aesthetics which does not 
also include a request for the subjects’ introspections, particularly 
with regard to his interpretation of the task and the means by which 
it was tackled. Another introspective approach is to investigate 
what a person feels about art in general and works of art in particular, 
There are many ways of externalising inner processes of thought, 
expectation, association, aspirations, etc. Asking for verbal reports 
and free verbal descriptions is one among many complementary 
techniques which are discussed in chapter four. Introspection should 
be regarded as one among several techniques for studying an 
individual's experience of, and attitude towards, art. By using 
a variety of techniques, all aimed at the same general target, the 
researcher stands a better chance of achieving veridical description 
and valid explanation.
45
and the Rationalism of thinking. Boyce characterises science as 
being predominantly rational-empirical, and art as predominantly 
metaphorical, whereas religion is predominantly metaphorical- 
rational. He then goes on to argue that contemporary psychology 
is suffering from super-empiricism. His argument is not that 
psychology should become less empirical, but that it should 
become more powerfully rational, and more open to the knowledge- 
giving qualities of the metaphor. 'Psychology must invoke the 
knowledge-giving tools of the humanistic trade, but also do all 
that is possible to provide empirical tests for whatever is so 
revealed.
Although discussed in the context of psychology as a whole, 
Boyce's argument is particularly apt for the psychology of art. 
Psychology has tended to re-structure its subject-matter so that 
it comes into line with its interpretation of scientific methodology, 
This will be most clearly revealed in the discussion of experimental 
aesthetics and of aesthetic measurement in chapters three and 
four. In common with psychology as a whole, the psychology of art 
has suffered from too high a degree of empiricism. However, the 
results of this empiricism have not been wasted for a large number 
of observed facts are a pre-requisite for theory-building and 
explanation. The main emphasis of the psychology of art should be 
to find ways of analysing and elucidating human experience and 
behaviour in relation to works of art whilst avoiding extremes of 
subjectivity and objectivity.
^There are already exemplary instances of the first part of this 
conclusion. Gombrich (1963a), an art-historian, has analysed art 
in terms of the elucidation it can provide for the psychologist in 
his study of mind; Bruner (I962) argued that art, like science, 
gives knowledge through a metaphoric process, and more recently 
Arnheira (I969) has argued that perceptual and conceptual processes 
are different aspects of the same mental activity. These ideas 
are extremely interesting. They must be empirically tested.
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IV Explanation in the Psychology of Art
Bridgeman, who is possibly the chief proponent of operationism 
in physics, has also provided us with an excellent definition of 
explanation. 'Explanation', he says, 'consists of analysing our 
complicated systems into simpler systems in such a way that v/e 
recognise in the complicated systems the interplay of elements 
already so familiar that we accept them as not needing explanation'. 
This definition of explanation can be likened to looking up the 
meaning of a word in a dictionary. Usually it is defined in terms 
of words that are already familiar to us,so that they provide the 
meaning of the word in question. It might happen that one of the 
words used to define the unknown word is itself unfamiliar to the 
enquirer and so will itself require 'definition' in terms of other 
words which are familiar to him, and so on until all words required 
to 'define' the original word are 'familiar'.
Bridgeman's definition of explanation can be taken to mean 
nothing more than the translation of the complex and/or unfamiliar 
into the familiar. This appealing interpretation does not however 
provide any prescription for achieving that end. Perhaps this is 
why some explanations fail because complex phenomena are 'explained' 
in terms of concepts which, though familiar, are themselves in 
need of explanation. This is what / happens when 'classificatory' 
explanation is employed. This is a terra employed by Deutsch (1964) 
to distinguish it from the alternative which he prefers viz. 
structural explanation. He argues that classificatory explanation 
is essentially descriptive or generalizatory. A particular 
instance is explained by being subsumed under a statement 
summarizing a number of similar phenomena, i.e. it is shown to be 
an instance of a general case. Deutsch gives as examples Hull's 
drive stimulus (^ ) and the fractionalanticipatorygoal stimula )
"^Quoted in Theobald (1968) p. 53.
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as examples of this kind of explanation. The alternative is 
'structural' explanation, by which an event is explained if it can 
be deduced as the property of a structure, system or mechanism. 
Generalizatory explanation is in terms of other behaviour of a 
like nature, and is therefore similar to Argyle's (1957) notion 
of same-level description. Cn the other hand, structural 
explanation is in terms of other behaviour, observations or 
hypotheses about the underlying structure. This, Deutsch claims, 
takes us away from the 'economic redescriptions' of behaviourism 
towards revelation of the abstract system. The system need not 
be quantified, for like arguments in formal logic, its validity 
stands regardless of the content. By the same argument the actual 
embodiment of the 'structure' is not relevant to the validity of 
the explanation. Consequently physiological speculations are not 
necessary.
This form of structural explanation seems to be a goal worth 
striving for, and the structural explanations developed by Deutsch 
seem to confirm this as a fruitful approach. The total absence of 
this kind of explanation in the psychology of art makes it virgin 
territory of enormous potential for the explanation-bent psychologist 
who seeks order and comprehensibility out of the chaos of unrelated, 
experimental data that comprise the psychology of art. In fact, 
in the experimental psychology of art there is an almost total 
lack of any kind of explanation, structural or otherwise. Foss 
(1956) has provided a useful list of eight different types of 
explanation. Apart from the first type (viz. naming or classification) 
the occurrence of the other seven types is extremely rare in 
experimental aesthetics. Even causal explanations (the model of 
S-R psychology)is relatively rare. This is possibly due to the 
complex nature of works of art which makes it difficult to relate 
stimulus characteristics causally to aesthetic responses. This is 
the main reason why experimental aestheticians have tended to use 
molecular stimuli instead of integral works of art, as the former
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can be operationally specified and controlled in a way that is 
impossible with works of art.
It can be argued that the difficulties of satisfying the 
stringent definition of explanation (i.e. being testable 
predictively) based on the natural science model of psychology may 
have discouraged psychologists from trying other kinds of 
explanation. Generally speaking, correlational or teleological 
or historical explanations are considered inferior by modern 
psychology and are often criticised as unscientific. A more open 
minded attitude is required. Theobald (1968) has pointed out 
that the distinction between description and explanation is not 
clear-cut. To a large extent the difference between them depends 
on the context; the same statement can be taken as either description 
or explanation depending on the questions asked. In an earlier 
section I stressed that what constitutes an explanation is in part 
dependent on the exact question that is asked. This in turn is 
dependent on the level of knowledge of the questioner. The 
psychology of art must begin by asking very basic questions, as 
its level of knowledge is very low.
There is a danger that just as excessive quantification can 
conceal poor conceptualisation, technical jargon and phraseology 
can be used which has not been properly thought out. This is not 
an appeal to operationism of the kind recommended by Stevens (1939) 
or to logical positivism, but merely a stipulation that logical 
cogency is the chief aim of explanation. In other words, it should 
be the most reasonable under the circumstances, and not dressed 
up in elaborate quantification, pinched and bullied by inappropriate 
methodologies, or bent by pre-existent conceptual fraine-works.
V The Role of Theory
Just as there is very little explanation in the experimental
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psychology of art, there is also very little theory. This is not 
surprising as theory can be regarded as a form of explanation. 
Berlyne's progressive theoretical development which is tightly 
linked to his extensive programme of empirical investigation 
represents the one major theory-building effort in the otherwise 
theoretically barren field of experimental aesthetics. The only 
other theoretical contributions represent applications to art 
or more general theories, e.g. psycho-analysis. Gestalt psychology. 
Information theory.
Theobald (i960) has described theories as linguistic 
structures which provide a way of talking about things. In this 
way the theory gives meaning to experience and observation. In 
a similar vein Toulmin (1953) has conceived of theories as providing 
pictures of the sort of phenomena to be expected in any given 
circumstances, and uses the analogy of 'maps for representing 
phenomena' to illustrate this point. These two notions resemble 
the translation of the complex and unfamiliar into the simple 
and familiar. Theory is one way in which phenomena can be 
explained. It can do this in a variety of ways, directly or 
indirectly. Marx and Hillix (19&3) have distinguished two main 
functions of theory viz. its 'tool function' as an aid in 
directing investigation (of. Berlyne 1972a) and its 'goal function' 
which is valued in its own right as a contribution to scientific 
knowledge.. In its goal function theory integrates and orders 
empirical laws, and also codes summarises, and integrates information. 
Just as too limited a definition of explanation can impose strictures 
on the subject-matter that destroy what is most meaningful and 
important about it, too limited a notion of what constitutes 
theory can restrict our potential understanding of the experience 
and behaviour. There are no hard and fast rules for determining 
what is the best type of theory, for no theory is ever final.
There have been many classifications of theory. Perhaps one
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of the best and most exhaustive has been presented by Boring (1955)* 
Similar but more restricted classifications have been made by 
Argyle (1957) and by Marx and Hillix (1965). The categories are 
fairly similar, and when Boring produces 14 categories it is only 
by making further subdivisions within a larger category. Labels, 
such as axiomatic theories, and intervening variable theories, 
are well known in psychology and serve a useful purpose. However 
an alternative classification has been proposed by Royce (1970) 
which promises to provide greater insight into the role of a 
theory and the appropriate criteria by which it is to be evaluated.
He argues that all theories are predominantly correlational, 
experimental, phenomenological, explanatory, descriptive, speculative, 
or combinations of these. For instance Helson’s Adaptation-Level 
Theory (Kelson 1964) is experimental-explanatory whereas Fromm's 
theory of personality is phenomenological-speculative. From his 
analysis of general theories Royce concludes that optimal results 
are obtained when there is either high empiricism (sticking close 
to the empirical data) or relevant high formalism (e.g. an 
appropriate mathematics), and when the theorist restricts himself 
to a relatively limited domain, rather than attempt an all-embracing 
theory. This may be taken as the prescription for theories in 
the psychology of art, once the point has been reiterated that 
there is a serious need for theory-building in the psychology of 
art. General theories are not encouraged as they tend to be 
over-generalised, and are programmatic rather than explanatory.
Perhaps what is needed in the psychology of art is what Boring 
C1955) refers to as 'a modified tolerance' on matters of theory.
As in explanation, cogency is required rather than theoretical 
sophistication, for as Toulmin (1955) has pointed out, the criteria 
of what constitutes a theory changes with the changing horizons 
and developments of a field of enquiry. It is best to let the 
subject-matter determine the nature of the theoretical explanation
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and not the other way round. If a theory is cogent, and not 
just a stylistic and methodological straight-jacket for empirical 
data, it should either clearly provide explanation, or reveal 
by the absence of explanation the areas where further data are 
needed in order to produce explanations, Deese (1972) has put 
this point very succinctly: 'The purpose of empirical data is 
to give rise to fact*.
VI Models as explanatory aids
In a field of enquiry which is crying out for explanation, 
and the need for order, and is totally lacking in theory, models 
must have a vital role to play. The notion of analogy has already 
been used in a loose sense in connection with explanation and 
theory, but models are analogies in a very strict sense. A model 
is nothing more than an analogy, whereas a theory goes beyong 
analogy. A model lays no claim to correspond to reality but 
rather to symbolise it in some critical aspect. It functions in 
an 'as i f ,  almost a 'let's pretend ' , capacity whereas a theory 
functions in an 'it is' capacity. This important difference 
between models and theory led Simon and Newell (1956) to argue 
that theories can make Type I errors (that is they tend to state that 
things are the case when they are not), whereas models are 
particularly prone to making Type II errors (that is to assert 
that things are not the case when they are). This is because 
no analogy is perfect. A theory is a conceptual system which 
attempts to describe the real thing. Facts which are inconsistent 
with a model can be tolerated, but inconsistent facts are fatal 
to a theory.
It is not easy to define a model in strict terras. Deese 
(1972) has characterised them as metaphorical representations 
of aspects of reality, which tend to concentrate on the essence of 
something while avoiding the detail. Chapanis (1961) has listed
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five of the chief advantages of models. They are that (a) 
they describe and help us to understand complex systems or events 
by replacing them with simpler and more familiar analogies; (b) 
they can help us to see new relationships; (c) they provide 
frame-works within which experiments are done; (d) they help us 
predict when experiments are impossible; and finally, (e) they 
amuse us. Another advantage lies in the potential of some models 
to provide pictorial visualization (Lachman 1$60), which helps to 
tie abstract notions to physical reality, thus making the ideas 
easier to handle.
In the psychology of art, the development of models would 
provide an important first step towards explanation and theory- 
building. The models would help to create order out of the chaos 
of empirical data that exists, and help re-structure the empirical 
data as a pre-requisite to developing more elaborate explanation. 
Models, however are not without their dangers. It is possible to 
be blinded by their 'mental dazzle' (Royce 1970) and, as a result, 
fail to see the shortcomings of a particular model on account of 
its concrete appeal and plausibility. There is also the related 
danger that the model may become reified, if it is forgotten that 
the model is only an analogy. Chapanis (I96I) has argued that models 
are too often not validated, but qualifies this by saying this is 
a criticism more of mode1-builders than models. However the point 
still holds. The dazzle, and illusion of instant comprehensibility 
may encourage model-builders and others to forget that models should 
be evaluated by the same rigid standards that would normally be 
applied to theories.
It is clear then that models must be used with great caution. 
However they do have a vital role to play particularly in a field 
like the psychology of art which is lacking in theory and explanatory 
devices. Both as explanatory aids in their own right and a stepping- 
stone to the development of theory, models have a vital role to play.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Approaches to the Psychology of Art
'Psychology should be pictured, 
not as a society of good men and 
true, harbouring the occasional 
malefactor, but rather, one in 
which everyone is searching for 
sense; in which differences are 
largely of temperament, tradition, 
allegiance and style; and in which 
transgression consists not so much 
in a clean break with professional 
ethics, as in an unusually high­
handed, extreme or seIf-deceptive 
attempt to promote one particular 
view of reality at the expense of 
all others'•
(Hudson; The Cult of the Pact, 
1972, p.125)
The broadest division of method and theory in the psychology 
of art can be seen in three major approaches to the area, viz, 
psycho-analysis. Gestalt psychology, and experimental psychology.
The founding fathers of these broad approaches to psychology were 
also pioneers in the psychology of art. Freud and Jung made many 
references to aesthetics and problems in art, though neither of 
them wrote a systematic treatise on the subject. This is also true 
of the two members of the Gestalt triumvirate who wrote on aesthetics, 
(viz. Koffka and Kohler). Only Fechner, the pioneer of experimental 
aesthetics, produced a large-scale work on the subject.
All three approaches have generated large amounts of research, 
theory, and interpretations. Today they survive as three rival 
camps with little communication between them except when one side 
sees fit to repudiate another. It is necessary to take a closer 
look at the three approaches in order to determine their respective 
merits and defects. In this way an integrated approach to the 
psychology of art may evolve.
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I Psycho-Analytical Approaches to the Psychology of Art
(a) Freud's writings on aesthetics
The word theory was deliberately avoided in the heading to 
this section since Freud did not in fact write a theory of 
aesthetics, and it is doubtful whether a complete system can be 
built out of his views, despite the many attempts to do so 
(cf, Spector 1972). Freud's basic thinking on the psycho-dynamics 
of art is most clearly set out in one passage of approximately 
400 words in his Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Freud 
1916-17). It is here that Freud explicitly states that it is the 
function of fantasy to give a degree of comfort and consolation to 
man in the constant struggle between the instinctual demands of 
the id, ever craving satisfaction, and the practical difficulties 
and obstacles of the outer world which obstruct satisfaction. 
Fantasies are a kind of relief mechanism, and have their origins 
in the unconscious* According to Freud, the artist has a peculiarly 
flexible repression mechanism which is not possessed by ordinary 
men. It enables the artist to transform these fantasies so that 
they become depersonalised, and thus detached from their obvious 
source in the Unconscious. By disguising and transforming his 
fantasies into the culturally accepted forms of art he is able to 
dispell his repressions. ' 'If he is able to accomplish all this he 
makes it possible for other people once more to derive consolation 
and alleviation from their own sources of pleasure in their own 
unconscious, which have become inaccessible to them; he earns their 
gratitude and admiration and he achieves through his fantasy what 
originally he had achieved only in his fantasy - honour, power and 
the love of women' (Freud I916-I7)»
In short, Freud is here saying that both the creation and 
appreciation of art is grounded in the satisfaction of unconscious 
impulses and wishes.. Freud did not systematically develop this
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notion, nor did he try to explain just how the artist achieved 
this transformation of his unconscious wishes. Freud was only 
interested in art as a further example of the process of sublimation. 
This is the major mechanism by which man escapes from the painfulness 
and frustration of reality into the world of fantasy, and finds a
path back again to reality in a way that is not so unpleasant.
In this way art functions as a substitute for instinct-gratification 
protecting men in the painful transition from the 'Pleasure Principle' 
to the 'Reality Principle' (Freud 1920), The sublimation of 
libidinal impulses to alternative gratifying activities underlies 
not only the origin of art but also of myth, religion, science 
and philosophy. In other words, the whole of civilisation is a 
product of sublimation, but it was in art, above all, that Freud 
saw the opportunity for the fulfillment in fantasy of wishes which 
in real life are frustrated either by external obstacles or by moral 
inhibitions.
Freud stresses the close relationship between the artist and 
the neurotic. If a man cannot sublimate his impulses, and these 
impulses cannot be satisfied in the real world, then he withdraws
into the fantasy world of neurosis. The artist is a special type
of person, who according to Freud 'has an introverted disposition 
and has not very far to goto become a neurotic'. The artist has 
the advantage of producing all the wish-fulfilling benefits of 
fantasy, whilst not losing complete contact with wish-denying 
reality, which is the fate of the neurotic,
Freud was most concerned with explaining the origins of art 
in order to illustrate his general theory of the mind. He was not 
at all interested in explaining formal aesthetic qualities. To 
Freud every work of art was a manifestation of the unconscious.
In the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud does not discuss art, 
though he does draw the analogy of the dreamer and the poet. In
56
this view art is like a public dream. The mechanisms which 
transform the latent content of the unconscious into the manifest 
content of the dream are the same as the mechanisms which enable 
the artist to express unconscious wishes in his art. Of these 
mechanisms, condensation, displacement, and symbolisation have 
become the stock-in-trade of all psycho-anlytic interpretations 
of art.'
Most of Freud's writing on art consisted of interpretive
2
analyses of individual artists, or particular works of art. In 
each case Freud's approach was 'biographical' in that he examined 
what was known about the life-history of the artist. By explaining 
this in psycho-analytic terms Freud was also explaining the work 
of the artist. For instance,. Freud argued that Leonardo's problems 
as an adult, viz. his incapacity for even homosexual love, his 
indifference to his artistic productions, his ultimate turning away 
from the life of the artist to that of the scientist - could be 
traced to his childhood experiences (Freud 1910).
It is interesting that Freud did not interpret the work of 
any living artist. This makes the testing of his interpretation 
all the more difficult, for as Farrell (1965) has argued, Freud is 
merely applying the methods of psycho-analysing a living patient to
Ï
Condensation is the mechanism by which one idea in the manifest 
dream can stand for a great many associations which in turn lead 
to quite separate meanings in the latent content. Displacement 
occurs when the emotional charge is separated from its real object 
or content, and attached to an entirely different one. Symbolisation 
is the transformation of latent content by substitution of objects 
or ideas which are linked to the original in some way (e.g. through 
function, appearance, association, etc.). The important notion of 
the Freudian symbol has been criticised by Bertanffy (19^5) who 
argues that they are not really symbols at all. As they can have 
either a one-to-anything relationship or an anything-to-one 
relationship they have no more significance that free-playing 
association. Fickford (I968, 1970) has analysed the semantic content 
of paintings as though they were dreams, and provides examples of 
displacement, symbolisation, condensation, and secondary elaboration, 
and restitution and abstraction.
2
Notable among these are the famous studies of Leonardo da Vinci.
57
the analysis of the life of a dead artist. There is no way of 
checking the effectiveness of the analysis. The interpretation is 
little more than an 'explanatory narrative which fits together the 
knovm facts about the artist, and removes the inconsistencies'. 
Farrell goes on to argue that an explanation of this type has no 
logical necessity, and therefore does not preclude the possibility 
of alternative explanations. This is a particularly important 
point as the greater proportion of psycho-analytic writing on art 
consists of this type of interpretation.
It has already been noted that Freud's emphasis on the content 
of art, and his neglect of aesthetic qualities, is due largely to 
the fact that art was used by Freud to illustrate his general theory, 
of the mind. However, the emphasis on content also results from 
Freud's own view of aesthetics. Spector (1972) has given a 
detailed account of Freud's tastes in art and stresses that Freud 
was influenced by the theories of Goethe and Lessing. This is the 
view that what is important in art is the spiritual value of the 
depicted content, and not its formal qualities. Marcuse (1958) has 
argued that Freud's view on art were a product of the time in which 
he lived. He speculates that if Freud had grown to manhood after 
1914, *Ke would have seen that the make-believe reality of art is 
capable of using much that is unaltered, unconcealed, and not at 
all mild and gentle'. Marcuse was referring to the harsh realism 
of German expressionist painting (e.g. Otto Dix, George Grosz,
Max Beckman)^ after the first World War. This argument can be taken 
further in two ways. First, Freud's notion of the sublimated content 
of art is only applicable where there is semantic content. A great 
part of world art is abstract or semi-abstract, e.g. much Greek
(continued)
(Freud I91O) and Michelangelo's sculpture 'Moses' (Freud 1914), 
and four studies in literature (Wilhelm Jensen 1837-1911» Goethe, 
Dostoyevski, Shakespeare).
Gee H. Read; A Concise History of Modern Fainting (1959)
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ornament, Islamic art. Medieval illuminated manuscripts (see 
Plate I) or even modern abstract art. At the time Freud was 
writing on art the radical transformations of modern twentieth 
century art were securing all round him. It appears that Freud 
was very hostile to the modern art of his day, and paid no 
attention to it at all (Spector 1972). Had he done so, he might 
have had to reformulate his thinking on art.
Another respect in which Freud's sublimation theory of the 
content of art fails is in its failure to explain the existence of 
erotic art. Two recent books on eroticism in art (Lucie-Smith 
1972; Ivahman 1972) clearly show that explicitly erotic scenes have 
been depicted in almost all periods of art, and in almost all 
cultures even though it may not always have been the 'official' art 
of the time. Much primitive art, and a great deal of Hindu, as well 
as contemporary, art is explicitly sexual in content. In addition 
many of the great masters of the past have indulged in the 
depiction of erotic scenes, though they are not generally well 
known (Lucie-Smith 1972). Freud's theory of sublimation in art 
could never have been universally true, and is certainly not true 
today. There is still however the possibility that for some 
painters and some observers sublimation may play a role in 
determining their production or appreciation of certain works.
Many writers have sought, in vain, to find in Freud's writings 
the skeleton of a more formal theory to correspond to the ego- 
psychology that he developed in contrast to the id-psychology to 
which the theory of sublimation belongs (Weiss 1947, Rieff I960,
Waelder I965, Spector 1972). Spector (1972) has pointed out that 
as early as 1913 Freud had recommended his book on jokes (Freud 
1905) for its relevance to aesthetic problems. This was not 
actually taken up in detail until Weiss (1947) used it to propound 
a formula for aesthetic perception. Freud had characterised wit, 
comedy, and humour as the economy of the expenditure of psychic
59
energy in inhibition, thinking and feeling respectively. Weiss 
simply extended this idea; pleasure in formal aesthetic qualities 
derives from the economy of expenditure of psychic energy in 
perception. Both Rieff (196O) and Spector (1972) find in scattered 
remarks, and casual references to art the grounds for their 
respective constructions of Freud’s later ego-theory of art.
Rieff lays stress on the notions of emotional catharsis and 
psychic economy,and Spector emphasises ideational processes and 
the theory of empathy. These interpretations are elaborative con­
structions that go well beyond what Freud actually said.
Another problem in Freud’s theory of art is that he does not 
explain how the work of art comes to have any value for the 
observer. Freud suggests that the symbolic content of the work 
of art grants emotional release to the observer ’and an enrichment 
that would not be possible without the relaxation of inhibition by 
aesthetic means’ (Fraiberg 1958). In this sense form is no more 
than dressing for the unconscious content. Gombrich (l9o5b) 
has tried to define in more detail the exact nature of symbols in 
art. He describes them as 'sensible analogues to higher meanings' 
which constitute the essence of art. Gombrich argues that it is 
often impossible to separate the content of the symbol from its 
manner of presentation (Gombrich I966). This occurs in such a 
way that only those ideas that can be adjusted to the reality of 
formal, structure become 'communicable', and their value to others 
rests at least as much in their formal structure as in the idea'.
In trying to show that psycho-analysis is relevant to form, Gombrich 
leaves Freud's views far behind.
■ Psycho-analytic theory has often been criticised for its 
vagueness, and poor definition of concepts, and the general lack 
of empirical support (Eysenck 1972e). In his extensive review of 
empirical tests of Freudian ideas and concepts Kline (1972) included
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a section on the psychology of art. He argues that the sublimation 
theory is scientifically testable, though no empirical tests have 
so far been carried out. This is not altogether true for a number 
of experimental studies have been carried out which have investigated 
psycho-analytic ideas in relation to art. For instance. Child and 
his associates (Child I965; Cooperman and Child I968, 1$69; Child 
Cooperman and V/olowitz 1969^ have found significant correlations 
between measures of psychoanalytic personality traits and a test of 
aesthetic judgement. Machotka and Waite (1968) have shown that the 
more sexually arousing the depiction in art of a female nude, the 
more it must be distorted to be considered aesthetically pleasing.
It must be admitted however that these studies do not provide 
rigo/rous tests of Freud's ideas and that Freud's basic ideas have 
not yet been tested.
I think it can be agreed that the Freudian theory of art is
not a scientific theory in the Fopperian sense of that word, but
that is not to share Eysenck's opinion that it is therefore of no
value. Débité the fact that the theory rests on the validity
2
of Psycho-analytic theory as a whole , with its deterministic view 
of man, the Freudian approach to art does have some distinct 
advantages. First it does not shrink from that 'consonance and 
dissonance of multiple meanings that interlock in the structure of 
artistic meanings' (Gombrich I963). Secondly, the method rests on
1See Chapter seven of this thesis for details.
2
According to Eachman (1971) empirical support for psychoanalytic 
theory is very poor, but according to Kline (1972) it is reasonably 
good. It should be noted, however, that Rachman is mainly concerned 
with the effectiveness, or rather the ineffectiveness, of psycho­
therapy which he regards as the main source of proof thatpsycho- 
analytic theory is valid. By contrast, Kline has gathered together 
and evaluated almost all the experimental tests of Freud's ideas, 
over a very wide range of topics. There can be no doubt that 
interpretation of these studies is influenced by prior belief as 
Kline so ably expressed in his reply to Eysenck's criticism of his 
work (Eysenck 1972e).
61
direct contact with, and experience of, art. Thirdly, it has 
involved the interpretation and explanation of individual works of 
art. This is in stark contrast to experimental aesthetics which 
is rarely directly concerned with works of art, and is rarely applied 
to help analyse and understand a particular work. As Spector (1972) 
has put it, psycho-analytic interpretations of works of art are 
'sometimes revealing, sometimes wildly off the point, but frequently 
point the way to new interpretations of considerable interest'.
There is no reason why empirical tests cannot be made to substantiate 
a given interpretation. This would be necessary to stem the tide 
of ad hoc, diverse psycho-analytic interpretations.
(b) The Jungian Approach to Art
In the broadest sense Jung's 'Analytical' psychology is 
trans-personalistic, This is because, in Jung's view, the factors 
that form and influence an individual's personality lie outside 
his personal life-history. This is in opposition to the prevailing 
Freudian view that the determinants of a person's personality are 
to be found mainly in his personal life-history, particularly in 
the first five years of his life. According to Jung, these influences 
which lie outside the individual person are located in the Collective 
Unconcious. This is unlike Freud's notion of the personal Unconcious, 
for it 'represents deposits of man's typical reactions since 
primordial times to universal situations such as fear, danger, the 
struggle against superior power, relations between the sexes, 
relations between child and parent, hate, love, birth, darkness'.
(Jung 1923). The contents of the Collective Unconcious result from 
'inherited possibilities of psychical functioning in general'. The 
Unconcious functions to supply typical reactions, arising from the 
experience of mankind consonant with the laws and necessities of 
man's inner life.
An extremely important concept developed by Jung which has 
direct relevance to a psychology of art is the arche-tyjp^ . • As these
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correspond to the typical and fundamental experiences incurred by 
man since primordial times they form the constituent elements of 
'the Collective Unconscious. They are themselves non-perceptible 
and are never explictly manifest. Jung describes them as 'instinctive*, 
or psychologically necessary reactions to certain situations.
With their inborn propensities to react in a certain way they 
augment Consciousness, and lead to modes of behaviour that are 
psychologically necessary', (Jung 1919). The symbolic images of 
art represent extremely powerful manifestations of archestype s.
Each arche-type has an invariable nucleus of meaning that is never 
fully present in the manifest arche-type. As such its meaning is 
metaphoric and can never be fully explained (see Jaffe 1964).
Art is not the only source of archetypal! images. Jung 
devoted much of his life to the e>zploration of arche typal. symbols 
in myths, fairy-tales, religions, and mysteries. He did not discuss 
particular artists or particular works of art. His only paper on 
an artist was a short analysis of Picasso's creativity (Jung 1932) 
which had more to do with Jungian therapy than Picasso's work.
Jung's interest in art did not arise out of an interest in aesthetics 
but rather his concern with the psychology of the pictorial 
representation of psychic processes. This led to Jung's interest 
in symbols, which he saw as representations of libidinal energy 
canalised into new forms. Jung stresses that what makes something 
a symbol depends on the attitude of the consciousness which 
contemplates it. The same object can be a sign for one man and a 
symbol for another depending on whether he regards it as a concrete 
phenomenon or a symbol of human life.
In a paper on Analytic Psychology and Poetry (1925) Jung 
spells out the function of art. 'He who speaks in primordial 
(arche-typalL) images speaks with a thousand voices. He enthra/ls 
and overpowers, while at the same time he lifts the idea he is 
trying to express out of the occasional and transitory into the
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realm of the ever-enduring. He transmutes our personal destiny 
in the destiny of mankind, thereby involving in us all those 
beneficial forces that have always enabled mankind to find a refuge 
from every peril and outlive the longest night'. Jung is obviously 
impressed by the enormous importance of art in our lives, but feels 
that it does not have this effect solely because of its aesthetic 
qualities. It is due mainly to the comfort to be derived from the 
ability of artists to make arche-typal content available to us 
(Jung 1951). Jung tells us that in considering pictures containing 
arche-typal symbols we should think not of art but of something more 
and other than mere art, viz. the living effect of the arche-type.
Jung asserts that it makes no difference whether such a picture is 
good or bad from an artistic point of view. The fixation of a 
symbol is a kind of objectivisation; it lends form to what is 
otherwise indeterminate and inexpressible, and enables one up to 
a certain point to penetrate to its true meaning and to understand 
it. By drawing or painting it, and by implication contemplating 
it, the individual can assimilate it into his own consciousness.
(Jaffe 1964).
I have already noted that Jung did not engage in interpretive
analyses of artists or works of art. However, followers of Jung
have not hesitated to 'hunt the archetype ' with the same relish 
with which Freudians (e.g. Wight 1946) seek symbols of male and
female genitalia in works of art. Neumann has undertaken a detailed 
Jungian interpretation of the work of Henry Moore (1959a) and also 
of the work of Leonardo da Vinci (1959b). (The latter forms an 
interesting contrast with Freud's own interpretation of Leonardo 
(Freud 1910)), It has often been said of psycho-therapy that Jungian 
analysts always seem to get Jungian patients and Freudians always 
get Freudian patients. The same effect seems to influence their 
respective interpretations of art.
'I
The resemblance of this phrase to 'Hunting the Snark' (Lewis Carroll) 
was accidental but appropriate.
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Apart from interpretations of art there have been no 
experimental attempts to test Jung's theory of arche-typal symbols 
in art. It would appear to be very difficult to test these 
ideas. However, Head (1943) has described an informal experiment 
in which he asked school children to relax, as though falling 
asleep and to paint the images that appeared to them. The 
children produced a startling number of mandala-like images (See 
Jacobi 1968, pp 138-141) (See Fig. 3-1) which Read saw as an 
empirical confirmation of the existence of the Collective 
Unconscious. Read's examination of the mandala symbols produced 
by the children (See Fig. 3-2) also led him to confirm Jung's claim 
that the symbolic manifestation of the arche-type is naturally 
aesthetic in form and quality. This experiment is full of loop­
holes and would not satisfy the criteria of scientific acceptability 
even as laid down in this thesis. However, it would not be 
difficult to check this finding under more controlled conditions.
Fig. 3-1. An oriental 
mandala, from Jacobi (i960)
Fig. 3-2. A mind-picture from 
Read's experiment with children 
(Read 1943).
The children also produced abstract paintings of astonishing 
sophistication. See Read (1943), plates 22-25, for similar examples.
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In Psychological Types (1923) Jung described the four functions
of the Conscious which are present in every individual viz., thinking
intuition, feeling and sensation. They represent four modes of
apprehending and assimilating psychic data regardless of content,
one of which tends to be dominant in each individual. In addition
each individual has a general attitude, viz., extraversion or
introversion, which when combined with the four functions makes
eight personality types. The extraversion-introversion dimensions
and its relation to aesthetic reactions has attracted much attention
1
among experimental aestheticians. Jung explains how one's general 
attitude, or habitual manner of reacting to outer or inner experiences 
is reflected in art. He sees the creative process as activating the 
eternal symbols of mankind which lie dormant in the Unconscious, 
and shaping and elaborating them to produce a finished work of art. 
Extraverted art springs from the artists remoulding of outward 
experience, whereas introverted art is created when the artist is 
overwhelmed by the inner contents of the psyche
The relation of Jung's types to art has been systematically 
developed by Bead in Education Through Art (19^3)* He argues 
that there are eight distinctive modes of aesthetic expression which 
correspond to Jung's eight modes of psychic expression. For example 
he sees that a form of Thinking Extravert art is modern academism, 
whilst Thinking Introvert art is seen in Impressionism. Feeling 
Introvert art can be seen in abstract expressionism (e.g. Jackson 
Pollock, Mark Tobey), and Expressive Extravert art is seen in 
caricature. This is a stimulating and challenging application of 
Jung's ideas to the history of art which could be systematically
1
These studies will be discussed in detail in Chapter seven of 
this thesis.
2
This corresponds closely to Lowenfeld's (1952) 'visual' and 'haptic* 
types. For a discussion of Lowenfeld's work and the art of the 
blind, see Bickford (1972 ch.3).
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tested* Similar attempts to analyse artistic style in Jungian 
terms have been made by Neumann (1959a) and Abell(1952). These 
ideas could also be empirically tested, though it would be hard 
to test Bead's additional claim that all the diversity of art from 
prehistoric art down to the present can be explained, and to a 
large degree ordered,by reference to corresponding psychological 
types.
Another Jungian idea that has relevance to the psychology of 
art was described in 'On Psychic Energy' (1948), viz. progression 
and regression in the movement of psychic energy. Progression 
consists in a continuous and unobstructed adaptation to the conscious 
demands of life. This includes the differentiation of 'attitude' 
and 'function' types, which is rooted in the need for adaptation 
to the outside world. By contrast regression in the movement of 
psychic energy is caused by a failure of conscious adaptation. The 
intensification of the unconscious which results in a regression, 
provokes a one-sided accumulation of energy. This in turn causes 
the contents of the Unconscious to rise to the surface. Regression 
is thus rooted in the need for adaptation to the inner world, 
and Jung stresses that although it may be a symptom of disturbance, 
it can also be a way to restore balance and even broaden the psyche. 
Regression has particular relevance to art as it is the means by 
which images (i.e. specific manifestations of psychic energy 
or arche-types)are activated and raised from the Unconscious so 
that the psychic processes can be channelled in a progressive 
direction. This idea was taken up by Kris (1953) who developed 
the notion of 'regression in the service of the ego' which is 
discussed below.
For both Jung and Freud the role of the Unconscious is of 
critical importance to art. Although both men were most concerned 
with artistic creativity their ideas are relevant to the perception 
of art. Whereas Freud saw art as a means to the satisfaction of 
libidinal desires in the individual, Jung saw art in transpersonal
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terras, having relevance to mankind as a whole. For both Freud and 
Jung art is not a luxury. It is an important and essential means 
by which adaptation to the outside world is achieved. Art serves 
the needs of the Unconscious. To this effect the content of art 
is of supreme importance, and its formal of aesthetic qualities 
are of secondary importance.
(c) Other Psychoanalytic writers on art: Rank, Kris, Waelder
and Ehrenzweig
There have been many developments of the original ideas of 
Freud and Jung, each one usually starting as a point of disagreement 
and often developing into a whole brand of psycho-analytic thinking 
far from the orthodox theory (Brown I96I). In the field of 
aesthetics there have been many developments of, and deviations 
from, Freud's original ideas. This section will concentrate on 
four of them.
(i) Rank (1932) was disatisfied with Freud's mechanistic 
interpretation of art as no more than the sublimation of repressed 
libidinal wishes. He saw the real problem as explaining why the 
artist produces the form he does, for Freud could not explain why 
some artists are geniuses and some are mere hacks as the same 
sublimatory process underlies all art. As both psycho-analyst 
and art-historian. Rank re-interprets the relation between art 
and the artist. He developed important explanatory concepts such 
as the notion of a collective cultural factor which places the 
artist in the social and cultural setting which has an impact on 
his art. Rank argues that the artist's creative impulse has 
something positively anti-sexual in its yearning for independence 
of organic conditions. This is the very opposite of Freud's view. 
The artist is seen as both an individual and as a social being.
This is the fundamental dualism of all life in which artistic 
creativity (and the creative impulse generally) originate. Rank 
stresses the free creative and self-representative character of all
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art, and its tendency to liberate from the biological. He also 
stresses its self-justification and immortalising urge, its need 
of and yet resistance to the cultural age, and the conflicts that 
result from being an artist. Rank’s contribution is significant 
in that he has tried to explain problems in art and the history 
of art, and has moved away from Freud's oversimplified notion of 
art.
(ii) Ernst Kris, in Psycho-Analytic Explorations in Art 
(1953), has attempted to reconcile and integrate Freud's 
biographical determinism with Jung's hereditary collective 
determinism. In this way he is able to interpret not only 
specific works of art or specific artists but whole traditions 
and styles in art. Like Rank he analyses the complex interaction 
between the personality of the artist, his chosen media and 
'those historical conditions which determine the modes of expression 
and the problems to be solved'. The main contribution of Kris 
(1933) lies in the notion of 'regression in the service of the 
ego'. This is the notion that the creation and enjoyment of art 
involves in part a controlled regression from more mature forms of 
cognitive activity to less mature ones deep in the Unconscious.
All the while the ego remains intact with reality and in command of 
the individual which is what differentiates this kind of regression 
from that of the neurotic. V.’ith the ego still in command a 
positive use of the less mature functions can be made in the 
interest of the more mature ones. A partial confirmation of this 
notion has recently been revealed by Child (I963) who found a low 
positive but significant correlation between a specially devised 
measure of 'regression in the service of the ego' and a measure 
of aesthetic judgement. This formed only a small part of a much 
larger study; there is good reason for exploring this notion
See Gombrich (1950) for a succinct account of these unfolding 
conditions and problems.
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systematically and in more detail. In much the same way, Kris's 
and Rank's interpretations of the history of art could be tested 
empirically, at least in terms of contemporary reactions to the 
various periods and styles of art.
(iii) The psycho-analytic interpretation of art by Waelder 
(1965) also grew out of a disatisfaction with the limitations of 
Freud's theory of sublimation as the essential process in art.
V/aelder argues that Freud's main contribution was the revelation
that 'there is a conscious and an unconscious reaction to art; 
the former is due to its aesthetic qualities, the latter to its 
more or less hidden content, and aesthetic merit makes it possible 
for otherwise inadmissable content to pass'. V/aelder argues that 
Freud's theory of sublimation in art corresponds to Freud's early
writings on Psycho-analysis. He did not develop an ego-approach
to correspond to the development of his 'id-psychology' to which he 
paid great attention in the latter part of his life. That Freud 
did not devote even one paragraph to an ego-approach to aesthetics 
suggests perhaps that he did not intend to develop his sublimation 
theory. V/aelder argues that Freud lacked the time, so he has 
developed his own ego- and super-ego approaches to art* V/hilst 
characterising the id aspect of art as a means of obtaining wish- 
fulfillment and the satisfaction of fantasy, Waelder describes the 
eog-aspect as the striving for perfection and economy of means 
in the achievement of the 'id' objectives. This is virtually the 
same as the view expressed by V/eiss (1947), though V/aelder also 
stresses the role of the ego as a problem-solving agent. Besides 
striving for economy of means the ego also derives pleasure from 
the solution of a problem that had seemed impossible, and also 
from the quality or fittingness of the solution. V/aelder claims 
that this pleasure derives from 'the victory of mind over brute 
forces'. The super-ego approach developed by V/aelder is only 
weakly psycho-analytic. It is based on a self-consciousness, or a 
self-transcendence of the self in the face of fate or reality through
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the medium of art,
(iv) Perhaps the most detailed attempt to explain the 
unconscious roots of artistic form can befound in the writings 
of Ehrenzweig (1962, 1967). He rejects the attempt by Weiss 
(1947), V/aelder (1965) and others to explain artistic form on the 
model provided by Freud's theory of jokes (Freud I905). Ehrenzweig 
argues that jokes have only a superficial structure, but works of 
art have, in addition, an unconscious structure. This deep 
structure cannot be seen by means of ordinary day-to-day perception 
but requires what Ehrenzweig calls 'undifferentiated perception' 
which is dependent on unconscious scanning of the work of art.
In undifferentiated perception the Gestalt laws of organisation 
do not apply and there is no differentiation into figure and ground. 
Equal attention is given to all that is presented in the visual 
field. This type of perception is an unconscious process. 
Undifferentiated perception is primary in every individual but 
the need for biological adaptation causes it to be replaced by 
differentiated perception in which 'an interest in pattern is 
suppressed, in the interests of visual efficiency in the scanning' 
of the outside world. This argument parallels in many respects 
the evolution of the geometric-technical mode of (adult) perception 
from the physiognomic mode which characterises the perception of 
children and primitive peoples (V/erner 1956). Ehrenzweig rejects 
the orthodox psychoanalytic view that the Unconscious is chaotic 
and unstructured. He argues that it is only in terms of conscious 
analytical perception that it is seen as such. The importance of 
unconscious perception for art is summed up in the statement that 
there are in the work of art 'complex relationships that refuse to 
be caught in the stable and neat grid of common-sense visualisation. 
Art forms may arise from an undifferentiated matrix underlying all 
conscious imagery and image-making, where all the nonsensical 
contradictions and distortions of the primary process are resolved'. 
This view represents a marked departure from orthodox Freudian theory,
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Ehrenzv;eig's approach is interesting in that his starting- 
point is psycho-analytic theory, though he sees it as in need of 
revision. The evidence he draws together for his argument come 
from a variety of sources, viz. anecdote, artists introspections, 
examination of paintings, the studies of blind people who recover 
their sight, and experimental studies in perception. However it 
is difficult to see exactly what is meant by undifferentiated 
perception. Ideally it would be helpful to test empirically 
whether such a process exists at all and if it does, to determine 
its characteristics. Kline (1972) has argued that as it is a 
process that exists in the Unconscious it is not amenable to 
scientific testing. However, Ehrenzweig's notion of undifferentiated 
perception is similar to the concept of 'pre-attention' developed 
by Neisser (1964, 1967). The idea has been speculatively applied 
to aesthetic perception by Hochberg (1972). Similar ideas on 
focussing attention to ground and texture rather than figurai 
qualities have also been developed by Gardner (1972b). The notion 
could be defined in information-processing terms and subjected to 
empirical test, without having to stipulate the existence of an 
Unconscious.
Ehrenzweig is even more vague on aesthetic experience per se.
He develops a notion of 'oceanic feeling' not dissimilar to that 
discussed by Freud. Even so 'Ehrenzweig's interpretation is a 
stimulating one, and it should not be rejected out of hand because 
we lack the necessary techniques for testing it. His utilisation 
of a wide variety of information sources should be encouraged in 
the psychology of art. Perhaps the chief value of 'Ehrenzweig's 
theory is that it goes some way toward improving the acceptability 
of psycho-analytic theory to a psychology of art, and stands as 
an antidote to the over-simplified conceptions of psycho-analytic 
theory that are held by many experimental aestheticians.
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Psycho-analytic Approaches Discussed
This exposition oi the major psycho-analytic approaches to 
art has been fairly extensive. This is because of the strong 
association between Freud's own sublimation theory and all 
psycho-analytic theory of art. For example, Berlyne (1972a) has 
discussed ^reud's sublimetion theory as though it was representative 
of all psycho-analytic writing on art. Berlyne seems to imply that 
if Freud's theory is rejected then the rest is as well. In 
addition experimental aestheticians (particularly the tough-minded 
variety) tend to ignore or are totally unaware of post-Freudian 
psycho-analytic writing on art. In constructing an empirical 
psychology of art it is better to do so within a modified empirical 
frame-work, that is open to a variety of different influences, so 
that psycho-analytic concepts would be considered not only relevant 
but also worthy of investigation. Irvin Child and Machotka are 
currently the only empirical psychologists who are prepared to 
attempt empirical tests of psycho-analytic ideas on art but this 
is very small compared to the potential that exists.
The chief problem with psycho-analytic theories centres round 
the question of their scientific status. It has been argued that 
Psycho-analysis is a quasi-scientific psychology which gets away 
with a concept of truthfulness, the opposite of which is not a 
falsehood but another alternative 'truth' (Medawar 19o9). Medawar 
sees it as a mythical structure which makes sense and is believable 
regardless of whether it is true or not. This kind of functional 
truth belongs to the world of imaginative literature, but not to 
science. Psycho-analytic theory lies at the extreme end of the 
humanistic type of psychology discussed in the previous chapter.
For example, art is not scientifically investigated by means of 
analogues in laboratories, but as part and parcel of the human 
condition which is seen as the 'ever-existing possibility of 
suffering, the constant need for morally responsible decisions in
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situations of confusing complexity, and the possibility of extreme 
situations that * try mens souls*', (Wa elder I963). Methods of 
analysis employed witain this frame-work do not necessarily guarantee 
greater insight and truth, compared to scientific methods in the 
narrow sense. /.hat is needed is the empirical checking of the 
ideas by suitable methods. It might be said that psycho-analytic 
writers are high on imagination but low critically, whereas 
experimental aestheticians are, on the whole, lov/ on imagination 
and low on self-criticism, particularly in relation to art.
The scientific status of psycho-analytic theory in general 
has been discussed by Nagel (1959), Napaport (196O), Popper (I963), 
Berlyne (1971), Eysenck (I972e) and many others. The criticisms 
are well known. A general point is that the terms and concepts 
employed are ambiguous, often metaphorical, low in operationism, 
and there are no rules of correspondence for linking the concepts 
to reality. It is also argued that psycho-analytic theory does not 
lead to clear-cut predictions, and it is immune to empirical 
refutation. Finally it is argued, particularly by Eysenck (I961) 
and Nachman (1971) that psycho-therapy, which is grounded in psycho­
analytic theory, has not been proven to work.
This is a complex issue. Much of the criticism stems directly 
from an adherence to the natural science model of psychology which 
was rejected in chapter two. However there is really no need to 
get bogged down by discussions of the scientific status of psycho­
analysis for, regardless of the conclusions, it is more important 
that the psychology of art is exposed to the ideas and concepts that 
psychoanalysis has to offer. So long as they are defined or
redefined in an acceptable way, the ideas can be tested, regardless
1of the scientific status of the discipline that gave rise to them,
^For example, Myers (1962) has constructed a test to measure 
Jungian personality types, and Child (l9o5) devised his own measure 
of Kris's notion of 'regression in the service of the ego'
74
It is most important that the psychology of art does not remain 
ignorant or intolerant of this very fertile source of ideas.
An important feature of the psycho-analytic approach to art
is the interpretative strategy. This involves the analysis of
unique works of art in a way that is not possible by the experimental
approach because its emphasis is on finding general laws rather
than unique insights to specific works of art. There is however
a draw-back to the use of the interpretive strategy as there is
no external check on the correctness of the interpretation. The
lack of self-evaluation has led to a prolific outpouring of
interpretive studies, particularly of painters who lend themselves
well to Freudian and Jungian 'symbol spotting', viz. Bosch,
Grünewald, Goya, Leonardo, the Surrealists. The most common symbols
are of male and female genitalia, closely followed by the castration 
1
complex. Painters like Corot or Constable or Cezanne are hardly 
if ever subjected to interpretation. There is a distinct likelihood 
that in the eyes of the average experimental aesthetician it is 
better to reject such a reckless animal outright than to try to 
tame and assimilate it. The vast majority of papers published in 
the psychology of art have been psycho-analytic interpretations of 
this type; experimental studies are few by comparison. However, it 
would seem wasteful to discount such effort. Perhaps Farrell's (1963) 
compromise is the best answer when he suggests that the psycho-analytic 
interpretation is a 'narrative' that can provide insight, but no 
guarantee of its correctness. However, the correctness of the 
interpretation may be checked by empirical means outside the frame­
work of the particular brand of psycho-analytic theory that 
generated it. One possible technique would be to compare interpretations
Confining himself to contemporary art, Kahman (1972) has given 
examples of all the sexual symbols Freud listed in his Introductory 
Lectures (1932). These include keys, rooms, flowers, rings, guns, 
bottles, wood, hats, coats, ties, machinery, landscapes and teeth. 
In much the same way the strangest things become arche-types 
(cf. Jaffe 1964).
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given by different psycho-analysts (of both the same and different 
schools) under standard conditions. In this way a measure of 
consensus between and within schools of thought could be obtained.
In conclusion, the psycho-analytic approach to art is 
important in that it deals directly with art and not with 
artificial laboratory analogues. It also draws attention to what 
Gombrich (19^5^) has called 'the consonance and dissonance of 
the multiple meanings that interlink in the structure of artistic 
meaning'. It is a useful and legitimate approach within a 
psychology of art, particularly if it is seen as an important 
source of ideas and hypotheses that can be empirically tested.
In view of this, the debate concerning the scientific acceptability 
of psycho-analytic theory is irrelevant. Finally the interpretive 
strategy is considered a necessary technique especially if it is 
tied to empirical checks. The rich imagination of the psycho­
analytic approach must not be rejected, though it should be tamed.
The Gestalt Approach
Neither Kohler nor Koffka wrote a systematic treatise on 
art, though both men made many references to aesthetics in their 
writings, especially in Principles of Gestalt Psychology 
(Kofflia 1955)» and Kohler's The Place 01 Value in a V.'orld of Facts 
(1958). In addition Koffka (19^0) analysed some of the problems 
for a psychology of art in which he elaborated and developed some 
of the ideas referred to but not developed in the earlier works.
The impact of Gestalt psychology on psychology in general 
has been enormous, despite the fact that the Gestalt psychologists 
never developed a formal theory of perception (Allport 19G2).
Their chief contribution consisted in the formulation of a new way 
of looking at the facts of perception. The approach developed as 
a reaction against the molecular approaches of Introspectionism
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and Behaviourism, by laying emphasis on higher-order stimulus 
characteristics, instead of the separate elements that made up 
the whole. The famous dictum that 'the whole is different from
' I
the sum of the parts' is the hallmark of the Gestalt approach. 
Emphasis was placed on the configurations (the Gestalten) of 
behaviour and consciousness which cannot be equated with the sum 
of so many sensations of reflexes. Kohler used a tune as an 
example of a 'whole' whose structure cannot be explained either 
by the qualities of its single notes or by the relations between 
them. Such an approach appeared to have ready application to 
the problems of art.
Among the many contributions of Gestalt psychology only those 
aspects that are relevant to the psychology of art will be 
discussed here. The better-known examples of 'Gestalt' qualities 
are expressed in the Gestalt laws of perception (for examples 
see byburn, Fickford and Hirst 1964). Koffka (1935) formulated 
three basic laws of primitive organisation which characterised 
the psychological field, viz. (a) the psychological field will 
always divide into figure and ground; (b)configurations always 
take the best possible form that conditions will allow, and (c) 
configurations are isomorphic to stimulus patterns. Wertheimer 
(1923) demonstrated with abstract geometric patterns how proximity, 
similarity, continuity, common fate, and closure are the organising 
features of perception.^
'^Fratt (1969) reminds us that Kohler did not say ' the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts' as is commonly believed.
^Nesearch on the psychology of perception has tended to concentrate 
on artificial molecular stimuli. It is strange that objects, pictures 
and works of art have not been used as stimuli as these have greater 
ecological validity (Gibson 1966a). Recently, Fischer (196?) has 
presented examples of reversible figure-ground relationship which 
he has discovered in paintings. lie recommends them as stimuli in 
experimental research.
^This paper can be found in Ellis ( 194?)#
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Arnheim (1943) was perhaps the first to apply these Iws to 
the study of works of art. He claimed that 'the artist by 
organising sensory facts according to the laws of Pragnanz, unity, 
segregation and balance, reveals harmony and order or stigmatises 
discord and disorder'. Arnheim argues that our perceptual mechanism 
strives towards balence and unity in order to assimilate stimuli 
within its own balenced and unified structure. The artists' 
striving for balence is seen as just one aspect of a universal 
tendency towards order in nature. In this view can be seen the 
almost metaphysical assumptions made by the Gestaltists about the 
nature of the universe and the place of psychology in it (see 
Kohler 1938). This is exemplified in the notion of isomorphism 
(i.e. the identity of form between physical and psychological 
processes) which provides the explanatory basis of the gestalt 
theory of expression, whereas Arnheim (1943) discussed the general 
significance of Gestalt ideas in their application to aesthetics, 
other writers have applied them directly to the interpretation of 
specific works of art. For instance Pepper (1949) has presented 
working examples of figure-ground and positive-negative space 
relationships, and the operation of sensory grouping, closure and 
sequence principles in actual paintings and sculptures. More 
recently Arnheim has used Gestalt principles as the basis for his 
influential book. Art and Visual Perception (1934)..
A feature of the Gestalt approach to the psychology of art is 
that it attempted to provide a basis for distinguishing between 
good and bad works of art. The basic premise underlying this 
distinction is that there is a sense in which all perception is 
essentially artistic (Koffka 1940). By this Koffka meant that 
the perception of art is not different in kind from perception in 
general, and is therefore bound by the same laws of perception that 
apply to the perception of ordinary objects. Koffka argues for 
the identity of the work of art and the perfect Gestalt, by 
claiming that nothing in the work of art can be changed without
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altering its beauty,"* The Law of Pragnanz states that in day-to- 
day perception the perceptual system imposes as much order as 
possible on the physical stimulation. The work of art is 
specifically made with the idea of being a good Gestalt, and 
thus does not possess the limitations of ordinary perception.
In 1935 Koffka listed the main characteristics of the good 
gestalt as regularity, simplicity and symmetry. Arnheim did not 
however subscribe to the equation of good Gestalt and good art 
for he stressed the importance of dynamic tension within the 
perceptual field as an important aesthetic quality (Arnheim 1954,
1958). Perhaps this change of opinion also reflects a change in 
the climate of artistic opinion in the intervening period.
I/e have seen that the notion of good Gestalt was used by the 
early gestalt psychologists as a criterion of good art. This 
readiness to face up to problems of value is a distinctive feature 
of Gestalt psychology. As Kohler (1938) argued, questions of 
value constitute some of the facts which science should investigate.
There are two major disadvantages to the notion of 'good form* 
as the criterion of good art which stem directly from weaknesses 
within the Gestalt approach itself. First of all the idea of 
good Gestalt is very vague, and not easy to specify. The vagueness 
of the concept of 'good form' led Rawlins (1939) to attempt a 
more specific formulation. He presented the formula, E = Ec + Ei + Ef, 
in which the total energy in a system (E), was the sum of the 
creative energy in the artist (Ec), the intrinsic energy in the 
system (Ei), and the free energy (Ef) that remains in the completed 
work. In this view the amount of Ef in great art is equal to zero.
This has been experimentally investigated by Pronko et al (I963) 
who rejected the notion. This experiment was not however conducted 
within a Gestalt frame-work.
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which amounts to saying no more than Koffka (1940). However the 
attempt by Eysenck (1942) to bring more precision to the notion of 
good Gestalt as the basis of art deserves more serious attention.
He reviews his own and other experimental evaluations of Birkhoff's 
(1933) study which revealed that artists prefer simple, ordered 
forms to more complex irregular shapes. Eysenck attempted to 
integrate the findings of Birkhoff, and the general aesthetic factor 
by interpreting the latter as the embodiment of good Gestalt.
On this basis he formulated a law of Aesthetic Appreciation, viz. 
'The pleasure derived from a percept is directly proportional to 
the decrease of energy capable of doing work in the total nervous 
system, as compared with the original state of the whole system'. 
Functionally, this is almost identical to Rawlins' (1939) inter­
pretation, There does not appear to be a more recent attempt to 
systematically refine the notion of Good Gestalt as the basis of 
good art, except for Arnheim's work which is discussed below.
The second major disadvantage which is related to the first 
is the absence of quantification of the concepts. This means 
empirical testing of the ideas is difficult. Hochberg (1972) has 
pointed out the Gestalt laws of perceptions have never been 
quantified nor empirically tested. Attneave (1959a) suggested that 
one of the applications of Information Theory could be to quantify 
and test the Gestalt laws. This has been done on a small scale by 
Attneave (1954) and Hochberg and McAlister (1953), though it has 
not been systematically followed up. Gregory (1973) has argued 
that there is no evidence that the laws of organisation hold for 
the perception of the world, of objects, even though they may hold 
for the perception of geometric shapes. There is however some 
circumstantial evidence from Arnheim (1969) and Pickford (1972) 
that the Gestalt laws are relevant to the perception of the flat 
surface plane of paintings, even when three dimensional space is 
1See chapter six of this thesis.
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seen, though this would need empirical confirmation, Firenne (1970) 
and Polanyi (1970) have both argued that a 'subsidiary awareness 
of surface' is a critical feature of pictorial perception. The 
Gestalt laws may have relevance to this awareness.
The difficulties involved in quantifying the figurai goodness 
of paintings can be seen in a study by Kellet (1939). He attempted 
to determine whether the lav;s of perceptual organisation were 
relevant to the perception of paintings, and whether 'good form' 
determined effective reactions. He asked a panel of judges to 
rate paintings and photographs (which were paired with the paintings 
by content) on the various aspects of good form such as whole-part 
relationships, closure, continuation etc. IVhen viewed under normal 
(30 sec) and tachistoscopie conditions (.24) the photographs were 
generally better liked, even though the paintings had been judged 
by experts as having better form. Overall there was no relation 
between a picture's gestalt rating and the effective responses to 
it. Even with the short exposure, there was no relation, despite 
the fact that the better form of the paintings ought to have 
enhanced perception under these restricted viewing conditions.
Kellet concluded from the lack of relation between good gestalt 
and preference judgements that gestalt unity of figure is not 
objectively specifiable, as it is an experiential rather than an 
objective phenomenon. This conclusion is biased because it is 
based on the premise that figurai unity is actually a determinant 
of aesthetic reactions and this has not been demonstrated. The 
second part of the conclusion is, however, sound as there is a real 
difference between the objective specification of a stimulus, and 
its phenomenal significance (Brunswick 1956; Heckhausen 1964; 
Attneave 1959). Ironically it seems that Kellet may have reached 
the right conclusion for the wrong reasons. He only concludes 
that gestalt unity is not objectively specificable because his 
measurements did not reveal the expected relation to aesthetic 
preference. This experiment, though interesting is methodologically
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too weak to provide evidence on the relation of Gestalt configura­
tions to aesthetic preferences. There does not appear.to have 
been a systematic test of this relationship.
The application of Gestalt ideas and concepts to art have 
inevitably resulted in an over-emphasis on the formal features of 
paintings. It has been noted already (Gombrich I965) that form 
and content are inseparable. With regard to form, the laws of 
perceptual organisation, if they can be applied to works of art 
(as yet unproven), are likely only to be relevant to the art of 
Classical Greece, the Renaissance, and the Academic tradition in 
Europe (See Plate II). The notions of balance, harmony, good 
proportion are essential features of this type of art. However 
primitive, medieval, oriental and much modern art does not have 
aesthetic standards which approximate the ideals of good Gestalt 
(Osborns 1968a) (See Fig.3-3)
I
f î ^  3-J Max Ernst, Tl'C  B c itu tiju l Season, 131J. Frottage on paper, reproduced in the surrealist portfolio N a tu r a l  H is to ry .
Even within the Western tradition there are notable exceptions to
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the general trend (Bosch, Rembrandt, El Greco) who have deviated 
from the Classical (or Gestalt) ideal. Fickford (1972) has pointed 
out that the Impressionists deliberately destroyed the relation­
ship between figure and ground, which was considered by Chaplin 
and Krawiec (l9bo) to be one of the few immutable laws of 
perception. It would appear that the laws of perceptual organisation, 
and good Gestalt, if they are relevant to paintings are only 
selectively so. For example, the paintings of Piero della Francesca 
(Florence l4l6-92) are noted for their static, stable calm, b/hereas 
this is intuitively perceivable it is doubtful whether the notion 
of good gestalt does anything more than substitute one phrase for 
another without any gain' in meaning. The danger is that the use 
of the phrase 'good Gestalt' might give a spurious impression 
that the painting has been 'explained'. Good gestalt has limited 
applicability to art and practically no explanatory power.
The other major contribution of gestalt psychology to the 
psychology of art is the theory of expression. The gestalt position 
was one whicn insisted that 'in explaining psychological phenomena 
no appeal should be made to past experience until every other 
possibility has been exhausted' (Pratt 1969). The gestalt theory 
of expression was developed by Koffka (1935), and Kohler (1947) to 
counteract the associationist theory of empathy (e.g. Lipps 1903) 
which in one form or another had been dominant for over fifty 
years. The theory was developed and applied to aesthetic expression 
by Koffka (1940) and Arnheim (1949)$ which Pratt (1964) considers 
to be the most important contribution of Gestalt psychology to 
aesthetics. In brief this theory states that shapes, patterns 
and configurations are intrinsically expressive. The expressiveness 
of an object or configuration lies in its tertiary qualities 
(denoted by words for moods, e.g. sad, tense, gay). These tertiary 
qualities are not associated by learning, experience, or memory as 
they are directly perceived in the object. The principle of 
isomorphism was used to explain how this is achieved. It is because
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the structure of mental states in the brain are the same as the 
perceived structure of expressive stimuli (lines, curves, etc.) 
that meaning is perceived directly (Arnheim 1949)• The whole question 
of meaning and expression in art is treated separately in chapter 
nine. Consequently the Gestalt theory of expression will not be 
discussed in detail here.
The physiological speculations by the Gestalt psychologists 
in support of the notion of isomorphism, have not been upheld 
by subsequent physiological research (Hochbeg 1957) • Arnheim in 
his later writings dropped the physiological explanation of 
isomorphism. Despite this the notion of isomorphic correspondence 
between physical and mental events is still regarded as the means 
by which meaning is expressed directly in the formal aspects of art 
(Arnheim 1969).
Before concluding this section on the Gestalt psychology of 
art it is necessary to discuss in more detail the work of Budolt _ 
Arnheim. Ee has certainly been the most productive of Gestalt 
psychologists writing on art, and has been actively contributing 
to the subject for over fifty years. Apart from his development of 
the Gestalt theory of expression (Arnheim 1949, 1958), his most 
influential v;ork is Art and Visual Perception (1954a) which has 
had an enormous empact on educationalists, though little on 
psychology in general. It represents a fairly orthodox Gestalt 
interpretation of form, shape, colour, harmony etc, as determinants 
of aesthetic experience. The book lays great stress on the 
perceptual determination of reactions and .tends to ignore the 
possible mediation of culture, learning, and personality. Like 
most Gestalt works on art it is speculative rather than testing.
The idea of structural or isomorphic similarity between works 
of art and emotional reactions to them has strongly influenced 
the eminent philosopher of art, 3. K. Langer (1942, 1957)
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theoretical rather than empirical. Arnheim's collected writings
of art (Arnheim 196?) and two other books (I969, 1971) reveal
that Arnheim lays a great deal of stress on meaning in art which
is expressed in the formal qualities of a painting. This is
particularly developed in Visual Thinking (I969). In this book
Arnheim argues that the isomorphic characteristics of thinking
and perceiving mirror each other; they can be regarded as twin
aspects of the same thing, viz. visual thinking. Arnheim's
interpretation in its basic features bears a strong resemblance
to the information-processing approach to perception (Forgus I966;
Gibson 1966a; lîeisser 1967; Haber 1973) except that Arnheim's
analysis is qualitative and non-experimental. The traditional
distinction between the separate processes of perception and
cognition are broken down. Forgus, Gibson and Heisser are all
concerned to study cognitive processes in an active organism
rather than to investigate the senses in isolation. However,
Arnheim differs from them in his use of isomorphism as an
explanatory principle. The significance of this is fully developed
in Arnheim (1971)» Here he argues that the 'good' Gestalt is
a feature not only of art and perception, but of all the phenomena 
1
in the universe, Arnheim regards it as a reflection of the 
fundamental order that exists in the universe. He argues that 
man's striving for order, of which art is but one manifestation, 
derives from a universal tendency throughout the organic world.
It is also paralleled by, and perhaps derived from, the striving 
towards the state of simplest structure in physical systems 
(Art and Entropy 1971). Because entropy theory is concerned 
with the unmeasurable, global macro-state it does not reduce the 
order and harmony of good Gestalt to 'redundancy' and 'no information', 
Arnheim asserts the superiority of the molar approach to the study
^This argument was first propounded by Kohler (1938) and adnered 
to by him for the rest of his life (Kohler 1969)»
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of aesthetics, as of everything else 
Conclusions
The most obvious contribution of Gestalt psychology to art 
is the formulation of the laws of perceptual organisation.
However it is doubtful if these have any explanatory value 
as it is not possible to apply the rules to complex works of 
art, though the systematic testing of phenomenal measures has 
not yet been attempted. In addition the rules, even if measurable 
may not be applicable at all to many kinds of art. Through lack 
of clear definition, and quantification the laws have not been 
tested, a state of affairs which has lead to intuitive interpretive 
analyses of works of art with no guarantee of validity, beyond 
superficial plausibility. The Gestalt theory of expression has 
immediate relevance to art and stands as an important rival to 
the empathy theory of expression which is discussed in chapter 
nine. The physiological spculations have been abandoned, though 
isomorphism is still used as an explanatory concept, though now 
based on a more metaphoric, rather than a literal, interpretation.
The Gestalt approach differs from the psycho-analytic approach 
in that it does not attempt to explain why people look at art in 
the first place, Whereas the psycho-analytic writers place most 
emphasis on motivational aspects the Gestalists laid most stress 
on perception. Similarly''the psycho-analysts stressed content, 
whilst the Gestaltists stressed formal structure. Perhaps the most 
important point of emphasis for the Gestalt psychology of art, 
which separates it from all the other approaches, is the attempt 
to define what constitutes good art. The notion of good Gestalt 
as a criterion of the aesthetic is not too vague to be tested, 
and so this attempt to embrace the problem of aesthetic value 
has not yet been empirically evaluated.
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The methodological advantages of the Gestalt, approach 
consisted in the careful use of introspection, an emphasis on 
the molar qualities in art, and a close contact with real works 
of art at least in Arnheim’s work. Introspection permitted 
sensitive, flexible awareness of the complexity of the processes 
involved, though the absence of experimental testing led to 
acceptance of ideas whose validity was not checked. Finally the 
direct contact with art by way of illustration, argument and 
interpretation has almost certainly given Gestalt ideas on art 
greater acceptability to others interested in art. Paradoxically 
it has had less impact on the psychology of art than on other 
fields concerned with art, (e.g. art education and art criticism). 
This is not necessarily a bad thin^. Experimental aesthetics 
has impressed few psychologists and virtually no art experts.
Experimental Aesthetics
The umbrella term experimental aesthetics covers a great 
variety of methods and approaches rai'ging all the way from the 
molecular behaviourism of Eysenck and Berlyne to the correlational, 
humanistic approach of Burt, Bulley and Child, The only thing 
they have in common is the fact that they all employ empirical 
techniques of investigation of one kind or another. As a result 
they all use some form of measurement. As this is an extremely 
complex problem, especially in aesthetics, it will be discussed 
separately in the following chapter. However, many of tne 
assumptions underlying the choice of experimental metnou nave 
implications for the type of measurement employed, z.nere tnis 
occurs the general significance will be discussee in this cnapter 
and a more detailed analysis will be given in the lollowing cs-ipter
The chief advantage of experimental techniques seems ta lie 
in tr.e approximation of objectivity that is me me possible through 
the control of variance by means of appropriate quantification
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and designs of experiments. According to Marx and Hillix (I963) 
the 'principle of control' is the one distinguishing feature of 
science, for it is by this means that the scientist is able to 
identify the sources of variance in his observations. The 
classical experiment entails the manipulation of one or more 
(independent) variables by the experimenter who can then observe 
and measure the variation this causes in the other (dependent) 
variables under study. In other words the experiment must be 
designed in such a way that variation in the dependent varia­
ble can only be attributed to variation in the independent variable, 
and not to any other source of variation. Ideally the experimenter 
controls and manipulates the independent variable and observes 
or measures the effects of this on the dependent variable. This 
is the ideal experiment of the 'tough-minded' experimental 
aestheticians, among whom Berlyne is most prominent.
The need for internal validity often conflicts with the 
representativeness or naturalism of the experiment, or what 
Campbell refers to as 'external validity' (Campbell 1957). If an 
experiment lacks this it is not possible to generalise the results 
beyond the exact laboratory conditions. The 'tender-minded' apprbach 
to aesthetics sacrifices a degree of internal validity in order to 
make the study more realistic. They stress individual differences 
and tend to use correlational techniques, rather than to artificially 
control and manipulate variables. In general tender-minded 
aestheticians put most emphasis on the need for external validity, 
whereas the tough-minded aestheticians place most emphasis on 
internal validity.
I. Tough-minded experimental aesthetics
It may seem a little arbitrary to call Fechner who was actively 
interested in aesthetics between I863 and 1870, the founding fatner 
of the tough-minded school of experimental aesthetics. However he 
belongs to this camp because he is claimed as the spii'ituaj. fatner
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of those modern experimental aestheticians who fall into the
tough-minded category. For instance Berlyne (1972a) has described
Fechner's three-fold contribution to experimental aesthetics.
First, he carried out some experiments that set an important
precendent. In one experiment he investigated experimentally
the significance of the Golden Section which was the first ever
empirical test of this centuries-old notion. In the other study
he conducted the first ever opinion poll concerning the aesthetic
1
merits of two paintings. As Berlyne correctly points out the 
significance of these experiments lies in the measurement of the 
preference of a sample of people instead of regarding one's own 
preferences to be either typical or exceptionally authoritative.
Fechner's second main contribution places him strongly in 
the tough-minded camp. He advocated an attack on 'aesthetics 
from below' which concerns itself with simple stimuli like 
rectangles and polygons and simple responses such as liking and 
disliking. By concentrating on simple phenomena rather than 
complex works of art and aesthetic experience, Fechner assumed that 
the relationship between stimulus characteristics and associated 
response is more easily investigated. The use of molecular 
stimuli is one of the hall-marks of the tough-minded approach.
In advocating 'aesthetics from below' Fechner also described three 
methods for the experimental study of aesthetics. His 'method of 
choice' is the forerunner of modern preference methods (ranking, 
rating, paired comparison etc); the 'method of application' fore­
shadowed modern content analysis; and the 'method of production', 
required the subject to manipulate a variable stimulus according 
to a set of instructions. Only the first method has been widely 
used in experimental aesthetics (see chapter seven) while the other 
methods have not been much used despite their enormous potential
"*For details of Fechner's opinion poll see Boring (lyyO)
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(see chapter 4).
Fechner's third major contribution consisted in his fifteen 
psychological principles of aesthetics. The principles are 
speculative and were not even stated in a formal way. They 
represent the various aesthetic hypotheses which seemed relevant 
to Fechner and were formulated from suitable sentences in the 
text of 'Vorschule der *Asthetik' (I876) by Lillian Martin (1906). 
She reformulated each hypothesis, one by one, and subjected it 
to some kind of empirical test. Her methods would not now be 
acceptable by modern standards, but the approachds exemplary.
It represents an attempt to empirically test ideas coming from a 
fertile but non-empirical source.
This epi6temological aspect of Fechner's work would also 
place him in the tender-minded camp though this aspect of his work 
is not generally well knov;n. There can however be no doubt about 
the work of the Harvard mathematician, Birkhoff (1931, 1933). He 
attempted to reduce aesthetic experience to a mathematical 
formula. He argued that there were three elements of aesthetic 
experience viz. the perceptual effort which increases with the 
complexity (C) of the object; the feeling of value or aesthetic 
appreciation (M), and finally the awareness of harmony, symmetry 
or order (O) in the object. Birkhoff's aim was clearly stated;
'hithin each class of aesthetic objects to define the order (0 ) 
and the complexity (C) so that their ratio M = O/C yields the 
aesthetic measure of any object in the class'. The relationship 
of M to 0 and C was intuitively established. Birkhoff devoted 
much effort to the operational specification of features of 
objects that contribute to their C and C components respectively 
in order to compute their aesthetic value which he claimed 
predicted preference judgements. For one reason or another
1----------
See chapter four, page 119.
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the formula did not work, but it remains as an important attempt 
to quantify aesthetic stimuli and measure aesthetic value.
The exclusive emphasis on quantification and aesthetic value 
meant that individual differences, the effects of culture, 
learning and past experience were all considered irrelevant 
extraneous variables which conceal the essential mathematical 
relationship between stimulus characteristics and response.
This is a feature of the tough-minded school v/ho try to concentrate 
on what they consider the essentials of aesthetic experience 
and disregard what they regard as contaminating factors. This is 
most clearly seen in the work of Eysenck.
Eysenck has been working in the field of experimental 
aesthetics off and on for the past thirty-five years (see Eysenck 
1939). He has vigorously defended the molecular approach as 
the first stage in the natural progression of science from the 
simple to the complex (Eysenck 1957). In this article he attempts 
to forestall the obvious criticism that experimental findings 
with the simplest possible stimuli viz. simple colours and colour 
combinations, simple proportions of lines (cf. Eysenck 194lb,
1941c) are not applicable to more complex situations. He does this 
not by reference to natural aesthetic reactions to real works of 
art but by showing how preferences for combinations of colours 
can be predicted from a knowledge of preferences for single 
colours and their respective positions on the colour circle.
This may be a step forward from the simple to the complex but it 
is a negligible gain. It is quite meaningless to say that this 
justifies the molecular approach.
Another feature of the tough-minded approach is the pre­
occupation v;ith objectivity. Eysenck tries to argue that beauty 
as a characteristic of a stimulus is no more subjective than the 
colour green because both these characteristics can be specified
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by agreement between observers. A little later in the discussion 
Eysenck in a single sentence turns this into an objective 
criterion of the aesthetic: 'If in accordance with our definition 
of the terra 'objective' we call this average order of preferences 
the 'objective' or 'true' order, then we can perhaps call those 
who agree with it most the 'best* judges and those who disagree 
with it most the poorest judges'. We are, of course, as Eysenck 
admits free to reject this definition as it has no logical 
necessity. However the mere statement of the assumption is 
sufficient for his purposes. It represents an example of the 
conceptual naivete that can be concealed beneath the technical 
sophistication of the experimental techniques used by the tough- 
minded school. Much of Eysenck's recent work has been based on 
preferences for the polygons which Birkhoff (1933) used as aesthetic 
stimuli. His only measure of aesthetic reaction is rating scales 
or ranking for liking. The quest for objectivity in this manner may 
make the experiments internally valid, but externally invalid as 
it is impossible to generalise the results to natural aesthetic 
experience in response to great works of art that have appealed 
to men for centuries, or even more humble v/orks of art.
Finally we come to the most prominant contemporary experimental 
aesthetician. Berlyne*s work has all the features of the tough- 
minded approach viz. molecular stimuli, vigorous experimental 
techniques, elaborate quantification, and a positivist attitude 
to aesthetic experience. His main emphasis has been on the 
exploration of why people look at some patterns in preference 
to others^ as well as why people choose to look at them at all.
From his experimental work he has developed an elaborate theory of 
aesthetic motivation which will be discussed below. In this section 
only Berlyne's methodology will be discussed.
He is unashamedly behaviourist for in the introductory 
chapter of Aesthetics and Psychobiology (1971) ke declares that,
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'Nowadays it is widely acknowledged that psychologists must 
study human and animal behaviour, What goes on in the mind can 
be subjected to scientific inquiry only insofar as it is reflected 
in observable behaviour'. He also believes that behaviour is not 
fully explained until it is put in a biological perspective, which 
is a view he shares with Eysenck.
In justifying his own approach Berlyne has been at pains to 
explain why the tender-minded aestheticians have failed. He feels
(a) they have been cowed by the cultural mystification of art and 
artists; (b) they have failed to separate normative and factual 
questions; (c) they have treated art as a unique phenomenon and 
have therefore studied in isolation from other activities; (d) they 
have been over impressed by individual differences; and finally 
(e) they have relied too heavily on verbal measures. Berlyne's 
alternative is clear to him. If diagrammatic stimuli can be 
substituted for works of art, questions of value and meaning ignored, 
individual differences neglected, aesthetic experience replaced by 
behavioural and physiological measures, then given all this, 
experimental aesthetics can be regarded as scientific. Berlyne 
is clearly distorting (and possibly destroying) his subject-matter 
in order to make it fit into his chosen methodology.
Berlyne (I9?2a) stresses that the 'new experimental aesthetics', 
as exemplified in his own work, contrasts with the old style in 
three principle ways, viz. the use of collative stimuli, the 
employment of a variety of verbal and non-verbal behavioural 
measures, and a general link-up with the main body of psychology. 
Apart from the use of collative stimuli (see separate discussion 
below) it must be admitted that the remaining two, at least as 
ideals, are major steps forward which should do much to improve 
the general status of experimental aesthetics. It is paradoxical 
that these trends should arise in that brand of experimental 
aesthetics which in the long run has least to offer.
93
II Tender-minded experimental aesthetics
The tender-minded approach to experimental aesthetics has 
fewer adherents than the tough-minded approach. By far the larger 
amount of research in experimental aesthetics falls into the 
latter category. The major contemporary exponent of the tender 
approach is I. L. Child, We have already seen that he has argued 
for a rejection of the deterministic model of man and the type 
of experimentation which assumes that all the determinants of 
experience can be found in the physical environment. Child does 
not conduct experimental studies in which he manipulates stimuli 
and observes reactions. Rather he follows in the tradition of 
Burt (1933) and Bulley (1933) by exploring the correlates of good 
aesthetic judgement which he, and they, defined as agreement with 
expert opinion. Child has taken great trouble over the design and 
preparation of his test of aesthetic judgement, and has tested the 
relationship between aesthetic sensitivity and an enormous number 
of aesthetic and cognitive variables. He is thus able to produce 
a picture of the characteristics of people most likely to be 
sensitive to art. When most workers in the field concentrate on 
stimulus determination Child investigates organismic variables, 
and individual differences generally.
A major problem with the tender-minded approach is that it is 
easy to reject it on the grounds of poor experimental design particu­
larly when the wrong criteria are applied. Hogg (1969a) has argued 
that most experimental work prior to I96O is methodologically 
weak. This might give the impression that the exceptions to this 
are those studies that belong to the tough-minded camp. This is 
not true as Berlyne’s criticisms of early work indicate. Berlyne 
would almost certainly reject Child’s careful methodology as 
unscientific. There is a danger then that the methodological 
intolerance of the tough-minded experimentalist would lead to the
94
rejection of valuable work such as Child’s, because it does not 
meet their unrealistic standards of what constitutes scientific 
method.
Closely linked with the tender-minded experimental approach 
is the acceptability of theoretical discussion and analysis.
Notable for this kind of writing is Mace (19^2, 1972) who has 
discussed the notion of art as a form of play activity, the 
aesthetic attitude, and works of art as innate releasing mechanisms.
In a similar fashion, Foss (19^2) has expanded the notion of 
innately determined responses, and lEM’s in his speculative article 
on the biological basis of art. It is interesting to note that 
Foss’s reference to pleasure-centres which are directly stimulated 
by the configurations of art anticipates in some respects Berlyne's 
explanation of the hedonic value of art (Berlyne 1967, 1971)» The 
notion of art as metaphor, viz. the fusing of two realms of experience 
has been elaborated by Bruner (1962) and also by Eoestler (1964). 
Finally the diverse ways in which aesthetic pleasure can be derived 
from perception are discussed and analysed by Chandler (1934) and 
Adcock (1962). These articles follow in the tradition of earlier 
introspectionist discussions (e.g. Kevner 1937; Hauron 1935), and 
contribute valuable ideas for empirical testing.
It is instructive to compare the extremely rare theoretical 
writings that arise from the tough-minded approach. Generally 
speaking theorisation or speculation is discouraged and so the rich 
source of inspiration and ideas for testing which can be derived 
from the papers quoted above is lost to the tough-minded approach.
This is most clearly brought out in a paper by Lundin (1956) who 
rejects the notion that aesthetic experience is an internal state, 
an inner psychic state or even a conscious feeling. He prefers to 
use the concept of the ’aesthetic behavioural event’, and to describe 
behavioural measures of the three components of aesthetic appreciation, 
viz. the attentional, perceptual and the affective. He argues that
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psychology should not go beyond observable behaviour. A similar 
argument was put forward by Feibleman (l9o3) who attempted to 
analyse aesthetic experience in terms of need reduction, appetitive 
behaviour and the preparatory behaviour that leads to tne consumma- 
tory response. In conclusion, the tender-minded approach has 
associated with it a body of creative, imaginative writing of a 
speculative nature that provides a fertile source of ideas for 
testing and elaboration which is absent from the tougher approach.
The milder scientific techniques of the former permit the empirical 
examination of notions, and ideas that would not be considered by 
the tough experimentalists. The tender approach has a humanistic 
model of man, and its tolerance of alternative methods of approaching 
the psychology of art render it open and amenable to the examination 
of ideas from other non-experiraental disciplines, such as psycho­
analysis, the history of art and so on.
Ill Berlyne's Theory of Aesthetics
The theory has evolved over many years (Berlyne I96O, 1965, 
1967) and has received its most detailed and comprehensive statement 
in Aesthetics and Psychobiology (1971)» Although it rests on an 
extensive and systematic programme of experimental research it is 
not a complete theory for despite its foundation in rigorous 
experimental work it is largely speculative. Berlyne's work 
continues to develop (Berlyne 1972b, 1972c) so it might be more 
appropriate to regard it as a proto-theory.
Berlyne’s uses the term 'psycho-biology* because he feels the 
term psychology is too ambiguous. He uses the term to refer to a 
highly scientific experimental approach which has close links 
with biology, evolutionary theory, genetics, embryology and 
physiology. He claims, as we have seen, that behaviour is not 
fully explained until it has been placed within a biological
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perspective. In addition, Berlyne has set his theory tightly 
within the frame-work of stimulus-response learning theory and 
information theory. Consequently Berlyne's aim is to seek the 
biological origins of art or in other words, to explain why we 
derive pleasure from art.
The essential feature of the theory is the relation between 
physiological arousal and the experience of pleasure or displeasure. 
The argument is complex but clear. Different stimulus situations 
differ in their arousal potential, i.e. they vary in their capacity 
to cause increases or decreases in arousal in the perceiver. As 
a result of changes in arousal brought about by the stimuli, the 
perceiver experiences pleasure or displeasure which he attributes 
directly to the stimuli. Positive hedonic value is a property of 
the stimulus and is equated with its pleasure or intrinsic reward 
value, and negative hedonic value is equated with unpleasantness 
or punishment. In his detailed review of neurophysiological studies 
of pain and pleasure centres in the brain Berlyne (1967) reveals 
that pleasure (or reward) can occur in either of two ways, viz. 
a decrease in arousal from a higher level or an increase in arousal 
from a relatively low level. Neurophysiological work on the brain 
has revealed three separate pleasure centres in the brain. Berlyne 
refers to these as (a) a primary reward centre, direct stimulation 
of which produces pleasure; (b) an aversion centre stimulation of 
which inhibits the action of the primary reward centre; and (c) a 
secondary reward centre which inhibits the inhibiting action of the 
aversion centre on the primary reward centre. With these mechanisms 
Berlyne attempts to explain how variations in arousal (as indicated 
by physiological and behavioural measures) can produce the 
experience of pleasure and displeasure.
Berlyne begins with two basic assumptions which are necessary 
to his explanation. First, he assumes that there is a normal curve 
of thresholds operating in both systems, and secondly that the
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average threshold for neurones in the aversion system is higher 
than in the reward system. The argument is most clearly 
illustrated with the aid of Berlyne's diagram (see Fig. 3-4)
activity of 
aversion system
->
activity of 
reward system
Y= absolute threshold 
Xi = ambivalence or 
indifference 
)a= maximum pleasure
Fig. 3-4 Berlyne's model of 
arousal (from Berlyne 1971)
By this model the net effect of a given amount of arousal potential 
is equal to the algebraic sum of the tv;o curves. Thus at low 
levels of increasing arousal only the primary reward system is 
activated, at a critical point along this continuum pleasure is 
at a maximum (X^ in diagram). Any further increase in arousal 
potential brings the aversion system into operation thus reducing 
the amount of experienced pleasure. At a higher level of arousal 
the effects of the pleasure centres and the aversion centre 
balance each other (at ). This results in a state of ambivalence 
or indifference to the stimuli causing this level of arousal, With 
any further increase in arousal the activity of the aversion
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system will exceed that of the primary reward centre, and 
disple-isure or negative hedonic value results. The combined 
effects of the two systems reacting to different levels of 
arousal potential can also be clearly seen in the celebrated 
Wundt curve (see Fig. 3-5) which Berlyne appears to regard as 
confirming the correctness of his interpretation.
positive
hedonic
value
arousal \  potential
indifference
negative
hedonic
value
Fig.3-5 The relationship between 
hedonic value and arousal 
(from Berlyne 1371)
By this scheme any increase in arousal in A is pleasurable, 
but unpleasant in B or C. Any decrease in arousal is pleasurable 
in C and B but unpleasant in A. Berlyne sees this as the underlying 
mechanism of aesthetic reactions, which he has operationally 
defined as rated pleasingness on a seven-point scale.
This reductionist explanation fits the established facts 
well, but is nevertheless highly speculative, as Berlyne is ready 
to admit. For instance there is no reason why the activity of the
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reward centre should form an asymptote. It is possible that the 
aversion centre could operate by reducing the activity of the 
point where it ceases to function, instead of remaining constant 
as arousal continues to increase.
However this piece of physiological speculation is not 
necessary to Berlyne’s main contention that it is the function 
of art to create in the perceiver levels and changes of arousal 
that are pleasurable to the observer, Berlyne devoted much 
of his book to the description of arousal increasing devices, and 
arousal-moderating devices. Of the former the collative variables 
are most important. They are called collative because their 
insignificance rests in the contrast that exists between two or 
more stimuli, or in the information derived from other stimuli.
The most important collative variable is complexity, though 
novelty, surprise, incongruity, conflict, ambiguity, multiple 
meaning, and instability are all important arousal increasing 
devices. By contrast the arousal-moderating devices are more 
familiar as psychological variables though Berlyne has not 
specifically investigated them. He discusses predictability, 
association of content, Freudian displacement, stimulus generali- 
sation, familiarity, exemption from inhibition and exertion , 
and the grouping and patterning of stimuli. Berlyne also reviews 
theories of aesthetics and philosophies of beauty and concludes 
that the most common feature of all the attempts to define beauty 
as the notion of 'order in multiplicity' or 'unity in variety'.
He speculates that multiplicity in art has an arousal-increasing 
function, whereas order has an arousal-moderating function.
This refers to Freud's theory of jokes (Freud 1905) in which 
the structure of the joke enables the id to by-pass the defence 
mechanisms of the ego, and discharge libidinal energy without 
threat to the ego.
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According to Berlyne there are three ways in which pleasure 
can be derived from a change in arousal. The 'arousal jag' 
refers to the situation in which the 'organism' seeks a temporary 
rise in arousal for the sake of the pleasurable relief that comes 
when the rise is reversed. Secondly the 'arousal boost' refers 
to the situation in which a moderate increase in arousal is sought 
because it is satisfying in itself (i.e. in section A on the 
arousal continuum, Fig. 3-5)* Thirdly, there is the situation 
in which arousal moderating and raising are present simultaneously 
(arousal boost-jag) instead of sequentially (arousal jag).
The experimental evidence for these speculations comes from 
Berlyne's extensive and systematic investigation of the relation 
between collative variables, arousal, and hedonic value. liost work 
seems to have concentrated on complexity based on his set of 
collative stimuli (Fig. 3-6) and to a lesser extent on novelty.
This arises directly out of Berlyne's earlier work on exploratory 
behaviour. He concludes from his review of his own work and that 
of others that there is an inverted U relationship between 
pleasingness and complexity. Maximum pleasingness coincides with 
intermediate leads of complexity, which is consistent with Berlyne's 
interpretation in terras of the Wundt curve (Fig. 3-5)* A fundamental 
assumption underlying this formulation is that arousal increases 
linearly with complexity. Berlyne has not demonstrated this 
directly with physiological measurement and his collative stimuli, 
though he did reveal a linear relationship between complexity and 
judged interestingness of the stimuli (Berlyne 19o3). Berlyne 
attributes this to the interaction of arousal reduction and increase 
mechanisms operating at different levels, but stresses that it is 
difficult to generalise from his data where individual differences 
exist to some extent, to works of art where individual differences
'I
This is Berlyne's preferred term.
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tow-com plexity categories
X X X
X X X
X X X
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A irregularity of arrangerrsnt
1 1! r
C heterogeneity of elements
B amount of material
D iriagularity of material
high-complexity categories
515
E incongruity
G
XB asymmetry
A
A
XA  number of independent units
i
iTC^ 'V 'C f")
XC random redistribution
I
0
Fig. 3-6. Berlyne's collative stimuli. (From Berlyne 1963)
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would be much greater, especially as ecological and semantic 
factors would also be very important. Despite this Berlyne 
attempts to interpret problems of proportion, balance, and rhythm, 
as well as artistic styles in terms of arousal increases and 
moderation. Despite the limitations of the experimental data 
he appears to have no qualms in concluding that the primary function 
of art lies in its intrinsically rewarding effects on the central 
nervous system.
In evaluating Berlyne's contribution to the psychology of 
art it is impossible to separate his findings from his methodology, 
as they are inextricably linked. Berlyne stays well within the 
limits of general psychology by confining his research to general 
features of perception rather than concentrating specifically on 
aesthetics, or including consideration of what may be distinctive 
to the arts. His collative properties are features of objects in 
general, and his 'hedonic value' is equivalent to pleasure in 
general. There is no systematic attempt to relate these to aesthetic 
experience. Berlyne relies entirely on experimental studies 
investigating reactions to molecular stimuli (collative stimuli 
etc.) which are supposed to function as analogues for works of 
art but cannot be equated with them. Consequently his findings 
have doubtful relevance to the perception of works of art.
Berlyne certainly does not show how his findings can be tested in 
relation to works of art.
Serious doubt has been cast on Berlyne's inverted-U model of 
the relationship between pleasingness and complexity in a detailed 
study by Smets (1973). Using direct measures of physiological 
arousal she demonstrated that Berlyne's assumption of a linear 
relation between complexity and arousal only held for a restricted 
range of complexity where extremely simple and extremely complex 
stimuli were excluded. Berlyne can be criticisea for not systemati­
cally varying his independent variable. As a result the inverted-U model
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is valid only for an intermediate range of complexity. Alien a 
very large range of complexity is used then a different curve 
emerges. Berlyne's inverted-U relation is confirmed but only for 
a specified range of complexity.,
Despite his stated concern to avoid 'pre-operationist and
pre-behavioural assumptions' (Berlyne I963) he falls into the trap
of equating collative properties 'with some of the factors that
underly 'form', 'structure' or 'composition' in works of art
(cf Fig.3-6). This is weakly consistent with formalist theories
of art (see Charlton 1970 ch.2) and does not take count of other
theories viz. that art is expression, or the representation of the
appearance of things. By concentrating on formal characteristics
only, Berlyne's findings have no application to meaning in art
whether this is in terms of its symbolic content, or the expressive
quality of the structural organisation, or its semantic significance.
The expressive power of African art, or Eskimo carvings, or even
the juxtaposition of saddle and handle-bars that magically makes
2
a bull's head for Picasso, all lie outside the formalist position 
that is inherent in Berlyne's choice of experimental stimuli.
It is because Berlyne's rigorous experimental work was carried 
out with formalistic analogues that he finds difficulty in applying 
his findings to works of art. As an example of the crudeness of 
his method in relation to works of art we can take an isolated 
experiment by Berlyne (1970) in which he as experimenter classified 
paintings as more complex (filled with people) or less complex 
(portraits of single people) and used this distinction in a bivalent 
study of the effects of complexity on rated pleasingness. This use
1
The experiments by Smets (1973) on the relationship between 
arousal and aesthetic judgements are discussed in chapter seven 
in the section on complexity.
^For an illustration, see Penrose in Gregory and Gombrich (1973) 
p.244.
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of real works of art represents an almost unique exception to 
his use of molecular stimuli. The application of his findings to 
the interpretation of style is particularly weak in view of his 
pretensions to the rigorous methods of operationalism. For example 
Berlyne explains variations in artistic style as the product of 
changing preferences for certain ways of intensifying arousal 
(e.g. Baroque art) or tempering it (e.g. Renaissance art). He 
argues that the function of artistic style is to distort the 
pictorial presentation of objects in ways that are neurologically 
acceptable. That notion of higher human meaning, on which Gombrich 
has put so much stress, has no place in Berlyne's behavioural 
scheme of things. Similarly the notion of unity-in-variety is 
reduced to the 'arousal jag-boost'.
In a more recent paper Berlyne (1972c) has defended his 
attempts to quantify aesthetic values. He argues that, since 
aesthetic value often hinges on where exactly a pattern is located 
along what he calls the goodness dimension, precise measures are 
necessary. This view stems directly from his equation between 
collative properties and art as form. As he cannot quantify 
aesthetic meaning or the semantic content, or the influence of 
cultural factors, etc. these are left out of count. As a behaviourist 
Berlyne is not entitled to see art as form only. It is only 
because this aspect is amenable to quantitative experimental study 
that Berlyne has concentrated on it. In his quest for high internal 
validity Berlyne sacrifices, almost totally, any notion of external 
validity. The psychobiology of aesthetics seeks to relate 
characteristics of aesthetic reactions to characteristics of 
aesthetic patterns. In looking for general psychological laws 
Berlyne gives scant attention to individual, social and cultural 
factors influencing aesthetic experience. There is no justification 
for assuming that these factors are logically independent of the 
characteristics of the stimulus in terms of its impact on the 
perceiver. Berlyne's findings may only relate to the collative
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stimuli treated in isolation.
Perhaps the real issue is whether or not Berlyne's findings 
are relevant to the psychology of art, even if it were possible 
to disregard the methodological limitations of his approach.
The answer depends on whether it is possible to equate Berlyne's 
notion of hedonic value with aesthetic value in general. Koestler 
(1964) has made the telling point that there is a world of 
difference between 'that unity in diversity that can be debased 
into a formula for the execution of paintings', and that which 
can be grasped intuitively 'as a peephole into eternity'. Read 
(1943) has also tried to separate the aesthetic from the hedonistic, 
by stressing that many things are agreeable which are not beautiful 
or artistic.
Finally, Arnheira (1971)» though not specifically discussing 
Berlyne's work, has presented what might be taken as the ultimate 
objection to his findings, when he says 'We cannot content ourselves 
with the demand that the performance of the artist be sufficiently 
rich to fit the level of complexity at which our brains function. 
Vdiat is required is that the structural order reflects a genuine 
true profound view of life'. Berlyne would argue that this is 
outside the realm of scientific psychology. Rather it is the other 
way round. It is unscientific of Berlyne to ignore the essential 
character of art.
The achievements of the experimental approach to aesthetics 
has been summarised neatly by liunro ( I963) « ' .Vhat the laboratory
psychologists have been able to achieve by exact methods, from 
Fechner to the present day, adds up to comparatively little from 
the standpoint of those who deal directly with the arts. As 
summarised in general surveys, it deals with the more marginal 
superficial aspects of art and aesthetic experience, with 
statistics on preference, optical illusions, verbal associations
1:06
and the like, and the more obvious aspects of form and technique 
in the arts. It never reaches those levels which artists and 
scholars in the arts regard as most central and important to the 
phenomena concerned'. This statement in the light of the detailed 
discussion of Berlyne's work above reveals the necessity for a 
broader more diversified approach in the context of an enlightened 
empiricism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Problems of Aesthetic Measurement
Psychology as a science must involve some form of measurement. 
In its turn the psychology of art must also utilise measures of 
aesthetic experience and behaviour. In the last two chapters it 
was argued that too rigid a conception of quantification and 
measurement can lead to the concentration of research effort on 
nun-aesthetic qualities, or trivial aspects of form which have 
little to do with art and aesthetic experience. It will be the 
purpose of this chapter to explore the problem of measurement in 
the psychology of art, and to establish a conceptual basis for 
measurement which is both true to its subject-matter and at the 
same time useful to the psychologist. Unfortunately these two 
conditions rarely exist in the same technique or measurement device. 
It is perhaps this conflict between truth to aesthetic experience 
and psychological usefulness which has resulted in the number and 
diversity of different measures. It will be argued below that most 
of these techniques are widely used because of their practical 
usefulness and ease of operation, whilst their validity or meaning­
fulness is ignored or uncritically accepted. Thorough conceptual 
analysis of the assumptions underlying aesthetic measurement is 
needed if the fragmented, disjointed and often irrelevant character 
of much of the work done by experimental aestheticians is to be 
avoided in the future. Only after such an analysis can the next 
stage of empirical validation of specific measures be attempted.
I Assumptions about measurement in psychology
Measurement is here used in its widest sense, and can therefore 
range from head counts at the nominal level, through ordinal and 
interval measurement to the finest callibrations on a ratio scale
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(cf. Stevens 1951). Measurement is accomplished whenever number 
meanings are assigned to characteristics of an object or event.
The advantages of measurement are well known. Increased precision, 
avoidance of ambiguity, and universal meanings in description and 
explanation, all make for that objectivity of method which is held 
to be the hall-mark of scientific psychology and most clearly 
separates it from philosophy (Piaget 1975)* The disadvantages of 
measurement in psychology are equally real, but they are too 
often ignored or forgotten. It is an easy matter to assign 
numbers to aspects of observed behaviour or experience but it 
is much more difficult to determine whether the numbers represent 
an adequate description of the behaviour or experience in question.
In particular it is necessary to know whether the system of 
measurement used, and the subsequent mathematical manipulations of 
the numbers are actually isomorphic with the phenomena which are 
measured. To some extent this is a problem which is most serious 
when higher forms of measurement (interval and ratio) are used.
It might well be taken as an argument in favour of confining 
aesthetic measurement to ordinal and nominal levels because the 
mathematical operations available are more limited and are in a 
sense 'closer' to the original phenomena measured, (cf. Hudson 
1970, 1972). This point requires further elaboration.
Once numbers have been assigned to behaviour or experience 
they can then be analysed as pure number relations, i.e. as 
numerical abstractions which have been detached from the phenomena 
they describe. Torgerson (1958) has argued that in the social 
sciences there is a tendency for concepts to have either 'systematic' 
or 'operational' impact, but not both. A quantified and elaborately 
numerical construct e.g. 'intelligence' or Osgood's three-dimensional 
'semantic space' (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum 1957), are almost 
impossible to locate in the real world* They are systematic 
constructs and only have meaning with reference to the particular 
system that gave rise to them. By comparison a construct with
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high operational impact (e.g. aesthetic experience) is numerically 
unsophisticated, with the result that it is defined in many 
different ways, and usually in terms of the measure employed.
Brown and Ghiselli (1964) have highlighted three ways of 
interpreting the required correspondence between the meanings 
of number systems and the meaning of the observed psychological 
variables. They are particularly important in evaluating aesthetic 
measures. The first occurs when the experimenter ignores the 
meaning of the psychological variable and relies on mathematical 
operations instead, e.g. factor analysis of aesthetic preferences. 
Secondly, the experimenter may look only for meanings that are 
mathematically meaningful and manipulable. This may account for 
the tendency to lay stress on nomothetic or group characteristics, 
and to avoid introspective and other idiographic measures. Finally, 
the experimenter may generate hypotheses for testing which are 
mathematically defined and tested. The information analytic 
approaches to the study of aesthetic experience fall into this 
category. In each case the mathematical analysis has either 
meant a departure from the psychological facts or has imposed 
restrictions on them that are invalid. In general by confining 
measurement to the ordinal and nominal levels there is less danger 
that aesthetic experience is lost beneath the complexity of a 
numerical system that bears little relation to the phenomena being 
investigated. By striving for lower levels of measurement and 
simpler forms of analysis it becomes easier to detect false 
assumptions, and any lack of isomorphism between psychological 
phenomena and the number systems used to describe them.
II Assumptions about aesthetic measurement
Before describing the ideal characteristics of aesthetic 
measures it is necessary to determine whether they should have 
special qualities in view of the fact that they are supposed to
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record behaviour and experience in relation to works of art,
(a) Perhaps a major problem of aesthetic measurement is 
that the psychologist is working in an area where he is not 
himself an expert. One of the chief features of works of art is 
that they are valued objects, i.e. they vary on a continuum of 
the aesthetically good to the aesthetically bad, or alternatively 
from masterpiece to trash. Questions of value traditionally lie 
outside the realm of psychology, but it is difficult to separate 
aesthetic experience from the fact that it is in response
to a valued object. The real problem for the psychologist is 
that there is disagreement in the world of art concerning what 
is or is not a work of art, and also the aesthetic qualities and 
value of specific works. Hogg (1969a) has correctly argued that 
it is not necessary for the psychologist to make assumptions 
about the ultimate nature and function of art. On the other hand 
this must not lead him to ignore this aspect of aesthetics lest 
he studies aesthetic perception as a class of perception in general, 
and fails to study what is unique to art (cf. Zusne 1970).
(b) The fact that works of art are valued increases the 
difficulty of the psychologist's task. It is essential for him 
to distinguish facts from values. Facts can be tested for 
statements about facts either are, or are not, the case. Values 
cannot be tested; they can only be accepted or rejected according 
to one's own value system. Aesthetic measurement must accommodate 
for differences in individual's value systems, and must not 
assume that paintings are perceived in much the same way as 
everyday objects. It is because there are no strictly right or 
wrong responses, as there are in say intelligence tests, that
the psychology of art has difficulty evaluating aesthetic reactions. 
Aesthetic measures, ideally should reflect and elicit the values 
adopted by individuals, rather than ignore them as irrelevant or 
inconvenient. Westland (1967) has argued that facts concerning
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individual preferences between art objects can be collected 
independently of the values ascribed to those works of art.
This is an unsatisfactory attempt to maintain objectivity in 
aesthetic measurement, because it ignores an intrinsic feature 
of aesthetic experience, viz. that a painting is responded to 
in a particular way partly because it is valued in a particular 
way.
(c) Another requirement of particular importance to 
aesthetic measurement is naturalism. When works of art are 
isolated from their actual or usual content, or the person is asked 
to record his reactions on the psychologist's measuring device, 
there is a danger that the persons responses and behaviour will 
be altered or distorted. The intrusion of measurement between an 
individual's response and the work responded to is a highly 
artificial situation. Campbell (1957) has highlighted the effects 
that testing can have on the testee's otherwise typical performance 
and reactions, and Harre and Secord (1972) have argued that 
traditional experimental designs distort the phenomena being 
studied by blocking out considerations that play a vital role in 
a naturalistic setting. This is particularly important in 
aesthetics. For instance Souriau (1955) has drawn attention to 
the fact that it is not sufficient that a work of art is presented 
to a person to call his response aesthetic. This is even more 
true when a laboratory analogue or geometric figure is presented 
as a substitute for a work of art. Equally it cannot be argued 
from non-reaction or failure to respond aesthetically in an 
experiment that the person is incapable of aesthetic appreciation. 
In the light of this, it is essential for the experimenter to 
establish the kind and range of stimuli in the presence of which 
the person comes up with distinctively aesthetic reactions. In 
addition the experimenter must determine to wliat degree stimuli 
presented to an individual in an experiment arouse in that 
individual phenomena analogous to those that would occur in
112
spontaneous aesthetic appreciation.
(d) All psychological measures must be both valid and 
reliable. There are many ways in which validity can be established. 
However, in order to be valid an aesthetic measure must take count 
of the points raised above. In addition there are many other 
specific points which will be raised in the discussions that 
follow. Reliability on the other hand raises a slightly different 
problem. Kelly (1955) has joked that reliability is a measure 
of what makes a test insensitive to change. This is in the context 
of his notion of personality which is 'ever in flux' so the notion 
of test-retest reliability has little meaning. It is difficult 
to determine whether measures of aesthetic reactions should be 
required to be stable in this sense or whether reliability is an 
irrelevant conception. The answer to this question depends upon 
the exact function of specific measures. It is at least a question 
that should be answered in relation to each of the many different 
forms of aesthetic measurement. As a general rule, in the absence 
of empirical evidence, it is unreasonable to assume that measured 
reactions should be stable and characteristic of a person. Experience of 
art is something that is constantly evolving and changing. On the 
other hand reactions to very simple stimuli in experiments (plain 
colours and simple geometric shapes) are likely to be stable and 
may v;ell account for their all too common use as stimulus material 
in experimental studies.
Ill Characteristics of aesthetic measurement may be broken down
as follows:
A. Characteristics of the stimulus
1. Molar or molecular
2. Representative or specially grouped:
a) ad hoc tests
b) psychometric tests
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3. Natural or modified stimuli
4. Originals or reproductions
5* Objectively or phenomenally defined
B. Characteristics of the task
1, S reacts normally
2. S is asked to react by;
a) giving free verbal responses
b) arranging stimuli in order (ranking)
c) assigning numbers to the stimuli (rating)
d) using other scaling techniques (ratio estimation)
e) grouping the stimuli (sorting)
f) miscellaneous techniques
3* S is asked to make a choice:
a) between pairs of stimuli
b) from a group of stimuli
4. S is asked to modify the stimulus
C. Characteristics of the analysis
1. The results may be studied at face value
2. They may be compared to a criterion
3. They may be correlated with other variables
4. They may be structured in some way
This classification is somewhat artificial, as the separate 
divisions are not mutually exclusive. They are presented in this 
form in order to assess the assumptions underlying each technique. 
Often these are glossed over in general discussions of the 
approaches of specific experimenters. There have only been two 
serious reviews of aesthetic measurement. Child (1964) concentrated 
on the problem of criterion, and McAliinnie (I968) discussed 
several approaches to aesthetic measurement but did not discuss 
the significance of the individual techniques comprising a particular 
approach, and the underlying assumptions.
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IV Some definitions:
a) Aesthetic judgement refers to the attribution of 
aesthetic value to a work of art. Theoretically an individual 
should be able to grade a work of art as good or bad, independently 
of whether or not he likes it.
b) Aesthetic preference refers to an individual’s liking 
or disliking a work of art.
c) Aesthetic sensitivity is the degree to which an 
individual's preferences and judgements correspond to some external 
standard.
These definitions correspond closely to those given by 
Child (1964) and as definitions accord well with common-sense.
The interrelatedness of these concepts can be seen in Child's 
technique of evaluating preferences against a criterion (viz. 
expert opinion) so that simple preferences become a measure of 
artistic sensitivity. In other words Child is using an individual's 
likes and dislikes as a measure of his degree of agreement with 
the judgements of experts. In this case the judgement is implied 
by the preference. I shall use the term judgement to refer only 
to the direct attribution of value implied by the use of terms 
like beautiful, great, sublime, good, etc. In addition to the 
above it is necessary to distinguish between:
d) aesthetic reaction which refers to the totality of 
behavioural and experiential responses coordinated into a 
meaningful whole, and
b) aesthetic response which refers to the isolated response 
to a specific component of aesthetic measures.
Aesthetic reaction embraces the non-evaluative description 
of the way an individual sees or interprets or experiences a
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a painting, and is in part composed of the measurable aesthetic 
responses, as well as all the thought and feelings which determine 
an individual's overall reaction to a work of art.
A. Characteristics of the Stimulus.
1, The choice between molar and molecular stimuli
This is perhaps the biggest choice facing the psychologist 
entering the field of experimental aesthetics for the first time.
The choice is between using whole integral molar paintings as 
stimuli, or using laboratory analogues in the form of simple 
geometric (molecular) stimuli. It has already been noted that 
experimental aesthetics began at the molecular level with Fechner's 
(1876) study of preferences for rectangles. Since that date the 
molecular and molar approaches have existed side by side fluctuating 
in popularity (Valentine I962). Today the use of molecular stimuli 
is most common, and is generally associated with the tough-minded 
approach to aesthetics.
By confining itself largely to objectively quantified
parameters of colour and form, the molecular approach assumes
that more rigorous control over the stimulus is achieved. In his
rejection of molar stimuli Berlyne (1971) has put this point very
strongly; 'It is impossible to say which, or which combination,
of .the many variables distinguishing two works of art may be
responsible for any difference that may be discovered between
reactions to them'. It could be due to anything from semantic
content to social custom. Similar arguments have been put forward
by Eysenck (1957) and Valentine (1962). Thus the use of molecular
stimuli helps to eliminate these irrelevant factors. The
experimenter is then free to systematically vary or manipulate the
stimuli because they have been vigorously defined or quantified.^
_
Even the objective quantification of form in simple geometric 
stimuli is fraught with difficulties and disagreement. See the work 
of Hochberg and Brooks (I960), Stenson (i960, I968); Brown and 
Andrews (I968); Brown and Owen (l9o7), Behrman and Brown (I968); 
Michels and Zusne (I965)» discussed in chapter six.
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In this way it becomes easier to measure the effects of the 
independent variable on dependent responses. Typically the ^
variables manipulated have been simple lines and geometric shapes, 
plane colours and colour combinations, complexity, and information 
levels, though Berlyne's collative stimuli have also added an 
elementary cognitive dimension in his use of variables like 
incongruity and novelty. For the most part it is argued that 
molar works of art are too complex to permit identification of 
the characteristics determining reactions to them.
The chief disadvantage of molecular stimuli is their low 
'ecological validity' (Brunswik 1956; Gibson I966). In other words 
the stimuli have not been drawn from, and are hence not representative 
of, the real situation to which generalisations must eventually 
be made. The molecular stimuli in order to have any degree of 
ecological validity must already possess the parameters that 
characterise the 'stimulus domain'.^ As this has not been shown 
to be the case then the results of experiments vdth molecular 
stimuli may be spurious and irrelevant to the perception of art.
The Gestalt approach to perception has laid great emphasis on 
dependent-part qualities. In Kohler's (1959) words; 'Parts of 
molar perceptual units often have characteristics which they do 
not exhibit when separated from those units', A related argument 
against the use of molecular analogues has been developed by 
Harré and Secord (1972), They reject the practice of treating 
the attributes of people as parameters which can be held constant 
or varied on the assumption that they are logically independent
The most commonly used shapes are the polygons which can be 
generated randomly according to Attneave and Arnoult's (1956)
Method I. More recently it has become common to generate stimuli 
using computers (Noll 1972; Kawano 1972).
^In chapter three it was noted that Berlyne has assumed without 
empirical proof that his collative properties are the common 
features underlying all. artistic form.
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properties, which is a necessary assumption underlying the quest 
to relate independent variables to dependent ones. As Harre 
and Secord argue, the attributes of people are not logically 
independent but are interactive, and the most important ones of 
all may not exist in isolation. This argument could apply 
equally well to the use of molecular stimuli. Of necessity, most 
emphasis is on formal qualities, and there is no reference to 
meaning, content, feeling etc. which must interact with the way 
the form is perceived. Any of these variables when added to the 
molecular characteristics may nullify the effects observed in their 
interaction. On the whole there is a general reluctance to test 
hypotheses which have been formulated with molecular stimuli, on 
reactions to integral works of art.
It can also be argued that the control exercised over
molecular stimuli is more apparent than real. Peters (1942) has
pointed out the danger of committing what he calls the ’stimulus
error'. This consists in the identification of stimulus variables
independently of human reactions. Peters argues that qualities
like complexity, unity, balence, and symmetry are not intrinsic
characteristics of the stimulis themselves but are a function of
the individual's reaction to them. The use of molecular stimuli
does not entail that all the experimental subjects are responding
to the same independent variable in the same way merely because
']
the experimenter has embodied it in the stimuli. This is a 
recurring problem in experimental aesthetics. Quantiliability is 
therefore not a specific advantage of using molecular stimuli, as 
it is much more realistic to specify aesthetic stimuli in 
phenomenal terras.
This is clearly revealed in a study by Barnhart (1940) who revealed 
that his subjects were less interested in the Order or Complexity 
of Birkhoff's polygons than in their intrinsic shape, their 
association value, and their potential for use in designs. Attnenv© 
(1959) and Zusne (1970) have also revealed the discrepancy between 
objective specification and phenomenal experience.
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Tne molecular approach has led to an obsession with the 
response and the stimulus as separate categories* There is a 
tendency to ignore the true 'dynamical context' (Bloom196l) in 
which the individual's past experiences, his anticipations and 
feelings all come to bear on his perception of a work of art* 
Consequently, the molecular approach suffers generally from a lack 
of naturalism. There is a real difference between affective 
responses, i.e. liking-disliking for simple shapes, and experience 
of that art wnich is 'expressive of the unfathomable mystery of 
pure being' (Huxley 1959). This point can also be made of 
experimental studies using molar stimuli, but at least it can be 
said that aesthetic reactions and experience are much more 
likely to occur in response to real paintings, than to Eysenck's 
polygons or Berlyne's collative stimuli.
In conclusion then, the disadvantages of the use of molecular 
stimuli seem to lie in the difficulties of generalisation to 
natural aesthetic experience in relation to real works of art.
The neglect of meaning, even the 'set' that the stimuli are 
aesthetic stimuli, makes the interpretation of the results extremely 
haZmardous. Experimental rigour is attained at the price of 
destroying or ignoring what is essential to the subject-matter.
Even the degree of control over the stimulus is more apparent 
than real, as the applicability of phenomenal measures suggests.
This does not mean that the molecular approach should be 
abandoned altogether for there is a case for studying reactions to 
simple geometric stimuli and plain colours. Peters (1942) has 
noted, and recent studies (Vanderplas et al, 19^5 * Kolt-ïïansen
1971) have demonstrated,the great variability and complexity of 
reactions to simple stimuli. In addition Valentine (1952) and 
Osborne (1964) have argued that lines and colours have an appeal 
and beauty of their own which should be investigated. This is fair 
enough as an aim of the psychology of art, but it must be remembered 
that findings with such simple stimuli cannot be generalised to
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the aesthetic experience of works of art without some form of 
test. Notable among the few ideas which have originated with 
molecular stimuli and have been successfully applied to real works 
of art are Bullough's perceptive 'types' (Bullough I910) and the 
theory of empathy (Lipps I903). Perhaps the opposite procedure 
would be more fruitful. Hypotheses derived from studies with 
molar stimuli could be rigorously tested \n.ta molecular stimuli, 
and finally be tested by transfer to new molar stimuli."*
The argument against the exclusive emphasis on molecular 
stimuli is very strong. On the other hand the loss of experimental 
rigour in the use of molar stimuli also presents difficulties for 
the experimenter. In the course of the remaining part of this 
chapter attempts to maintain cogency will be discussed 
doing so it is necessary to discuss briefly three approaches 
have utilised molecular stimuli, and which represent the greater 
part of research effort of experimental aesthetics.
(a) Birkhoff's (1933) attempt to quantify the relationship 
between the order and complexity components of works cf art to 
aesthetic value has already been discussed. Expérimental eraluatiens 
of Birkhoff's formula have tended to provide partial confirmation, 
though the correlations between M (aesthetic value) and avers gei 
rank orders for his polygons have tended to ce well below nnr-ihcff*s 
figures (Wilson 1939» Brighouse 1939; Beebe-Center and Iratt 19pn; 
Barnhart 19^0) and one study found no relation at all Clavns Urt-), 
Two investigators (Eysenck 19'4lc; Harsh, neebe-Jenoer ami neeoe— 
Center 1939), recommended modifications to Birkhoff's formula which 
increased the size of the correlation between M anc 
ratin{S or rankings. Thereafter Birkhoff's metnod an1 po.
In this context Hogarth's 'Line of leauty ', ann tne 'coluen 
Section are legitimate areas of investigacicn wnxcn can oe tes 
with both molecular and molar stimuli.
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seems to have lapsed into oblivion until it was raised again by 
Eysenck (1963). He factor analysed ratings of all Birkhoff's 90 
polygons, and extracted thirteen interpretable factors, and a 
higher-order factor of order-complexity. In a later study he 
compared the ratings of the polygons by artists and non-artists, 
and established that non-artists tend to like more complex polygons 
than the artists though most of the polygons were equally liked, 
(nysenck and Castle 1970b), Eysenck has argued that the order- 
complexity factor lies at the basis of preference judgements 
(Eysenck 1971a). Birkhoff's work has now been left far behind, 
though his set of 90 polygons survives as a measure of aesthetic 
preference widely used by Eysenck (1972b; 1972c; Eysenck and 
Caburo 1971; Eysenck and Iwawaki 1971) and others (Eisenman 1968a). 
There is no reason why this assortment of polygons should be taken 
as a standard set of aesthetic stimuli, and their exclusive use 
as aesthetic stimuli should be discouraged.
b) The work of Frank Barron holds a dual position in that 
the greater part of his work is concerned with molecular stimuli 
(Barron and Welsh 1952; Barron 1953) with an emphasis on preferences 
for complexity-asymmetry versus simplicity-syrametry as a personality 
variable. Barron is unusual in that he relates a dichotomy based 
on molecular stimuli to preferences for molar paintings (Barron 
1952). The widespread use of the Welsh Figure Preference Test 
(Welsh 1959) and Barron's book. Creativity and Psychological 
Freedom (I96S) may have increased the acceptability of molecular 
stimuli in experimental aesthetics.
Two groups, defined by their preferences for complex or simple 
figures respectively showed consistently different preferences 
for paintings. The subjects preferring complex figures tended to 
like modern, experimental paintings as well as the primitive and 
the sensual whereas the subjects liking simple figures tended to 
like religious paintings, and pictures embodying authority, and 
aristocratic power
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c) In visual aesthetics, at least, information-theoretic 
approaches tend to use molecular stimuli. This is because information 
levels nave to be defined as objective parameters of the stimulus, 
e,g. number of corners (Munsinger and Kessen 1964), angle of 
rotation (Arnoult 1957)» matrix grain (Dorfman and McKenna 1966), 
number of angles (Attneave 1957)» number of elements (Rump I968) 
and matrix grain (Kawano 1972). There has been no attempt to 
obtain technical measures of information from real works of art. 
Despite the apparent technical and numerical sophistication of 
the inform.^tion measures, they are little more than metaphoric 
interpretations of the mathematical processes underlying the theory 
(cf, Shannon 1943; Miller 1956; Attneave 1959; Garner I962).
Emphasis is placed on quantifying the information contained in 
the stimulus. Unless he is asked there is no way of knowing 
whether for each individual the objective information corresponds 
to his phenomenal experience (Peters 1942). A recent study by 
Moll (1972) clarifies this. He generated computer patterns with 
different degrees of randomness. Although subjects tended not 
to distinguish between stimuli that were statistically equivalent, 
each individual had a preferred level of randomness. There was 
no evidence for a maximal level of information determining 
preferences of the group.
It is too dangerous and facile to identify some form of 
aesthetic information with information in the technical sense.
Green and Courtis (i960) have argued that what should be measured 
is something in the process of perceiving itself and this necessarily 
embraces meaning. It is perhaps significant that the major book 
on information theory and aesthetics (Moles 1966) is concerned 
mainly with the studies of the information content of music, which 
by its sequential nature makes it more amenable to information 
measures. By contrast paintings present a vast and continuous 
range of possibilities which can be experienced in any order, 
unlike music. Recent work on eye-fixation studies in relation 
to pictorial perception (Yarbus 19^7) has revealed two important
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points of relevance. i?irst the various parts of the picture are 
fixated in a virtually random sequence. Secondly, some parts of 
the picture never come into foveal vision, and at any one moment 
only a tiny part of the picture is clearly seen (= to 1.3° of 
visual angle), as Iiochberg (1966) has argued the phenomenal 
picture is a construction in 'the mind's eye ' and is only partly 
determined by its iniuial information content. Information theory 
is concerned witn transition probabilities whereas perception is 
non—sequential. Information theory measures are appropriate to 
physical syntactic properties of the stimulus whereas perception 
embraces meaning (semantic) properties as well.
Eroadbent has discussed the application of information
theory to perception (Eroadbent 1964) and concludes that the
nature of the ensemble from which a particular stimulus is drawn
has been proved beyond doubt to be an important variable. On
the other hand quantitative applications of information theory
have proved less successful. Corcoran (1971) also rejects
information theory as an artefact of the experimental procedures.
The concept of redundancy cannot be applied to everyday situations
because it is impossible to define the total population from which
a stimulus is drawn. Berlyne (l971, 1972a) is enthusiastic about
information theory but he also can only apply it to his approach
2
and findings by analogy. The use of such terms as redundancy, 
channel capacity, information transmission (see Berlyne 1971 
ch.5 ) by way of post hoc explanation give a spurious sense of 
having explained phenomena v/hen all that has happened is that 
technical jargon has been substituted for common sense aescriptions.
Information theory approaches based on statistical specification
Eroadbent does ho'wever note that detailed quantitative application 
of the theories of information theory has been more successful in 
reaction-time studies.
^See his discussion of information-theoretic aestheticians. Most of 
this work is published in French and German; as yet there are no 
English translations.
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of and measurement of information and response should be 
distinguished from the information-processing approach to 
perception. This approach (cf. Neisser 196?; Haber and 
Hershenson 1973) lays stress on the processes by which the 
perceptual world is created out of the input to the senses.
Unlike the informâtion-theory model, the mind is not passive, 
single-minded, undistractable and unemotional as physical 
communication cnannels are. Seeing is an act of construction 
which makes more or less use of stimulus information depending 
on circumstances. The information-processing approach places 
emphasis on stages of processing e.g. iconic storage, short term 
memory etc., and the transformation of input into codes or forms 
of representation. In view of its great potential for the 
investigation of aesthetic perception, it is surprising that the 
information-processing approach has not been systematically applied 
to the study of aesthetic perception.
2 , Hepresentative or specially grouped stimuli
a) If the experimenter chooses to employ molar stimuli he
is faced with a difficult decision concerning the range of
stimuli used, and the manner in which they are presented. A
major choice is between using a fully representative range of
aesthetic stimuli or only using selected groups. The picture
post-card test devised by Burt (1933) and Bulley (1933) was
1extremely comprehensive in the range of art objects used.
Eysenck's (1940) study of the general aesthetic factor utilised 
a whole range of items including portraits, landscapes, oook- 
bindings, vases, mathematical curves, statues, and advertisements* 
More recently Jardinet (1938) and Bernard (1970) have constructed 
comprehensive tests of painting preference which were intendea
The list included chairs, book-cases, wine-glasses, teapots 
and embroidery.
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tobbe representative of all schools and types of art. Similarly 
Child (1962) attempted to be comprehensive in his selection of 
paintings in his test of aesthetic judgement. A problem with 
the attempt to be comprenensive is that it is almost impossible to 
achieve this and at the same time have a practical manageable test. 
Consequently, periods of art have to be excluded or single items 
represent a whole school, painter or period. This entails choice 
and value judgements on the part of the test constructor which 
could seriously influence the experimenter's findings and his 
ability to generalise from them.
It is probably more useful if the experimenter classifies 
the stimulus domain according to a set of rules. In this way he 
can concentrate on a selected number of categories. A common 
broad division is into abstract versus representational (Roubertoux, 
earlier and Chaguiboff 1971; Lindauer I969, 1970b; Knapp and Wullf 
1963)» A four-part classification was used by Knapp (l964) who 
divided his stimulus paintings into the realistic, the fantastic, 
the geometric, and the impressionistic, and Peel (1944) used only 
landscapes and still-lifes. If the molecular approach can be seen 
as a reaction against stimulus-chaos, then attempts to categorise 
and control molar stimuli in the ways described above are essential 
for both control and the need to sample comprehensively. It is 
certainly something that should be more seriously and more 
systematically taken into account in experimental studies.
All the tests described above were designed as experimental 
measures, rather than as tests to be used outside the frame-work 
of the experimental set-up. The disadvantage of these ad hoc 
tests is that it is impossible to compare results between different 
experiments. Pew of the tests are properly validated and testea 
for reliability, a notable exception being Child's test (19o2).
Many of the tests have been designed by the experimenter himself, 
often without the aid of art experts. There is a very real need
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to develop with the help of art experts a standard set of stimulus 
paintings which can either be grouped in pre—determined art 
categories or tax^en as a comprehensive whole* If only these 
stimuli were used, under a range of standardised conditions, then 
comparison between studies would be possible and the confusion 
that exists in experimental aesthetics would be reduced.
b) otandardised tests of art aptitude or art judgement 
would be the answer if they were more efficient (Anastasi I96I). 
Child (19^4) has drawn attention to the low positive correlations 
that have been found between tests ostensibly measuring the same 
thing, and a review by Michael (1960) concludes that the tests are 
inefficient in predicting success in art schools. Recently a 
number of studies have factor analysed performances on the Barron 
Welsh Art Test (Eysenck and Castle 1970a; St, Clair-Fenny 1937); 
and the Maitland Graves Design Judgement Test (Eysenck 1967)*
The analyses reveal that the single overall score on these tests 
conceals a complex interaction of separate factors which determine 
performance on the tests. Similar studies in which the test 
performance of artists has been compared with non-artists have been 
carried out using the Maitland Graves Test (Eysenck 1970b; Eysenck 
and Castle 1971; Child 1964), the Welsh test (St. Clair-Fenny 
1973), and the Meier test (Stallings and Anderson 19^9; Blottenberg
1972). The general trend of these results indicates that the 
tests no longer discriminate effectively between artists and 
non-artists, though they were originally designed to do so. It 
is a feature of these tests that a high score is obtained if the 
testee chooses those items which were liked by artists rather 
than non-artists in the original standardisation sample. These 
studies suggest that both artists and laymen today have changed
^Out of the 2126 tests listed in Tests in Print (Euros I96I) only 
1.4^ 3, or 29, are in the fine arts. Of these only 10 are concerned 
with visual art, three of which were first designed in the twenties 
or thirties.
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their criteria for aesthetic preferences, and that the tests are 
no longer valid tools with which to measure aesthetic sensitivity, 
judgement or artistic aptitude. Michael (I96O) concluded his 
review as follows: 'In probably no other area of testing is there 
a greater need for research and development than in the fields of 
music and visual art. It is to be hoped that during the coming 
decade systematic and novel efforts will be expended toward designing 
and validating new measures'. Regrettably fourteen years later his 
hope has not yet been realised though some interesting ideas 
have been proposed by Thomas (I963) and St. Clair-Penny (1973).
St. Clair-Penny (1973) has gone some way towards overcoming 
the problem of a static, out-dated criterion of correctness of 
response based on expert opinion by using the Welsh Figure 
Preference Test as a purely descriptive tool. He characterised 
groups of people in terms of the average rank order of preferences 
for each item on the test. In this way comparison between groups 
became possible through a purely descriptive measure, with no 
reference to the norms. A limitation of this technique is that 
it is highly test specific. It would be preferable to develop 
a standard set of representative molar (and molecular) stimuli 
and to use these in a purely descriptive way, to characterise the 
preferences of various groups. Thomas (I963) has criticised the 
fact that most tests are based on the assumption of a single 
correct criterion of good art. He recommends that separate norms 
be established and adjusted to different philosophies or 'schools' 
of art. In this way a testee could be classified according to 
which set of criteria be is using in making his judgements.
Similarly he could be classified according to the type of art he 
liked most. Other sections of the standard art test could measure 
art knowledge (identification of painters, periods,) art analysis 
(identification of media, detecting balanced and unbalanceo 
designs), style sensitivity (learning to discriminate between 
artistic styles) and so on. Ad hoc measures of art knowledge and
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analysis have been designed by Eisner (1966) and Bernard (1970) 
and a measure of style sensitivity would be easy to design as the 
criterion of correct response is totally objective. The Allport- 
Vernon—_,inosey ocale of /alues is not strictly speaking an art 
judgement/aptitude test, but rather a measure of attitudes to the 
political, economic, aesthetic etc. aspects of life. The test 
gives separate scale scores for the different domains and the 
aesthetic scale is often used as a measure of an individual's 
interest in art and related areas (Sisson and Sisson 1940; Knapp 
and Green 1959; Knapp 1964; Cost I966; Hood 1972). In line with 
the argument above this test should not be used without empirical 
study of its current validity and its relation to other aesthetic 
measures.
3 . Natural or modified stimuli
A.nother choice open to the experimenter is whether or not 
to present stimuli under natural viewing conditions. Meier's 
test (1942a) paired correct representations of painting and 
sculpture with modified versions, so that the latter represented 
a breach of some canon of art. By his choice the testee indicates 
his awareness of the basic canons of art. However, most studies 
using molar stimuli present normal paintings as stimuli under 
natural viewing conditions. There is however great potential 
for presenting paintings under degraded viewing conditions, as 
this is a well-tried technique for investigating perceptual 
processes generally. Tachistoscopic presentation is a little 
used technique in experimental aesthetics (cf. von Hitook in 
Valentine 1962, p.138-140; and Brighouse 1939b; Kellet 1939)»
It would for instance be a useful tool for investigating the 
hypothesis that works of art facilitate perceptual processes in 
some way which enhances their apprehension as an object (Chandler 
1934; Eysenck 1942; Valentine I962). Other useful techniques for 
investigating aesthetic perception as process, but which have not
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yet been tried out, include sequential part presentation,
(McFarland 1963); successive aperture viewing, (Parks 1963); and
stabilization of images on the retina, (reviewed by Keckenmueller
19op). All of these techniques, if systematically used, could
provide interesting data on the perception of works of art.
fij-
In a study of the nerception^the human face, Harmon (1973) has 
described two techniques for degrading the quality of the stimulus 
picture, viz. block portraits, and continuous smearing,  ^ which 
would be useful for testing hypotheses in a precisely quantifiable 
way.
4. Real worxs of art, reproductions or specially prepared stimuli.
This is the final major choice concerning the stimuli that are 
to be used in experimental studies. Despite the fact that 
reproductions are rarely accurate enough to give a clear idea 
of what a painting is really like, real works of art are hardly 
ever used in experimental aesthetics. Notable exceptions are 
studies by Munro, Lark-Horowitz and Barnhart (1942); Gordon (1933); 
and Lindauer C1969» 1970a, 1970b). Reproductions, usually in 
the form of picture-postcards, photographs and colour slides are 
smaller in scale, give no indication of the actual size of the 
original, lack a frame or any texture, and it is rare for the colour
To produce a block-portrait the image is divided into n x n grid 
so that each cell is given the average brightness value of tne 
area contained in it. For continuous smearing the image is 
divided into a 256 x 236 grid, so that the brightness level in a 
given cell is the average of n x n cells surrounding it. j.his 
would be a suitable technique for testing Gombrich’s demonstration 
that you can improve the aesthetic appeal of a poor academic 
painting (in this case a Bonnencontre) by breaming up the image. 
Gombrich used rolled glass to achieve this effect (see uomorich 
1963b, p.40).
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to be highly accurate.■' Above all, as Berger 1972 has argued,
the reproduction is simply not the same thing as the original
work of art. Essentially it is a mass produced image of something
other than itself. The reproduction is valueless, expendable and
replaceable. By contrast the original is unique, often highly
valued and has a mystique which is not associated with its
reproduction. Reproductions are therefore surrogates of the
paintings they stand for, so that results obtained with them should
potentially be general!sable to the original works. In doing this
the experimenter is handicapped by the lack of naturalism entailed
in the use oi reproductions. The practical advantages of using
reproductions in a laboratory setting are however very great.
On the other hand the use of real works may be essential if too
2
much verissimilitude is lost.
The practice of using reproductions in place of original 
works has never been properly validated. This is surprising in 
view of the fact that responses to reproductions must be 
functionally equivalent to reactions to the works of art they 
represent in order for generalisation to be possible. There 
have only been two tests of this correspondence. Grimes and 
Bordin (1940) have demonstrated that originals and reproductions 
are discriainable when people are asked to detect which is which.
-1
The National Gallery London currently sell a small post-card 
reproduction of the Leonardo cartoon which is brown in tone, as 
well as a larger version which is definitely green in tone (see 
Plates III and IV).
2
Lindauer (1973) has proposed the use of real abstract paintings 
as stimulus material because this avoids contamination of responses 
though attention to the theme or depicted content of representational 
works (cf. Gordon 1935 î Kelson and Mouton 1964). xlIso dominant* 
colour and tonal values can be controlled and to some extent 
manipulated. Consequently Lindauer's work has dealt solely with 
real abstract paintings (Lindauer 19^9» 197Gb, 1971). This seems 
to be an excellent compromise but has the disadvantage that reactions 
to abstract art may not be typical of all art especially among 
laymen (Tucker 1933)»
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but that they do not appear to notice the difference when they 
are not 'set' to. A more recent study by Dreher (I968) comparing 
reactions to coloured and monochrome reproductions and the real works 
found distinct differences in reactions and concluded that the 
psychology of art should be based upon interactions with real 
art objects, and not just reproductions. There is a serious 
need for more systematic investigations of the functional 
equivalence of originals ana reproductions as stimuli in experimental 
aesthetics.
There is nov/ever one sense in which this problem may not 
be so serious. Host art appreciation classes, and most 
experience of art (especially great art), and that located in 
other countries, is attained through the medium of photographic 
reproductions in books, and also from colour slides, postcard 
reproductions and to a lesser extent from film (cf. Kenneth Clark's 
television series 'Civilization'). In this sense it is certainly 
more naturalistic to use reproductions of molar paintings than it 
is to use molecular stimuli. A reproduction does at least possess 
some perceptual similarities, and some of the associations which 
are linked with the original, though as Malraux (1963) has argued 
so well, photographs can easily change the impact and significance 
of a work of art. It would, however, seem sensible to investigate 
the functional equivalence of reproductions and originals before 
much further research is carried out.
An alternative approach is to use paintings and drav;ings 
which have been specially executed for the purposes of a specific 
experiment. This procedure has been used by Klein (1968 ), as well
as by Getzels and Csiksentraihalyi (1969) * this way real
paintings can be used, and it is possible to exercise some control 
over them. For example, a wide range of artists or art students 
could be asked to draw the same object. Artists could also be
asked to draw the same objects in a variety of ways to convey
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different moods, interpretations etc. Alternatively the same 
artist could draw a great variety of objects to suit the 
requirements of the experimenter. It is surprising that this 
rich source of stimulus manipulation has not been tapped in 
experimental aesthetics. This is one symptom of the general 
reluctance of the psychology of art to utilise the special skills 
and knowledge of artists and art experts, who are at least on 
home ground.
B. Characteristics of the Task
In this section the choices open to the experimenter, 
concerning the experimental task, are discussed,
1. S reacts normally (or the 'just looks' approach). This 
is the purely behavioural solution to the problem of aesthetic 
measurement. The experimental subject is asked to look at the 
stimuli while various behavioural and physiological measures are 
made. The subject is not asked to 'give' any response while 
measures are made of his physiological arousal (GSR, eeg patterns), 
eye-fixations or the amount of time he spends looking at 
particular stimuli.
The first two measures (of arousal) have not been widely 
used outside the general frame-work of Berlyne's theory of 
aesthetic motivation though an important exception is a study by 
Smets (1973) who obtained direct physiological measures of 
arousal while subjects were actually observing molecular stimuli 
varying in complexity and colour. Ey comparison with arousal 
measures, eye-fixation studies are more common, though most of 
them have not been directly concerned with the psychology of art.
A very early study by Stratton (1903) used photographs of the eye. 
He claimed that his results disproved the 'muscular sensation 
theory' viz. that the pleasure of seeing a graceful curve or vase
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results from the ease with which the eye follows the line of the 
curve (see -ig«4—1) Stratton's measurements were probably not very
accurate, but considerable improve­
ments were made with the equipment 
designed and used by Buswell (1935) 
for his extensive study of the 
perception of pictures. However 
even this is inaccurate compared 
to the methods and techniques 
described in detail by Yarbus (1967) 
and kackworth (19^7)» Bearing in 
mind the relative crudeness of 
Buswell's techniques his study is 
exemplary for its systematic 
investigations of topics of great 
relevance to the psychology of art.
start
nd
Fig.4-1. Vase, Stimulus 
and the pattern of 
recorded eye-fixations, 
(from Stratton, 1903» 
p.242).
Although this study produced a large amount of data (discussed in 
chapter nine) it was marred by poor stimulus sampling (e.g. some 
generalisations were based on only one picture seen by one or 
two people), and also by poor statistical treatment. Buswell 
tended to present typical fixation patterns of a given individual 
rather than to reveal actual group trends. However, another 
criticism of Buswell's work also holds for recent eye-fixation 
studies of picture perception, (kackworth and Korandi I966; Yarbus 
1967; Loftus 1972). This is that they do not attempt to relate 
behavioural measurements to phenomenal experience. The person 
is regarded as a machine with moveable eyes rather than as an 
individual whose evaluation, preferences, feelings and expectations 
might be reflected in the way he moves his eyes in response to a 
given work of art, The studies mentioned above are important 
contributions to the general information-processing approach to
^It is interesting to note that the 'muscular sensation theory' 
was a basic premise utilised by Birxhoff (1935) in Bis aesthetic 
formula.
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perception (particularly pictorial perception). There has not, ' 
as yet, been a study which investigates the relationship 
between eye—fixations and the aesthetic experience and evaluation 
of works of art. Such a study could contribute much to an 
understanding of the processes of aesthetic perception particularly 
if it were linked to phenomenal measures of the type to be 
discussed below.
The time spent looking at a stimulus is a common independent
1variable in psychology. In the psychology of art there have been 
a number of studies which permitted very short viewing periods 
(tachistoscopically), while others have investigated the effects 
of spending a very long time looking at a painting. Martin (I906) 
asked her subjects to look at a painting for forty-five minutes, 
and Brighouse (1939a) has used similar techniques. Alternatively, 
looking-time can be used as a dependent variable, in order to 
determine how long a person chooses to look at a given stimulus 
(Gilmore 19^3; Lindauer 1971)* Other investigators have 
investigated the changing evaluation of works of art over a 
period of weeks or even months (Littlejohns and Keedhara 1932).
The chief idea underlying these studies is that the phenomenal 
object (in contrast to the physical object) changes over time.
This has been very neatly demonstrated in an experiment by 
Harding (i960) who showed that complex, difficult poems were at 
first disliked but progressively became more liked as a function 
of increasing familiarity. By contrast the simpler more superficial 
poems were liked at first, but with increased familiarity they 
became less liked. Harding interprets this by regarding aesthetic 
appreciation as a skill whicn is improved as a function of practice. 
Studies involving looking-time as a dependent variable in both 
continuous and repeated sessions would provide very valuable
^For a review see Leckart and Faw (19^6)»
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inf01 mation. on the development of aesthetic experience, particularly 
if it is related to phenomenal measures.
The o-dvantages of these behavioural measures are clear.
They are totally objective, and there are often no measuring 
instrumonu6 intruding between an individual and his natural 
response to works of art. However they have little value to a 
psychology of art, if used in isolation from other measures, 
particularly of the individual and his experience. This type of 
investigation snould be incorporated within a larger theoretical 
frame-work of research. As Deutsch (1964) has pointed out the 
collection of too much factual detail can conceal the essential 
structural relationships existing within complex behaviour and 
experience. Exclusive concentration on purely behavioural measures 
can lead to the accumulation of data on a large scale without a 
corresponding increase in our understanding of aesthetic experience.
2. (a) 3 may be asked to give free verbal reactions. A
large number of the experimental studies reviewed by Valentine 
(1962) had no other measure than verbal reactions and introspections 
in the presence of aesthetic stimuli. It has already been noted 
in chapter two that modern scientific psychology is very reluctant 
to use such methods, particularly since the overthrow of methodolo­
gical Introspection of the ’/urzburg school by Watsonian Behaviourism, 
The reaction has swung too far, for now it is thought that the 
collection of free verbal reactions is subjective and therefore 
unscientific. For example, Berlyne (1971) iii u chapter entitled 
'Impediments to Progress' includes the emphasis on verbal reactions 
as one of the reasons for the failure of experimental aesthetics.
In chapter two of this thesis it was argued that the rejection of 
introspection as a source of data which could be used to generate 
hupotheses for empirical testing, was itself unscientific.
One of the main advantages of free verbal reactions consists
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in. reminding the experimenter of the sheer complexity and subtlety 
of the phenomena he is dealing with. It is all too easy to forget 
when analysing the averages of seven—point scales, that for many 
people their response to great works of art are among the most 
important experiences in their lives, on a level with love for 
otners, and religious experience. Introspection can give insight 
to the nature of this experience and how it feels for others.
It also has the advantage of making each person an individual 
instead of merely a number, the psychological significance of 
which can easily be divorced from its quite different mathematical 
meaning (Gregson 1964a), Introspection confirms the complexity, 
variability and meaningfulness of aesthetic experience. The 
argument for the relevance of introspection has been strongly put 
by Harre and Secord (1972) who claim that 'the things that people 
say about themselves ... should be taken as reports of data that 
are relevant to phenomena that really exist and which are relevant 
to the explanation of behaviour.' This contrasts with the 
behavioural view of verbal statements as the phenomena themselves 
(cf. Berlyne 1972c, Eysenck 1972d, ch.7). The studies by 
Valentine (1962, p.125) and by Mortimer-Tanner and Naylor (I965) 
are rare exceptions to the general rejection of introspectionist 
measures.
There are serious difficulties with introspection as a 
measure of experience. Much has been written on the subjectivity 
and intrinsic biases of introspective data. Souriau (1955) has 
stressed that aesthetic appreciation when spontaneous, normal and 
direct is tacit, a point which was also made by Moles (1966). 
Language is extraneous to aesthetic experience, despite the fact 
that countless books and countless discussions on art have taken 
place through the medium of language almost from the beginning 
of history. ^ Thus to ask a person to verbalise his responses and
^There is a nice anecdote quoted in de Sausmarez (19^9) about 
Ben Nicholson's mother, who was also a painter, feeling the urge 
to go and scrub the kitchen table after hearing too much 'art-talk'
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reactions is to impose on him a special exercise which is quite 
different from natural appreciation. As such they should only 
be interpreted in relation to other measures of the individual's 
overall reactions. Verbalising may activate categories of 
response whicn are different from those of silent appreciation.
Two studies by Alexander (1960) and by Mirels and Efland (197O) 
both using multidimensional scaling techniques, have provided 
evidence which suggests that people can sort stimuli into categories 
v;hich they cannot describe. Finally, verbalization of reactions 
could be influenced by degree of verbal fluency, rather than an 
individual's actual experience and appreciation. This is an 
important limitation when making comparisons, e.g. between artists 
and non-artists, eetween social-economic classes, the sexes, etc.
An alternative approach is to restrict the use of words 
available to the subject by asking him to choose from an adjective 
check-list (Israeli 1923), a technique which is commonly used in 
studies of interpersonal perception (cf. review by Taguiri1968).
The difficulties of this technique lie in the choice and pre- 
classification of adjectives, and the possibility that an 
individual's use of an adjective is influenced by the restricted 
choice open to him, or that he might use the word in an unconventional 
way. The technique may give a spurious impression of objectivity, 
and give the experimenter a false sense of confidence in the 
meaningfulness of the data he collects.
(1 overleaf continued)
With reference to the value of artists talking about art. Bodkin 
(1934) has quoted the well-known dictum: 'bont't talk painter, paint:' 
Further examples of the superiority of images over words are the 
non-verbal pictorial essays to be found in the series of books 
edited by Kepes (1965a, b; 1966a, b) and also in Berger (1972).
The photo,:jTaphic essay was always an exciting feature of BIF& 
magazine (see The Best of Life, 1975» Time-Life Books, N .Y .). The 
work of I'hotographers like Bill Brandt or Cartier-Bresson all 
illustrate the way in which images can apeak louder than words.
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In general the use of introspection and free verbal 
reactions should not be discouraged* It is a legitimate source 
of data for generating hypotheses and for providing background 
material. Of particular importance are the introspections of 
artists, either about particular works of art, or art in general. 
Collections oi artists' writings on art such as Goldwater and 
Treves (1943) and Herbert (1964), and the writings of the verbally 
fluent painters such as Leonardo da Vinci, Joshua Reynolds, 
Kandinsky, Paul Klee and Henry r.oore, are highly relevant sources 
for a psychology of art. The three volumes edited by Holt 
(1937, 1938, 1906) presenting documentary material on art from 
the Kiddle Ages to the Nineteenth Century provide invaluable 
source material for the art psychologist. So long as it is not 
the only technique employed, introspection is an extremely 
important tool in the psychology of art.
2. (b) 3 may be asked to rank-order the stimuli: the subject 
can be asked to rank stimuli for overall preference or liking 
(e.g. Burt 1933; Eysenck 1940, 194la) on the basis of specified 
dimensions like colour, content, composition, mood etc. (e.g.
Peel 1944; lickford 1943; Helson and Houton 1964); or pleasingness 
and interestingness (Berlyne, Glgivie and Parham 1968) or novelty 
(Berlyne and Parham I968). There are two basic assumptions
*An important distinction is drawn between what artists say or 
write about their work or art in general, and what art critics 
and theorists say about the artists. '<.liereas the artists account 
may be considered as primary data for the psychology of art, the 
writings of theorists etc, provide no more than auxilliary back­
ground material, unless their interpretations are being empirically 
investigated in their own right. It is essential for the art 
psychologist to be familiar with art theory, and the various 
interpretations of a given artists work, but he should not rely 
on them exclusively for generating hypotheses about aesthetic 
experience. Gombrich has provided a very useful bibliography of 
artists writings on art and theories of art in The Story of Art 
(Eleventh Edition, 1966, pp. 471-473)*
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underlying ranking as an aesthetic measure, viz, that subjects 
can meaningfully order stimulus paintings from most-of-X to 
leasL—of-k, and that differences in ranking reflect genuine 
differences in overall reactions between subjects. On an a 
priori basis it is difficult to justify either of these 
assumptions. In view of the complexity of works of art it has 
to be demonstrated empirically that the stimuli can be 
meaningfully ranked on single dimensions (e.g. content or realism) 
v;hile ignoring others (e.g. colour, mood, period, style, technique 
and so on). As a measure,ranking on pre-determined dimensions 
is a gross simplification of aesthetic reactions because it does 
not reveal why and on what bases the paintings are really being 
ranked. This is likely to vary between and within individuals 
and is likely to vary with each painting used. The main practical 
advantage of ranking is that it produces large amounts of 
quantitative data with great facility. The analysis of ranked 
data, especially correlations and factor analysis rests on the 
assumption that the criteria being used by each individual are 
stable throughout ranking, and that they do not change during 
ranking. Unless each person is asked there can be no guarantee 
that this is happening. There is strong evidence (Gibson I963» 
1969) that perceptual learning can take place with mere exposure 
to complex stimuli in the absence of extrinsic feed-back. 
Consequently familiarity alone may alter the individual's capacity 
to perceive the stimuli and bring about changes in his criteria 
of judgement (cf. Harding 196S).
This point is particularly important when the stimuli used 
are both large in number and heterogeneous. Burt (1933) asked 
subjects to rank over 30 picture post-cards ranging from 
reproductions of classical master-pieces rignt down to 'the 
most flashy birthday cards', and Eysenck (I940a) asked his subjects 
to rank l3 sets of picture material of various kinds making a 
total of 281 elements for ranking. In later studies (e.g. Eysenck
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1968) subjects have been asked to rank Birldioff's 90 mono­
chromatic polygons. Some doubt has been thrown on the validity 
of these extensive ranking tasks by kest and Bendig (1956) who 
found that test-retest reliability of rankings declined as a 
function of the amount of intervening ranking activities. With 
large quantities of ranking significant amounts of random error 
appeared in the final rankings. The authors called this 
phenomenon'aesthetic fatigue' in ranking. Similarly the absence 
of anchors, or the nature of the anchors themselves have been 
shown to produce distorted reactions as a result of changes in 
adaptation level (Fillenbaum I963)» In addition it can be argued 
that presenting a set of criteria for respective rankings limits 
the freedom of the subject to react and forces him to respond 
even when he has no real responses to make. This is a feature of 
all techniques which structure the kind and type of response the 
subject can make by providing dimensions and categories to structure 
the individual's responses.
2. (c) S may be asked to rate the stimuli. The subject may 
be asked to indicate his responses to stimulus paintings by 
assigning numbers to them on scales presented to him by the 
experimenter. The widely used 5 or 7 point scale is probably 
the most popular measuring device in experimental aesthetics, 
both within and outside the frame-work of Osgood's theory of 
Semantic Space (Osgood et al. 1957) which has contributed greatly 
to its popularity as an aesthetic measure. As a technique rating 
is highly adaptable and generates a large quantity of numerical 
data easily and quickly. The main underlying assumption is that 
assigning a number on a scale in response to a painting is 
equivalent to (or isomorphic with) the persons reaction to the 
work of art or aspects of it. As with ranking the superficial 
appearance of objectivity in such a technique, and its ease of 
generating results amenable to sophisticated analysis has led to 
its adoption and wide use with insufficient critical and conceptual
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analysis. It cannot reasonably be argued that assigning numbers 
on a scale represents an individual’s total aesthetic reaction. 
Usually the individual is asked to record ratings on a small 
number of scales, without any other attempt to obtain additional 
information from him. In addition there is a tendency for users 
of rating methods to analyse averages of the ratings and to 
regard these as typical of a group.
Gregson (1954a, 1968) has demonstrated that the same stimulus 
painting can be rated differently according to its position in a 
series. For example, a given painting was more highly rated at 
the end of a series than the same painting when it appeared at the 
beginning of a series. Similar data, throwing doubt on the 
stability of aesthetic ratings has been presented by Dornic and 
Kuric (1970) and Ferguson (1972). It appears that with successive 
presentations of the paintings the subjects' frame of reference 
shifts. This is probably a function of changes in adaptation- 
level (Helson 1964). Dornic and Kuric (1973) argue that direct 
methods of measurement (viz. rating and ranking) should be 
abandoned.
Thurstone (1959) has argued that the aesthetic value of an
object is entirely determined by what goes on in the mind of the
percipient, and it is almost impossible to find exact stimulus
correlates. Cn the other hand Saw (1973) has argued; 'To fail to
1insist on the correlation between reaction and qualities of the 
object is to risk falling into the modern heresy that it is the 
state that is important and that it does not matter how you got 
those'. Thurstone's argument is too extreme but it is at least 
in the right direction. The use of rating techniques is an 
inadequate attempt to externalise what goes on in the mind of
1Huth Gaw is a philosopher and is not here using 'correlation* 
in a technical sense.
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the percipient. Rating as a measure is probably more suited 
for use with stimuli of great simplicity, (e.g. Birkhoff polygons). 
It is surely only the convenience and ease of use of the 
technique that accounts for its continued use.
2. (d) 3 may be asked to scale the stimulus-painting by 
other methods. Systematic evaluations of techniques of scaling 
aesthetic value have been carried out by Ekman and Klinnapas 
(1962a, 1962b) and by Dornic and Kuric (I967, 1970). The first 
pair of authors have compared paired-comparisons, ratio estimations, 
and category estimations of the same stimulus-paJ-ntings. From 
the derived scales they found that the interval and category
scales are a logarithmic function of the ratio scale. They 
argue that a 'true' interval sea! 
methods vis. paired comparisons.
1
cale can be derived from the indirect
A feature of many multidimensional scaling studies is that 
the experimental subjects are not asked to evaluate paintings 
for certain qualities like composition or colour or for their 
effects on the individual (e.g. pleasingness). Instead the judged 
similarity of stimulus paintings presented in pairs is being 
scaled (Klein I968; Skager, Schultz and Klein I966; Kirels and 
Elfland 1970; Soude 1972a, 1972b). Subsequent factor analyses 
provide descriptive bases for characterising both individuals and 
groups according to the criteria they have used themselves. As 
the task is based solely on similar!ty-disimilarity judgements 
the obtained results are not contaminated by the input (scale 
labels etc.). In addition the task is easy to perform and appears 
natural to the subjects. The most valuable and interesting 
results of factor analyses have emerged from studies using this 
technique.
This is based on the criterion of the ratio scale derived from 
the ratio estimations by Thurstone's Case V,
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2. (e) S may be asked to sort the stimuli in some v;ay.
The subject can either be asked to successively sort the stimulus- 
paintings according to a single dimension thus producing a rank- 
order (e.g. Silver, Landis and Messick I966), or he can be asked to 
sort them into categories which can either be of his own choice 
(Alexander 1950) or supplied by the experimenter. As an indirect 
method of ranking it has the advantage of placing less strain 
on the sorter, and maintains a degree of naturalism by the 
avoidance of numbers, and the fact that the individual can choose 
his own criteria. The latter need not even be verbalisable as 
they are implied in the sorts that an 3 makes. In their study 
Silver, Landis and Messick (1956) used the technique of successive 
interval sorting. Subsequent analysis revealed five different 
viewpoints for judged similarity none of which corresponded to 
analysis of averaged individual ratings. It is surprising that 
this technique has not been widely used in experimental aesthetics.
A variation of sorting is the repertory grid technique first 
developed by Kelly (1955) in the context of his Personal Construct 
Theory. The Repertory Grid assessments have been used in many 
experiments and have been used in many branches of psychology, 
both within and outside the frame-work of the theory (cf. Bannister 
and Mair 1968). Typically it involves presenting a range of 
stimuli (or elements) in triads. The subject is asked to describe 
how two of the elements are like each other and thereby different 
from the third. The verbal labels attached to the distinction 
represent the individual's construct. This process continues 
until the person cannot suggest any more constructs. Then all 
the elements are assessed (e.g. by ranking or rating) in relation 
to the elicited constructs. The task is simple and pleasant to 
perform. Although it provides essentially idiographic measurement, 
nomothetic measures are possible (Bannister and Kair, 1968). The 
technique is highly flexible, and adaptable to a great variety of 
experimental conditions.
1.4-3
The Repertory Grid technique has not been widely used in 
the psychology of art, Davisson (1971) in an exploratory study 
investigated the structure of individuals' evaluations of 
paintings and found that the technique revealed reliable 
differences between people. Pope and Thomas (1972) have used 
the grid as an aid to self-expression in art, and Carver (1969) 
successfully assessed the value-structure of reactions to films 
by critics and teenagers. Although this technique has the great 
advantage of eliciting the individuals' or groups' construct 
structure, it does have the limitation of relying on verbal 
ability in eliciting and naming of constructs. Alexander (1960) 
has noted that multidimensional scaling (in this case bivalent 
sorts of molecular stimuli) revealed certain dimensions along 
v;hich the stimuli ranged. The subjects' efforts to verbalise 
the basis for their judgements (using a grid technique) bore 
little relation to these dimensions. Alexander warns of the 
danger of forcing individuals to group stimuli only in ways that 
they happen to have words for. Kith this warning always in 
mind, the Repertory Grid can still function as a useful aesthetic 
measure•
2. (f) Miscellaneous measures. These include a biographical
index to predict aptitude or sensitivity to art (Lawrence 
Ellison, Fox, and Taylor 1972); measures of how much money 
people spend on art (paintings, books, reproductions, etc.) 
(Bernard 1970); frequency of visits to galleries, and exhibitions 
(Roubertoux 1970); knowledge of art (Eisner i960); and even a 
device which records the footsteps of museum visitors without 
their knowledge (Bechtel 1967)* V/hen these are used within a 
framework of other measures, they all have a useful role to play. 
It is only when they are used in isolation that they become less 
meaningful. They are also important in helping to meet the 
'naturalism' requirements discussed in an earlier section.
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3. (a) S is asked to make a choice between, members of a pair. 
This was the method used by Bulley (1934, 1931) and by Child (1962), 
and characterises the majority of standardised art aptitude tests.
It seems to be a feature of this approach that the choices made by 
subjects are evaluated against a criterion. In terms of the test 
there is a correct and an incorrect choice for each item. The 
problem of using a criterion in aesthetic measurement is discussed 
separately below.
Alternatively every stimulus can be paired with every other 
one systematically (i.e. the method of paired-comparisons). Ekman 
and Kunnapas (1962a) and Dornic and Kuric (1970), have argued 
that the paired comparison method is an ideal aesthetic measure, 
especially with untrained people, since it only involves either-or 
decisions. This is more natural and easier than rating or ranking.
At the same time the paired-comparison method can yield sophisticated 
measurement at the interval level. However, even this technique 
is not without its difficulties. Kennedy (196I) has demonstrated 
a 'central tendency' effect in aesthetic judgements in that subjects 
tend to prefer stimuli towards the centre of the range presented 
to them, even though they were presented in pairs. The same 
figure was the least preferred in one series of small triangles 
and the most preferred in a series of medium sized triangles.
Kennedy attributes this to the fact that subjects are expressing 
preferences even when they have none. They resolve the dilemma 
by simply choosing the least extreme of the stimuli presented to 
them. This experiment has serious consequences as most paired- 
comparisons studies involve molecular stimuli. It would be 
interesting to repeat this experiment with molar stimuli in order 
to see whether a similar central tendency effect is found in 
judgements of paintings. The paired-comparison method using 
molar stimuli, linked to multidimensional scaling would seem to 
be a useful technique, especially when this is associated with 
verbal measures and introspections.
14-5
5. (b) 3 is asked to make a choice from an array. An 
interesting technique has been developed by Gardner (1970a, 1970b, 
1971a). It is a match-to-sample task in which each individual 
is presented v;ith a stimulus painting, and is asked to select 
from an array of four, a painting by the same artist. Gardner 
claims (1971a) that the task can be used to measure 'sensitivity 
to style*. It is fairly natural, non-verbal, and highly 
adaptable to experimental conditions (see Gardner 1971a.» 1972a).
In addition it can provide a progressive record of each subject's 
performance. By careful arrangement and choice of stimuli in 
the array the experimenter can determine the basis for each 
subject's choice. It further has the advantage of engaging the 
attention and interest of the subject in a problem-solving task,
V/ith due care this technique could be widely used in experimental 
aesthetics. It is one of the few aesthetic measures where the 
criterion of correct choice is purely objective.
4-, S is asked to modify the stimulus. This is essentially 
the 'method of production' (Fechner I876) and has been used by a 
number of investigators ; Pierce (1894) and luffer (1903) asked 
subjects to arrange lines on a surface to give a pleasing effect, 
and Daniels (1933)» and Kliorley (1933) investigated the ability 
of children to arrange material to produce compositional balence, 
and unity. For the most part these studies have used very simple 
stimuli, e.g. wooden blocks, sticks in a frame, etc. (cf. Holt- 
Hansen (1971) for a rare recent study). A very interesting 
device was designed by M. Morris (1957). He chose to investigate 
some hypotheses in relation to a specific work of art, viz.
Kenneth Martin's 'Composition: Black and Red' (1954) which consisted 
of a pattern of four plain black, and two plain red, rectangles 
on a white ground. A full-size model of the painting was made 
on which five of the rectangles could be moved in relation to a 
fixed rectangle by screw controls which were handled by the subjects who 
could arrange the rectangles as they chose. This technique has
146
enormous potential for investigating perception of balance, 
harmony etc. without necessitating any special skill on the part 
of the subject. The technique could also be used to assess 
the effects of varying actual paintings by Mondrian, Ben 
Nicholson (see Plate V), Malevitch and other painters who 
manipulate plain colours and pure shape and painters like 
Soulages and Yves Klein, Morris's technique would not be 
suitable for non-abstract painting, or even the majority of 
abstract painting. However, it should be possible to apply 
this method to more complex and varied paintings with the aid 
of computer-generated visual images under the control of 
experimental subjects (Kawano 1972).
Ill Characteristics of the Analysis
1• The data derived from a variety of aesthetic measures 
can be treated at face value. Essentially, this occurs when 
verbal reactions and introspections are categorised by the 
experimenter (cf. Bullough I908). It is also characteristic of 
the Psycho-analytic and Gestalt approaches to the psychology of 
art. This kind of data has two main advantages. It can lead to 
understanding and insight on the part of the art psychologist. 
This can be turned into hypotheses which can be empirically 
tested. Alternatively the data can be subjected to quantitative 
treatment. At this level the only possible analysis is at the 
nominal level, i.e. in terms of the number of people falling 
into different categories. Liam Hudson has argued for this 
approach(Hudson 1972) and has also demonstrated its potency 
(Hudson 1968). His method achieves considerable cogency, whilst 
preserving a large degree of naturalism and psychological 
meaningfulness, which is not distorted by statistical artefact.
>1
Hallach (1959) has used a similar technique when he asked music 
students to complete specially developed 'unfinished* pieces of 
music•
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Measuring scales are not essential requirements for accurate 
description as the latter is a pre-requisite of designing the 
scales in the first instance,
2. The obtained data can be evaluated against a criterion.
There have been two major approaches to the use of a criterion. 
Individual results are compared either with the average preferences 
of the group (Eeebe-Center 1932; Eysenck 1939» 1940, 1937) or they 
may be compared to the judgements of art experts, (Child 1902,
1964; and most art judgement tests). It is difficult to determine 
exactly how and on what basis the consensus of a group can be 
held to be a criterion of v;hat is aesthetic. Eeebe-Center 
concerned himself with a search for the universalities of human 
nature upon which the idiosyncrasies of individuals were imposed.
He argued that averaging across groups eliminated the idiosyncracies, 
leaving concensus as a measure of the true basic objective appeal 
of a stimulus. This argument (with more biological emphasis) 
has been explicitly adopted by Eysenck (1957). It is difficult 
using concensus as a criterion to separate universal aesthetic 
value from any agreement arising from group conformity, or the 
shared values arising from common cultural experience. It has 
been stressed several times already that individual differences 
in the way works of art are perceived, are the rule and not the 
exception. Child (1962) in support of his own position has argued 
that it doesn't make an individual insensitive to works of art 
if he doesn't agree with the majority opinion of a group. In 
this study he demonstrated a strong negative correlation between 
concensus and experts' opinion. Child goes further and says 
that aesthetic sensitivity is found only among a minority group 
in the population. Child locates this sensitive group by
'I
determining the degree to which they agree with expert opinion.
■Tj-------------------------
The Agreement ranged from +.69 to -.29 and is strongly correlated 
with personality and cognitive variables (Child 1964, 1965).
See chapter seven.
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By his present methods Child appears to be studying the experts 
indirectly by means of the preferences of ordinary people. In 
addition he cannot be sure that he is not measuring conformity 
to art standards rather than the processes which are genuine 
components of aesthetic reactions. Child's method would be 
more acceptable if he called his measure 'agreement with experts' 
instead of 'aesthetic sensitivity'. It is really a descriptive 
measure.
It would appear that consensus is a stable characteristic 
of a group. Gordon (1923) utilisating rank order preference for 
Oriental rugs found that intra-group agreement averaged around 
+.13, but the averaged rank order for the group correlated with 
another group very strongly (+.94). In a similar study Child 
(1962) found an average intra-group correlation of +.23 and an 
inter-group correlation of +.o3. This suggests that the agreement 
within a group, though small, is a stable characteristic. However 
there are no grounds for claiming that agreement with group 
concensus is an objective index of aesthetic sensitivity (Eysenck 
1937). Degree of agreement with group consensus is also a 
descriptive measure.
The value of using a criterion (of either expert opinion 
or group concensus) as a standard of the aesthetic is questionable. 
Experimental aesthetics strives to be strictly factual in inquiry, 
and the notion of evaluating responses should not enter into the 
design of a study unless agreement with averaged values of the 
group or those of experts are specifically being investigated. 
Unless an individual's ability to distinguish poor art from good 
art is being investigated then the use of a criterion in 
experimental aesthetics is not a necessary requirement.
In conclusion, neither 'consensus* nor 'expert opinion' 
should be set up as objective standards of aesthetic value.
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However agreement of an individual with the average judgements 
of a group, and the degree to which individuals agree with 
experts are important descriptive measures in the psychology of 
art •
3. The obtained data cen be correlated with other variables.
In experimental aesthetics there have been a very large number
of correlational studies in which picture preferences or
evaluations are correlated with a large number of variables
1ranging from food preferences, attitudes, somato-types, 
complexity preferences, socio-economic class, education, sex, 
intelligence, and almost all aspects of personality and cognitive 
behaviour (hc.hinnie 19b3; Child 19^9; lickford 1972). Despite 
this enormous effort experimental aesthetics does not possess 
an accummulated body of knowledge or experimental data which 
helps increase our understanding of behaviour and experience in 
relation to art. There is still no central body of facts which 
can be used by the art teacher or the art theorist. This is 
largely due to the great variety of stimuli, subjects, and measures 
employed and the emphasis on discrete variables. Vague unstructured 
correlational studies should be avoided unless they form a part 
of a systematic attack on a problem. The multifarious correlational 
studies which characterise the work of McV.liinnie, Sisenmann,
Knapp, Child and many others cannot be related to each other, and 
taken as a whole do not contribute greatly to the psychology of 
art. There is a very great need for systematic planning and 
standardisation of methods, particularly in the context of large 
scale programme research.
4. Finally, the data collected may be structured by factor 
analysis. The intention of factor analysing the results may
^Sheldon (1940)
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determine the manner in which the data are obtained. It is not 
surprising in view of the large number of correlational studies 
in experimental aesthetics that there should also be a large 
number of factor analytic studies. They are noteworthy chiefly 
for the lack of agreement which exists between the separate 
studies. Even factor analyses of a set of standard stimuli can 
produce different factor structures. Responses on the kelsh 
Figure Preference Test were factor analysed by Eysenck and Castle 
(1970a) who found four orthogonal higher-order factors (viz. 
simplicity and three different aspects of complexity: geometric, 
irregular, and representational). Using the Welsh Test (St. Clair- 
Penny 1973) revealed a single geometric factor corresponding 
to Eysenck's first factor, and in addition three orthogonal 
factors relating to different aspects of asymmetry, but which 
were too complex to be labelled.
The validity of a factor analysis depends largely on the 
validity of the measures used. Factor analysis utilises 
sophisticated statistical techniques which can be applied to 
numerical data regardless of the way in which the data were 
obtained, given that it is at an acceptable level of measurement. 
There is a risk that the analysis may be too sophisticated for 
the crude measuring devices being used. Cnee obtained it is 
easy to forget that the resultant factor structure was derived 
from data based, for example, on ratings which involve an enormous 
loss of relevant information, and also a distortion of what is 
obtained. In experimental aesthetics there is a tendency to 
measure and analyse phenomena merely because statistical techniques 
are available, rather than to base measurement on a criterion
1
It should be noted that Eysenck only allowed 15 seconds for 
looking at each design, whereas Fenny did not impose a time 
restriction. Penny used the Revised Art Scale of the UFPT 
(V/elsh 1959) and Eysenck used all the items which occur in either 
version (Barron and Welsh 1952; kelsh 1959).
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of psychological meaningfulness. There is no point using levels 
of measurement and analysis higher than is required to be 
psychologically meaningful or to test a hypothesis.
This point is discussed in more detail in chapter six where 
it is argued that factor analysis has limited value in the 
psychology of art unless the factors can be tested for validity 
outwide the frame-v/ork of the stimuli and responses which gave 
rise to them. To some extent this point is also true of 
multidimensional scaling techniques, though they have the 
advantage of laying,greater stress on individual differences 
rather than on the general structure.
U . Comparisons between measures. Before concluding this 
chapter reference must be made to a number of studies which 
compared different aesthetic measures. Berlyne (1965) has 
argued that *It is not safe to assume that all so-called measures 
on aesthetic appreciation or preference are measuring the same 
thing, and assumptions about the ways the various measures are 
related cannot be trusted without empirical study.’ A similar 
point has been made by Wallach (1959), Child (19^4), HcWhinnie 
(1908), and Hogg (1969a). For almost as long as standardised art 
tests have been in existence they have been intercorrelated with 
each other (cf. Carroll 1952; Dewar 1958). Child (1964) reviewed 
these studies and revealed ’the general finding that standardised 
tests of aesthetic sensitivity are not very highly related to 
each other'. These are all tests which are designed to 
differentiate between artists and non-artists, but as we have 
seen the tests do not appear to do so with contemporary samples 
(cf. St. Clair-ienny 1975). There has obviously been a change in 
aesthetic preferences since the tests were designed. It has also 
been argued that there is no advantage in using a criterion for 
1
Correlations ranged between +.21 and +«51
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evaluating aesthetic responses per se. It is preferable to use 
the tests as purely descriptive measures. In this way it should 
be possible to avoid anomalies such as the correlation of -.32 
between two tests of aesthetic sensitivity, viz. Child's test 
(1962) and the revised Meier Art Judgement test\ found by 
Stallings and Anderson (1969).
More interesting perhaps are several studies in which a 
greater variety of standardised and other tests of aesthetic reactions 
are compared. Child (1964) compared preferences for smells, 
colours, polygons, and painting reproductions with preferences 
on the MGDJT, the Bulley test (1951), and his own test (Child I962). 
The last three tests utilise a criterion of expert opinion for 
assessing aesthetic sensitivity whilst the first four are purely 
descriptive. Child found a significant positive correlation 
between preferences for the various visual molecular stimuli, but 
they did not correlate with preferences for the smells, the 
paintings, nor with the sensitivity measures. The Bulley Test and 
the Child Test(both utilising molar stimuli) correlated highly with 
each other but not with the MGDJT (which utilises abstract designs). 
Eysenck (1972c) has recently thrown light on the relationship 
between different measures in two interesting studies. In the . 
first, the aesthetic measures consisted of (a) 10 pairs of items 
which were highly loaded on factor I (i.e. symmetry-asymmetry) of 
the MGDJT ; ^  (b) the ten most liked, and ten least liked of
Birkhoff's polygons (from Eysenck 1968); and (c) the ten most 
and least liked of Hornung's (1952) designs from Eysenck (1971).
^Meier (I963 ).
^Eysenck's factor analysis of the MGDJT (Eysenck 1967) revealed 
five separate factors which contributed to the overall score on 
the test, viz. (a) symmetry-asymmetry; (b) three-dimensional 
design; (c) complexity not included in (a); (d) simple, unbalanced, 
irregular design; and (e) an uninterpretable factor,
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Factor analysis of preferences on the three tests based on a 
sample which was highly representative of the general population 
(it = 484) revealed separate, almost independent, factors 
representing performances on each of the three tests. Eysenck 
concluded that aesthetic sensitivity to stimuli of the kind used 
in the experin.ent is relatively specific and does not extend 
from one set of stimuli to another. In the other study Eysenck 
(1572b) co;npared the performances of artists and non-artists 
on the MGDJT, Child's test, and Birkhoff's polygons. Analysis 
revealed that the tests were measuring different things, and 
there was no evidence that one test was superior to the remaining 
two in differentiating between artist and non-artist. Eysenck's 
conclusion is consistent with the other study: 'Perhaps there is 
no unitary single ability called aesthetic sensitivity'. Instead 
he argues, there might be fragmented and partial sensitivities.
This finding highlights the need to use correlations of an 
individuals resronses with expert opinion or with group consensus, 
not as criteria but as purely descriptive measures. There is a 
great need to evaluate and compare the different types of measure 
being used and to greatly extend the work of Dornic and Kuric 
(19^7, 1970) end Ekman and Ivunnapas (1962a, 1962b) who have 
compared different methods of scaling aesthetic reactions. As 
yet little work has been conducted to investigate the relationship 
between verbal and non-verbal measures, though Berlyne has an
'I
article in press on this topic. The comparison, and evaluation 
of aesthetic measures should be regarded as an absolute priority 
in the psychology of art. Vjhen descriptive measures with 
standardised stimuli and response mechanisms have been established 
hypotheses in aesthetics should be tested using 'converging
'Interrelations of verbal and non-verbal measures used in 
experimental aesthetics'. In press, but see Berlyne (1972c).
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'I
operations' (Garner, Hake and Eriksen 1956). Although this is 
an essential technique for 'closing in on non-observable 
processes' in any experimental investigation, it is particularly 
important in experimental aesthetics when different measures 
appear to be measuring different kinds of sensitivity. Hypotheses 
cannot be tested using stimulus specific measures, unless this 
is required by the hypothesis being tested. There is a need for 
a set of standard descriptive measures which may be utilised 
in whole or in part according to the experimental requirements..
If only part of the set of stimuli is used then the generalisability 
of the results is decreased and is limited to the types of 
stimuli sampled. Though low external validity is sometimes 
necessary for the first experimental explorations of a hypothesis, 
high ecological validity should always be the ultimate goal. All 
too often experiments utilise one or two aesthetic measures ivdth 
selected unrepresentative stimuli without any attempt to test 
the applicability of their findings with other measures and other 
stimuli.
1
The authors define converging operations as 'any set of 
experimental operations which eliminate alternative hypotheses and 
which can lead to a concept which is not uniquely identified with 
any one of the original operations, but is defined by the results 
of all the operations performed'.
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CHAPTER FIVE
An Integrated Approach to the Psychology
of Art
•Concepts lead us to make 
investigations; they are the 
expression of our interest 
and they direct our interest•.
Wittsrenstein.
Except for the blind we all look at objects, though we do not 
scrutinise them unless that is our specific purpose. For the most 
part it is sufficient to obtain enough information from an object 
to avoid bumping into it or to identify it in order to do something 
with or to it. This applies to all objects, including people and 
paintings. However, all objects can be looked at more closely either 
for the greater information this gives (e.g. the year and make of 
car) or for the effects of tailing a closer look (e.g. the pleasure 
derived from what is seen). Every object can be looked at in three 
different ways. The numismatist looks at coins differently when he 
is asking as collector and when he is using money to buy a bar of 
chocolate. In the latter case the coins are familiar to him and it 
is only necessary for him to distinguish different denominations 
on the basis of shape, size and colour. In the former case the 
numismatist is seeking information from the coins themselves which 
will tell him its denomination, date, country, mint, condition.
When he uses money to buy things then he sees the coins functionally, 
hdien he seeks to derive information from them he is adopting a 
theoretical viewpoint. Finally the same person could look at some 
coins purely because of qualities inherent in the coin e.g. its 
patina, modelling, proportions etc. In this sense he is looking at 
the coin aesthetically.
The three ways of looking at coins described above correspond 
somewhat crudely to the three modes of perception described by 
Vernon Lee (1915). They are not presented here in an explanatory 
capacity but rather as a starting point for determining whether
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aesthetic perception and the perception of art are to be treated
as classes of perception in general or whether there is some
important sense in which they should be regarded as special types
of perception. For the sake of clarity aesthetic perception
refers to the perception of any object which is apprehended for
its own sake whether it be a pattern of telephone v;ires on the
horizon, a beautiful woman, a flower or any object which is not
being looked at functionally or theoretically. The perception of
art is a subcategory of aesthetic perception in v;hich the object
is a work of art. Hot all art perception is aesthetic. For
example the valuer or restorer must regard the art object in
functional and theoretical ways, though this does not prevent him
from regarding the same object aesthetically, Mace (1972) has
recently explored Lee's three types of perception in an attempt to
'[
elucidate the notion of the 'aesthetic attitude'. The word notion
is used deliberately for at one level there is fairly general
ox
agreement among aestheticians that aesthetic experience^perception 
involves a distinctive kind of contemplative object (viz. a work
2
of art), as well as a distinctive kind of contemplative attitude 
on the part of the observer (Osborne 1970)* If it is possible to 
draw the many differing interpretations together (e.g. ïïungerland 
195^ Î Osborne 1970), and to ignore different degrees of emphasis, and 
the different aims of the theorists then some general degree of 
consensus appears to emerge. In general aesthetic experience involves
1
See also chapter 9 of this thesis.
^Attitude in this context really refers to a distinctive mode of 
attcntional state which is often regarded as a necessary and 
sufficient condition of aesthetic experience. The terra is not to 
be confused with the conventional psychological definition'of an 
attitude, e.g. as an enduring disposition characterising a person's 
feelings, beliefs, behaviours towards a object or class of objects. 
There is of course a sense in which a person could possess attitudes 
to art (e.g. as measured by the Allport-Vernon-Lindsey'Scale of 
Values). Consequently the 'aesthetic attitude' is to be distinguished 
from attitudes to art.
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some degree of heightened awareness (either of the object or of 
the observer) which may or may not involve a feeling of pleasure.
This is most easily achieved through a sustained observation of 
a work of art which involves a certain kind of attention to 
the intrinsic properties of the object and its depicted content 
(if it has any) with no reference to its function,^ value, information 
content, or any other extraneous factor. Perhaps to say this is 
not very much and to a philosopher it might seem outrageously 
naive, however, it has two distinct advantages. First, it gives 
the psychologist a starting point. He does not have to accept 
this as an accurate description of aesthetic experience, but it 
does at least give him an idea of what he is looking for. Secondly, 
and this is related to the first, it should remind him, among 
other things, that ratings of 'pleasingness *, liking, beauty, are 
responses only and not the totality of aesthetic reaction or 
aesthetic experience in general.
It has already been accepted that the psychologist must 
try to avoid assumptions that are not supported by empirical data.
His chief objective is to obtain an accurate reliable description 
of aesthetic experience before he can attempt to explain it.
Before elaborating a frame work which may help the psychologist in 
this task, it is helpful to note the origins of the notion of 
aesthetic experience. The notion of regarding something aesthetically 
is a fairly modern conception which has arisen from our increased 
exposure to art of all kinds, from all countries and all historical 
periods. Seen out of context, separated from the purpose for 
which they were made, art objects of the past have come to be 
judged by criteria which are intrinsic to themselves (Malraux 1954).
In this sense objects, once functional in their own cultures, 
have become aesthetic objects in ours. Now the modern emphasis
'^ The term 'aesthetics' was first used by Alexander Eaumgarten 
(1714-62). It derives from the Greek word for perception.
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is to produce objects purely for aesthetic contemplation (Osborne 
1968, ch.10) rather than solely to fulfill religious, social or 
ideological functions, though some writers cling to some of these 
ideals.
The art psychologist is entering a world where disagreement 
and philosophical debate are pursued partly in the interests of 
determining the truth and partly because such debate is enjoyable 
in its own right. This suggests that whereas answers and certain 
conclusions will not necessarily be found in their writings, clues 
of great value will be. For example Aiken (1955), in his discussion 
of aesthetic perception, has distinguished three different 
approaches which separately or in combination may have some bearing 
on the psychological study of aesthetic perception. The first 
school of thought Aiken calls 'aesthetic sensationalism'. This 
is the view that the aesthetic is given immediately in sensation, 
for example, in Bell's (1914) words : 'You only need a sense of 
form and colour to appreciate a v/ork of art'. This school of 
thought has argued that aesthetic or symbolic meaning is irrelevant 
to the appreciation of art. A slightly less restrictive theory 
is that of 'aesthetic perceptualism' which lays emphasis on the 
self-motivated, self-gratifying exercise of perception for its own 
sake. Any cognitive function, such as thinking or information 
seeking, is regarded as a distraction from the exercise of pure 
aesthetic perception. Finally the 'aesthetic attitude' is defined 
as that disposition or set of dispositions that is involved in 
the contemplation of beauty, in which questions concerning ontological 
status, correspondence to reality, utility, etc. are irrelevant.
This conception does not involve the satisfaction of a need which 
is the case with aesthetic perceiitualism. There is both agreement 
and disagreement expressed in these views. They will probably
'I
cf. Berger (I98O) who defends the Social Realism of 'official' 
Communist art.
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sustain philosophical discourse for centuries to come.
It is into this framework of thinking and writing on aesthetic 
experience that the experimental psychologist brings his own 
methods and techniques of analysis. Although the psychologist's 
function is primarily empirical it is necessary for him to analyse 
the problem first. It is the aim of this sectionna lay a ground­
work for the psychological investigation of aesthetic experience, 
in the narrow sense of pure aesthetic perception of works of art. 
Consequently there will be less emphasis on the behaviour surrounding 
the production and appreciation of works of art. This is also 
the concern of experimental aesthetics but I shall argue that most 
work to date has concentrated on peripheral areas such as the 
correlates of preferences for paintings instead of investigating 
aesthetic experience in response to the paintings themselves. To 
use an analogy from archery, much empirical and experimental work 
has been done around the edges of the target but virtually none has 
been aimed at the ’bull's-eye*.
As Mace (1972) succinctly put it, ’An object must be recognised 
and identified before it can become an object of aesthetic perception. 
The crucial question is, what more?’ In the first instance it is 
obvious that aesthetic perception is a special class of the 
perception of objects in general. Paintings are often perceived 
merely as illustrations which are approximations of visually 
perceived reality. Many studies have demonstrated that this is 
the main criterion by which artistically naive adults, and children 
in general, judge paintings. In this sense, psychology has already 
made a major contribution to the perception of paintings even though 
seen as non-aesthetic objects.
The main problem seems to be the 'what more' quoted from Mace. 
Perhaps it is this quintessential componant which makes aesthetic 
experience oualitively different from perception in general and
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which causes artists and philosophers alike to reject or ignore 
the crude and seemingly irrelevant findings of psychologists.
Perhaps they believe as Eraque did that 'You can say everything 
about a painting except the bit that really matters'. Perhaps it 
is this failure to appreciate the significance of the 'what more' 
of aesthetic perception that has led to the arid banality of so 
much work in experimental aesthetics in which most work has 
concentrated on establishing the determinants and correlates of 
preference for paintings. This tangential approach to experimental 
aesthetics reflects both the lack of reliable guidance from 
philosophical aesthetics and the inappropriateness of traditional 
teciiniques and methods in psychology. Kennick (1958) has argued 
that there is no single set of criteria by which we can recognise 
aesthetic judgements (and by implication) aesthetic experience.
This lack of guidance has forced most psychologists into unimaginative 
operationalism which ignores aesthetic experience in the true sense, 
and which conceals the crudity and inappropriateness of the methods 
and techniques employed under the general label, 'scientific'.
The experimental study of person perception has much in 
common with the experimental study of aesthetic perception. I 
propose to explore the similarities and differences, both as 
processes and as experimental investigations, of person perception 
and aesthetic perception respectively. In this way I hope to show 
how the psychological investigation of aesthetic perception can be 
improved and made more relevant. This does not imply that the study 
of person perception has succeeded whereas experimental aesthetics 
has failed. It means only that experimental aesthetics can benefit 
from an analysis of the process and investigation of person 
perception, which is an area more familiar to most psychologists 
as a field of enquiry.
l6l
I The Perception of Objects, People and Paintings:
Some Definitions :
'I
(a) Object Perception here refers to the normal perception of 
everything in our environment which in a philosophical or 
practical sense can be said to be an o b j e c t T h i s  includes 
books, houses, trees and mountains but excludes ideas, abstractions, 
relations, states of mind, etc.
(b) Person Perception has been neatly defined by Taguiri (1968) 
as the process by which we perceive and know the characteristics 
of other persons. In the sense that this involves perceiving the 
facial and bodily appearance of another person it corresponds to 
the perception of objects generally. However, in the sense that 
the process of person perception involves an assessment of another 
person's personality, mood, intentions, etc. it is essentially 
person perception and not object perception. Person perception is 
also referred to as interpersonal or social perception.
(c) Aesthetic lercertion is here referred to as the process 
involved when an aesthetic attitude is taken toward a painting, in 
the sense outlined above. It does not embrace reactions to 
paintings which are not aesthetic in the sense defined. These 
non-aesthetic reactions although relevant to experimental aesthetics 
should not be confused with aesthetic perception per se.^
']
An exact definition of perception is not required here. However 
it is perhaps useful to note that it is taken to mean something in 
accord with Gregory's interpretation of perception as the process 
of 'making remarkably efficient use of strictly inadequate, and 
so ambiguous, information for selecting internally stored hypotheses 
of the current state of the external world' (Gregory 1970). 
Differences in the interpretation of perception as a process should 
not seriously affect the discussions which follow.
cf. Gibson's (1951) definition of an object as 'a closed physical 
surface envelopping a substance of some kind'.
^This highlights the weakness of the operational definition of
(continued..)
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A Comparison of Cbject,Person and Aesthetic Perception
(a) Variation in Reference. The definitions given above 
embody the differences in the subject-matter of the three classes 
of perception. Person Perception only refers to people whether 
physically present to the observer (direct perception) or mediated 
by surrogate stimulation (photographs, television or paintings) 
in ivhich case it is indirect perception. Reactions to surrogates 
are only classed as person perception when the observer is judging 
the characteristics of the person portrayed. Cn the whole aesthetic 
perception refers only to works of art or objects which are 
functionally regarded as such (e.g. objets trouvés). The
1aesthetic appreciation of nature deserves separate treatment.
Since paintings and people are objects within the visual 
environment the findings of the psychology of object perception 
are relevant to the extent that people and paintings share the 
defining characteristics of objects generally.^ Although psycho­
physical considerations of shape discrimination, identification 
thresholds etc, are of great importance we also 'need to understand 
how the process of perception is affected by other concurrent 
mental functions', (e.g. set, mood, past learning, predispositions, 
deprivations), and how these functions are themselves affected by 
the operation of the perceptual processes, (Bruner and Goodman 1947).
(from overleaf)
aesthetic perception (and experience) as reactions in the presence 
of a work of art. There is no basis for distinguishing reactions 
to the painting as illustration or object, and reactions to the 
painting as illustration or object, and reactions to the painting 
as aesthetic object.
1 ^For instance, see the discussion by Saw (1975).
2
Gombrich (I96O) in Art and Illusion drew heavily on the work on 
Ames and the Transactionalist School to illustrate the role of 
expectation and mental s\.t in the perception of pictures.
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These determinants of the perception of objects generally are 
vitally important to the understanding of aesthetic perception.
(b) Variation in Complexity. All objects vary in their degree 
of complexity, i.e. the amount and/or variety of constituent 
elements. Today the trend is to call this 'information' in the 
technical sense. Some objects are very simple in perceptual terms 
(e.g. cricket-balls, bus-stops, balloons), while others are very 
complex (buildings, trees, landscapes, people and paintings).
Running across this distinction of complexity is one of meaning­
fulness. Regarded as a physical stimulus (e.g. using Gibson's 
(1950) notion of the transitional probabilities between parts) 
many paintings are simple (e.g. the Suprematist paintings of 
î-ialevich (1878-1935) or the ITeo-Rlasticisra of Mondrian( 1872-1944) 
or the drawings of Paul Klee (lu79-1940). Despite this these works 
are rich in meaning and connotation. The cognitive processes 
involved in responding aesthetically to these paintings must be 
high level in nature. Brunswick (1956) has made much the same 
point with regard to the perception of people: 'Human appearance 
and especially the face constitute as tight a package of innumerable 
contributing variables as might be found anywhere in psychological 
research'. Regardless of the degree of physical complexity of 
the stimulus, person and aesthetic perception both involve high 
level cognitive processes. Until there is empirical data on 
this point there are no a priori grounds for determining w'hether 
high level cognitive processes are sufficient or necessary 
conditions of aesthetic experience.
1
See Malevich , Mondrian and Klee on their own work in Herbert 
(1964).
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(c) Variation in dynamic qualities. Come objects are static, 
some can move and others have moving parts. All paintings are 
physically static so the psychological study of space and movement 
perception of objects is not relevant to the aesthetic perception 
of paintings, unless they fall into the category of Cp or Kinetic 
art. Viewed as a physical object, or illustration, studies of 
pictorial depth perception are extremly important. Similarly 
the perception of depth and movement is particularly relevant 
to the perception of Film, Dance and Drama. Arnheim (1933) in 
Film as Art argued that it was the very inability of the cinematic 
form to reproduce reality perfectly that gave scope for the 
expression of artistic qualities by making effective use of the 
limitations of the medium, and has recently reaffirmed this point 
in relation to painting (Arnheim 1972). By contrast people are 
always moving except in photographs. This movement must facilitate 
our perception of others because it gives more information, the 
ambiguity of which is reduced by contextual cues (cf. Gombrich 
1972d). A photograph or a painting represents an instant in time 
in which antecedent and subsequent events can only be suggested, 
and not depicted. It is not surprising that it is often impossible 
to tell whether a photograph depicts a smile or a grimace, or that 
a person may look unfamiliar or not like his real self, or 
alternatively a painting or photograph can look more like the 
person than the person himself.
However, there is an important sense in which paintings are 
not static. The observer may perceive what Langer (1957) has 
called 'virtual movement', viz. the impression that the form and 
masses in a painting seem to move, or are about to move in relation to
1
This does not, of course, apply to medieval and early Renaissance 
paintings where events separated in time are simultaneously 
presented on the same canvas, e.g. Masaccio's 'The Tribute Honey', 
c .1427, in the Branacci Chapel, Sta,Maria del Carmine, Florence.
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each other. The galloping horses portrayed by Degas look as
though thep really are racing along even though the pigment is
totally static; wrestlers in bronze by Pollaiuolo (1429-98)
2
really look as though they are in the middle of a fight. By 
contrast both styles (e.g. Ancient Egypt) and particular p&inters 
(e.g. Louis Le Kain, 1593-1648, Plate VI) are noted for their 
static qualities and lack of 'virtual movement'. A different 
interpretation of dynamic qualities has been given by Arnheim 
(1951» 1954) who lays emphasis on the patterns of stress and 
tension which result from the formal compositional organisation 
of tlie painting a.-d the intrinsic expressiveness of the elements 
of painting. He argues that a painting's aesthetic qualities 
derive directly from the dynamic qiu:lities of the stimulus pattern.
There is however a third sense in which a painting may be 
dynamic. This is the ch_..uge in the perception of a painting which 
develops over time as a result of increasing familiarity. This 
ide,a has been expounded by Roman Ingarden ( 1962) and by Osborne 
(1970), who refer to the gradual changes that occur over time in 
'the arees of indeterminacy' that exist in a painting. It is 
these changes which progressively transform the painting from an 
ordinary neutral object of perception into an aesthetically 
perceived object. To use Ingarden's term the work of art is 
'actualised' from the physical object by the person ivho perceives 
it, becoming for him something that is unique and private. This 
dynamic actualization of the aesthetic object is another feature 
which adds to the difficulty of studying aesthetic perception.
It is interesting that the concept of actualization may correspond 
to a similar process in person perception when a person originally 
perceived as a stranger becomes an acquaintance and is eventually
The Daces at Longchamp, I872, Paris.
2
Hercules and Antaeus, c.l4?5. National Museum, Florence.
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perceived and treated as a friend or loved one, i.e. the progression 
from stereotype to a unique individual. Consequently in this 
important sense the perception of people and paintings may be 
regarded as dynamic.
(d) Variation in Function. People with sight need to see
'I
objects in order to go about their day-to-day lives. In this sense, 
object perception is vital. Similarly judging the intentions, 
moods etc. of other people is essential if we are to engage in 
smooth social encounters with them. Argyle (1969) has laid great 
stress on the importance of accurate person perception as a major 
component of social skills. He argued that serious deficiencies 
in this ability could lead to psychotic withdrawal, or in a less 
serious form to anxiety, because of clashes with other people 
which would result from not perceiving them accurately enough. 
Aesthetic perception is entirely different. It is not essential 
for day-to-day living in the practical sense. It is essentially 
a minority activity indulged in by a relatively small number of 
people. I-iost people live in sublime ignorance of the claimed value 
of aesthetic experience, though many writers have argued that 
there is an increasing need to develop aesthetic sensitivities in 
us all to improve or maintain the quality of life. Eodkin (195^) 
claimed that the aesthetic experience of paintings help to 'ennoble 
and fortify our human nature', though others have claimed more 
practical advantages which would accrue from a greater emphasis 
on aesthetic education (Read 1943, Arnheim 1969; Reid I969)* If 
their ideas were adopted on a large scale, aesthetic perception 
could play a role in our lives at least as important as person 
perception though on quite a different plane.
1Gregory (1966) noted that 90/ of the information from our 
environment reaches us through the eyes.
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(e) Variation in frequency of occurrence. Consciously or 
unconciously we see objects all the time our eyes are open, éven 
though we may not be attending to them. Although we only see 
people when they are present (apart from hallucinations) we only 
indulge in person perception when we need to form some opinion 
about the mood, personality or intentions of another person.
People are part of our daily lives, works of art are not, unless 
we specifically seek them out. Given that an individual is 
aesthetically sensitive and is in the right mood, and there are 
no distractions, whether or not he responds aesthetically is not 
a matter of choice for him. There is a sense in which the 
aesthetic reaction is triggered by the stimulus painting (Foss 
1952; Mace 19^2) possibly by some form of innate releasing mechanism 
(lid'O or a learned equivalent. Typically, time and energy is spent 
seeking out aesthetic stimulation. The observer chooses how,
when, where and for how long he will look at a painting. He can 
come back time and time again. His reaction is not determined by 
physical change in the painting, though in person perception 
reactions are contingent on the behaviour as well as the appearance 
of the stimulus person. Usually the aesthetic observer contemplates 
the stimulus at his leisure. VHien perceiving another person he is 
constrained by many factors including social etiquette, time, 
unfolding events, and the necessity for concentrating on other 
matters at the same time. Person perception is functional and is 
practiced when required. Aesthetic perception is contemplative 
and determined by the observer, though it can be triggered by a 
v/ork of art.
(f) Variation in expertise and authority. There are no human 
experts on the perception of objects, though mechanical aids (e.g. 
telescopes, and microscopes) are used to extend human perceptual 
powers, Equally, no one is taught to see objects, though fine 
discriminations and other perceptual skills are taught especially 
for industrial skills (Gibson 19^9i Annett 1969)* Children are not
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taught to see objects per se, nor are they specifically trained 
in the art of person perception. It is largely a question of 
trial and error learning rather than formal teaching. Although 
attempts are made to improve an individual's ability to perceive 
and judge others (Argyle I969) there are no experts in the skill 
itself. Ey contrast aesthetic perception receives formal 
training at schools and universities in a variety of forms (art 
appreciation, history of art, practical art, etc.). Although widely 
taught at school, very few children carry their lessons in art 
on into adult life (Feel 1954; Valentine I96O) which suggests,
'I
among other possibilities, that the teaching is not very effective.
A number of those who do carry their interest on into adult life 
eventually become art experts, the connoisseurs and arbiters of 
taste, (viz. painters, critics, art historians, aestheticians, 
philosophers). It is a major function of the experts to judge, 
interpret, explain, or expound art and works of art and to render 
them more comprehensible to the layman. They also provide 
guidance on matters of taste; they tell us how we ought to react.
As a result, the study of differences between experts and non­
experts in their reactions to art is a major field of enquiry in 
the psychology of art.
(g) Variation in the ran-e of accertr^ble reactions. Closely 
related to the existence of experts in the field is the fact that 
only a circumscribed range of experience and responses o.re 
considered proper when experiencing works of art. In other words 
there is a right reaction which is relative to the prescriptions 
laid down by the experts. Aesthetic experience is value-laden.
Some reactions may be considered cheap, trivial, misguided, whereas 
others are profound, moving, mystical, khen regarding physical 
objects most people agree most of the time. khen there is a 
disagreement this can usually be attributed to a causal factor such
1
See Chapter eight of this thesis.
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as a mistake or a hallucination. When there is disagreement over 
a work of art it could mean that one person lacks aesthetic 
judgement or sensitivity, or they have different value systems,
(i.e. belong to different schools of thought). In person 
perception differences in judgements about the same stimulus 
person are very common and often very large (Taquiri I968).
Despite this most people get along well enough. However, there 
is still an objectively true judgement corresponding to the 
characteristics of the stimulus person.
When looking at paintings there are considerable individual 
differences both in preference judgements and aesthetic evaluations. 
There are no objectively true évaluétions. There are only the 
opinions of the experts and the non-experts. The experts agree 
among themselves to some degree. Hurt (1933) has noted that when 
a wide range of stimuli are presented to experts covering a wide 
range of aesthetic quality there is a high degree of concensus 
between experts. This however reduces as the quality of the 
ixj.intings becomes more homogeneous. Despite this there is suggestive 
evidence that non-experts disagree among themselves more than 
the experts (Valentine 19o2). Pratt (1936) has argued that 
differences of opinion in regard to paintings result from the fact 
that people see different things when they look at the same 
painting. It is more likely that everybody sees the same thing 
in a painting but that they attend to different aspects of it, 
and give different weights to its various characteristics. The 
position is made even more complex by the fact that there are no 
hard and fast rules for identifying a work of art, or knowing that 
what one is actually experiencing is aesthetic in nature.
In art there are experts, but there is no reason why laymen 
should defer to one expert rather than another. This curious 
situation contrasts with person perception where everyone is his 
own expert and defers to no-one. In person perception differences
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of opinion about a given person reflect a wide range of error- 
making, In aesthetic perception a similarly wide range of 
reactions reflects differences in value rather than error. In 
this sense aesthetic perception is more like ethical judgements 
than the perception of the internal states of other people.
(h) Variation in assumptions about reference objects. Person 
perception is largely a matter of inference. It is a question
of making judgements about the unobservable characteristics of 
other people. Implied in this process is the assumption that the 
other person is a conscious organism, which is capable of thought, 
and can generate behaviour in the v/ays similar to the observer 
(Taquiri 1968). In aesthetic perception the object is an inanimate, 
complex, often revered object. In person perception the object 
is another person, which has the distinction of being more like 
the perceiver himself than any other object of perception. This 
gives the observer a unique opportunity to generalise from knowledge 
and experience of himself as a person to his perception of others. 
Paintings are a special class of objects in general which have an 
aura of mystique and subtlety, which does not permit the comfortable 
sense of being well-qualified to make judgements about them which 
is associated with person perception. This may explain the well- 
worn phrase: *I know nothing about art but I know what I like'.
(i) Variation in the mediacy of perception. Gibson (1954)
has postulated a theory of pictorial perception which is extremely
1important for experimental aesthetics. Ke makes the distinction 
between direct perception which is a process of 'becoming aware 
of an object', and pictorial perception which is the process of 
'being made aware of an object'. Representational works form the
Gibson has since modified this theory (Gibsoni966, 1971), but 
his analysis of pictorial perception is still valid and relevant 
to this discussion. For a discussion of the later theory see 
chapter nine.
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substantial majority of all paintings, (Indeed the number of 
purely abstract painting must be very small (cf. Read I960). The 
pure abstract painting is not relevant to this section.) Gibson 
described representational paintings as surrogates for real 
objects whether they be ideas, moods, events, ideals, or physical 
objects. Perception of a painting involves seeing it in a frame, 
or as a square of canvas which isolates it from the rest of the 
visual field. The perceiver must look at it as an entity in 
itself. Responses which are appropriate to the depicted object 
are not necessarily appropriate when perceiving a picture of the 
object. Consequently a special frame of mind or set is required 
not only to see the distal stimulus as a picture but also as a 
work of art. Gibson (1954) goes on to say that the same object 
can be perceived both as a flat object (a 2-dimensional surface) 
or as three dimensional space (virtual space). The ability of the 
perceiver to see the same distal stimulus either as paint on 
canvas or as a depiction and the relation this has to aesthetic 
experience is an interesting phenomenon which must be explained 
by experimental aesthetics. Finally, Gibson discussed the manner 
in which the painter can produce a painting which is the product 
of his own perceptual processes (of distortion, selection, etc.) 
which are characteristic of normal perception. Consequently, an 
observer can see a depicted object in a way that has already been 
processed by another perceiver (viz. the painter) and which he 
might process again. This is a feature of aesthetic perception 
which might account for the sense of heightened awareness that 
is sometimes experienced in perceiving a painting (cf. Koestler 
1964).
Just as there can be pictures of objects there can also be 
pictures of people, Gombrich (1972a) has recently asked how it 
is that a picture of a person can seem more like the person than 
the person himself, and Hochberg (1972) has attempted to explain 
how we can distinguish good likenesses from bad, and distinguish
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temporary expression from permanent facial structure in a portrait.
It would be interesting to see whether personality judgements of 
a person depicted in a portrait would show greater concensus among 
observers than judgements made of the real person. The study of 
pictorial perception is of very great relevance to the perception 
of paintings.
II The Empirical Study of Aesthetic Perception and 
Person perception
Both aesthetic perception and person perception are very complex 
processes. They are both important and can both involve questions 
of value, albeit in different ways. This makes empirical 
investigation very difficult- . It is not therefore very surprising 
that both fields of investigation should be in a state of confusion. 
Large numbers of studies are reported annually but there seems 
to be no guiding structure, no order,and very little progress.
As Taguiri (1968) put it, the study of person perception has been 
* hindered by an excess of empirical enthusiasm and a deficit of 
theoretical surmise'. There is a general lack of theories that 
span the data available, which at the same time retain contact 
with neighbouring or more general fields in psychology. In 
chapter two of this thesis it was argued that the psychology of 
art is in much the same position, regarding aesthetic perception.
The biggest problem of both aesthetic perception and person 
perception is that of achieving accurate, naturalistic and valid 
descriptions. In the light of this I propose to discuss a model 
of aesthetic perception which is directly derived from a model 
of person perception developed by V.'arr and Knapper (1968). The 
description of the model will be followed by a discussion of its 
potential contribution to the psychology of art.
It is essentially a qualitative relational model similar 
to the explanatory models developped by Leutsch (1964). The model
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relates only to present perception, as it has no temporal or 
developmental dimensions (see Fig, 5-1)• There are three categories 
of input, 'viz, present stimulus information, present context 
information and stored stimulus information, and there are two 
categories of perceiver variables, vis. current state of perceiver 
and stable characteristics of the perceiver. All three input 
categories and the two perceiver categories act directly on an 
input selector which operates both peripherally and centrally, 
to a proce85ing-centre which generates three different types of 
output or response categories viz. evaluative, attributive and 
affective responses. The elaborate network of interaction and 
feedback loops existing between cells in the model can be seen 
in the diagram.
For the purposes of this discussion only the cells will be 
described in detail, for the interconnections can best be 
determined by empirical research. It is hoped that by allocating 
research in experimental aesthetics to the categories contained 
in the model the structure of the field will emerge and areas of 
neglect or too much emphasis will be revealed.
If fig. 5-1 is compared with barr and Knapper's (1968) model 
(see appendix 3) certain modifications will be noticed. First, 
it has been streamlined a little to facilitate comprehension. 
Secondly, the direct feed-back loop from responses to present 
stimulus information has been removed. This is because the 
stimulus is inanimate and cannot change itself in the light of the 
observer's reaction, as a person might. Thirdly, for similar 
reasons the expectancy response category has been dropped because 
the physical painting is not likely to generate expectancies 
about its behaviour etc. in the future. This has been replaced 
with evaluative responses to embrace aesthetic judgements, as well 
as the more neutral aesthetic reactions. Fourthly, the direct link 
between stored stimulus information and present stimulus information 
has been removed, again because of the fact that paintings are 
inaminote. Finally, a new direct link between attributive responses 
and the processing centre has been formed (see discussion below).
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Fig. 5-1. A model of aesthetic perception. (Adapted from. 
Warr and Knapper 1968) '
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The Stimulus Variables.
(a) Present Stimulus Information. This refers to the distal 
stimulus as a concrete physical object. It contrasts with present 
context information in the relation of figure to ground. In the 
study of person perception the independent variables studied 
include the observed person's appearance, posture, facial expression, 
apparent status, clothes, presence or absence of spectacles, etc.
( .arr and Knapper 1$68, Taguiri 1968). In experimental aesthetics 
there has been considerable emphasis on present stimulus information 
but usually in the form of molecular stimuli (simple colours and 
shapes or combinations of these). KTien molar paintings (or 
reproductions) have been used it is not usually as an independent 
variable, but rather as a set of stimuli which will reveal 
differences of reaction in the observer. Thus paintings are often 
presented to determine whether people are more influenced by the 
depicted content than more formal aesthetic qualities. This is 
particularly common in studies with children. Psychoanalytic studies 
have also put a great deal of emphasis on the depicted content.
The methodological difficulties of using molar stimuli as independent 
Variables has already been discussed in chapter four. It is not 
therefore surprising that most studies investigating formal and 
compositional features (symmetry, balance, unity-in-variety, etc.) 
as an independent variable tend to utilise simple geometric stimuli, 
though as we shall see in chapter six several researchers have 
made realistic attempts to study these in molar paintings by using 
multidimensional scaling techniques.
An aspect of the present stimulus information that has not 
been seriously investigated is the effect on preference and 
evaluation of different artists, schools, periods of painting 
as well as different types of visual art (painting, sculpture, 
architecture, film, drama, dance, furniture, etc.). There have 
been one or two isolated small-scale attempts in highly restricted 
areas. In order to be valuable, such studies would have to be large
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scale, well sampled and extremely well thought out.
There is no sense at present in which the psychology of art 
is an applied discipline. There is considerable scope for develop­
ment here. dingle artists could be studied. For instance^if 
Henry Hoore's work were subjected to psychological study it would 
also be possible to study the artist's personality, attitudes, etc.
It would be possible to compare psychological measures of his own 
work by other people and by himself. Hsing every available suitable 
psychological measurement technique, and designing experiments to 
test hypotheses, an invaluable aid to understanding both the artist 
and his work would be established. After his death, a complete 
psychological record would survive to help later generations 
understand and appreciate the man and his work. A comprehensive, 
empirical psychological study of e single artist and his work has 
not yet been made, though Gestalt or psychoanalytic speculative 
interjiretations are common.
Other variables that fall into this category which have not 
seriously been investigated include the effects of medium, size of 
work, and reproductions on overall reactions. In conclusion, 
there has been a considerable amount of work on the present 
stimulus informotion, but much of it has been peripheral method­
ologically weak, or lacking in naturalism. This is an area of 
research that is extremely important to our understanding of aesthetic
'I
I have chosen iTinry Iloore as an example for several reasons. 
Foremost among these is the fact that he is among the greatest 
living artists today, and I personally have a great interest in his 
work. He is eighty years old, and the opportunity to record a great 
living artist might soon be lost. In addition Henry Moore is highly 
articulate about his own work and art in general (see 'Henry ihoore 
on Gculpture', edited by James 19b6) and it might be possible to 
empirically check his ideas, and see whether they accord with the 
way people actually see his work. Finally it is appropriate in the 
context of this thesis in view of the fact that Freudian, Jungian, 
and Gestalt interpretations have already been made of his work.
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experience,
(b) Present Context Information, By contrast with the above 
this area has been more extensively studied in the field of person 
perception than in aesthetics. This is probably due to the fact 
that context is regarded by writers on art as a factor that is 
largely irrelevant or at least extraneous to the appreciation
of art which should be judged on its intrinsic merits. In person 
perception the effects of context are extremely important. Variables 
include social setting (school, work, home); perceived role 
(father, manager, husband), group membership (student, hippie, 
socio-economic class); ongoing action, etc. Although it is argued 
that corresponding variables of context in the perception of 
paintings should not affect the observer (e.g. Bead 1950; Osborne 
1970), the fact is that they probably do (cf. Bruner 1957). This 
area has been almost totally neglected in psychological aesthetics. 
There is an important need to investigate the effects of judging 
aesthetically poor paintings in a group of good or well-known 
paintings, the effects of a room's decor on reactions; seeing a 
painting alone or in a group of people; the false attribution of 
a work to a painter, etc.
(c) otored stimulus Information. In both person perception 
and aesthetic perception this is an important area of investigation. 
It represents all that an observer kno,;s, feels, or believes about
a work of art prior to encountering it, whether it is for the first 
time or not. In person perception stored stimulus information is 
subdivided under two main headings, vis. kno'wledge of the 'other' 
as an individual and knowledge of the 'other' as a type (stereo­
type formation). In aesthetic perception this can be parallelled 
by knowledge of or familiarity with specific work, in contrast to 
knowledge and familiarity with the type of work at one or more of 
three levels, vis, the individual painter, his 'school' or 
the period of art to which he belongs. In a more general sense the
177
observer may bring with him knowledge, familiarity and attitudes 
to art in general. All these can affect how an individual appraises 
a given work of art, Bruner and the Perceptual Functionalists 
(Brunswick 1956) have laid great stress on the mediation of 
central processes which interact with the physical stimulus to 
produce the phenomenal object. The central processes affect 
perception as a result of motivational states, predispositions, 
expectations, past learning, satisfactions, deprivations, and set. 
Bruner and Postman (19^9) have noted that the less the structured­
ness or univocality of the stimulus input, the more striking the 
role of the directive non-sensory input will be in determining 
perceptual experience. The tremendous diversity of art both 
within and between cultures, (e.g. European, Chinese, Columbian, 
Oceanic, African) and the subtlety of individual works, permits 
considerable scope for the influence of stored stimulus information 
on present perception.
There have been a small number of studies which investigated 
the effects of familiarity (e.g. Frumkin 1963; Foss 1966). 
Unfortunately however, knowledge of and familiarity with art is 
usually partialled out as an extraneous factor (e.g. Child I965) 
rather than studied in its own right. A rare exception to this is 
a study by Bernard (1970) who specifically measured familiarity 
with, and knowledge of, paintings as an independent variable. In 
addition to his conscious knowledge, each individual possesses an 
undifferentiated accumulation of views, opinions, and judgements, 
which are derived from other people, in addition to his own 
assumptions, views and prejudices about art in general and specific 
works. This corresponds to Bruner and Taguiri's (195^) notion of 
the 'implicit personality theory'. This would embrace an individual's 
criteria of what an object has to be like in order to be liked 
by him, or regarded as a good as opposed to a poor work of art.
For example this could mean that it must be a representational 
painting in the classical manner which idealises man and nature
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particularly if hung in an elaborate gilt frame in a museum.
Alternatively, another person might be less specific about means,
but place more emphasis on the aims of the painter, e.g. that
the painting should possess, in the words of Matisse :'Luxe, Calme,
1
et /olupte'.
In addition to criteria of classification and evaluation 'the
implicit aesthetic theory* embraces the kind of knowledge that a
person feels he needs to have in order to appreciate the work of
art. Gombrich (196O, 1962) has argued that the expressive power
of a painting can only be properly interpreted in relation (or by
contrast) to the artist's characteristic style, or the prevailing
style of a period. He illustrates this with two paintings by 
2
Van Gogh , one of which was intended by the artist to embody a 
feeling of calm and tranquility, the other tension and anguish.
Both are painted with Van Gogh's characteristically turbulent, 
vigorous brush-work, and it is only by seeing them in relation to 
each other that it is possible to determine that one is more 
peaceful than the other. Gombrich stresses that all meaning and 
expression in art depends on a priori knowledge of possibilities. 
Knowledge of the conventions of a given genre or painter allows us 
to enter into the framework of possibilities, and so to evaluate 
any given work against this framework (Gombrich 1973). Consequently 
an individual's knowledge of art is a very important determinant 
influencing his overall reactions and ex%:erience of a work of art.
Similarly a single item of information may change the mental 
set with which one looks at a painting. In ifays of Seeing, John 
Berger (1972) invites the reader to look at Van Gogh's 'klieat Field
'I
See Introduction to Catalogue of Matisse Exhibition by Lawrence 
Gowing (Arts Council of Great Britain, I968)
^In Gombrich (1972d)
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with Crows' (1390) , and having done so, he invites the reader 
to look again, this time with the information that it was the last 
painting executed by Van Gogh before he committed suicide, Berger 
is obviously predicting a change in reaction. It would be easy 
to test this idea empirically. A further aspect of stored stimulus 
information is brought out in a discussion of the aesthetics of 
snobbery by Koestler (196^) who claims th:t antiquarian snobbery, 
susceptability to famous names, an obsession with authenticity (as 
opposed to the perfect forgery), and the commercial value of art 
all affect the way a painting is perceived, though none of these 
actually affect it as a physical stimulus. Koestler does not 
regard this as a trivial phenomenon, but rather as the result of 
a serious confusion of values. These factors could well form 
important criteria in an individual's implicit aesthetic theory.
-.n individual's implicit aesthetic theory functions in the 
context of a prevailing cultural aesthetic theory. The modern 
view is that an aesthetic attitude can be adopted toward any 
object, and that a work of art has no other function than being 
a work of art (Malraux 1953» Hungerland 1957). In Classical times 
and the Fenaissance, naturalism was the order of the day and in 
medieval aesthetics art was used to teach orthodox religious 
doctrine to the illiterate. Today the prevailing cultural aesthetic 
theory is that almost anything is art; anything can be justified 
as art. Within this context individuals can be characterised 
according to the value system they have adopted whether this can 
be traditional academic painting, the avant-garde generally, or 
selected aspects of various schools of thought.
As a global description of what people expect of art, and 
the effects it has on them, the implicit aesthetic theory (at the
1
In the collection of V. W. Van Gogh.
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individual and the cultural level) can function as an integrating 
frame-work in the psychology of art, drawing together the diverse 
variables and influences that ultimately determine an individual’s 
or group's reaction to art. The implicit theory also reflects an 
individual's personality and other stable characteristics, and 
therefore has an impact well beyond the category of stored stimulus 
information. Perhaps it is better conceived as the central feature 
of the processing centre; a state of readiness to respond to 
different aspects of works of art according to a set of assumptions, 
values, expectations, and decision-making processes.
(d) Current State of the Perceiver. This area has received 
thorough and extensive attention in both the psychology of art
and in the study of person perception. In this context attentional 
and emotional states are particularly important in relation to 
the aesthetic attitude discussed above. Unfortunately this has 
not been explicitly investigated in the psychology of art. In 
experimental aesthetics generally there has been too much emphasis 
on the easily measurable determinants and correlates of aesthetic 
responses (ratings, rankings, etc.) rather than in terms of real 
aesthetic experience or appreciation of a work of art. Physiological 
arousal is an important variable in this category, and plays a 
very dominant part in Berlyne's theory of aesthetics. Unfortunately, 
apart from a study by Smets (1973) there has been no attempt to 
measure or record arousal levels during the process of perceiving 
something aesthetically. Sinets used matrix grids as stimuli, so 
there has been no attempt to record arousal during aesthetic 
experience of a great and loved work of art, or while someone is 
introspecting in front of a great work of art. The closest parallel 
in person perception would be to measure arousal levels as a function 
of attraction and perceived beauty in another loved person,
(e) Stable characteristics of the perceiver. This is probably 
the busiest area in experimental aesthetics. The perceiver's
181
personality, intelligence, age, education, socio-economic class, 
sex, culture, life-style, cognitive style, etc. has been correlated 
with his aesthetic judgement and preferences, with a disturbing 
degree of wasted effort due to partial overlap between studies, 
and the use of different measures. With an almost infinite range 
of stimuli to sample, and innumerable ways of measuring the 
perceiver variables, experimental aesthetics could continue 
'spinning its wheels in the mud' (Mcv.liinnie 1971) for years to 
come. It is however an important field which should be treated 
systematically with a standard set of representative stimulus and 
adequate response sampling. At the same time it represents only 
a small part of the total research effort that should be devoted 
to the psychology of art. This should be clear from examination 
of the model of aesthetic perception. It is in this area particularly 
that the psychology of art faces the greatest danger of going 
astray. Hudson has eloquently argued against sole reliance on the 
hard facts: 'age, sex, social class, educational achievement, 
marriage and divorce rates, fertility, the incidence of disease 
and crime, central values and what have you... There is a profound 
pleasure to be had in hitching interpretations to data such as 
these. They form our anchor in times of need. But in isolation 
they are meaningless ; and we tend, in any case, to absorb ourselves 
in playing statistical tunes on them. Morse, if we are not scrupulous, 
we find ourselves edging round to the view that such simple facts 
are in some important sense basic; that people are reducible to 
the for:! 5 of evidence about them that we find it easiest to collect' 
(Hudson 1972 p.155).
Ill The Hesponse Categories
It may seem too rigid and somewhat arbitrary to classify all 
responses and reactions into attributive, affective, and evaluative 
categories. Cn an a priori basis it is reasonable to divide 
reactions to aesthetic objects into categories, if only to assist 
the researcher to plan and conduct his work. Affective responses
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include all reactions of a more or less emotional type, which can 
be elicited through introspection and other measures of liking- 
disliking, associations, etc. These responses are essentially 
passive and private. By contrast attributive responses involve 
some form of cognition (thinking, problem-solving, categorising, 
interpreting) which results from a decision to do any of these, 
e.g. dating the work, detecting influences, etc. The affective 
responses is less the result of a decision than the experienced 
impact of the stimulus painting itself. The third response 
category c^n, but needn't, be dependent on the affective and/or 
the attributive reactions. An individual's decision to rate the 
painting as a work of art need not be iifluenced by his liking it, 
nor by its attribution to a particular artist. In this sense it 
could be regarded as an independent process.
As a reminder that aesthetic and artistic perception is 
being investigated, it would perhaps be a good thing if another 
box, labelled 'pure aesthetic experience' were added to separate 
the perceptual responses to art from the mildly pleasant perception 
of everyday objects. Bearing in mind that the concept of aesthetic 
experience is not distinct even in the minds of philosophers, and 
is even less clear in the eyes of psychologists, the box must remain 
empty so long as experimental aesthetics continues to concentrate 
on peripheral and trivial aspects of aesthetic perception. The 
chief aim of the box would be to remind psychologists that the mere 
collection of ratings, rankings, groupings, etc. in response to 
works of art does not in itself guarantee that the subjects have 
been responding aesthetically or that the measures are genuinely 
aesthetic. There is a grave need for detailed accurate descriptions 
of how people react to and experience works of art. Until this is 
done the significance of previous research cannot really be 
assessed,
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II Processing Centre and Input Selector.
It is because of the emphasis of experimental aesthetics on 
the determinants and correlates of aesthetic responses that these 
boxes in the model are empty. This is disturbing in view of the 
sheer quantity of time and effort that has been devoted to the 
psychology of art. There are two important aspects relevant to 
the process of aesthetic perception and the related experience. 
First, there are the mechanics of the process in information- 
processing terms (see chapter nine), and secondly, the contents 
of the process. It is in this latter respect that the notion of 
an implicit aesthetic theory is most relevant.
be have already noted that people attend to different things 
when looking at the same object. Hungerland (1954) has illustrated 
how two art critics gave dramatically opposite interpretations of 
Cezanne’s paintings. One said that Cezanne’s space and volume are 
based structurally on line drawing, and the other claimed that 
Cezanne relies less that any other painter on line drawing. Both 
critics agreed on the aesthetic value of Cezanne’s paintings, 
though their interpretations must have been distorted by their 
respective commitment to different theoretical positions. Another 
famous clash of interpretation, by Walter Pater and Bernhard 
Berenson respectively, concerned Leonardo's Kona Lisa (see Osborne 
197c, pp.257-260) . There can be no doubt that 'what v/e see when
By v;ay of illustration, Walter Pater wrote, among other things, 
that 'She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the 
vampire she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of 
the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas, and keeps their fallen 
day about her; and trafficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants.' 
(Studies in the History of the Penaissance, 1875)• Berenson is not 
nearly so entranced: 'V.'hat I really saw in the figure of the Kona 
Lisa was the estranging image of a woman beyond the reach of my 
sympathies or the ken of ray interests, distastefully unlike the 
women I had hitherto known or dreamt of, a foreigner with a look I
(continued)
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we look at a picture depends on the nature of the interest with 
which we approach it and the habits of appreciation which we have 
formed' (Osborne 1970). Consequently everyone who approaches a 
work a art with serious intent necessarily does so with a range of 
tacit beliefs about it, and tacit expectations about what he may 
find in it,and what he may get from it. Cn a purely descriptive 
basis it is possible to characterise people in terms of their 
implicit aesthetic theory. The art psychologist needs to know 
the conditions and criteria by which people characteristically 
appraise a work of art, as an aesthetic object or in any other way. 
Similarly he also needs to know the conditions under which people 
describe or refuse to describe an experience as aesthetic. In 
this way people could be classified according to the criteria they 
use in making aesthetic judgements, and the characteristics by 
which they define aesthetic experience.
A critical question is: how is the psychologist to go about 
obtaining these descriptions and forming appropriate taxonomies?
One way of approaching this would be to determine whether an 
individual's implicit aesthetic theory corresponds to the prevailing 
art theories that have existed from Classical times to the present 
day. This could be established by simple preferences among a 
suitably selected range of stimuli. A taxonomy of Western art 
theories given by Osborne (1968) would assist the sampling of
(continued from overleaf)
could not fathom, watchful, sly, secure, with a smile of anticipated 
satisfaction, and a pervading air of hostile superiority'. (The 
Study and Criticism of Italian Art, I9I0). Berenson does not like 
it as a work of art because it is too problematic, and thus prevents 
the mystic union between it and ourselves. See Osborne (1970, 
pp.250-269) for other comparisons between reactions of experts to 
the same works. As an example of one artist's intolerance of the 
work of another, Manet is reputed to have said of Aenoir: 'Advise 
the poor fellow to give up painting.' In his turn kenoir said of 
the Venus de Kilo, 'Nothing but a great policeman, not like the 
Venus d'Arles or Kedici' (Kenneth Clark, The Nude, p.Bl).
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stimulus paintings, and subjects could be asked for their reason 
for choosing particular works. Thus people could be divided into 
the following categories depending on whether they regarded art 
as :
(a) pure craft or manufacture,
(b) an instrument of education or improvement,
(c) an instrument of religious or moral indoctrination,
(d) an instrument for the expression or communication
of emotion,
(e) an instrument for the vicarious expansion of experience, 
or combinations of (a) to (e). All these are instrumentalist 
theories of art in that the individual finds satisfaction if a
work of art fulfills a particular function. Alternatively the
individual could be interested in art as a reflection or copy
of Nature. There are essentially three kinds of Naturalistic 
theory, which he could implicitly or explicitly adhere to, viz.
(a) Realist, in which art is a reflection of the actual,
(b) Idealist, in which art is a reflection of the ideal, 
or, (c) Fictional, in which art is a reflection of imaginative
actuality.
Finally, there are two kinds of Formalistic theories, in which 
art is seen as:
(a) an autonomous creation, or
(b) an organic unity.
These formalist theories lay most emphasis on the intrinsic 
perceptual qualities of the work of art and closely approximate 
the aesthetic attitude. It is quite possible for a person 
holding a formalist approach to link this to a naturalist and an 
instrumental approach at the same time. This taxonomy is crude. 
For example there are many different ways in which a work of art 
can be seen and appreciated as a thing in its own right. It does 
however provide a starting point for the psychologist in his 
attempt to characterise individuals' reactions to art.
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Using this approach there are many things that he can 
discover. For example he can determine what kinds of people 
respond to the two kinds of art described by Koestler (196?)» viz. 
the art that has a transcendental appeal and cathartic effect, 
and the kind of art that is a mildly pleasant pastime. The 
psychologist also needs to discover^what kinds of art and under 
v;h:.t conditions, can produce these differential effects in 
observers? In much the same way we need to know why and how 
people attribute beauty to objects. Are there, for instance, 
different kinds of beauty as suggested by Read (1950), viz. the 
Classical, the Oriental, the Byzantine, and the Primitive? Another 
feature of an individual's implicit aesthetic theory is the kind 
of experience that he regards as aesthetic, and therefore to be 
sought after, Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) have identified seven 
different psychologicrsl processes all of which they claim 
contribute to the overall aesthetic experience.‘ However the authors 
are not sure of the relative importance of the various processes 
in determining overall aesthetic experience. It is quite possible 
that individuals show different patterns of organisation among 
these processes which may effect qualitatively the kind of aesthetic 
experience they have. If stimuli could be chosen which strongly 
elicit the respective processes then it would be possible to 
classify people according to their dispositions towards certain 
kinds of experience. There is clearly a considerable amount of 
research to be done at the phenomenological descriptive level 
before meaningful tests of hypotheses can be conducted.
1
These include the arousal and relief of tension; a mental set 
enhancing attention to the spacial, structural and meaning qualities 
of the stimulus; a feeling of empathy; 'aesthetic distance'; ' 
sublimation of repressed wishes; symbolic processes; and expansion 
of cognitive capacities.. According to Kreitler and Kreitler (1972) 
any stimuli which elicits all these processes is a work of art.
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Conclusions
The model of aesthetic perception described here has high­
lighted the state of imbalance existing in current experimental 
aesthetics. It has revealed that some areas of research are well 
developed, and others hardly touched on at all. Moreover it has 
revealed that the inter-relationships between categories, e.g. 
the input or the output variables, have also been neglected, in 
experimental aesthetics. The model also reveals a lack of 
attention to the essential processes involved in ;>>erceiving 
aesthetically. In specific terms the following points can be 
made :
(a) More emphasis should be placed on the relationships 
between the stimulus variables, the person variables, and aesthetic 
experience.
(b) In particular the 'current state of perceiver' should 
be studied in terms of attention, motivation and arousal in an 
attempt to throw light on the hitherto neglected' aesthetic 
attitude'.
(c) Experiments should be designed specifically to elucidate 
the operating principles of the 'input-selector' and the 'Processing 
centre'.
(d) There should be less ad. hoc work. Instead work should be 
planned to integrate with other research in an attempt to provide 
more systematic description and explanations.
(e) The 'implicit aesthetic theory' v/as presented as a 
conceptual frame-work for characterising an individual's expectations, 
beliefs, values, and criteria which determine and influence his 
encounters with art. As a conceptual frame-work it forms the basis
of an integrated approach to the psychology of art, and emphasises
the important need for systematic comprehensive research at the 
€nO
phenom^logical descriptive level. Only when this has been done are 
explanations possible.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Structure of Aesthetic Experience
In view of the complexity and subtlety of reactions to art 
any attempt to reduce aesthetic experience to a small number of 
graspable categories, components, elements or dimensions must be 
seen as a primary aim of the psychology of art as it is of science 
in general. There are tv;o basic ways of doing this. The 
investigator may elicit or discover the structure that appears 
to underlie reactions of people looking at art objects. Alternatively 
he may impose some kind of a priori structure on their reactions.
The first approach attempts to reveal order out of variability 
and the second imposes order to reduce the variability. The first ^ 
approach can be subdivided into (a) the discovery of structure 
itself; and (b) the use of the discovered structure to impose 
order on the responses of people experiencing art. The second 
basic approach can be subdivided into studies which (c) impose 
an a priori order before the person responds, and studies in which
(d) he is allowed to respond freely and the investigator imposes 
order by developing a post hoc classification of responses.
I The discovery of structure
This is usually achieved by utilising fairly complex statistical 
procedures such as factor analysis, and multidimensional scaling. 
Essentially factor analysis provides a measure of the proportion 
of common variance shared by a number of measures, or a number of 
people on the same measure.
In England at least, most work has centred round the notion of 
a general aesthetic factor, which is analogous to Spearman's 
general intelligence factor 'g'. This was discovered by Burt (1933) 
and his co-workers (Bulley 1933; Dewar 1938) as well as Williams 
et al (1938), Eysenck (I940a, 1940b, 194la), Pickford (1948) and
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Feel (1944). These studies have been extensively described by 
Valentine (1962) and by Pickford (1955, 1972) but seem to have 
aroused little attention outside England, They originally arose 
out of Burt's general work on personality (Burt 1939). Here he 
describes the basic finding that there is a 'large general factor 
for artistic ability which enters into every manifestation of 
aesthetic taste' (Burt 1939). Within this general artistic factor 
there are smaller general or group factors corresponding to the 
various types of art, viz. music, literature, painting, and also 
a factor for executive skill in visual art. As noted above, the 
general aesthetic factor corresponds to Spearman's general 
intelligence factor *g', though Burt stresses the independence of 
these two general factors.
Burt's definition of the general factor is somewhat vague
though in line with current aesthetic theory of the day. In
effect he defines it as the appreciation of what amounts to
'significant form' (as expounded in the theories of Roger Fry
(1920) and Clive Bell (1914). This is essentially an appreciation
1of lines and colour which are combined in a particular way.
This factor underlies all aesthetic reactions and was used to explain 
the interpersonal agreement in ratings and rankings found by Burt 
and his associates.
Burt moved from revealing the structural organisation of
personality to the correlation of personality factors with aesthetic
judgement. Eysenck, by contrast, worked the other way round. He
started by factor analysing aesthetic preferences and then correlating 
the aesthetic factors with Burt's personality dimensions. In
'I
Burt does not, however, subscribe to Bell's or Bulley's view (1951) 
that there is a unique aesthetic emotion experienced in response 
to significant form.
^For more detail of the correlations between aesthetic factors and 
personality see chapter seven of this thesis.
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addition to revealing a general aesthetic factor Burt (1939) had 
speculated about the existence of two bi-polar factors which 
seemed to be related to preferences for, (a) classical as opposed 
to romantic art; and (b) realism as opposed to impressionism. 
Eysenck (1940a) set out to explicitly test this. He used an 
extremely varied range of visual stimuli and confirmed the finding 
of a general aesthetic factor. In addition Eysenck revealed a 
weak bipolar factor. In a later study Eysenck (I94la) controlled 
for the effects of the general factor by using only stimuli of 
acknowledged aesthetic merit in order to reveal the bipolar factor 
more clearly. The bipolar factor that emerged could easily be 
identified as a 'brightness' factor (labelled 'K') which 
differentiated preferences for modern, impressionistic, colourful 
art as opposed to older, sombre, more conventional works. Eysenck 
interpreted the general factor as one of 'aesthetic taste*
(labelled 'T') which is independent of age, sex, artistic 
sophistication, race or nationality. Later studies extended the 
coverage of the 'K' factor to general complexity as opposed to 
simplicity of stimuli, as well as to other sense modalities 
(Eysenck 1940b, 1941c, 1942).^
Eysenck had been critical of earlier studies because they had 
not selected stimuli which were free of 'irrelevant associations'*
']
It will be recalled from chapter four that Eysenck's criterion 
of correct aesthetic choice was agreement with the average judgement 
of a group. He used l8 different sets of stimuli which were 
analysed separately. Consequently an individual's loading on T 
(or his aesthetic taste) is a measure of whether or not a person 
who most agreed with the average judgement in one test also agreed 
most with the average judgement in the other tests. In that 
chapter I argued that this was really a measure of group concensus, 
rather than a measure of aesthetic taste based on external standard 
or value. As a measure of intragroup agreement across diverse sets 
of stimuli the general and type factors combined account for less 
than a third of the total variance. Individual non-group factors 
(e.g. response to content, or emotional reactions) were regarded 
by Eysenck as aesthetically irrelevant even though they accounted 
for about ^0% of the variance, the remaining 13/^ being error
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He accordingly chose stimuli that were generally equal in aesthetic 
merit; equal in representational accuracy; and finally equated for 
familiarity. The resulting general factor Eysenck attributed 
directly to the intrinsic qualities of the stimuli, and speculated 
about the operation of a fundamental biological tendency which 
is innately determined. This notion was directly tested by 
MeElroy (1952) among aborigines in Australia. He found no 
evidence for a between-cultures factor of 'good taste*, but did 
find evidence of a within cultures general factor which suggested 
the operation of cultural conditioning of perception rather than 
biological determination. Eysenck has presented further evidence 
for between-cultures agreement on the general factor (Souief and 
Eysenck 1971, 1972) though this is based solely on judgements of 
Eirkhoff polygons. Eysenck still adheres to a biological explanation, 
which seems to be inconsistent with another finding of his (Eysenck 
1972b) which showed that aesthetic sensitivity is stimulus-specific. 
Consequently he has no grounds for treating the Birkhoff polygons 
as a valid culture-free test of the general aesthetic factor. In 
addition, I have argued below that a high degree of concensus can 
be expected from reactions to polygons because there are so few 
ways in which they can vary.
Further support for the general aesthetic factor has come from 
Dewar (1958), Williams et al (1938), Pickford (1948, 1969a) and 
indirectly from Peel (1944), though interpretations of the factor 
varied slightly. For instance, Pickford ( 1948) characterised it 
by 'emotional expression and harmony of design '. He also described 
the bipolar factor as sentimentality and accuracy of representation 
as opposed to atmospheric effect and symbolic expression. A recent 
account of a study carried out in 1956 of the aesthetic preferences 
of schizophrenics (Green and Pickford I968) also revealed a general 
aesthetic factor, though it had a stronger emotional and expressive 
significance than is the case with normal persons, who put more 
emphasis on formal qualities of colour and design harmony. Iliffe
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(1960) also revealed a general factor of ’beauty’ underlying the 
ratings of young women's faces, which is a somewhat predictable 
and uninteresting finding.
Research on the general aesthetic factor with its associated 
bi-polar factors seems to be a curiously British phenomenon. As 
such it is consistent with the Burt-Vernon model of the hierarchical 
structure of mental abilities which has so strongly influenced 
British work in the area (see Vernon 1950). This is partly the 
result of a commitment to a particular factor-analytic technique 
which was developed by Spearman and used by Burt and his associates. 
As Guilford (1954) has pointed out, the use of the summation 
technique necessitates the production of a general factor and 
subsidiary bi-polar factors, which is not the case with other 
techniques (e.g. principal axes, principal components and centroid 
methods) (Harman I96O). To some extent it would appear that the 
general aesthetic factor is a statistical artefact of the method 
being used. However, in a recent (1970) edition of The Structure 
of Human Personality (1955), Eysenck has defended the approach. 
Although he does not attack the specific statistical argument put 
forward by Guilford, he defends the general factor as an index of 
agreement existing in the reactions of individuals to a wide range 
of stimuli. Thus the summation technique reveals factors which 
characterise the reactions of people within sets of different 
stimuli. On the other hand, factor analysis of reactions to a 
limited range of stimuli, e.g. polygons, does not produce a 
general aesthetic factor, but factors which are more specifically 
related to the stimuli in question, e.g. in the case of polygons, 
factors af complexity. Thus they are general within a specific 
stimulus domain.
The factors revealed by Burt and his associates were not 
rotated to psychological meaning. Hence the factors they revealed
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were unrotated, somewhat arbitrary reference axes and are not 
necessarily the ones yielding simplest structure. It would be an 
extremely interesting exercise to evaluate Burt's work by using 
his stimuli and more modern factor analytic techniques. As it 
is there is clearly no evidence that favours the notion of a 
general factor of aesthetic taste over the multiple factor approach 
and the goal of simple structure. As Butcher (I968) has put it; 
'Whatever scheme is put forward it is statistically perfectly 
equivalent, but quite different in structure and nomenclature'.
In this sense the old chestnut about factor analysis that you get 
out of the analysis whatever you put into it is true. This 
perhaps points up the need for empirical evidence outside the 
correlational factor analytic framework to justify the particular 
method adopted, and to test and validate the interpretations of 
the factors.
The Thurstone-type of analysis which reveals a range of 
separate specific factors, has characterised work in America, and 
also in England particularly in the last 20 years. It cannot 
produce a general factor, and studies using this type of technique 
have revealed a bewildering variety of factors, all of which are 
presumed to underly aesthetic experience. In an early attempt 
to find the reasons for overall liking of the backs of playing- 
cards Guilford and Holley (1949) asked the subjects to sort the 
cards on the basis of colour, form, and content, respectively as 
well as for overall liking. The five factors that emerged did 
not correspond to the categories that had been supplied for sorting. 
Four of the factors related to subject-matter, (romantic adventure, 
feminine interest, opulence, outdoor interest) and there was 
only one formal factor (simple, modern, stylised design). However, 
it is doubtful that the average range of playing-card designs 
would elicit any formal or aesthetic interest on the part of the 
students who acted as subjects in the experiment. Although 
characteristic of the layman's interest in painting, and also that
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of children, these findings do not shed any light on the process 
of aesthetic perception, but only on the perception of objects 
or a special class of objects (viz, pictures on the backs of 
playing cards). Gordon (1952, 1955) got round this problem by 
using real paintings. His analysis revealed three main factors, 
viz. (a) acceptance or rejection of modern art; (b) interest in 
craftmanship; and (c) interest in style and/or originality.
Gordon's interest was mainly in the differential reactions of 
artists and non-artists.
In the context of Osgood's theory of 'Semantic Space' Tucker 
(1955) carried out a factor-analysis of ratings of paintings 
using forty scales derived mainly from observers' comments. He 
revealed three orthogonal factors corresponding very closely to 
the three dimensions of meaning revealed by Osgood, et al (1957), 
viz. Activity, Evaluative, Potency. These have since been widely 
used as a measure in experimental aesthetics. Tucker (1955) found 
that the factorial structure of representational paintings 
coincided closely with that of objects in general, though a 
different structure emerged for abstract paintings. This suggests 
that the representational paintings were being responded to as 
though they were substitutes for the depicted content, and not as 
autonomous works of art.
More recently a factor-analysis by Rouse (1964) revealed
six stable factors, only one of which (viz. dynamic/static)
']
differentiated between good and bad works of art. In two other 
studies by Kay (I969) and Kloss and Dreger (1971) none of the 
factors revealed could be used to predict preferences between 
the stimuli used. In a factor analytic study McWhinnie (1970b) 
failed to find any relation between broad general behavioural 
variables (perceptual and cognitive styles) and aesthetic preferences
1
In this case literary passages.
195
(as measured by Welsh Figure Preference Test.) He concluded that 
concentration on characteristics of the art object would be a 
more fruitful avenue for further work. The same point had been 
made much earlier by Peel (194-5, 1946) whose use of a priori 
categories for determining responses for subsequent factor 
analysis is discussed in the section below. However a realistic 
attempt to bring together characteristics both of the observer 
and of the stimulus can be seen in the work of Skager, Schultz 
and Klein (1966a). They started a programme of research with 
the premise that judged quality in art is a joint function of 
characteristics of the painting and what I have elsewhere called, 
the individual's 'implicit aesthetic theory'. Klein et al (1966a) 
argue that since dimensions of preference are likely to be a 
function of different characteristics of the drawings (used in 
the experiment) and viewpoints as to the importance, then an 
examination of the drawings characteristics may stimulate hypotheses 
about the psychological characteristics of the individual who 
produce or prefer the drawings. They factor analysed quality 
ratings of I9I drawings which had been specially executed by art 
students under standard conditions for the experimental programs.
The ratings were made by both art-experts and laymen. The 
analysis revealed three different points of view for the experts, 
and one for the laymen. At that stage the experimenters felt 
confident in identifying and labelling only one of these factors 
which they labelled as a viewpoint or factor of sponteneity- 
deliberateness.
In another paper published in the same year, oliager, Schultz 
and Klein (1966b) obtained ratings of preferences and similarity
It is this latter part of the argument which distinguishes this 
approach from that of Kunnapas and Norman (1971) and also Loveless 
(1968) who confine their analyses to characteristics of the 
paintings and do not speculate about the psychological characteristics 
of people whose preferences are determined by certain features of 
the paintings.
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estimates among 25 paintings. The three dimensions revealed by- 
factor analysis were complexity v. simplicity; realistic v. formal 
composition, and deliberate v. impulsive treatment. The last 
dimension has been explored in more detail by Klein and Skager 
(1967) and Klein (1968). In these studies sponteneity - deliberate­
ness was found to be a stable, reliable dimension which could be 
used to predict quality ratings of paintings by people v/ho 
respectively held the two opposed view-points of what constitutes 
quality in painting, Klein (I968) correlated similarity judgements 
with preference ratings and found that ratings of quality clustered 
into three distinct view-points. The three separate viewpoints 
correspond to the two schools of art from which the art-experts 
were drawn, and the view-point of the laymen. The 'Professor I ' 
view-point makes overall quality judgements based on a preference 
for spontaneous as opposed to deliberate handling. The 'Professor 
II' view-point put less emphasis on realism and preferred neat 
but spontaneous handling. Finally, the layman view-point stressed 
the importance of photographic realism combined with a slight 
preference for complexity rather than dynamism. Although these 
findings differentiate only crudely and possibly obvious differences 
in the view-point of different experts and differentiates not at 
all among laymen, it does at least stress individual differences 
and varying view-points in aesthetic perception.
Somewhat similar work has been conducted by Silver, Landis 
and Messick (I966) who used multidimensional scaling of similarity 
judgements to reveal individual differences in reactions to the 
geometric designs which they used as stimuli. Factor analysis 
revealed five different view-points none of which corresponded to 
the average ratings. Silver et al (1966) argued that single 
methods of measurement tend to conceal individual differences.
The five different view-points revealed were not labelled by 
the author as they felt this would be premature, though the five 
viewpoints seem to correspond to different aspects of complexity.
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Similar work using multidimensional scaling has been carried out 
with texture preferences (Christensen 19&2; Ekman, Hosraan and 
Lindstrom I965). Using similar techniques Kay (1969) analysed the
preferences of children (aged 11-l4X for eight painting reproductions.
1
He revealed eight different dimensions, though none of them, either 
singly or in combination, could be used to predict the relative 
popularity of the paintings as measured by preference judgements.
Complexity as a major factor determining aesthetic reactions 
has emerged in a large number of studies. Early factor analytic 
evaluations of Eirkhoff's aesthetic Measure (1933) revealed complexity 
as an important determining factor. Harsh, Beebe-Center and Beebe- 
Center (1939) using a Thurstone-type analysis revealed four different 
factors determining preferences among the polygons, viz, (a) 
smoothness of contour; (b) simple regular figures; (c) rotational 
and diagonal symmetry; and (d) irregularity, A later study by 
Eysenck (I9^1c), using the summation method, revealed a general 
aesthetic factor (explaining 31% of the variance) and a bipolar 
factor of simplicity-coraplexity (explaining 13% of the variance).
Using black and white molecular stimuli Barron and Welsh (1952) 
factor analysed preferences for polygons and revealed a dominant 
factor of complexity-asymmetry v, simplicity-symmetry, which 
subsequently became the basis of the Welsh Figure Preference Test
The dimensions identified were (a) turbulence - serenity, (b) depth 
effects - flatness, (c) sombre - bright colours, (d) movement - 
quiescence (depicted by content or by line), (e) puzzlement (non­
obviousness of abstract paintings), and (f) antiquity (early painting 
style).
2
It should be noted that Eysenck did not use the complete set of 90 
polygons. He deliberately excluded 26 of them because of obvious 
associations, e,g. Star of David, Swastika, etc. He isolated 12 
different aspects of shape or form which, when separately weighted, 
produced a formula for Birkhoff's 'M' which gave a correlation of 
-,91 with the rank order preference. In many respects this list 
corresponds closely to the factors revealed by Eysenck (1968) when 
he subjected preferences for the polygons to a Thurstone-type analysis,
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(Welsh 1959)» More recently, after a long absence, Eysenck has 
returned to experimental aesthetics. He revealed a factor of 
simplicity-complexity in four different factor analyses, using as 
stimuli (a) the Maitland Graves Design Judgement Test (Eysenck 
1967); (b) Birkhoff's polygons (Eysenck I968; Eysenck and Castle 
1970b); the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Eysenck and Castle 1970a); 
and black and white designs (Eysenck 1971a). With reference to 
his work with Birkhoff polygons Eysenck still adheres to the notion 
of a general aesthetic factor ( 'T' ) #. This is defined as the 
concensus (based on rank ordered preferences) that exists between 
art and non-art groups in their judgements of polygons. On the 
other hand the bipolar factor K, has been redefined as preferences 
for simple as opposed to complex polygons.
As a result of these factor analytic studies Eysenck (1972c) 
was able to devise three different tests of aesthetic sensitivity.
A test of symmetry-assymetry derived from items on MGDJT (i.e.
Factor I, Eysenck 1967), and two tests of *T* derived from the factor 
analysis of Birldioff Polygons, and Kornung designs respectively 
(Eysenck 1968, 1971a). Factor analysis of the preferences of 484 
people revealed a factor structure with separate factors loading 
highly on the three tests with very small intérêt correlations. 
Eysenck is forced to conclude that 'aesthetic sensitivity of the 
kind used in the experiment is relatively specific and does not 
extend from one set of stimuli to another'. The reasoning behind 
these tests is circular. The 'correct' items in each test were the 
most preferred items from the earlier studies, and the incorrect 
were the least preferred. Eysenck is once again assuming that 
agreement with group concensus is a measure of aesthetic sensitivity. 
However, even if the tests are regarded as measures of preference 
it is interesting to note that they have clearly distinguishable 
underlying factors. Perhaps it would be wiser to use the tests as
These were taken from Hornung (1932)
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descriptive measures of an individual's preferences,
A recent study by Nias and Frith (1973), also using molecular 
stimuli, revealed a dominant factor of contour (amount of edge) 
which was regarded as distinct from complexity as this had been 
quantitatively controlled in the computer generation of the stimuli. 
Overall the subjects tended to prefer intermediate levels of 
complexity (measured in bits of information) but when items equal 
in amount of contour were presented, they tended to choose the 
simpler design. In a discussion of the problems of measuring 
visual form Michels and Zusne (1963), and Brown and Owen (1967) 
have noted that visual stimuli cannot be properly defined since 
the multidimensional structure of form is not known. Even crude 
measures of quantity were not possible until the introduction of 
information theory. However, a number of studies have attempted 
to specify and define physical shape. Stenson's (1966) factor 
analysis of similarity judgements of random polygons revealed 
four critical measures, viz. (a) the number of turns in the form;
(b) the length of the perimeter; (c) the perimeter squared to area 
ratio; and (d) the variance of the internal angles of the form, 
Stenson speculates that these are the physical correlates of 
complexity. These findings coincide loosely vTith those of Silver, 
Landis and Kessick (1966), and have been confirmed by Behrman 
and Brown (1968). However, more recent studies have revealed 
slightly different structures (Stenson 1963; Brown and Andrews 
i960). In neither of these studies is complexity per se an 
important factor. Instead factors like curvature dispersion, 
jaggedness and compactness become important variables. There is 
a long way to go before these can be related to phenomenal 
experience of shape, and affective reactions to it. However, 
work of this nature is necessary before a descriptive measure of an 
individual's preferences among a fully representative sample of 
shapes and forms can be designed. Such a battery of stimuli each 
with a specified loading would correspond to standardised colour
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stimuli, as in the Munsell system. In line with previous arguments 
this should not be taken as a measure of artistic sensitivity.
It could however figure as one among many sets of stimuli in a 
battery of aesthetic measures.
Another line of development is to use factor analysis to 
characterise the stimulus paintings in a manner similar to that 
recommended by Michels and Zusne (1963). For example Knapp 
and Green (1939) used factor analysis to differentiate between 
geometric (rational) and non-geometric (expressive) abstract 
paintings. This classification was subsequently used in a study 
investigating the correlates of different types of painting (Knapp 
1964). The broad dichotomy has since been confirmed by Kloss and 
Dreger (1971) though the same stimuli were used in both cases. A 
still rarer use of factor analysis is its application to the works 
of a single artist. Loveless (I968) has attempted this in his 
analysis of similarity judgements of paintings by Picasso. He 
found four main factors which a team of art experts labelled (a) 
structured realism; (b) synthetic cubism; (c) surrealism; and
(d) expressionism. This is an interesting and potentially widely 
used application of factor analysis. It is perhaps dissappointing 
that the factors correspond closely to pre-existing art-style 
categories which have been attained by the verbal methods of art 
criticism and art history. However, it is possible from this study 
to compare the differential factor loadings of a given painting.
It is possible that the labelling of factors, at best intuitive 
and at worst arbitrary, was strongly influenced by the existing 
artistic style labels. This is an application of factor analysis 
that has great potential, subject to its being able to tell us 
more than we already know. In an interesting study of still-lifes 
by Cézanne, Kunnapas and Norman (1971) used multi-dimensional 
scaling of similarity judgements to reveal three major factors of 
formal composition, viz. (a) complex horizontally arranged motive;
(b) vertical central figure; and, (c) central figure without
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background. Differences in these factors could be used to predict 
differences in evaluations by artists and non-artists. In 
addition each individual could be characterised by loadings on the 
three factors.
Similar work on descriptive criteria has been carried out 
by Douse (1964), Bernheim (1964) and by Goude (1972a, b) with 
very interesting results. In the first study Goude factor analysed 
the similarity ratings of artists and non-artists in response to 
eight paintings (4 landscapes and four crucifixions) presented in 
paired-comparisons (Goude 1972a). Analysis revealed four factors 
which were common to both artists and non-artists, though their 
respective weightings differed in the two groups. In addition 
there was a fifth factor which was not common to both groups. The 
common factors revealed were depicted theme, lyric tranquillity of 
nature, static stylisation, and anguished drama. The non-artists 
fifth factor related to crucifixion dynamics, whereas the artists 
fifth factor related to colouristic lustre. In the second study 
Goude (1972b) investigated and revealed the effects of age, teaching 
and mental illness on the factor structure found in the first study. 
This method is clearly suitable as a system for classifying works 
of art on a purely descriptive basis, viz. similarity estimates.
This technique would be an ideal tool for characterising people in 
terms of their implicit aesthetic theory, but only in terms of 
crude general criteria.
In the earlier discussion on aesthetic measurement, it was 
argued that the repertory grid technique devised by Kelly (1953) 
and developed by Bannister and Hair (I968) would be a suitable 
and flexible tool for eliciting aesthetic view-points. A study 
by Davisson (1971) has specifically evaluated the usefulness of
1
This study is unusual, perhaps almost unique, in carrying coloured 
illustrations of the stimuli used in the published account.
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the technique. He concluded from the individuals that he tested 
that they possessed consistent personal dimensions of judgements 
which were reliable over time and could be used to make valid 
predictions about subsequent preference judgements. As a tool 
to assess idpgraphic characteristics, its use should be 
encouraged to refine and add to the more general dimensions that 
are revealed by the factor analysis of nomothetic data (Carver 
1967; Pope and Thomas 1972).
II Applications of the results of Factor-Analysis
The application of the results of factor anaZytic studies 
to aid subsequent research is surprisingly rare in the psychology 
of art. The main body of research seems concerned merely to 
elicit factors with little attempt to test for reliability and 
validity, or even to determine whether the factor structure is 
useful in guiding further research or making sense of other 
findings.
There have been a large number of factor analytic studies 
associated with the Semantic Differential technique (Osgood et.al 
1937). Springbett (1960) used the Semantic Differential to 
determine whether abstract paintings have any connotative meaning 
as measured by inter-subject agreement on the respective scales. 
Although the results were complex, Springbett concluded that the 
semantic differential did measure connotative meaning in non- 
objective art. In a later study Choynowski (1967) factor-analysed 
ratings on 72 SD scales. He revealed eight 'easily interpretable’ 
factors, viz. (a) original-commonplace; (b) subjective-objective;
(c) serene-gloomy; (d) dynamic-static ; (e) warm-cold; (f) sketchy-
There has been a large amount of work using the Semantic 
Differential to measure affective responses to plain colours 
(e.g. Kansaku 19&3; Wright and Rainwater 19&2; Hogg 1969b, 1969c)
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v;orked-out; (g) devoid of content-full of content; and (h) 
georaetric-non-geometric. The eight factors explained 81% of 
the total variance. A somewhat similar study by Beittel (1963) 
revealed different factors from those found by Choynowski viz. 
good-bad as art; masculinity-feminity; sponteneity-deliberateness; 
feeling for nature; and finally, coraplexity-simplicity. Beittel’s 
study is interesting in that he respectively analysed the 
characteristics of the paintings; the ways in which the judges 
rated the paintings; and the characteristics of the judges them­
selves. Thus he was able to isolate three factors characterising 
the different ways the paintings were judged. It appeared that the 
painting was evaluated either as a product or on the basis of the 
processes involved in producing it, e.g. intuitive-rational, 
informal-formal. A third approach was descriptive, and non-evaluative 
e.g. masculine-feminine. Finally the judges could be divided into 
the deliberative (authoritarian) and the spontaneous (non­
authoritarian). This is an extremely interesting and fruitful 
use of the semantic differential which could generate many 
hypotheses for independent testing and evaluation.
Molecular stimuli have also been assessed using the semantic 
differential. Eisenman and Rapaport (1967) and Eisenman (1968c) 
used it to assess reactions to random polygons differing in degree 
of complexity, and Berlyne and Peckham (I966) used it to assess 
Berlyne's collative stimuli. In all three studies only one scale' 
was used to represent each of the activity, potency and evaluation 
dimensions though Osgood et al (1957) recommend at least 3 scales 
to represent each dimension. Berlyne (l972c) has recently 
discussed a number of studies (some unpublished) using the Semantic 
Differential with a variety of visual stimuli which suggest a 
large amount of correspondence between Osgood's Evaluative factor 
and hedonic value; between the Activity factor and complexity/ 
uncertainty; and finally between the Potency factor and cortical 
arousal. It is doubtful that such correspondence will strengthen
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Berlyne's theory for two reasons. The first is the low esteem 
of Osgood's theory (cf. review in Bannister and Hair I968) and 
the second is the looseness of the association between Osgood's 
factors and Berlyne's behavioural measures.
Nidorf and Argabrite (1970) have developed an interesting 
technique for measuring aesthetic communication. They compared 
the semantic differential ratings of artists in response to 
their own paintings and compared these to the ratings of the same 
works by other people. Any correlation between the ratings of 
artists and 'public' was treated as a measure of aesthetic 
communication mediated by the work. This technique should have 
considerable scope for exploring the role of artists’ intentions 
in relation to the finished product and the way it is perceived.
The results of a previous factor analysis of preference 
judgements by Gordon (1952, 1955, 1956) were applied in a study 
by Getzels and Csiksentmihalyi (I969) who asked both artists and 
non-artists to rate paintings for craftmanship, originality, and 
for overall liking. By systematically partialling out the effect 
of one variable on the remaining two, they discovered that the 
non-artist group was influenced by craftmanship rather than 
originality in making their preference judgements. The artists, 
on the other hand, were more influenced by originality than 
craftsmanship. The average ratings of the artists and non-artists 
were similar, though the ratings by the non-artists were 
homogeneous compared to the artists. This suggested that the 
differences within the artists group were complimentary.
This study is not only a clear and concise application of the 
findings of an earlier factor analysis, it is also methodologically 
interesting in its contrast of the reactions of artists and non­
artists to help elucidate the complexities of aesthetic perception. 
The authors also speculate on the utility of contrasting paintings 
that are universally liked by artists and non-artists respectively.
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Several of the studies discussed above have used the factors 
revealed in an attempt to predict preferences, evaluations or 
even to differentiate between groups. Some were successful 
(Klinnapas and Norman 1971; Skager, Schultz and Klein I966; Eysenck 
1972c) and others were not successful (Kay 19&9; Rouse i960).
The majority of factor analytic studies have been purely descriptive. 
There have been few attempts to check the validity of the factors, 
or even to establish whether they are useful as a classification 
system.
General Discussion and Conclusions
At present there appears to be little consensus on the 
structure of aesthetic experience as revealed by factor analysis 
and related techniques. To some extent this is a result of the 
need to quantify aesthetic experience and the obligatory assumptions 
about interval measurement. Although aesthetic measurement 
presents many difficulties these are not insurmountable. However, 
the emphasis on quantification means that only aesthetic responses 
are recorded and aesthetic experience is ignored. It is not 
sufficient to assume that asking someone to rank order a set of 
paintings for judged pleasingness is an adequate measure of his 
aesthetic reactions to these works. There is a danger of assuming 
that only what is measurable is relevant. This is perhaps more 
evident in factor analytic studies than in other areas of 
investigation.
One reason for the considerable differences between the 
results of the factorial studies discussed is adherence to a 
particular conception of the structure of mental abilities 
interpretation. It has been noted that there is no evidence to 
choose between these approaches except on a priori grounds. They 
result from the assumptions underlying the research from its 
inception. The general factor is far too important a notion to
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be ignored. It is however regrettable that its only contemporary 
proponent is Eysenck (1972b) who only uses molecular stimuli, 
and has not attempted to investigate it in relation to works of 
art. The latest evidence suggests that the general factor is 
specific (Eysenck 1972c). There is no recent evidence of a 
general factor running through reactions to all visual stimuli, 
indeed all art as propounded by Burt (1933). There is a strong 
case for reassessing the original experimental data using modern 
statistical technique and adequate stimulus sampling.
Another problem in assessing factorial studies is the great 
variety of stimuli that have been used (playing-cards, polygons, 
abstract designs, geometric designs, slides of paintings, real 
paintings, specially prepared drawings, etc.). Taken in relation 
to the great variety of subjects used in the studies and the 
great variety of measures used, and varying experimental conditions, 
it is not surprising that there is so little agreement between 
studies. There is a serious need for preparing a standardised 
set of visual stimuli ranging all the way from simple forms 
representative of basic factors of shape to sets of paintings which 
are representative of schools and types of art. Only then can 
factor analyses be carried out on the respective sets of stimuli, 
or groups, or all of them together, using standardised procedures 
of measurement, procedure and analysis.
The use of molecular stimuli as a substitute for real works 
of art is strongly discouraged. Molecular stimuli can vary 
in only a limited number of ways (notably aspects of complexity). 
This contributes towards greater internal validity though the 
experimenter must sacrifice external validity, because he cannot 
be sure that his subjects are responding aesthetically and the 
generalizability of the findings is restricted. To some extent 
this is also true when molar stimuli are used, but it is more likely 
that they will respond aesthetically (if they are going to at all)
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to objects that are culturally classified and known as aesthetic 
objects (Saw 1973). In addition the use of molecular stimuli 
eliminates subject-matter or theme as a determining variable.. Non 
representational (or abstract) art is a subcategory of art in 
general so it should be studied separately and not taken to stand 
for all types of visual art. Only isolated movements in the history 
of art have argued that art has no semantic content of any kind 
whatever, (e.g. the Constructivists or the Suprematists, see 
Herbert 1964). There is a vast difference between these kinds of 
art and monochromatic polygons. It is hardly surprising that 
factor analysis of reactions to molecular stimuli do not reveal 
theme*or emotion factors, whereas these are always revealed when 
molar stimuli are used.
Complexity has emerged as a factor determining reactions and 
aesthetic preferences in a large number of studies (Beebe-Center 
et al 1939; Harsh et al 1939; Barron and Welsh 1932; Silver, Landis 
and Messick 1966; Stenson 1968; Eysenck 1967, 1968, 1971aj 
Eysenck and Castle 1970a, 1971). In all of these studies molecular 
stimuli were used. In the majority of studies using molar stimuli 
complexity has not appeared as a factor determining reactions.
In the two studies using molar stimuli where complexity did 
appear as a factor (Beittel 1963; Skager, Schultz and Klein 1966b) 
the stimuli had been specially prepared under standard conditions.
In both studies students had executed drawings or paintings 
of the same scene or object, under certain constraints of size 
and media. Under these conditions the stimuli are standardised 
to the point where comparison along a dimension of simplicity- 
complexity becomes extremely likely, because of the similar 
features in all the paintings. In neither of these studies did 
complexity appear as a major factor. There are very few ways 
in which polygons can vary as there is no variation in meaning, 
mood, originality, intensity, realism, colour, etc. It is almost 
certain that a factor of simplicity-complexity will emerge from 
factor analysis of reactions to molecular stimuli*
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The perception of form should not be equated with aesthetic 
perception per se. Unless the perception of form is being 
specifically studied the application of factor analysis to 
the perception of molecular stimuli, as a model of aesthetic 
perception, should be discouraged. The study of complexity as 
a determining factor of aesthetic reactions has gained a very 
strong foothold in experimental aesthetics, especially in the 
last ten years. This is due largely to the fact that it is 
already a familiar concept in general psychology and it is 
relatively easy to quantify and manipulate in experiments, if 
only in the form of polygons or other similar shapes. The widely 
known work of both Barron (1954, I968) and Berlyne (1971, 1972a) 
has probably contributed to the importance of complexity as an 
aesthetic factor in experimental aesthetics. Due to the reluctance 
of present-day psychology to look in upon itself and examine its 
own assumptions and methods the relevance of complexity as an 
aesthetic factor is assumed without question. It is unlikely that 
the present reliance on molecular stimuli will cease unless there 
is a radical change of heart in experimental psychology as a whole.
There are other ways in which factor analysis can be profitably 
used. Loveless (1963) studied the stylistic features of paintings 
by Picasso by means of factor analysis, as did Kunnapas and 
Norman (1971) with paintings by Cezanne. Though not concentrating 
on a single artist Klein et al (I968) have investigated the formal 
features of painting and used related viewpoints as to their 
aesthetic significance for different individuals. Factor analytic 
techniques can also be usefully used to investigate the underlying 
features or structure of the style of individual painters, schools 
of art, historical periods, countries, and other groups (cf..
Goude 1972a, b). The features of the style could be elucidated 
as well as varying interpretations of the style (and content).
It would be interesting to determine whether art-critics' or 
art-historians' interpretations matched what factor analysis would
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reveal of their own reactions, as well as the reactions of non­
experts, The application of factor analytic methods to specific 
works or artists might also provide an antidote to the vagaries 
and subjectivity of ad hoc psycho-analytic interpretations. The 
generally low esteem of much of experimental aesthetics could be 
due to the apparent reluctance to deal directly with works of art 
and problems in art. By concentrating on molar stimuli factor 
analysis has the potential of redressing that imbalance and 
restoring the status of experimental aesthetics, not just in 
psychology but also in the world of art.
In short, factor analysis and multidimensional scaling 
techniques must be regarded as tools for providing classifications 
within complex reactions and also within complex aesthetic stimuli, 
The factors cannot be accepted as anything more than statistical 
unities until they have been shown to work as psychologically 
meaningful entities, and other empirical evidence converges to 
add support to the psychological utility and meaningfulness of 
the factor. Factor analysis should be used to test hypotheses, 
as well as to characterise paintings, and reactions to them.
Ill Post hoc categorisation of elicited responses 
and reactions to art
In general, the elicitation of dimensions by factor analysis 
and multidimensional scaling typifies the American approach to 
the investigation of the structure of aesthetic perception.
By comparison, the post hoc categorisation of elicited responses 
(particularly verbal) is more characteristically European.
Perhaps the most famous and influential example of this method 
is the study by Bullough (I908, I910). He asked the subjects in 
his experiment to give their reasons for liking the plain squares 
of colour that he used as stimuli. Despite the limitations in
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the use of molecular stimuli, Bullough was able to extrapolate 
with a degree of imagination that is discouraged in present-day 
psychology. He differentiated four basic types of response.
These have been described and discussed extensively by Burt (1933), 
Read (19^3), and Pickford (1972). Valentine (19Ô2) also described 
and discussed Bullough's work and presented the results of his 
own experiment using molar stimuli in which the four basic types 
of response described by Bullough were confirmed (Myers and 
Valentine 1914). In essence, the four types are: (a) associative ' 
(i.e. influenced by associations aroused by the colour of the 
stimulus); (b) 'physiological* (influenced by the effect the 
stimulus has on the person, e.g. dazzling), (c) 'character' 
(influenced by erapathetic projection); and (d) 'objective' 
(influenced by intellectual rather than emotional factors).
Further introspective confirmations have been provided by Feasy 
(1922), Kunroe (1925) and Dewar (1938). More recently Clements 
and Smith (I968) have subjected the classification to empirical 
test using factor analysis and confirmed Bullough^s types.
Bullough's ideas have had more influence in the world of art and 
art education (e.g. Read 1943) than they have had in psychology, 
of art or in general. This is regrettable because the psychology 
of art has generally failed to apply its findings to the problems 
which ostensibly gave rise to the psychological investigations in 
the first instance. Bullough's work has the charm of directness 
and relevance to art, despite his use of molecular stimuli. Again 
it is regrettable that imaginative extrapolation should be so 
unpopular in experimental aesthetics.
A recent example of post hoc categorisation is a study by 
Mortimer-Tanner and Naylor (I963). They published the results 
of the ranking of 12 reproductions of paintings by a total of 
1332 subjects over a period of 7 years. Analysing the results they 
were able to classify the dimensions of preference into objective 
and subjective categories. The former group made references to
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clarity, colour, composition, content, contrast, realism, 
stereopsis, technique and vitality, which are all characteristics 
of the paintings. The subjective category included references 
to associations, atmosphere, inspiration, interest, imagination 
and mood, which are all features of the individual’s response. 
This experiment is lacking in control, but compensates for this 
by the fact that it is illuminating. Similar studies have been . 
carried out by Frances (I968) and by Hussain (1966a). Frances 
classified the main reasons for liking paintings as realism, 
originality, beauty, colour, subjective impressions, and 
expressiveness. Hussain's classification was similar, but more 
general in nature. The two most commonly used categories were 
sensitive quality, and technical quality, which are almost too 
broad to be useful. The general nature of the classifications 
in this study reflect the wide range of art stimuli that were 
used, viz. paintings, sculpture, architecture, poems, etc. 
whereas Frances only used figurative drawings.
Although post hoc classifications tend to be lacking in 
experimental!rigour, they have a useful contribution to make to 
the psychology of art by acting as a complement and antidote to 
the rigourous straight-jacket and aridity of experimental 
aesthetics at its most extreme. The chief advantage of these 
studies lies in their flexibility and the creative contribution 
of the experimenter who plays an active role in interpreting 
the results. Apart from the obvious danger of bias, there is 
also the limitation that the technique only records what each 
individual is capable of saying, i.e. the results reflect both 
verbal habits and the vocabulary of each individual. Alexander 
(i960) has demonstrated experimentally that shapes can be sorted 
into groups which cannot be labelled verbally, just as it is not 
always possible to identify clusters revealed by factor analysis 
(Skager, Schultz and Klein I966). Consequently, post hoc 
classifications of verbal responses to paintings should not be 
discouraged, but this type of study is best used as a starting
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point and guide for more rigourous and empirical checks of the 
reliability and validity of the categories by means of factor 
analysis. It appears to be a feature of post hoc classifications 
that they are not tested for validity and reliability. Gordon 
is exceptional in that he first classified the verbal reactions 
of artists and non-artists, and then factor analysed them (Gordon 
1952, 1955)* This link-up of the tv/o methods would seem to be a 
most productive answer to the apparent conflict in the flexible 
but subjective classifications and the objective though less 
flexible factor analyses.
IV A Priori Classification of Aesthetic Reactions
Perhaps the most important a priori classification which also 
has the most far-reaching implications is the division of experimental 
stimuli into good or bad as works of art. This is a critical 
feature of Child's work on aesthetic sensitivity and also the 
work of Burt (1933) and Bulley (1933, 1931) on aesthetic judgement. 
Typically the aesthetic measure employed consisted of preference 
judgements within pairs of art objects. One member of the pair 
constituted an aesthetically good choice and the other represented 
an aesthetically bad choice. The criteria by which a painting was 
considered good or bad was either established by the experimenter 
himself (e.g. Pulley's test) or by a panel of experts (Child I962).
The methodological significance of this use of a criterion of 
quality is extremely important for experimental aesthetics, and 
has already been discussed in chapter four.
The use of a priori classifications to structure the responses 
made by subjects in experiments is a fairly common technique.
By providing response categories the researcher limits the range 
of possibilities open to an individual by forcing his responses 
into a finite set of categories. The chief advantage of this is a 
reduction of variability, and the confinement of responses to
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pre-established categories. In much the same way, psychometric 
tests of personality permit comparison between individuals by 
restricting their responses to a number of dimensions, enabling 
comparison between individuals. However, this technique could 
force a subject to make responses that he would not normally 
make either because he has no true preference or through sensiti­
zation by the category labels. In this way the a priori categories 
may prevent adequate sampling of an individuals responses or 
they may encourage him to respond artificially. This point is 
also relevant to the application of elicited factors to restrict 
the range of possible responses to aesthetic stimuli in an 
experiment. Hov/ever, this is a less risky procedure as the 
elicited factors or dimensions are at least empirically derived, 
though there is a danger that factors which may characterise a 
group as a whole may not have any relevance to individuals within 
the group.
A priori response categories have been provided in a number 
of studies (Peel 1944; Pickford 1948; Guilford and Holley 1949; 
Haber 1958; Frances and Voillaume 1964; Helson and Mouton 1964), 
though the aims of the respective studies were different.
Guilford supplied separate rating categories for form, colour 
and liking in order to determine the contributions of the first 
two categories on the third. Peel argued that too much emphasis 
had been placed on the characteristics of people with too little 
attention to the characteristics of paintings. Accordingly, he 
used experts to rank-order a set of landscapes on three criteria, 
viz. naturalism, composition and atmospheric light, and a set of 
still-lifes on realism, technique, and sponteneity. Using the 
intercorrelations between an individual's rank order of preference 
and the selected criteria provided by the experts, he was able 
to estimate the influence of these criteria in determining each 
individual's preference. Realism and technique appeared as 
important determinants, with sponteneity bipolar to both these
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factors. In a somewhat similar stidy, Pickford (1948) asked 
his subjects to rank-order paintings on eight different criteria 
which he supplied. His aim was to be comprehensive in response
sampling. A subsequent factor analysis revealed a general 
aesthetic factor, and a bi-polar technical factor. Haber (1958), 
Helson and Mouton (1964) and Frances and Voillaume (1964) all 
used the same technique as Pickford. They all obtained inter­
correlations between measures of preference and rank-orders on a 
select number of criteria in order to determine the influence of 
the criteria on overall liking.
The dimensions of pleasingness and interestingness are the 
major response classifications used by Berlyne (cf. Berlyne,
Ogilvie and Parham I968; Berlyne and Boudewijns 1971). Rated 
pleasingness is regarded as an index of hedonic value and rated 
interestingness a measure of arousal, or rather presumed arousal 
(Berlyne I96O, I965). There is no empirical justification for 
using these and only these two dimensions usually represented by 
one scale each. They are used purely on a priori grounds in the 
context of Berlyne's general work on the relation of collative 
properties to arousal.
An extremely detailed classificatory system has been devised 
by Cardinet (1958). He combined paintings in pairs for use in 
studies of the criteria determining aesthetic preferences. The 
classification is hierarchical. For example, the main categories 
are sub-divided; colour is sub-divided into warmth, saturation, 
clarity and light, there being one pair of paintings to represent 
each category. The members of each pair were equated (and tested 
for equivalence) on the basis of subject-matter, general style, 
historical period (a dichotomy of modern v. old) and general 
aesthetic value* Religious and purely abstract paintings were not 
used. In this way, Cardinet felt reasonably sure of adequate 
stimulus sampling in order to reveal subjective criteria by which
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individuals chose between paintings. By use of this very 
comprehensive category system, Cardinet maximises the freedom 
of each individual to make natural and unrestricted preference 
judgements. He also avoids contamination of results through 
sensitisation from response category labels. Despite this, the 
validity of Cardinet's technique rests on the assumption that when 
a preference within a pair of paintings is made it is on the basis 
of the criterion by which they were originally paired. This 
assumption is unproven though it could be tested by asking each 
individual for the reason for his choice, though this has all 
the limitations of the verbal techniques discussed above. Although 
Cardinet's system is extremely comprehensive, it is still open to 
bias creeping in as a result of the experimenter’s own pre­
conceptions. It is arguable that idiosyncracy in responding is 
an essential feature of aesthetic experience, which should be 
revealed by analysis, and not concealed because of the rigidity 
of a priori classification. Cardinet's technique has the advantage 
of high ecological validity with good stimulis sampling, and the 
avoidance of response sensitization but there is still room for 
bias occuring in the classificatory system employed. Perhaps the 
advantages of the technique can be maintained, and the danger of 
bias removed through factor analysis of the classificatory system 
as a first step to developing a test of aesthetic preference with 
an approximation to ideal stimulus sampling.
A number of investigators have classified the stimulus 
presented as an independent variable. V/hereas Peel (1944) divided 
paintings into classes according to theme, Knapp (1964) presented 
stimulus paintings which were representative of four different 
compositional types, viz. geometric, representational, and expres- 
sionistic, and impressionistic. All the paintings were rated for 
liking and revealed some interesting findings e.g. liking for 
expressive art is negatively related to a liking for realistic 
and fantastic art, but is unrelated to liking for geometric. An
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added feature of Knapp's study is that specific hypotheses were 
being tested. This is quite rare in experimental aesthetics.
Conclusions
The attempt to reduce the overall complexity of aesthetic 
reactions through imposing or eliciting structure has led to a 
bewildering array of factors, dimensions, types categories, etc. 
which in toto seem as complex and as variable as the phenomena 
which gave rise to them. The area is suffering from the Bruno 
and Sylvie syndrome who used ever larger maps to embrace ever 
more detail until they ended up with a map the same size as the 
country they were in. If structure is the order that underlies 
variability, then the psychology of art has made little progress 
towards finding order.
The general aesthetic factor appears to be no more than a 
measure of agreement within a group that is largely stimulus and 
culture specific. As such it is a valid concept if used as a 
descriptive tool. By contrast Thurstone-type factor analysis 
leads only to a proliferation of different factors emerging from 
studies differing widely in stimuli used, experimental procedure, 
response sampling and person sampling. Most of these studies 
are based on preference judgements in relation to characteristics 
of the stimuli. A more interesting development is the study of 
the perception of work of art based on similarity judgements within 
pairs. This has the advantage of being relatively objective, whilst 
at the same time being a relatively easy task to perform. Studies 
using this technique, (Klein I968; Kunnepas and Norman 1971; 
Loveless I968; Goude 1972a, 1972b) have revealed interesting 
descriptive factors which have subsequently been proven to be 
psychologically meaningful in follow-up studies. As one among 
several techniques for characterising individual or groups in 
terms of their implicit aesthetic theories it is extremely valuable
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if careful and representative stimulus sampling is also employed.
Factor analysis has also been nomothetic in emphasis. By 
contrast multi-dimensional scaling, as well as the repertory grid 
technique, permits more individual characterisation. This is an 
important advantage of these techniques, particularly when 
emphasis is placed on the interaction of stimulus characteristics, 
and the observer's attention to them. In this way there is less 
risk of bias intruding through sensitisation by response labels.
Post hoc classifications of verbal responses have many 
disadvantages, but are at least flexible and sensitive. They 
should however not be used in isolation but rather as a means of 
generating hypotheses which can be checked by means of converging 
operations with multivariate analysis, and experimental studies.
It also appears to be a feature of classificatory studies that 
they are not checked for reliability and validity. Although this 
is difficult because no form of quantification is involved it 
would not be unreasonable to attempt.
Although multi-variate analysis based on similarity judgements 
can 'define' the stimulus as seen by an individual it does not 
give any indication of the nature of his experience. There appears 
to be no better index of this than an individual's own verbal 
introspections. V/hen taken in the context of other so-called 
objective measures with the same individual, his verbal intros­
pections become more meaningful and therefore less dangerous to 
use as empirical data in the study of aesthetic experience*
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Determinants and Correlates of Aesthetic Reactions
'There may be wrong reasons 
for disliking a work of art, 
but not wrong reasons for 
liking it.'
E. H. Gombrich
The Story of Art (1950)
In this chapter emphasis is placed on studies which attempt 
to relate characteristics of stimuli with characteristics of 
observers in their joint influence on an individual's reactions. 
Essentially a determinant is an event or property which is causally 
related to some other event or property which is its effect. This 
is most clearly demonstrated in the classical experimental 
paradigm where changes in a dependent variable can be shown to be 
directly caused by variation in an independent variable. In the 
psychology of art it is extremely difficult to manipulate an 
independent variable for the stimulus is too complex and subtle to 
permit such systematic variation. This is true even when molecular 
stimuli are used. The factorial and multidimensional scaling studies 
discussed in the last chapter represent one attempt to locate and 
identify the characteristics of the stimuli which determine aesthetic 
reactions (whether they be simple preferences, evaluations or more 
complex emotional experiences). However, the discovered factors 
and, in other studies, the reasons given by individuals, only have 
the logical status of correlates, viz. something that varies with 
variation in the stimulus but may not in fact be causally related 
to it. In chapter two it was argued that an over-emphasis on 
finding causal relationships was misguided, and that more emphasis 
should be placed on discovering relationships that are more 
descriptive in nature.
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A large number of separate studies have specifically 
investigated the determinants and correlates of aesthetic reactions. 
This is partly due to the almost limitless number of variables 
that could be investigated in conjunction with an equally large 
range of material which could be used as stimuli. The model of 
aesthetic perception described in chapter five will be used to 
bring order to the profusion of unrelated and unsystematic 
studies that seek to relate aspects of aesthetic reactions to 
other variables. The separate studies will be discussed under 
the categories appropriate to that model.
A. Stimulus Categories
I Present Stimulus Information
This is perhaps the most intensively studied group of 
variables. Here the emphasis is on the stimulus. Ideally it should 
be a work of art, but all too often it is a molecular substitute.
In general, it is of great interest to know which characteristics 
of a stimulus are related to particular kinds of reactions. The 
characteristics include simple psychophysical variables like shape 
and colour which have been investigated from Fechner's (I876) 
pioneering days right up to the present. Also included under this 
heading are the effects of subject-matter, composition, style, 
painter, period, etc., which are traditional concepts of great 
importance to art critics and historians (Read 1950; Bodkin 1954; 
Gombrich I96O; Osborne 1970). Finally there are the more general 
variables such as complexity and dynamism which are more familiar 
to psychologists.
(i) Form
As Gibson (1951) has pointed out the meaning of the word 'form' 
is ambiguous. It can refer to shape, figure, structure, pattern, 
order, arrangement, configuration, plan, outline and contour, all 
of which are similar terms though lacking in distinct meaning.
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These are all aspects of form as it is perceived in everyday 
perception (Zusne 1970). In addition there is the concept of 
artistic form which is equally ambiguous and every bit as hard 
to define (Gombrich 1963, pp.1-11). There seem to be three 
general meanings of the word form viz. (a) the substantial shape 
of an object in three dimensions; (b) the projection of ah object 
on a flat surface; and (c) abstract geometrical shapes composed 
of imaginary lines, planes or families of them. A work of art as 
an object is a form in sense (a); a representational painting 
is also a form in sense (b). The painting also has formal 
characteristics which include its properties of composition, 
conception, interpretation, meaning, stylistic characteristics, 
etc. The attempts of experimental aesthetics to grapple with 
such an indeterminate and complex topic have revealed most clearly 
the methodological weaknesses of psychology in its application to 
art.
(a) Experimental investigations of simple visual form or 
shape have usually taken the form of simple preference studies. 
They have been extensively reviewed by Chandler (1934), Valentine 
(1962), and Pickford (1972). Nearly all this work employed 
molecular stimuli, usually as discreet elements and only rarely 
in combinations. Attempts to systematically link the elements of 
shape to actual works of art were virtually non-existent.
Typical early studies (e.g. the work of Martin I906, and Hevner 
1935) investigated the simple characteristics of stimuli that were 
preferred or liked by their experimental subjects. The stimuli 
employed were usually invented by the experimenter on an intuitive 
basis that reflected his own feelings and thinking on the subject 
and were not quantified in any way. Typically, simple curves,
The study by Silver, Landis and Messick (I966), among many others, 
attests to the difficulty of defining the physical parameters of 
simple geometric stimuli, let alone complex works of art.
See chapter six of this thesis.
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angles, ellipses and circles were employed, with simple variations 
such as size, orientation and width of line. The study of simple 
lines and shapes was not related to form in art and seemed to 
have more relevance to the general perception of form than to 
aesthetic reactions. However, some work with simple molecular 
stimuli' did have important consequences, e.g. the rejection of 
the eye-movement hypothesis by Stratton (1903), and the development
' I
of theory of empathy (Lipps,I908).
More recently interest has shifted away from simple shapes 
(but see omets I969, 1973) towards the notion of complexity as a 
determinant of preferences. Hysenck’s factorial studies discussed 
in chapter five have revealed clusters of shapes and designs 
which appear to determine affective reactions (see Eysenck I968, 
I9Ô7 ; Eysenck and Castle 1970a; Eysenck 1971)* The aspects of 
the Birkhoff polygons which determine simple liking and disliking, 
appear to be general to other cultures viz, Japan (Eysenck and 
Iwawaki 1972) and Egypt (Souief and Eysenck 1971, 1972). Apart 
from this there would appear to be very little interest in 
preference studies for simple shapes and designs.
(b) Balance and symmetry was first studied by Fechner and 
subsequently by Pierce, Martin, Ivitmer, Angier, Legowski and 
Thorndike over the next forty years. The results of this 
subsequent research failed to show any one best form in each of 
the categories studied by Fechner (best rectangle, best cross, 
etc.). In the later work individual differences became conspicuous; 
the irrelevance of exact ratios like the Golden Section^ became 
evident, and only such vague criteria as moderation, simplicity 
or comprehensibility retained any validity (Chandler 1934;
Valentine 19&2, pp.93-6). Again, all these studies utilised 
molecular stimuli, and there was no attempt to assess balance or
1
These are discussed in more detail in chapter nine of this thesis.
2
The Golden Section has been known since classical times and is
(continued..)
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symmetry in real works of art, Kellet (1939) and Buswell (1935) 
both attempted to relate frequency of eye-fixations in the 
respective halves of balanced and unbalanced pictures and found 
that the composition of the paintings did influence eye-fixations. 
However, inspection of the paintings used reveals that this could 
be a function of the distribution of interesting detail rather 
than the formal properties of the picture.
A number of recent studies appear to confirm the special 
significance of the Golden Section ratio for perception at least 
with simple stimuli (ilcCulloch 196O; Hintz and Nelson 1971;
Eysenck and Tunstall I968; Berlyne I968) but there has been 
no attempt to relate this to the perception of complex works of 
art. Generally, artistic form has not been studied except by 
analogy with very simple manipulable patterns which are quite 
divorced from works of art. For example, Holt-Hansen (1971) 
individually asked subjects to place three unpainted wooden sticks 
on a black surface so that the figure formed appeared to possess 
the maximum beauty. Analysis of the patterns and S's introspections 
suggested three different working patterns, all of which were 
governed by associational and ideational factors, e.g. mutual 
attraction, arrows, flowers, and not by purely compositional 
considerations. It is very difficult to generalise from this 
kind of study to the perception of works of art, but it is 
interesting in that it reveals the rich variation in perceptual 
experience in response to simple stimuli, which has also been 
found by Bullough (I908), Barnhart (1940)^Vanderplas and Garvin
(continued from overleaf)
the proportion for which the ratio of A/B is the same as B/A+B.
In other words it is the proportion in which the smaller of two 
parts is .618 times the size of the larger. It v/as not however 
until the nineteenth century that the Golden Section was 
imputed to be a universal law of aesthetic beauty (Osborne I968) .
It v;as this theory which first attracted Fechner's attention and 
led him to his first studies in experimental aesthetics.
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and Smets (1973).
Arnheim (1954) has given detailed speculative analyses of 
balance, shape and form in visual art in the context of a general 
Gestalt approach. It is surprising that his ideas and interpreta­
tions have not generated experimental tests.
The age-old concept of 'unity-in-variety' has not received 
experimental evaluation, though Berlyne has carried out a small 
number of studies using molecular stimuli (Berlyne and Boudewijns 
1971; Berlyne 1972b). In these experiments the elements used 
varied dichotomously, viz. circle or square, large or small, solid 
or pierced, pink or blue. Presented in threes, side by side, 35 
different combination were possible. Berlyne found that pleasing­
ness (ratings) correlated negatively with judged complexity of 
the stimuli, which varied inversely with the number of identical 
elements in a tryad, and directly with the number of properties 
in which elements differed. The results are seen as yet another 
instance of intermediate levels of complexity being judged most 
pleasing. The inadequacy of Berlyne’s behaviouristic conception 
of unity-in-variety is immediately apparent if one considers 
types of art where complexity is deliberately exploited as a formal 
device. Islamic arabesques, Persian carpets (see Plate VII), 
early Irish manuscripts (e.g. the Book of Kells, c.800 A.D,.), 
all present to the observer a mass of intricate design and detail, 
and yet there is no confusion as the various patterns correspond 
to each other in order to form a complex harmony of design and 
colour. It would be much more revealing if experimental aestheticians 
investigated.the perceptual effects of stimuli like these as well 
as representational paintings in which the unity in variety is less 
obvious. At present we do not even know whether a liking for
^Notable examples are Michelangelo's frescoes in the Sistine 
Chapel (1308-1512), and Raphael's 'Galatea' (1514) in which 
Gorabrich has drawn attention to 'the perfect and harmonious 
composition of freely moving figures' (Story of Art, Eleventh 
Edition, p.235)
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Irish Medieval manuscripts is related to a liking for other 
complex art (e.g. Islamic art), and to a disliking for other 
kinds of art (e.g. Suprematism).
General features of artistic composition have not been 
systematically investigated by the psychology of art. In line 
with the argument of chapter two of this thesis it is not 
acceptable for empirical psychologists to express value judgements 
about the correctness of certain kinds of composition as a 
standard for evaluating works of art. Principles of formal 
composition in paintings have been laid down by Littlejohns and 
Needham (1932), by von Fieandt (1966), and as we have seen by 
Meier and by Graves in the designs of their respective art 
aptitude tests (Meier 1942; Graves 1948). Descriptive studies 
are required to investigate the way in which people see paintings. 
They may be characterised by the kinds of formal structure they ■ 
respond to, if any. This must be based on phenomenal reactions 
and not physical measurements of the stimulus. A possible test 
of an individual's ability to distinguish differences in artistic 
form would be to present pairs of paintings which were closely 
matched in colour and depicted content so that the individual 
must judge whether or not they are by the same artist, or the same 
genre, or the same stylistic period, and so on. The pairs 
could be scaled for degree of overall similarity and it would be 
possible to give weights to the various answers. They could be 
systematically paired for similarity on the basis of depicted 
content, colour, tone, mood, treatment, etc. Preferences between 
the same pairs would also give some indication of each individuals
'I
implicit aesthetic theory.
For example the following pairs might be used:
(a) Durer: The Painter's Father v. Rembrandt: Self-Portrait 
(both in National Gallery, London)
(b) Raphael: La Velata (Pitti, Florence) v. Titian: Flora 
(Uffizi, Florence)
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The amount of information accumulated by the psychology 
of art on the perception of artistic form is depressingly small 
in view of its one hundred-year existence. By contrast the 
potential for research and the need for it is alarmingly great.
A considerable amount of time and energy has been spent 
investigating the effects of variables such as the effect of 
stimulus complexity on aesthetic reaction. It is ironic that 
the more immediately relevant topic of artistic form should be 
almost totally ignored. A recent, if limited, development in 
the investigation of form in art has been an interest in the 
detection of left-right reversals of the image (Ross I966;
Nelson and MacDonald 1971) and formal organisation of subject- 
matter (Kunnapas and Norman 1971; Goude 1972a, b) particularly as 
this determines preference and value judgements. The objectivity 
and 'ecological validity' of this technique (Brunswick 1956) are 
sufficiently rigorous to satisfy the demands of the scientific 
psychologist whilst at the same time preserving and making
(continued from overleaf)
(c) Monet : Jeune femme assise sous un saule (National 
Gallery, Washington) v. Sisley: Small meadows in spring 
(Tate, London)
(d) Gainsborough: Cornard Wood (National Gallery, London) v. 
Constable, Near Stoke-by-Nayland (Tate, London)(or see Plates 
VIII and IX)
(e) De Hooch: Woman Peeling Apples (Wallace Collection) v. Vermeer 
The Artist's Studio (Czernin Collection, Vienna)
Other combinations might be appropriate pairs of paintings by:
(f) Pierre Soulages and Franz Kline
(g) Sam Francis and Jackson Pollock
(h) Willem de Kooning and Asger Jorn
(i) Francois Millet and Gustave Courbet
(j) Annibate Carraci and Michelangelo da Caravaggio
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allowance for the complex and subtle nature of the paintings.
Given an adequate set of representative stimulus paintings this 
is the ideal tool for assessing an individual's aesthetic theory 
though this must be supplemented by introspective data.
A number of studies have revealed the importance of lateral 
organisation as a determinant of preference and appreciation 
(Swarts and Swarts 1971î Swarts and Hewitt 1970; Nelson and 
Macdonald 1971). For instance in the first study the following 
properties of lateral organisation were successfully used to predict 
liking in different observers: (a) pattern of lighting; (b) profile 
orientation; (c) handedness characteristic; (d) quadrant distribution 
of important objects; and (e) ease of entering the picture space. 
However, some doubt is cast on these findings by an earlier study 
by Noss (1966). Although his subjects also revealed great 
sensitivity to left-right reversals of paintings after an initial 
very brief exposure, they were no better than chance in determining 
which was the correct or intended orientation. Despite this, 
orientation preference in paintings is an extremely interesting 
phenomenon that justifies further research.
Complexity as a determinant of aesthetic reactions was first 
quantitatively studied by Birkhoff (1933). Since then a large 
number of studies have investigated the nature of the relationship 
between complexity and pleasantness of the stimuli. The four basic 
types of relationship that have been found are presented in Table A. 
In the Birkhoff Model pleasantness is a direct negative function 
of complexity. In an earlier discussion (chapter four) it was 
noted that Birkhoff's formulation has not received empirical 
support. There are however a few recent studies which support the 
relationship, using simple geometric stimuli (Iwawaki and Clement 
1972), and preferences for grades of sandpaper texture (Ekraan,
Hosraan and Lindstrom I963). However, the overwhelming number of 
studies favour the two forms of the inverted-U relation (Models
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(a) Birkhoff Model (Linear Negative)
pleasantness
complexity
Studies
Birkhoff 1933; Erighouse 1939c 
Eysenck 1941; 19^2 (Extraverts 
only)
Reich and Moody 1970 (familiar 
stimuli)
Iwawaki and Clement 1972,
Edman, Hosman and Lindstrom 19&3'
(b) Eysenck-Eerlyne Model (Inverted U)
pleasantness
complexity 
Berlyne lv60, 1967, 1971 (ch.12)
Dorfman 1965; Dorfman and 
McKenna I966; Vitz I966; Wohwill 
1968; Eysenck and Castle 1970 
Rump 1968 
Eisenman 1966a, b 
Hunsinger, Eessen & Kessen 1964 
Eershenson, Munsinger, and 
Kessen 1965
Nias and Frith 1973; Bay I967 
(implicit in Golden Section 
studies, viz, Fechner I876; 
Pierce 1894; Angier I903).
(c) Terwillirer *s Model (based on Helson 1964)
t
indifferent
pleasant
unpleasant
^  Adaptation level 
—  discrepancy discrepancy-
(d) Linear Positive Model
pleasantness
complexity
Terwilliger 19o3 
Berlyne 1966
Berlyne and Peckham I967 
Munsinger and Eessen 1964
Jones, L'ilkinson & Braden I96I 
Jones 1964 
Vitz 1964
Taylor & Eisenman 1964 (artists 
only)
Eysenck 1941c (artists only) 
Eisenman 1966a, 196? (artists 
only)
Table A . Types of Relationship found between complexity
and Aesthetic Preference. (Adapted from Smets 1973).
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b and c). In essence this is the finding that intermediate levels 
of complexity are most preferred. The Berlyne-Sysenck model 
maintains that this is a function of a biologically determined 
level of complexity, whereas the Terwilliger model makes the 
inverted-U relation a function of each individual’s adaptation- 
level (Helson 1964). The final model (d) maintains that 
pleasantness increases directly and linearly with complexity.
The first thing to note about these studies is the extreme 
variability in the definition of complexity and the type of 
stimuli used. These have included the number of points or sides 
in a polygon (Munsinger and Kessen 1964; Yanderplas and Garvin 
1959» Eisenman 1963); the number of angles, lines and points of 
intersection in line drawings (Vitz I966); bits of information 
in dot patterns (Attneave 1955» Dorfman 1965» Iwawaki and Clement 
1972); the number of parts in a figure differing in form and
'I
location (Terwilliger I963); collative properties (Berlyne 1971; 
Eisenman 1966b; Maw and Maw I962); subjective ratings of pictures 
(Lindauer 1971; R'alker 1970; Osborne and Farley 1970) and art 
experts’ ratings in accordance with a provided definition (Wohwill 
1968). It is not surprising that so many different relationships 
should emerge.
Closer examination of these studies reveals that the relation­
ship is the result of a number of factors.
(i) The range of stimuli of employed. In the majority of 
studies in Table A complexity is not systematically varied, and 
very often a very restricted range of complexity was studied 
(Berlyne I963; I966; Jones 1964; Vitz 1964). Recently, indirect 
evidence v;as presented by Day (196?) and Wohwill (196S) which
Collative properties include irregularity of arrangement or of 
shape, heterogeneity of elements, number of independent parts, 
random distribution of elements, and incongruity. They are not 
quantitatively defined in terms of complexity though each pair 
consists of a more complex and a less complex stimulus represen­
ting a given collative property. (Fig, 3-6)
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suggested that the relationship between complexity and preference 
was a function of the range of complexity presented. This has 
been directly investigated by Smets (1973) who used three sets of 
stimuli (checker-board patterns) which had different amounts of 
maximum information (viz. high = 90 bits, medium = 225 bits, and 
low = 64 bits). Within each set complexity was determined in 
terms of each pattern's average subjective redundancy. The 
preference for the patterns in the different sets, when plotted 
against complexity revealed four different relationships. (See 
Fig. 1).
pleasant­
ness
Maximum information
--low  medium
• "■^A low
D high
upper medium
complexity
Fig. 7-1 The relationship between complexity and
preference for different levels of maximum 
information (adapted from Smets 1973, p.39)
Essentially this means that when the range of stimulus 
variation presented to an observer is small the relation between 
perceived complexity and preference is a linear or near linear 
positive function (Curves A & B). When a larger range of complexity 
is presented Berlyne*s and Eysenck’s inverted-U relation is 
revealed (curve C) though when a still larger range is presented
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(up to 900 bits) the inverted-U relation is only valid up to a 
certain redundancy level (in this case about 20%, curve U). The 
main significance of these findings is that Berlyne's theory of 
the relation between arousal complexity and preference is not 
supported for either very simple or very complex stimuli. Smets 
interprets these findings in terms of changes in redundancy 
thresholds as a function of the total range of complexity presented. 
This is in line with Miller's (1936) notion of 'bits' and 'chunks' 
of information by which the objectively more complex stimulus 
may appear relatively simple.
The series of experiments carried out by Smets is extremely 
interesting. Its relevance to art however is more difficult to 
establish, even though it is extremely pertinent to the large 
number of studies investigating the relation between preference 
and complexity. The stimuli used were checker-board patterns 
and complexity was measured in terms of transitional probabilities 
between cells (black or white) which were established by guessing 
from one cell to the next -whether it was black or white. There 
was no attempt to measure phenomenal complexity as each individual 
understood that term. Finally there is no sense in which these 
extremely' interesting findings could be generalised to the perception 
of art in general. It would be valuable to replicate this 
experiment using,as stimuli, paintings which deliberately vary in 
complexity, (e»g. Plates I, V, VI, VII).
(b) Individual differences. This is the second factor 
which can affect the relationships presented in Table A. A number 
of studies have revealed that the relation of complexity to 
preferences is highly idiosyncratic (Christensen I96I, 1962) and also 
that the inverted U-relation can be obtained by averaging the results 
of extreme scores (Vitz I966; Noll 1972; Fritzky 19^4; i'Zaplan,
Kaplan and Wendt 1972) though Rump (I968) obtained inverted-U 
relations for both grouped and individual ratings. Other studies
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have shown that preference for complexity is closely related to 
personality (Eysenck 1942; Barron and Uelsh 1932; Christensen 19o2; 
Bryson and Driver 1972; Wilson, Ausman and Matthews 1973), and 
an individual's disposition to seek out and experience high levels 
of sensation (Zuckerraan, Meary and Erustman 1970; Nias and Frith 
1973), as well as his degree of 'field-independence' (Bieri,
Bradburn and Galinsky 193o). Furthermore, Eisenman has shown that 
creative persons and mathematics students prefer greater complexity 
to non-creative and arts students respectively (Eisenman and Coffee 
1964; Taylor and Eisenman 1964), and also that first-borns prefer 
simpler polygons to later-borns (Eisenman I963), and that women 
tend to prefer more complex polygons than men (Eisenman and 
Johnson I969). Frances (1970) has also shown that students prefer 
higher levels of figurai complexity than working-class men of the 
same age. Training in art (Eysenck 194lc; Rosen 1933j Barron and 
Welsh 1932; Munsinger and Kessen 1964; Eisenman 1966a, 1967;
Eisenman and Ross 1967; Eysenck 1972b), as well as perceptual 
learning exercises (McV.'hinnie I963, 1966, 1970a) have also been 
shown to influence the level of complexity which is most preferred. 
Finally, Barry (1937) has revealed that production of (and 
presumably preference for) complexity in the art of primitive 
cultures is correlated with other features of the culture indicative 
of variations in typical personality.
In the light of these enormous individual differences biological 
speculations and hypotheses about the fundamental role of complexity 
as a determinant of all aesthetic reactions are seriously weakened.
-1
Although the range of stimulus complexity used by Eisenman is 
very restricted (viz, only three, twelve and 24-point random 
polygons) the emergence of strong individual differences is extremely 
important in view of the fact that a restricted range of stimulus 
variation would tend to conceal individual differences. On the 
whole Eisenman's methodology is weak (e,g, he only uses three 
instances at each of three complexity levels), and would benefit 
considerably from improved stimulus sampling and response sampling.
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(c) The influence of extraneous factors. There is no such 
thing as pure complexity. It cannot exist separated from shape, 
size, colour and other structural properties of the stimulus.
These factors may all influence an individuals liking for a 
particular stimulus. This is particularly apparent in Berlyne's 
standard set of collative stimuli (Berlyne 1963)* Preferences 
within pairs may be governed by considerations of shape and 
texture rather than more or less of the collative variables in 
question and Berlyne never elicits the reasons for choice. An 
aspect of shape which is very relevant to preferences for levels 
of complexity is the symmetry-asymmetry of the perceived figures, 
i-ioyles, Tuddenham and Block (1965) in their analysis of the Earron- 
VTelsh Art Scale found that liking for complexity v;as independent 
of a liking for asymmetry. This has also been systematically 
investigated by Eisenman, Idhen given a straight choice between 
asymmetrical and symmetrical polygons, the latter are most preferred 
(Eisenman 196?), and simple polygons are generally preferred to 
more complex polygons (Eisenman and Ross 196?)• When the two 
variables are combined the complex-symmetrical polygons are most 
preferred, and the simple asymmetrical are least preferred 
(Eisenman and Gellens I968), In a similar study Letzring (1972) 
has shown that the pleasingness of checker-board patterns was 
determined by interaction of black and white elements and contiguity 
of the elements rather than overall complexity, and Nias and Frith 
(1973) have shown that amount of contour was a more important 
determinant of pleasingness than complexity (measured in bits of 
information). Two factor analytic studies of Birkhoff's polygons 
(Eysenck I968) and Hornung's designs (Eysenck 1971) revealed a 
large number of factors relating to shape (e.g. Cross, star, pillar, 
rotational symmetry, shading, 3 dimensional effects). It is very 
clear from these studies that in addition to complexity particular 
shapes are important determinants of aesthetic ratings of simple 
designs, Eysenck has also shown that a general factor runs through 
preferences for Birkhoff’s polygons which when controlled for
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revealed a linear relation between '^complexity and preference 
(Eysenck and Castle 1970). Another factor that could contaminate 
the effects of complexity on preference is stimulus novelty. 
Although both Eisenman (1968b) and Berlyne (1970) have demonstrated 
that the subjective novelty of molecular stimuli is functionally 
equivalent to objectively defined complexity this is not the case 
with pictures or objects. Reich and Moody (1970) have demonstrated 
that there is a linear negative relationship between pleasantness 
and the complexity of stimuli which are familiar to a person, and 
a positive linear relation for stimuli which are new to a person. 
Finally, the connotative or symbolic meaning of the molecular 
stimulus could influence preference judgements, regardless of 
complexity (cf. Bullough I908, I9IO; Barnhart 1940). A number of 
studies have shown that the greatest number of meaning responses 
(associations) are evoked either by highly simple forms or those 
of intermediate complexity (Vanderplas and Garvin 1939; Goldstein 
1961 ; Eisenman 1966a; Smets 1973)* In view of the fact that 
ranking or rating molecular stimuli for preference may be forcing 
the individual to make judgements that he would not naturally 
make, it is likely that the inverted-U relation is demonstrated 
when individuals merely preferred the patterns which were easiest 
to organise meaningfully. This leads on to the next extraneous 
factor.
(d) The type of stimuli used. It v/as noted above that very 
few studies have involved molar stimuli. This is presumably 
because it is easier to define and control complexity objectively 
if molecular stimuli are used. Unfortunately the great number of 
definitions employed have not been systematically compared with 
each other except in one study by Kaess (1972) who found that 
checkerboard variation and the number of points in a polygon were 
not functionally equivalent as measures of complexity. When molar 
stimuli are used the experimenter must rely on subjective ratings
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of complexity. Only five studies have used pictorial material.
Walker (1970) found that liking increased monotonically with 
(previously scaled complexity) for stage-sets and modern paintings, 
but decreased monotonically for black and white reproductions of 
tartans. By contrast Osborne and Farley (1970) using a similar 
technique found a negative relationship between complexity and 
painting preference, and Lindauer (1971) found no relation at all 
between judged complexity and liking for abstract paintings. A 
study by Kaplan, Kaplan and Wendt (1972) confirms the domain- 
specific variation in the preference-complexity relationship. For 
photographs of urban and rural scenes the relationship between 
complexity and preference was linear, but it was negative for 
rural, and weakly positive for urban scenes. In the only study 
in which an inverted-U relation was revealed (using photographs 
of the environment and abstract paintings) Wohwill (I968) expresses 
doubt about the validity of the results because of the limited 
range.of complexity presented.
(e) The absence of complexity as a factor in factor analytic 
studies. It was noted in chapter six that complexity was very rarely 
revealed in factor analytic studies involving molar stimuli. This 
could well explain the conflicting findings described in paragraph
(d) above. By contrast the most common factor revealed in these 
studies is one which approximates to a dimension of static-dynamic 
or spontaneous-deliberate. The latter dimension has been revealed 
as an important criterion of evaluation by artists (Singer, Schultz 
and Klein 1966b; Klein and Skager 1967; Klein I96S) and similar 
major factors have been revealed by Bernheim (1964) and Rouse (1964). 
On the basis of a factor analysis Beittel (1963) was able to 
distinguish spontaneous and deliberate judges, and spontaneity as 
a factor determining preferences for drawings. Among the eight 
factors revealed by Choynowski (I967) one was described as dynamic- 
static (of composition) and another vras labelled sketchy-v/orked
small number of studies using molecular stimuli have employed 
subjective ratings of complexity (Atteave 1937; Berlyne^1966; 
Berlyne, McDonald and Parham 1967; Day 1967; Eysenck 1968).
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out. Finally Kay (I969) revealed a factor of movement-quiescence 
in the reactions of children to paintings.
In conclusion it seems unlikely that complexity is an important 
factor affecting aesthetic reactions, unless as noted above, 
complexity-conscious art is being observed. It is wasteful to 
continue research on complexity in molecular stimuli as a determinant 
of aesthetic reactions. It would be extremely interesting to 
investigate preferences for complexity-conscious art, as opposed 
to other kinds of art, e.g. geometric, ordered Greek ornament, 
ojr African designs (cf. Connell 1963; Williams 1971 for source 
material). Even if judged complexity does appear to influence 
the reactions to these kinds of art it would not be possible to 
generalise the findings to other kinds of art e.g. Renaissance 
painting and other periods of great art in which so much more than 
complexity can be seen to vary. The symbolic significance of the 
decorative elements in early Christian art, or the zen-inspired 
abstract paintings of Jackson Pollock (1912-1936) or Mark Rothko 
(1903- ) would be entirely missed if they were scaled solely
for complexity. The meaning of the complex organisation of the 
influences the perceptual significance of the complexity. Meaning 
cannot be separated from complexity as an independent variable.
In addition the apparent simplicity of a painting (e.g. by Raphael 
or Een Nicholson) might belie the deep thought, careful planning, 
and the fine artistic judgement which has enabled the simple- 
seeming interpretation of complex and subtle ideas.
(ii) Colour.
Preferences for colour, either in isolation or in combination 
have been investigated with the same enthusiasm as form and shape 
preferences, and with a similar disregard for the role of colour 
in art. Colour has the advantage over shape in that like music 
(or sound) it is objectively specifiable (hue, saturation and 
intensity), though of course this does not necessarily correspond
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to phenomenal experience (e.g. illusions of colour contrast).
The enormous number of studies of simple colour preferences have
been exhaustively reviewed by Eysenck (194lb), Valentine (1962,
Ball (1963), Hogg (1969b, c ) and Pickford (1972). For the most
part, plain rectangles of colour have been used as stimuli, and no
attempt has been made to relate colour preferences to evaluations
of specific paintings (e.g. the paintings by Bonnard or Matisse
in which a single colour pervades the whole canvas, and periods
of art which are acknowledged for their colour properties such
as 16th Century Venetian painting or Expressionist and Impressionist 
1
painting). The combination of form and colour was first studied 
by Kulpe (1903), and subsequently by Oeser (1932) who divided his 
subjects according to whether they were form- or colour-dominant.
This work does not seem to have attracted much attention though 
omets (1973), also using plane colours and simple geometric shapes, 
has returned to the problem though her main interest is in the 
expressive qualities of the stimuli.
Pickford (1948), and Kelson and Mouton (1964) correlated 
ratings of the colour of paintings with ratings of overall liking 
for the paintings, as a measure of the influence of colour on 
overall reactions. The latter authors calculated that colour 
determined 22>a of the overall variance in reactions to the paintings, 
whereas depicted content accounts for 34/j of the overall variance. 
Gordon's (1936) factor analysis revealed that non-artists were 
influenced by single colours in paintings, whereas trained artists 
were more influenced by combinations of colour. Using his match- 
to-sample technique Gardner (1969) hascfemonstrated that children 
are influenced by dominant colour in their aesthetic preferences. 
These techniques though they provide insight are somewhat crude 
in their relation to art. Goude (1972a) has also revealed that
1
Delacroix is on record as having claimed that he could paint 
Venus with mud if he could surround it with whatever colours he 
chose.
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artists noticed the 'colouristic lustre’ of the stimulus paintings, 
which appeared to go unnoticed by the non-artists who paid most 
attention to the depicted content (a finding also confirmed by 
Mortimer-Tanner and Naylor 1972).
A few studies have compared reactions to coloured and 
monochrome reproductions of the same paintings, Dreher (1968) 
revealed changes in average affective ratings of coloured and 
black and white reproductions. By contrast Mortimer-Tanner and 
Naylor (I963) found that individuals' rank order for both coloured 
and black ana white reproductions is consistently similar. It is 
interesting that for coloured reproductions men are less influenced 
by mood than are women, but the men and women are equally sensitive 
to mood in black and white reproductions. Since colour is the 
most commonly given reason for liking a painting (after depicted 
content) it would seem a very useful way of studying the effects 
of colour to systematically compare reactions to coloured and 
monochrome reproductions. It is surprising that this has not been 
done. So far the only definite thing known is that the absence or 
presence of colour in a picture does not affect the pattern of 
eye-fixations (Buswell 1935; Yarbus 1967).
Despite these studies the investigation of colour in art has 
been disappointingly scant compared to the enormous number of 
colour preference studies. Most of the techniques so far used are 
too crude to be very useful. For example they have to be sensitive 
enough to detect the way in which Titian (1477-1576), for example, 
used colour to create unity in his paintings which in compositional 
terras were otherwise unbalanced. The psychology of art has not 
yet systematically investigated the connotative and symbolic 
meaning of colour and the expressive power of colour in art.
An interesting compromise on experimental control and 
relevance to art could be achieved by adapting a technique used by 
Edward Munch (1899-1944). He cut up several wood-cut printing-blocks
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a l o n g  meaningful lines, e.g. the shore-line, round a person, along
the horizon, so that these elements could be separately inked
with a variety of colours so that when put together exactly the
1
same form could be seen with different colour schemes. This 
technique could easily be adapted to form a laboratory measure 
of the effects of colour on the perception of paintings. Similarly 
abstract paintings could be photographed through coloured lenses 
to systematically change the colour scheme. The psychology of art 
has not yet met the challenge of studying colour in art. There 
does not appear to be any major obstacle preventing a more realistic 
study of colour. It is only the will that is lacking.
(iii) Depicted content and degree of abstraction.
It is surprising, upon taking a closer look at experimental 
aesthetics that depicted content has not been systematically studied 
as a determinant of aesthetic reactions. A large number of studies 
have shown that the subject-matter of paintings is the main 
determinant of liking and evaluation especially among non-artists 
(Peel 1944; Tucker 1955; Gordon 1955, 1956; Guilford and Holley 
1949; Helson and Mouton 1964; Hussain 1966a; Getzels and 
Csiksentmihalyi I969). A similar tendency was found among children 
(see chapter eight). Linked with an interest in the subject- 
matter was a moderating influence of the degree of realism in 
the paintings (Pickford 1948; Prances and Voillaurae 1964). These 
findings make the psychological meaningfulness (reality) of the 
general aesthetic factor difficult to accept in the absence of 
anything more than correlational evidence. There are so many 
possible determining influences that it is not possible to conclude 
from concensus within a group that they are all agreeing about 
the same thing.
^Examples of these woodcuts can be found in the Catalogue of the 
Edvard Munch Exhibition 1974, items 207, 204, and I98 (Arts 
Council, London)
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Apart from these fairly crude studies there has been no 
attempt to correlate preferences for different types of content 
(landscapes, historical, military, naval battles, madonnas, rotting 
carcasses, portraits, street scenes, etc.). Some evidence is 
available from studies which investigated the relationship between 
personality and painting preference (discussed below) and from 
structural studies described in the previous chapter where 
paintings were categorised on an a priori basis. As 3 systematic 
variable in its own right determining reactions, variation in 
content has been neglected. This might be a function of the 
current Zeitgeist. Lindauer (1973) has gene so far as to suggest 
that only abstract paintings be used as stimuli in experiment 
because they have no content, and so the irrelevant and distracting 
factor of subject-matter can be eliminated. I shall argue below 
that content (symbolic, denotative or otherwise) is essential to 
aesthetic perception.
Most studies using abstract art as stimulus material have 
correlated preferences for abstract or for representational art 
with other person characteristics, viz. sex, education, class, 
personality. In these studies the division of paintings into 
abstract and representational is a convenient independent variable. 
There is no attempt to study abstract art in its own right and 
the kinds of reactions and experience it elicits.
Before proceeding to the next section it is necessary to 
comment on the often used dichotomy of abstract v . representational 
art used in experimental studies. This distinction is very crude 
indeed for as Gombrich (19&3, IS'opb) has been at pains to point 
out, content is inseparable from the form in wnich it is expressed 
so that the same object presented differently (i.e. in formal terms).
^i.e. in the sense of natural objects depicted pictorially.
is in aesthetic effect two different objects. Gombrich's 
specialisation in mediaeval and renaissance art, (cf. Norm and 
Form 196b) in which visual art had either religious or classical 
content, cannot be seen as the reason for Gorabrich's emphasis on 
the importance of the depicted content of art. As his extensive 
writing over a very wide range of topics would suggest (e.g.
Gombrich I960, 1966b) theme or content is an extremely important 
aspect of a work of art, though it is not a necessary condition 
of good or great art. It should therefore be a primary aim of the 
psychology of art to systematically investigate the interaction 
of form and content. This reduces to the notion of style in 
art especially if it is taken to mean differences in formal 
interpretation when the theme is held constant and differences 
in theme when the formal interpretation is held constant (Zucker 
1962). Thus it might be possible to use as stimuli still-lives of 
food and drink by artists who would have interpreted this theme 
very differently, e.g. Van Dyke, Chardin, Cezanne, Braque and 
Bonnard. Alternatively, stimuli could be selected from works by 
the same artist or artists with different themes, e.g. portraits 
and land-scapes by Gainsborough, Goya, Rubens, Cê'zanne and Corot.
By systematically varying these combinations it would be possible 
to come closer to an understanding of the relative influence of 
form and content in visual art. This would represent a major 
step forward from the crude generalisation that artists evaluations 
are influenced by compositional and formal factors, whereas non­
artists are most strongly influenced by the subject-matter and 
degree of realism of its depiction.
It was noted in chapter five that there has not been a systematic
4
In this context one might also investigate the psychological 
significance of the frequent meals which play an important part in 
recent films by Claude Chabrol, in contrast to similar meal-scenes 
in films by Luis Bunuel.
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attempt to measure the preferences of samples of the general 
population for particular painters, periods, styles of art, etc. 
Individual painters have not been studied using empirical 
techniques apart from isolated studies of Picasso (Loveless I968;
1969), Cezanne (Ivnapp 1969; Nelson and McDonald 1971) 
and Van Gogh (Pickford 1969a). This is a very sad state of 
affairs. It contrasts sharply with psychoanalytic attempts to 
grapple with content and the uniqueness of the individual artist 
even though he tends to be surrealist in the narrow or in the 
wider sense of that term (of. Bosch, Grünewald, Goya, Dali).
It is perhaps the association of 'unscientific' excesses of 
psychoanalytic interpretations of artists which deters empirical 
psychologists from tackling this problem in the fear that the 
brand of 'unscientific' will rub off on them. As it is, there is 
great potential for the art psychologist to aid the art historian 
or artist in his attempts to interpret and understand particular 
painters or styles.
It is very difficult to bring these studies on the relation­
ship between aesthetic reaction and characteristics of aesthetic 
stimuli together for the purpose of synthesis. Comparison 
between studies is handicapped by lack of a standard approach to 
the problem as well as the lack of standard stimuli and standard 
measuring techniques. Nearly all the studies stand in isolation 
from each other except where a single researcher (e.g. Eysenck, 
Berlyne, Eisenman) has tried systematically to investigate a 
specific problem in experimental aesthetics. Comparison between 
these is still difficult for the same reasons mentioned above.
It has been argued that psycho-riiysical research into the elements 
of visual stimuli (plain colour, simple shape) though worth 
studying in their own right, contribute little to our understanding
^Jungian and Gestalt-based interpretations of Picasso have also 
been presented by Jung (1932) and Arnheim (1973)respectively.
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of reactions to and experience of complex works of art. In addition, 
it has been argued that the important and extensive research on 
complexity is less relevant to aesthetic perception than is 
commonly supposed. Further work on complexity should be based on 
phenomenal judgements of works of art. As far as possible an 
objective basis for comparison between stimuli should be used 
(e.g. similarity judgements or style discrimination). This 
technique is well suited to the determination of factors which 
affect reactions, as well as to the characterisation of individual 
works, painters or styles.
Stored Stimulus Information
This area has been neglected in experimental aesthetics. It 
represents the knowledge, assumptions or expectations with regard 
to the work of art or art in general that the observer possesses 
and which influence his encounter with art. In an earlier chapter 
the notion of implicit personal aesthetic theory was discussed.
To assess this exi^ e riment ally would involve assessment of what 
individuals think represents good art, or the kind of art they 
like. To some extent this has already been done sporadically by 
workers in the field who were concerned specifically with other 
problems, e.g. factor analytic studies, correlational investigations 
of personality, etc. Some work has also been done on the need for 
self-consistency in aesthetic judgements (Hartley and Schwartz 1966; 
Nemeth and kachtler 1973), and on the degree of distortion required 
before a picture is regarded as aesthetic when the content is 
explicitly sexual (Machotka and Waite 1963; Machotka 1970a). These 
and many other studies which have been mentioned in other contexts 
all have a bearing on the multiple constellation of criteria, 
aesthetic or non-aesthetic, concious or unconscious, that influence 
an individual's reaction to works of art. It might be possible to 
determine the general influence of socio-economic status, educational 
level, intelligence, etc., but these are all contributing factors
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to what is manifested in one individual’s personal implicit 
aesthetic theory. It would be a more direct and sensitive 
approach to assess this as a whole, as it can be regarded as the 
mediating link between all the factors that influence an individual 
(psychological, psycho-physical and environmental) in his reactions 
to works of art. Although it is argued that a primary aim of 
the psychology of art is to systematically explore the mediating 
role of an individual's implicit aesthetic theory, it is not 
possible at this stage to draw any firm conclusions concerning the 
nature or operation of the implicit theory, though some possible 
factors have been noted.
A small number of studies have investigated the effects of 
familiarity and knowledge of aesthetic reactions. Frumkin (1963) 
obtained estimates of the frequency with which certain paintings 
had been seen before. He found that subjects who were familiar 
with some of the stimulus paintings liked all of them more than 
the subjects who were not familiar with any. The latter subjects 
tended to reject modern works and accept traditional works of 
low aesthetic quality. By contrast Child (I965) has investigated 
the effects of different kinds of background in art on aesthetic 
judgement rather than on preference. He concluded that aesthetic 
judgement is substantially correlated with amount of formal 
education in art (+.49) and with amount of experience of looking 
at art in galleries, books and magazines (+.49). It is 
significantly correlated but not very highly with pursuit of 
art-related hobbies such as sketching, sculpting, or photography 
with some art-related interest (+.21), and also with family 
attitude towards art (+.I8). The multiple correlation of aesthetic 
judgement with all four background variables together was +.59» 
Child is inclined to interpret this in the light of his other 
findings as a product of an individual's own aesthetic sensitivity, 
though there is no evidence that directly precludes the possibility 
that an individual's sensitivity score is largely determined by
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his knowledge of art. This is also true of a study by Bernard 
(1970) who designed his own test to measure familiarity wi_th 
paintings and found, among other things, that there was an almost 
linear relationship between level of knowledge and the artistic 
originality of the liked pictures. The effects of educational 
level were slight.
In an interesting experiment on the effects of minimal 
familiarity Ross (I966) found that after only 20 seconds exposure 
to paintings the subjects were highly accurate in identifying 
which paintings had been reversed on a second showing. This 
finding is in line with the extraordinarily large capacity of the 
brain to remember pictorial material seen only once before.
Present context Information
Under this heading is subsumed the interaction of an individual 
and the stimulus, we well as any aspect of the context situation 
or environment which has a bearing on his reaction. For instance, 
it has already been noted that it is important to establish 
whether there are important differences in reactions to paintings 
in an experimental laboratory as opposed to the same paintings 
in a museum or gallery. In addition, it would be interesting to 
determine whether reactions differed either in the same individual 
or between individuals, depending on whether a painting was seen 
in a museum, a book, on television, in someone else's home, or in 
a school. This has not been done. Some isolated studies have 
measured reactions to paintings in galleries, e.g. Munro, Lark- 
Horowitz and Barnhart (1942); Alschuler and Hattwick (1947); and 
Loveless (I968), though they have not compared reactions to the 
same stimuli in different locations. There has as yet not been 
conclusive evidence that reactions to molecular stimuli are 
functionally equivalent to reactions to works of art, or that
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reactions to reproductions can be equated completely with reactions 
to the real works of art.
The effects of context on the appreciation of art has been 
explored in an isolated study, described by Valentine (1962) 
in which paintings were associated in a sequence with either 
artistically good paintings or with poor paintings. This resulted 
in differential reactions which appeared to be influenced by 
the quality of the surrounding paintings. In another experiment 
subjects were asked to rate paintings in three separate rooms (an 
aesthetically pleasing one, an ugly one, and a neutral room)
(Maslow and Mintz 1956* Mintz 1956). Although this was a poorly 
designed and controlled experiment, there did seem to be a suggestion 
that the surroundings influenced the reactions to the photographs 
used as stimuli and that the effect was long-lasting. This study 
does no more than strengthen commonsense assumptions. It is 
however an important notion which deserves serious investigation.
Arnheim (1969, p.6l) has described an experiment (unpublished) 
by a student of his in which verbal reactions to a painting 
changed as a function of the paintings with which it was paired. 
Arnheim describes how 'a strongly stylised painting by Karel 
Appel made a Modigliani figure look realistic, whereas the same 
Modigliani looked suddenly^flat when confronted with a Cezanne 
portrait'. Most paintings in galleries are seen not in isolation 
but along side a great variety of other paintings which may 
enhance perceived differences, or suppress likenesses and 
completely change the impact of a painting. This has serious 
consequences for experimental studies particularly when the 
method of paired-comparisons is used. Phenomenally speaking the 
same stimulus painting could be different in eacn pairing. The 
individual's frame of reference may shift according to the 
contrasts between the stimuli presented to him, in much the same 
manner that was demonstrated by Gregson (I968) and Ferguson (1972)
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with successively presented stimuli. It is interesting that 
what is in one sense a methodological draw-back, is in another 
sense the very essence of a theory of expression in art (Gombrich 
i960, 1972a, 1972b).^
Stable Characteristics
(a) Personality. The main stable characteristic that has 
been studied is personality and is second only to complexity as 
the most studied variable in experimental aesthetics. Unfortunately 
there is more than one way of measuring personality which makes 
comparison between studies and evaluation of them very difficult. 
Wherever a number of studies have used the same measure a direct 
comparison is possible, though this is handicapped by variation 
in the stimuli used. The most commonly investigated aspect of 
personality studied is extraversion-introversion which has been 
measured in innumerable ways.
(i) Extraversion. Although this conception originally derived 
from the writings of Jung (1923) it has been correlated with 
aesthetic preferences' and aesthetic sensitivity in a large number 
of studies outside the Jungian frame-work. The results are 
summarised in Table B .
The results of all these studies are very confusing indeed. 
Wherever a relation has been tested by more than one study the 
results are contradictory. This also casts doubt on the relations 
supported by only one study (section IV), Consequently it is not 
possible to conclude whether or not extraverts are aesthetically 
more sensitive or whether their aesthetic preferences differ 
significantly from introverts. In addition to the usual difficulties 
1Gombrich's theory of expression in art is discussed in chapter 
nine of this thesis.
I(i) Introverts are 
more sensitive
(ii) Introverts are 
HOT more 
sensitive
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Meier Seashore Test 
McAclory Test 
Allport Vernon Lindsey 
Scale of Values
polygon.and design 
preferences tests 
Child Test
Carroll 1932 
Sisson & Sisson 1940^
Eysenck 1972b, 1972c 
Child 1962, 1963^
II(i) Introverts pre­
fer abstract to 
representational 
* paintings
(ii) No difference
ad hoc measure
Knapp & Green Abstract 
Art Test 
ad hoc measure
Jamison 1972 r 
Cardinet 1938
Knapp & Uulf 1963
Eoubertoux, Carlier 
Chsguiboff 1971
III 1, Extraverts
prefer: modern 
impressionis­
tic, colour­
ful, romantic, 
emotional 
paintings
2. Extraverts 
prefer : 
realism and 
reject
Expressionism
ad hoc measure Eysenck 1941^
Burt 1939 (unstable 
introverts)^ 
Eosenbluh, Owens & 
Pohler 1972^
Picture Postcard Test
Knapp I9Ô4 
Burt 1939  ^ (stable 
extraverts only)
IV Other Relation­
ships •
(a) Introverts 
prefer thinner 
rectangles
(b) Introverts who 
are also 
cognitively 
complex prefer 
simple poly­
gons
(c) No relation to:
ad hoc measure of 
rectangle preferences
polygon preferences
Eysenck & Tunstall 
19681
Bryson and Driver
I972I
colour preferences 
tone V .  colour form 
complexity preferences 
in paintings
7Currie (1906^
MeElroy 1933^ 
Osborne & Farley
I970I
1, Maudsley Personality Inventory or Eysenck Personality Inventory
2. Bathurst Test
3 . ileidbredder Test
4, Thurstone Temperament Schedule
3 . Myers-Briggs Type Index
o, Bernreuter Personality Inventory 
7* Gattell 16PF Questionnaire
Table B > Studies of the Relation between Extraversion 
and Aesthetic Reactions.
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of comparing the results between studies, the great variety of
measures of extraversion add a further dimension of variability.
The quoted studies cover a span of over forty years and so it is
not possible to accept the earlier studies without replication
because of cultural changes in taste over time. Despite these
difficulties it can be concluded that the relationship between
extraversion and aesthetic sensitivity or preference is not proven.
This statement stands stronger in the context of Eysenck and
Castle's (1970b) finding that there is no difference between
artists and non-artists in extraversion and Eysenck's (1972c)
finding that extraversion is not related to the three measures
1
of sensitivity used.
(ii) Measures of Jungian Personality. (Myer-Briggs Type Index,
Iiyer (1962). This questionnaire which measures Jungian types has 
been used in a number of studies. Child (I962, I963) has demonstrated 
that aesthetic sensitivity is correlated with intuition rather than 
sensation, and with perception rather than judgement. Using high 
scores on the aesthetic scale of the Allport-Vernon-Lindsey Scale
of Values as a measure of sensitivity, Carlson and Parker (19&9) 
have confirmed Child's findings. There also appears to be a 
close relation between type of painting preferred and Jungian 
personality type. The sensation type likes Realism, the intuitive 
type likes Expressive and Abstract art, whilst the thinking and 
judgemental types prefer geometric art (Knapp and Wulf 1963; Knapp 
1964). It is interesting to note that in a recent study Kloss 
and Dreger (1971) found no relation between personality (Guilford 
Zimmerman Temperament Survey) and preferences for Geometric versus 
ExpressioniStic art. It all depends on the personality tests 
used.
(iii) Measures of Freudian Personality. It was noted in an earlier
1
These were: Maitland Graves Test, Birkhoff Polygons and 
Child's Test .
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chapter that psychoanalytic theories of art, or psychoanalytic 
theory when applied to art, had most relevance to the personality 
of the individual and to his motivation for seeking out and 
deriving satisfaction from aesthetic objects. Child appears to 
be the only experimental psychologist who has attempted to relate 
aesthetic judgement (though not preference) to measures of 
personality in psycho-dynamic terms. Freudian categories of 
personality have been systematically explored by Gooperman and 
Child (1968, 1969) and Child, Cooperman and VJolowitz (1969).
Developing their own measures, which they also tested for reliability, 
they measured aspects of oral and anal personality, (e.g. indepen­
dence of judgement, liking for decision-making, deference to 
convention), and correlated these measures with aesthetic judgement. 
They were able to conclude, for instance, that what is relevant 
to aesthetic sensitivity in the notion of oral-active character 
is activity rather than sadism, and also that anal retentive character 
traits are negatively correlated with aesthetic sensitivity 
(Gooperman and Child I968), The highest correlations between 
aesthetic sensitivity and the measures employed were for independence 
of judgement, low deference to convention and other people, and 
finally, deference anxiety; the first and third being positive, 
and the other negative.
(iv) Other measures. The constellation of personality traits and 
attitudes which passes under the diverse names of conservatism, 
dogmatism, or authoritarianism seem to correlate with a rather 
negative attitude towards art. People who are high on these 
characteristics tend to prefer representational to abstract 
paintings (Roubertoux, et al. 1971), and to reject ncdern art
generally (Pyron 1966),^ though Wilson, Ausman and Iktthews (1973)
^Conservatism Scale of Cattell 16PF
2 ^
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach I96O)
^'hilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale (1970)
?
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suggest that 'conservatives' reject complexity in art whether
representational or modern. In addition, they tend to like
simple representational works and are characterised by a general
lack of ability to appreciate paintings (Frumkin 1963). It is
also interesting to note that one of the three major cognitive
characteristics which Child (1965) found to be correlated
significantly with aesthetic sensitivity was 'tolerance of ;
complexity'. Child had derived his measure from Adorno's
2
Authoritarianism Scale. In a study of authoritarianism and 
the judged pornography of great paintings of nudes, Eliasburg 
and Stuart (I961) found that authoritarian students^ in the United 
States saw the paintings as more pornographic than non-authori­
tarian students. The authors failed to find any relation between 
authoriatiranism and perceived pornography with Latin American 
students (Stuart and Eliasburg I962).
Unfortunately these findings are crude and largely predictable 
and do not add much to what is known already. As so often in 
psychology a considerable amount of time and energy is devoted 
to finding out what we know already or could have guessed. Other 
studies have attempted to obtain measures of personality through 
individual aesthetic preferences (Precker 1930). Apart from the 
work of Burt (1939) and Eysenck (194?), aesthetic preferences have 
not played an important role in a theory of personality. An 
early attempt independent of any theory to examine personality 
traits as manifested in aesthetic choice, was made by Barron and 
Welsh (1932). They found that people who preferred simple 
symmetrical polygons were conservative, conventional, enthusiastic 
and optimistic, whereas those who preferred asymmetrical-complex 
polygons were antisocial, creative, dynamical and pessimistic.
The two groups defined by their figure preferences showed consistently 
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach 1960).
^Adorno et al (1930)-
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different preferences in paintings as well. More recently Cerbus 
and Nichols (1962) have attempted to use aesthetic•preferences 
as a personality measure. They devised three separate aesthetic 
scales and correlated them with measures of personality. They 
found no relation of personality to preference for chromatic or 
achromatic qualities, or to degree of preferred abstraction in 
the stimulus paintings. On the other hand a scale representing 
objects V .  people (as subject-matter) revealed that those who 
chose depictions of people were outgoing, friendly and with a 
tendency to be more expansive, self-confident and happy. This 
sounds like a description of a stable extravert for which there 
are more direct measures. As the only qualities which correlated 
with personality in this study were semantic, rather than aesthetic 
it failed to measure personality through aesthetic preferences. A 
somewnat more interesting attempt was made by Christensen. He 
devised a texture-preference test based on natural texture (brick, 
cloth, bark, leather, etc.) which enabled him to classify the 
persons tested into three basic types, viz. those who preferred 
(i) complex unstructured ; (ii) simple structured; and (iii) simple 
structured textures, (Christensen 196I). Preferences for the 
three types of textures were clearly related to personality as 
well as to vocational preferences, (Christensen 19&2).
Finally there are a number of studies which are difficult to 
classify. For instance, Roubertoux (1970) used psychometric 
measures of personality to determine characteristics of people 
interested in visual art only, or drama only, as well as people with 
no interest in art. He found that personality traits are related 
to interest in art, and also that to each type (theatre-goers, 
and museura-goers) there corresponds a specific form of personality.
1 California Personality Inventory.
2
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and Kudor Vocational 
Preference Record,
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It would be interesting to see if Bernard’s test of the painting 
familiarity (Bernard 1970) could be used to cross-validate 
Roubertoux's findings. In another study Roubertoux et al (1971), 
this time using the Cattell 16PF, found that subjects v/ho 
preferred abstract to representational art were less dominant, 
dependent and conservative, and less global in their approach to 
things. In addition their soci-cultural level tended to be 
significantly higher than those preferring representational 
paintings. This latter finding was confirmed by Knapp and V/ulff 
(1963) who also found that preference for abstract art correlated 
with superior academic achievement at the pre-collegiate level 
and superior verbal and mathmatical abilities.
As noted in chapter four, Cardinet (1938) has tried to elicit 
the criteria people use in making preference judgements between 
paintings. The results were extremely complex and are difficult 
to make sense of. As a general point, however, it can be concluded 
that people tend to project themselves in their choice of pictures, 
and are not seeking compensatory expression in art. This has also 
been demonstrated by Charles Morris (1937) who found that Sheldon's 
types (mesomorphs, endomorphs and ectomorphs) tended to choose 
paintings which reflected their personality and interests. Morris 
argues that people project their needs in choosing paintings which 
satisfy them. Value judgements can be regarded as an index of the 
capacity of an object to satisfy a need, though people differ in 
the degree to whicb value and preference judgements are identical.
(V) The notion of an aesthetic person. In a very extensive study 
Child (1962, 1963) used a variety of perceptual, cognitive and 
personality measures which he correlated with aesthetic sensitivity 
He concluded that good aesthetic judgement is largely the outcome 
of a general cognitive approach to the world. This approach 
involves searching for complex and novel experience which is then 
understood and evaluated through relatively autonomous interaction
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of the individual with the objects providing such experience. The 
aesthetic value of such works of art would be a function of their 
aptness for engaging and rewarding the attention of a person whose 
cognitive approach to the world is of this character. In addition, 
to the three Jungian characteristics, (regression in service of 
the ego, the intuitive and the perceptive), tolerance of complexity 
and independence of judgement were the other two variables that 
made up this cognitive approach (Child 1963). In short the 
aesthetic person is open to experience, independent in judgement 
and capable of adaptive regression. This is consistent with 
Christensen’s (I961) characterisation of people who prefer complex 
unstructured textures. Ke describes them as sensitive and responsive 
to stimuli, seexers of stimulation and capable of dealing affectively 
with unstructured situations. It would be interesting to cross- 
validate Child’s and Christensen’s tests. It is odd that there 
has only been this one major attempt to characterise the aesthetic 
person.
Child’s study is exemplary for the wide range of variables it 
encompassed, (viz. 4 measures of background in art, 9 measures of 
perceptual skill, 8 measures of cognitive style, and 4 of Jungian 
personality.) Hogg (1969a) has severely criticised Child’s work 
as loose, lacking in causal determination, and selective. It is 
true that Child’s evidence is correlational rather than causal, 
but Child is very aware of this. He presents some extremely 
interesting findings many of which he replicated. Child's 
description of an aesthetic person is substantial and testable.
Hogg is applying inappropriate criteria when he condemns Child's 
work as loose and unsystematic. On the other hand he is correct
It is interesting to note that these suggest that there is a 
consistent tendency for aesthetic judgement to be positively 
related to skill in perception of visual form. However, the relation 
does not appear to be very important. There have been several 
attempts to develop aesthetic appreciation by means of formal 
training in perceptual skills, but the evidence for the efficacy of 
this approach is equivocal. See chapter nine of this thesis.
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in pointing out that there is no guarantee that the variables 
studied are the only, or alternatively the most interesting, ones. 
Child’s description may not be wrong, but at the same time it may 
not be complete. It is regrettable that Child has since shown no 
sign of expanding on the work he started so well, though he is 
still active in other areas of experimental aesthetics (Child 
1973)» and has generalised his findings to aesthetic judgement in 
children (Child and Iwao I968; Child 1970).
(vi) Intelligence, age, sex and socio-economic class. These common 
variables for research in general psychology, have also been 
correlated with aesthetic reactions. There seems to be a low 
positive correlation between intelligence and aesthetic judgement 
(Dewar 1938; Eottorf 1946; Allison 1970).^ The relation between 
intelligence and aesthetic preference has not been studied 
except for an experiment described by Knapp (1964). For the four 
categories of paintings used there were no significant correlations 
between preference for Fantastic or Geometric paintings, and 
scores on the Terman Concept Mastery Test. However, preferences 
for Expressionist paintings correlated significantly and 
positively with intelligence (+.23), but negatively with preferences 
for Realistic paintings (-.29). Preferences for abstract rather 
than representational paintings is also correlated with superior 
verbal and mathematical ability, superior achievement at the pre- 
collegiate level, as well as a high score on the aesthetic scale 
of Allport-Vernon-Lindsey Scale and Values, (Knapp and Kullf 1963). 
Child (1962) found that scholastic achievement did not correlate
1
That this is not the case with all arts is suggested in a study 
carried out by Eilliaras, Winter and Woods (1938) in which the 
correlation of appreciation for poetry with general intelligence 
was as high as +.63 whereas that between the appreciation of 
pictures and intelligence was only +.31 and for music and 
intelligence +.22. This could reflect educational biases of the 
time, which together with subsequent educational and cultural 
change makes it difficult to generalise these findings to the 
present. It is however an interesting relationship which deserves 
serious investigation.
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with aesthetic preferences, though it did correlate significantly 
with aesthetic judgement. This is also consistent with the 
finding that there was a tendency for representational paintings 
to be preferred by subjects with a lower socio-economic status,
(Frances and Voillaume 1964; Roubertoux et al 1971). This would 
suggest that the relationship between intelligence and aesthetic 
judgement or aesthetic preference is complex and deserves more 
extensive investigation using a variety of intelligence measures 
with systematic variations of the type of painting employed as 
stimuli. An important study in this context has been carried 
out by Eysenck (1972b) who used four measures derived from the 
MGDJT, Child’s test, and two measures using Birkhoff's polygons.
He found no clear cut relationship between intelligence and the 
three measures of aesthetic sensitivity. This could be a function 
of the kind of intelligence measured. It seems plausible that 
other types of intelligence (e.g. Hudson's (1968) converger-diverger 
distinction) should relate to both aesthetic judgement and 
preference.
The influence of sex on aesthetic reactions has been studied 
by a number of researchers. There is evidence that in the United 
States women are more knowledgeable about art and aesthetically 
more sensitive than men (Frumkin 1963; Obst I966; Eisner I966) 
though there is evidence that in France men possess more knowledge 
of art than women (Bernard 1972). Women tend to do better than 
men on the Graves Test as a whole but not on the separate factor 
scores directed by Eysenck (I967). They also do better than men 
on Child's test but not on Eysenck's polygon test (Eysenck 1972b). 
Whether this is a direct result of'biological sex differences or 
the environmental influences resulting from sex differences cannot 
be established, and is probably not a very meaningful thing to establish
1
See footnote on page I32.
«
1
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The aesthetic preferences of men and women have also been 
investigated. Burt (1939) has presented data which suggests that 
while men tend to prefer romantic and realistic paintings, women 
tend to prefer impressionistic paintings and men generally preferred 
more modern v/orks. Bernard (1972), who administered a questionnaire 
to purchasers of paintings, confirmed this general finding, albeit 
thirty years later and in France. He also found that men tended 
to like seascapes, and that both sexes preferred representations 
of their own sex, except for pictures of young girls which were 
equally preferred by men and women. In a systematic study,
Johnson and Knapp (19&3) found that sex differences in aesthetic 
preferences were smaller, than age, class, training and occupational 
differences (Knapp, Brimmer and White 1939). The interaction 
between preferences and formal features of the paintings and 
tartans used as stimuli were complex, but in general tended to be 
more extreme in the types of art preferred, and women chose the 
more controlled and subdued stimuli.
Surprisingly, in view of its importance in psychology as a 
whole* the effects of age and the ageing process on aesthetic 
judgement or preference have not been studied. There have been 
many comparisons between aesthetic reactions of children and 
adults, and a great many more studying developmental changes in 
the reactions of children (see Chapter eight). However, only 
one study by Simon and Ward (1973) has attempted to assess the 
effects of age on aesthetic judgement. Unfortunately, this was 
a poorly designed experiment and the age groups were not 
properly matched, and so it is not possible to draw conclusions
^This is confirmed in a study with children in the United States 
(Lark-Horovjitz 1938).
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from the study. This would seem to be an extremely important 
variable which has been totally neglected by experimental 
aesthetics. It is necessary to obtain records of the changing 
pattern of tastes as a person gets older and to measure the relation 
of preferences of older people to the prevailing fashions in art.
Socio-economic class has been explicitly studied by Bulley 
(1934); Frumkin (I960); Knapp, Brimmer and Shite (1959); Eisner 
(1966), and Loveland (1971) and also by other workers as part of 
a larger study (cf. Frances and Voillaume 1964; Eysenck 1970;
Child 1963). Despite the usual wide differences in stimulus 
material and aesthetic measure there does seem to be a tendency 
for middle-class subjects to show superior aesthetic judgement 
and to prefer greater complexity in visual stimuli (Knapp et al, 
1959; Francbs and Voillaume 1964) and for lower-class subjects 
to prefer simpler designs and more orthodox paintings, (Roubertoux 
et al 1971). As we have seen the effects of personality, 
intelligence and sex are extremely complex and would make any 
attempt to determine the influence of class except in the crudest 
sense, extremely difficult.
Other studies have investigated the relation between attitudes 
to life (Morris and Gciadini i960); attitudes to time (Knapp I962) 
and value systems, for example, as measured by the Allport-Vernon 
Scale of Values (Knapp and h'ullf 1963; Knapp 1964), The results 
of all these studies could be artefactual consequences of the 
particular type and range of stimuli employed as well as the 
particular kind of aesthetic measure employed. The argument for
1
It is interesting to note however that among the non-artists the 
older group (aged 35-45) obtained a significantly higher score 
than the younger group (aged 19-22) on the Bulley Test (1934) 
whereas there was no difference between these groups on the MGDJT 
(Graves 1946). This suggests that the older people might have 
different values from the younger, though this quite reasonable 
assumption could, and should, be studied directly.
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the establishment of standard criteria for the selection of 
stimuli and standardising the conditions of aesthetic measurement 
is very strong, for on it rests the efficacy and utility of all 
the work described above*
(c) Cross-cultural comparisons.
The culture to which an individual belongs is a major 
stable characteristic which may influence his reactions to art.
The cross-cultural study of aesthetic reactions is almost as old 
as experimental aesthetics itself (cf. Lalo I908) and has recently 
been extensively reviewed by Child (19&9) and Pickford (1972).
The chief aim of cross-cultural comparisons is to throw light on 
the problem of whether aesthetic values are culture-specific or 
universal across cultures. Cross-cultural agreement however small 
is seen by some writers as evidence for the objectivity of aesthetic 
values (Child I968, 1969), whereas the same evidence can be seen 
as evidence of cultural relativity (Pratt I96I). The truth would 
seem to lie somewhere between these two extreme positions. It all 
depends on how you look at the data.
llany of the recent studies have been associated with the work 
of Child v/ho takes as his criterion agreement with American 
experts (Child and Iwao 1963; Suraito and Child 19^3; Iwao and Child 
1966; Ford, Protho and Child i960; Child I968), In all these 
studies in Africa, Fiji and Japan, Child found small but 
significant agreement with American experts. Child attributes 
this to the independent discovery by people in different cultural 
traditions, of similar facts about the adequacy of particular 
works of art to satisfy their aesthetic interests. Child goes 
on to argue that this cannot be done by everybody in a given 
culture as aesthetic sensitivity is a minority characteristic. 
Consequently previous studies which have failed to find transcultural 
agreement did so because the sample was not preselected for 
interest in art. This does appear to be the case. People who are
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not preselected for interest in art show little transcultural 
agreement (McEli'oy 1932; Lawlor 1933; Hussain 1966b), in reactions 
to works of art, though Eysenck's (1941) reviev/ revealed 
considerable cross-cultural agreement in rank -order preference 
for colours. It is possible that non-aesthetic factors play a 
greater role in influencing the judgements of non-art people.
As these factors are likely to be culturally specific then 
transcultural agreement among non-artists is less likely than 
between artists.
A number of cross-cultural studies have been carried out 
by Eysenck and his associates. Eysenck described the general 
aesthetic factor as 'independent of teaching, tradition and other 
irrelevant associations' (Eysenck 1940). In two comparisons of 
preferences for Birkhoff polygons by Egyptian artists and non­
artists (Souief and Eysenck 1971, 1972), the author found both 
average and structural similarities between the responses of the
' I
English and Egyptians. However there are embarrassing differences 
such as the fact that Egyptian non-artists tended to prefer simple 
polygons whereas the English non-artists preferred complex polygons. 
Eysenck attributes the differences to the differential training of 
Egyptian and English artists, and concludes rather limply that the 
'data do not prove that cultural differences do not exist'.
Berlyne has as yet not carried his work into the cross-cultural 
field, but has noted (in Berlyne 1972c) that he plans to extend 
his work in this direction. With the biological emphasis of 
Berlyne's work one would expect that any degree of agreement 
between cultures however small, will be seen as providing support 
for his theory. It is unlikely that differences between cultures 
in aesthetic reactions will be emphasised.
1Similar findings were obtained in the Japanese-English comparison 
(Eysenck and Iwawaki 1971).
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As with the Niature-kfurture controversy in intelligence theory 
it is extremely doubtful that we can every accurately determine 
the relative influence of each. As aesthetic appreciation is 
very much a cultural phenomenon which is not amenable to experimental 
investigation with the manipulation of independent variables, 
it is unlikely that this controversy will be resolved. Although 
it is possible to speculate about the effects of a biological or 
a physiological factor determining reactions these are likely to 
be confounded in the tremendous diversity and variety of art both 
within and between cultures, periods, styles, and schools of art.
(d) Psychopathology and artistic behaviour.
Another area of research that must be briefly mentioned at 
this point is the investigation of the relationship between 
psychopathic illness and aesthetic reactions. These have been 
well reviewed by Cerbus and Nichols (I963), and also by Pickford 
(1972) who has worked extensively in this area (Pickford I967).
This work has usually been carried out with aims that stem from 
the attempt to understand mental illness as well as to provide 
therapeutic techniques. With the exception of Eisenman (1966b) 
these studies have not been carried out vsLth the aim of elucidating 
aesthetic problems, though the work has considerable relevance 
to several- areas in the psychology of art. These are the 
relationship between aesthetic reactions and personality (even 
if pathological) and to the general area of emotion and meaning, 
communicated in works of art.
(e) Colour Blindness and the Art of the Blind
In passing, it is necessary to mention two stable characteristics 
that have been extensively investigated by Pickford. They are the 
effects of colour blindness (especially among artists) and the art 
of the blind. Both topics are well described and discussed in 
Pickford (1972, Ch.3 and 3). Although colour vision defects can 
have demonstrable effects on the colour scheme used by artists 
there has been no attempt to assess the effect of major or minor
z6i
colour defects on the perception and appreciation of painting,
(f) Man versus Machine versus Monkey.
Noll (1966) has demonstrated how only 28/0 of an experimental 
sample were able to correctly identify a computer-generated 
picture which had been paired with a painting by Mondrian the 
style of which the computer picture simulated. The majority of 
the people in the experiment preferred the computer-picture.
Further doubt on the supposition that art necessarily and 
intrinsically embodies the spirit of its human maker is revealed 
in an experiment by Hussain (1986b). He obtained preference 
judgements of paintings by several artists, viz. Picasso; an 
established painter; children; and by Morris's famous painting 
Chimpanzee Congo (D. Morris I962), though the subjects did not 
know who had painted each of the paintings. They were judged by 
English school children, university students from England, France 
and India, ana also by English art students. Not one of the group 
ranked the paintings by Picasso, the established painter, the 
children, and Congo in the order that might have been expected.
This finding is not unique for Rensch (I965) has shown that art 
experts have been deceived by monkey paintings. Also relevant 
in this context are two studies by K. Morris (1937) and Pronko 
et al Cl 963) who both provide evidence that the actual form a work 
of art takes is not necessarily the most preferred, and that 
changed or altered versions of the same painting can be equally, 
or even more, pleasing. The studies suggest then that the work 
of art is not necessarily unique, perfect and immutable, embodying 
the spirit of its human maker. However, this does not of course 
preclude the possibility that some art (e.g. the Mona Lisa), is of 
this nature, or even the majority of what is commonly considered 
as great art.
Desmond Morris (1962) has reviewed all known studies of ape 
drawings together with the studies he carried out himself, and came
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to tue conclusion that 'the aesthetic aspect of picture-making 
is shared by man and ape'. According to Morris we share with 
apes 'an inherent need to express ourselves aesthetically in 
ways which are common to all picture-making from Leonardo to 
Congo'. The chief difficulty of Morris' study was its poor 
control and the absence of any form of measurement. A quantitative 
assessment of Morris' claims have been made by Smith (1973) using 
the simple device of a grid placed over the ape-drawings to 
enable objective quantification. Smith found evidence of a 
tendency to mark stimulus figures and to fill in blank spaces 
in all three chimpanzees studied, but only inconclusive evidence 
of a genuine balancing response, and no evidence of completion of 
an incomplete stimulus array, which had been reported by Morris 
(1962). It would seem that Morris' findings have been only 
weakly supported. His extravagant claims about the common 
biological basis of all art (human and primate), and also the 
aesthetic evolutionary interpretation given by Bleakney (1970), 
must surely be accepted only when simpler hypotheses have been 
eliminated, e.g. that an empty space is filled simply because it 
is the largest space left on which to draw a totally visible 
scribble. The hypothesis of genuine aesthetic expression in 
monkeys has neither been proven nor disproven.
There is however quite strong evidence that rhesus monkeys are 
capable of responding meaningfully to pictures. For example Butler 
(1961) found that monkeys gave fear-reactions to pictured snakes, 
and Ilochberg (1964) has described experiments in which rhesus
h
monkeys who had been trained to discriminate between li/e drawings 
of objects could transfer their learning to discrimination of the 
real objects. Similarly they could learn to discriminate the 
objects and transfer this to discrimination of perspective drawings 
of the objects. More recently Humphrey (1972) has presented evidence 
which shows that monkeys have strong and consistent preferences for 
colours, and for still and motion-pictures.
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(g) Training in Art.
The comparison of aesthetic reactions by Artists and non- 
Artis ts has been quite extensively studied in experimental 
aesthetics though it seems that the true potential and value of this 
technique has not been fully exploited. 'Artists' refers to any 
person having extensive training or experience, (i.e. employment) 
which is connected with art, and 'Non-Artists' refers to any 
person having no training or working experience in art. Child 
(1982, 1969) in his extensive work on aesthetic sensitivity, prefers 
the term Connoisseur in place of the lable artist. The latter 
term is preferable because it is objectively defined, and is free 
of the value connotation implied in the use of the word Connoisseur.
There seem to be two main advantages to comparing Artists 
with Non-Artists in their reactions to Art. The first is that the 
Artists are presumed to have greater understanding of, and insight 
into, works of art and into their own aesthetic reactions.
Associated with this is the hoped-for facility of Artists to 
describe and record their reactions to art. A second advantage 
is that comparison between those experienced and those inexperienced 
in appreciation of art might lead to illuminating insights into 
aesthetic experience.
Artists and Non-Artists can be compared to establish the 
stimulus determinants of their reactions. Non-Artists are 
influenced by naturalism (Peel 1944; Gordon 1933; Frances and 
Voillaume 1964), depicted content (Kelson and Kouton 1964; Getzels 
and Csii'sentmihalyi I969); clarity, single colours and craftman- 
ship (Gordon 1933, 1936). By contrast artists have been shown to 
be less interested in these factors and to pay more attention to 
compositional and formal qualities (Peel 1944; Gordon 1933, 1936; 
Kiinnapas and Norman 1971); dynamic qualities such as sponteneity- 
deliberateness (Klein I968), and originality (Getzels and 
Csiksentraihalyi 1969). In addition Morris and Sciadini (I966)
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have noted that artists distinguish between liking and evaluating 
a painting whereas non-artists tend to regard liking and evaluating 
as undifferentiated. There is also some evidence that artists are 
more sensitive to the emotional significance of paintings (Goude 
1972a).
The differential influence of complexity as a determinant of 
preferences for polygons was investigated by Earron and Welsh (1932) 
who found that artists preferred complexity-asymmetry to simplicity- 
symmetry in polygons. This confirmed Eysenck’s (1941, 1942) 
finding that artists preferred greater complexity in polygons 
than non-artists. This was later confirmed by Rosen (1933) and 
more recently by liunsinger and Kessen (1964) who argue that the 
Artist’s preference for more complex polygons is a joint outcome 
of the variability of the stimulus and the adequacy of the person's 
cognitive structure for processing higher levels of variability.
Art students, through extended experience of patterns and shapes 
have developed as part of their cognitive structure coding rules 
that reduce cognitive uncertainty below that of non-Artists.
Whether this is also true for works of art it is not possible to 
say. Eysenck's more recent work on differential reactions of 
Artists and non-Artists (Eysenck and Castle 1970; Eysenck 1970b) 
suggests that on both Birkhoff polygons and the Maitland Graves 
Design Judgement Test there is considerable agreement between 
Artists and Non-Artis ts, except that on certain items in both 
tests there were conspicuous differences in that the Artists 
have a strong preference for simple symmetrical designs. Outside 
Eysenck's own work it is difficult to find corroborative evidence 
apart from the finding that when presented with pairs of polygons, 
equated for Birkhoff's 'M', artists tended to choose the simpler 
of each pair (Brighouse l939c). Peel (1944) has also noted that 
artists tended to dislike too much representstional detail in 
landscapes•
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The explanation of the change from artists preferring 
complexity (Eysenck 1941) to artists preferring simplicity in 
polygons (Eysenck 1970b) could be attributed to cultural changes 
in aesthetic taste, but this is weakened by a number of recent 
studies which found that artists preferred greater complexity 
(Munninger and Kessen 1963; Taylor and Eisenman 1964; Eisenman 
1966a, 1967, Pyron 1966). The issue is further complicated by 
Noll (1972) v/ho revealed that complexity influenced affective 
reactions to molecular stimuli in the same v/ay for Artists and Non- 
Artists respectively. Eysenck's findings may well be stimulus 
specific.
Several studies have revealed that Non-Artists agree amongst 
themselves more than Artists in the judgements of paintings 
(Gordon 1956; Frances and Voillaume 1964; Getzels and Csiksentmi- 
halyi I969), and in judgements of Persian carpets, (K. Gordon I923). 
On the other hand, others (Child 1962; Burt 1933; Springbett I96O, 
and Tucker 1955) have revealed greater concensus among Artists 
than among Non-Artists. It is perhaps significant that the 
first two studies were based on correctness of aesthetic judgement 
on which the artists should be fairly knowledgeable. The remaining 
two studies were based on abstract art which may have produced 
confused responding among the non-artists. There is a strong 
case for systematically assessing the degree of agreement between 
artists in contrast to laymen in their reactions to art.
Very few of the studies comparing the reactions of artists 
and non-artists have concentrated on the actual process of perceiving 
a work of art. An isolated, but extremely interesting study by 
Brighouse (1939b) revealed several important differences in the 
'aesthetic apperception' of paintings by Artists and Non-Artists.
The artists spent longer observing the stimulus paintings, produced 
richer verbal reports, took longer to make up their minds about 
liking or disliking the work, and spread their attention more evenly
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around the painting. It is regrettable that psychology's present- 
day obsession with scientism should discourage this type of study 
which is qualitatively rich and at the same time empirically 
controlled.
One of the difficulties comparing the reactions of Artists 
and Non-Artists is the specialised vocabulary that the artist 
can use which may draw attention only to differences in evaluation 
which are expressable in words. Perhaps it would be more illuminating 
if future research concentrated directly on the study of artists 
themselves and not only by contrast with non-artists. It would be 
interesting to see whether Child's notion of the aesthetic person 
coincided with the characteristics of artists. The kinds of 
experience, and the kinds of stimulation that artists regard as 
aesthetic should be investigated firectly. In addition, the 
writings and talkings of artists (especially famous ones, represents 
the verbalised expressions of the implicit aesthetic theory of 
individual artists. This is extremely valuable raw material, which 
should be utilised optimally by the art psychologist, in conjunction 
with his empirical findings, to develop the notion of individual 
and cultural implicit theories.
Non-Stable Characteristics of the Person
This is another area in which very little research has been 
done. A number of studies have carried out work on the effects of 
perceptual learning on aesthetic reactions to complexity-asymmetry 
(McNhinnie 19Ô6 , 1970a, 1970b). As nearly all this work has been 
done with children with a view to finding the best ways of teaching 
art appreciation to children, it is discussed separately in chapter 
eight. Only two studies, (Haber 1958; Terwilliger 1965) have 
looked into the very important notion of adaptation-lebel as a 
determinant of aesthetic reactions (Helson 1964). As this is a 
dynamic, ever-changing base-level against which all new experiences
26?
are compared it is an important feature of the systematic change 
in the reactions (and also the expectations) of both individuals 
and groups over time. It must underlie an individual's artistic 
development and his changes of taste with time and experience. 
Shifts in cultural adaptation level must also underlie the way 
in which avant-garde art eventually becomes conventionalised and 
accepted. To take a longer time perspective than this and use 
the notion of adaptation-level to help explain the development of 
European art (Peckham I965) lies outside the limits of empirical 
psychology.
Outside the frame-work of a da ota tion-level theory, Ekman, 
Hosman and Lindstrom (I965) nave demonstrated that sacs individual 
has his own scale of roughness-smoothness in judging texture.
Using poems, Harding (1968) has shown that ratings of lilcing vary 
directly in relation to the number of times a person is asked to 
read it. Alschuler and Hattwick (1939) who studied the reactions 
of children to paintings over a period of six weeks found similar 
shifts in evaluation over tne period. Although not working within 
the frame-work of adaptation-level theory tnese studies have 
clearly revealed shifting adaptation levels.
Aesthetic appreciation does not characteristically involve 
overt behaviour. Indeed it is often said by definition to inhibit 
activity and practical perception. Consequently, mood and feeling 
(in contra-distinction to the appetitive emotions) must play an 
important role. Curiously, this has not been studied at all in 
experimental aesthetics. The notion of aestnetic emotion is 
discussed in a separate chapter.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Development of Aesthetic Appreciation
'The road from knowledge to 
love is far longer and less 
pleasant to travel than the 
road from love to knowledge'.
Thomas Bodkin, 'The Approach 
to Painting', (1954)
'Seeing comes before words. The 
child looks and recognises 
before it can speak',
John Berger, 'Ways of 
Seeing', (1972)
I Introduction ; What is appreciation?
The modern view, as Hungerland (1957) put it, is that an 
individual is free to adopt an aesthetic attitude toward any object, 
but that certain objects, viz. works of art, are better suited to 
this purpose than others. This statement of the modern view has 
been well elaborated and expounded in Osborne’s recent book 'The 
Art of Appreciation' (1970). He argues that appreciation is an 
nnqui-isW skill which can be acquired, cultivated and matured. It 
is a form of percipience, often emotionally charged and directed, 
leading to an expansion of normal awareness whereby the content of 
perception is enlarged and enriched. Osborne also argues that 
the fine arts, by inviting empathy and richer perceptual awareness 
can heip to redress the imbalence of an increasingly technological 
society. This view has also been expounded by Read (1943) and Reid
(1969) and Arnheim (1969). Although there is disagreement in 
detail concerning the logical status of appreciation (a question 
for philosophical aesthetics), there is fairly general agreement 
that aesthetic appreciation involves discriminating appreciation 
and understanding of the arts (Reid I969). This involves reacting 
to paintings not merely as physical objects, or merely as illustrations, 
but as objects of aesthetic awareness. Knowledge, sensory
269
discrimination, feeling and meaning are all features that 
intermingle in the complex and subtle processes that constitute 
aesthetic appreciation.
Appreciation cannot be reduced to a set of rules, otherwise 
it would be identical with knowledge and teachable as such.
This v/as a view held until the 19th Century and embodied in 
Academies of painting, where objective standards and canons of 
beauty, morality, function and technique prevailed (Osborne I968). 
However, individual differences in taste and preference within 
the range of 'good' works of art exist as much as between 'good' 
and 'bad* works of art. One aspect of the skill of appreciation 
is the ability to discriminate between good and poor works of art, 
particularly when this is based on independent judgement and not 
the opinion of others. It is the professional role of critics to 
help the 'man in the street' make a correct decision. In the 20th 
Century (and the end of the last century) the old and long-established 
Academic rules were no longer always applicable. Many critics 
however held on to them and reacted in a very hostile way to new 
movements such as the Impressionists in France, and the Vorticists 
in England. Today in the absence of absolute canons of art or 
agreed criteria of quality the burden of discrimination is very 
great. At one end of the scale each individual must judge every 
new experience for what it is, applying criteria he has developed 
himself, i.e. in terms of his implicit aesthetic theory. At the 
other extreme, the absence of agreed criteria is taken by some 
to mean that there are none, and that in art 'anything goes*. Out 
of this denial of criteria of judgement has evolved the notion of 
Conceptual Art which lays less emphasis on the art-work as a 
contemplative object. Instead it is a trigger for ideas, a 
functional object. In addition the persistent and prevailing
^Over the past fevr years the magazine Art and Artists seems to be 
concerned with conceptual art or anti-art, and very little else.
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interest in anti-art might reflect the confusion that results 
when there are no standards at all, rather than an art-form in 
its own right. By contrast with the avant-garde art of our day, 
the general population is still very interested in older forms 
of art. This is clearly seen in the recent highly successful 
London exhibitions of Chinese art, Egyptian art, and Impressionist 
painting.
Critics and philosophers alike have found it very difficult 
to define art, though with regard to art of the past it is easy 
to recognise what is or is not art. Croce has remarked: 'It 
might be said jocosely (and this would not be a bad joke) that 
art is what everyone knows it to be'. Although criteria of what 
is art as opposed to non-art, and criteria of what is good as 
opposed to bad art, change from century to century and generation 
to generation, at any one moment it is easy to recognise in a 
given culture what is considered as art in that culture, if only 
by the fact that art is what artists produce. For any individual 
person part of his skill in appreciation must be analytic to 
decide which objects he will consider as art, and how he will judge 
quality in those objects. Having made the appropriate decision, 
skill in appreciation implies ability to experience and respond to 
works to art in ways that are barred to people who do not possess 
appreciation skills.
In an attractively practical discussion of 'Sense and Nonsence
2
in Aesthetics', Saw (1958) has listed the facts of aesthetics 
which need to be explained in aesthetic theory. Many of the 'facts' 
are relevant to the psychology of art, and should be investigated 
by empirical methods. The most relevant of Saw's 'facts' are that:
^See the all-embracing definition given by Tatarkiewicz (1971) 
and his discussion of the problems of defining art.
2
In H», Osborne (Ed.) 1968b
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(a) m a n y  people spend time and energy contemplating works 
of art;
(b) people can be trained for increased enjoyment of them;
(c) most people think it is a good thing to make and appreciate 
such objects;
(d) it is possible to enjoy natural objects in the same way 
as works of art, and there is some connexion between the beauty of 
some of the arts and the beauty of nature;
and, (e) it is better to enjoy worthy objects than inferior ones.
Although these statements beg many questions they do provide
clear starting-points for the psj/chologists investigation of
aesthetic appreciation. For example, there has not been a systematic
study of the amount of time and energy people spend in contemplating
works of art. Often ad hoc experimental measures are obtained (e.g.
Child 196^), and tests of artistic knowledge and attitude (Eisner
1966; Bernard 1970) are devised for use as aesthetic measures.
There has been no attempt to survey and describe the natural behaviour
of people in this important respect. On the other hand, attempts
to train people to appreciate art have been frequently investigated
and are discussed in Section V below. Linked with the lack of
knowledge of how much time and energy people devote to art, there
is a similar dearth of information on people’s attitudes to the
perceived benefits of appreciating art as opposed to other forms
of activity, e.g. playing foot-ball.' This is yet another aspect
of the prevailing aesthetic theory which has not been systematically
documented and described. This is also true of Saw’s fourth ’fact’,
viz. the relationship between the beauty of art and nature. Finally,
it is doubtful if most people’s implicit aesthetic theory would
accord with Saw’s unquestioned contention that it is better to
enjoy worthy objects than inferior ones. Despite the tautology
of this statement it should be possible to find out what people
generally consider to be ’worthy*, and whether there is any sign
that it is preferable to enjoy worthy art, whether this is defined
^The world’s most popular painting (in terms of reproductions sold)
(continued)
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by experts' opinions in a given culture; by concensus for the 
population as a whole; or each individual's personal opinions.
The psychology of art has paid scant attention to the nature 
of appreciation as a psychological process. Instead it has 
placed most emphasis on the development of aesthetic judgement 
in children (discussed in section I); the differences that exist 
between adults' and children's aesthetic reactions (Section II); 
and various attempts to teach aesthetic judgement and appreciation,
I Children's reactions to paintings
This very popular field of investigation within experimental 
aesthetics has resulted in a disappointing achievement, out of all 
proportion to the effort involved. As far back as the beginning 
of the century (Calkins I9OO) children's verbal reactions to 
paintings have been recorded and coded. Since then there has been 
a spate of similar studies, differing only in stimuli used, 
populations sampled, and minor points of procedure. Only a small 
number can be sampled here. ITewcombe (1$24) interviewed or 
obtained written descriptions of beautiful objects from 2,000 
school children, aged 5 to 13* She found that colour was mentioned 
more than any other factor, which supported Calkin's (I9OO) 
findings. Eulley (193^) investigated the reactions of a similar 
number of children using a wide range of works of art and revealed 
a more complicated pattern in which young children were found to 
be strongly influenced in their liking for pictures by the depicted 
content as well as the colour of the painting. The majority of 
studies with children have supported the finding that children 
are primarily influenced by depicted content in their preference
(continued from overleaf)
is The Green Lady by Vladimir Tretchikoff. It is significant that 
neither the painting nor the artist is discussed in most stuaies
of modern art (cf. Read's A Concise History of Modern Fainting,
1 9 5 9 ).
273
for paintings (Neumann 1911; Valentine 1912; Littlejohns and 
Needham 1932; Katz 1944; Schwartz 1933; Subes 1958). Despite 
gradual changes in education recent studies show that the finding 
still holds (Rump and Southgate 19&7; Coffey 1969)* A number of 
studies compared average and gifted children and found that the 
verbal reactions of gifted child mainly concentrated on content, 
and then realism colour, but also included references to design, 
imagination and emotion (Lark-Eorowitz 1937, 1938, 1939; Munro, Lark- 
Eorowitz and Barnhart 1942).
From all these studies it is possible to draw the following 
conclusions :
(a) Children's preferences are strongly influenced by realism.
(b) The paintings should represent clear depictions of
objects, scenes, etc. which are interesting to the child.
(c) Finally, the paintings should enable them to form crude
associations, often on the basis of a preferred colour.
Up to 1980 there were however one or two exceptions to the 
general pattern of straightforward observations of children's 
reaction to art. Burt (1933) correlated the acquisition of 
aesthetic judgement (i.e. agreement with experts) with increasing 
age. Ke found that children aged 7 - 11 correlated about +.5 with 
experts' rank-order of the same paintings. Children aged 12-13 
correlated +.63 with the experts, and children of 13-17 produced 
a correlation of +.72 which was higher than that obtained by 
'miscellaneous adults' (+.3)» Burt attributed this to an underlying 
factor of aesthetic taste which is gradually acquired with education, 
but it is doubtful whether this task was a real measure of aesthetic 
appreciation or that it genuinely reflected children's real
^Eere there is a difference between girls and boys which is not 
present in (a). It tends to follow the cultural stereotype of 
sex-role identification; boys like battie-scenes and action-packed 
pictures whereas girls prefer pictures of flowers, children, 
landscapes, etc.
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reactions, rather than their learning of dates and pictures in 
class. However, this study does anticipate the development 
which has recently been adopted.
Before discussing these it is important to note two studies 
which revealed that children’s reactions to paintings may not 
be quite as simple and neatly categorised as most of the studies 
cited above seem to suggest. The first is the Littlejohns and 
Needham (1932) study which led them to express the somewhat cynical 
view that 'there is no more certainty in choosing pictures than 
there is in backing horses'. They set out to discover the kinds 
of paintings that children naturally prefer; the natural evolution 
of their tastes, and how this evolution can be fostered and developed 
Their comprehensive study revealed the complexity of children's 
preferences within the general context of liking for subject-matter 
and colour as major determinants of preference. For example they 
described the tendency of boys toward destructive, analytical 
criticism, and a liking for realism and exactness and the tendency 
for girls to be more emotional and take more interest in human 
feelings. Children ( 7 - 8  years) begin with an interest in the 
depicted object, and only later become interested in the painting 
as a picture of an object. By the age of 12 something like a 
standard of evaluation is applied. By current values this study 
would have little to recommend it in terras of research design and 
control, but for its comprehensiveness and sensitivity and attention 
to detail it is exemplary. The same might be said about the work 
of Alschuler and hattwick (1947). They also revealed the concealed 
complexity of children's reactions to works of art. The author's 
study of children's art-work revealed complex relationships between 
children's personality, attitudes and day-to-day experiences as 
these are manifested in their paintings. Similar evidence of the 
complex nature of child art has been presented by Arnheim (1934),
Read (1943), Kellogg (19&9) and Freeman (1972). In the light of 
this it is surprising that most studies of children's reactions to 
art are so crude.
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Experimental investigations of children's reactions to art 
since I96O seem to reflect a dissatisfaction with earlier studies.
For the most part they are designed to go beyond the broad 
findings summarised above, and to incorporate findings within a 
theory of development, though some researchers are still repeating, 
with predictable results, the studies of earlier v/orkers, (e.g.
Rump and Southgate 198?). The work of kachotka (1983, 1988), 
however, represents an interesting attempt to explain children's 
preferences for subject-matter and realism rather than form, 
composition or the other so-called aesthetic features of paintings, 
lie developed a theory of aesthetic development based on Piaget's 
stage theory of intellectual development (Inhelder and Piaget 
1933). According to i-iachotka, the aesthetic appreciation of the 
ciiild of 7 , based as it is on subject-matter and colour, requires 
no more than pre-operational functioning. Evaluation, based on 
realistic representation, contrast and harmony of colours and 
clarity of representation (found in 7 - 11 year olds) requires 
concrete operational thought, and finally interest in style, 
composition, affective tone, and luminosity (12 plus) necessitates 
formal thinking. Later levels of evaluation are added to the 
earlier ones but do not replace them. Frechtling and Davidson
(1970) support this general finding but claim that sensitivity 
to artistic style is dependent on concrete operational thought, 
kachotka did not measure the children's level of cognitive 
functioning and relate it to their verbal reactions to paintings.
He merely related the kinds of remarks made by children to the 
stage of cognitive functioning described by Piaget at a given age.
I lore direct evidence in support of Machotka's ideas have come
1
from Janes (1970) who used a direct measure of cognitive functioning.
She found a tendency for 'conservera ' in both the seven and eleven- 
year old groups to use more relational descriptive categories in 
response to paintings, this tendency being stronger in the older children,
1
Sigel's Conceptual Style Test.
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However, two recent studies throw doubt on Machotha's contention 
that awareness of artistic style is dependent on operational 
thought (e.g. class-inclusion and conservation). Walk, Karusaitis, 
Lebowitz and Falbo (1971) demonstrated that with training, 
children aged between four and six could learn to discriminate 
artistic style, but the greatest improvement in ability to describe 
differences in discriminated styles came in the six to eight-year 
old group. Gardner concurred with Machotka in his finding that 
pre-adolescent children do not speak of artistic style and do not 
understand an instruction to sort by style (Gardner and Gardner 
1970), and that they tend to sort by dominant figure even when 
explicitly instructed to sort by style (Gardner 1970a, 1970b).
In a later study Gardner (1972a) demonstrated that seven-year old 
children could be taught to discriminate between artistic styles 
in paintings. He concludes that style learning may be more closely 
related to discrimination learning or to the discovery of distinctive 
features than to class inclusion or conservation. It would thus 
appear that sensitivity to style develops naturally and is most 
clearly apparent in pre-adolescence. This does not however mean 
that style sensitivity is dependent on operational thought.
Outside the frame-v;ork of Piaget's stage theory of intellectual
development, many writers have speculated about the age at which
aesthetic appreciation emerges in children. Several studies have
emphasised early adolescence as the point at which genuine aesthetic
reactions emerge (Valentine 1912; Schultze 1912; Burt 1933)» These
studies illustrate the difficulty of defining genuine aesthetic
reactions as opposed to other non-aesthetic reactions. Valentine
defined it as verbal reactions falling into Bullough's 'character*
type. Schultze used the technique of photographing children's
facial reactions in response to paintings and Burt used agreement
with experts' rank-order. Other studies suggest that seven might
be a critical stage. Bulley (1934) found that seven-year old
1
children revealed better aesthetic judgement than children aged
This was defined as agreement with expert opinion, i.e.
Bulley's.
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between 8 and 11. Using the method of production rather than 
verbal reactions Jasper (1933) found that children between 3 and 7 
showed an increased ability to perceive graphic rhythm, and 
1/horley (1933) found a similar age trend in reactions to 
compositional unity, though it was very weak. Finally, Daniels 
(1933) found that pre-school children tended to prefer balanced 
to unbalanced three dimensional designs.
More recent studies have avoided the issue of defining an 
aesthetic criterion and have relied on strictly descriptive 
methods. Rump and Southgate (I987) noted a gradual progression 
in the pictorial interests and preferences of 7, 11 and 13-year 
old children and adults as measured by their reactions to paintings 
in an art gallery. However, a more erratic development was 
revealed by Richards and Ross (19^7) who evaluated the drawings 
of a cat by 1200 children under standard conditions. They found 
that some drawing-abilities increase steadily with age (range 
studied, 5 - 14),some fluctuate up and down (e.g. outlining), 
and some reach a peak and then decline (e.g. the number of colours 
used peaked at age 12 and thereafter declined). There is a 
complex interaction between natural development and environmental 
learning, and the effects of education. There was no evidence of 
a close relation with the onset of puberty.
Individual differences are very apparent in these studies. 
There is evidence that girls are usually more advanced than boys 
(Eisner I966; Hump and Southgate 198?), and that middle class 
children are more advanced than working-class children in their 
aesthetic judgements (Bulley 1934), and some children show greater 
aesthetic sensitivity than others (Munro et al 1942). However, 
despite different methods, different central concerns, and very 
different subject populations the results of studies of children's 
preferences among paintings and of changing criteria tend to 
concur, viz. that young children are influenced by subject-matter,
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and ignore realism, while older children prefer realistic 
representation, light and harmony. If aesthetic standards and 
criteria appear at all it seems to be about the age of 11 or 12.
II Adult reactions to painting.
The most interesting thing about studies of the aesthetic 
reactions of average adults is that they are remarkably like 
those of children. Eulley (1934) compared the reactions of 
artistically naive adults and children and found that the criteria 
used by adults were very similar to those of children. Placing 
more emphasis on the perception of works of art in terms of viewing 
times,; eye-fixations etc. Erighouse (1939b) found that children 
and naive adults were similar, though both were very different from 
adult artists. In their studies of the determinants of aesthetic 
preferences Feel (1944), and Pickford (1948) used both children 
and adults as experimental subjects. They both found that children 
preferred naturalistic pictures full of incident and detail and 
well coloured designs, which tended to be symmetrical. Adults 
also preferred naturalistic paintings, but had a more sober 
interest in colour. There was little interest in, or attention to, 
balance, rhythm and composition among the adults. The experts 
on the other hand were much less influenced by naturalism in a 
picture and placed much more emphasis on composition, form, etc.
It is interesting to note that neither adults nor 6th form pupils 
were aesthetically superior to the 13 and l4 year olds. More 
recent work has confirmed this general pattern (Frances and Voillaume 
1964; Hussain i960; and Mortimer-Tanner I963). It is important 
to note that the majority of studies quoted above used verbal 
aesthetic measures. More numerical, factor analytic, approaches 
strive to reveal underlying or covert dimensions which are not 
necessarily verbalisable. Consequently these studies produce 
very different results from the verbal ones described above.
Although it is highly desirable that information be obtained on
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unconscious, or unverbalisable aesthetic dimensions or criteria 
of judgement, the great diversity of findings does not inspire 
confidence in the methodology.
The only safe conclusion that is possible is that children 
and adults are alike in being influenced by subject-matter and 
naturalism in their reactions to paintings. Children are however 
more influenced by dominant colour than adults. It is not 
contended that these are the only criteria used by children and 
adults, only that the evidence suggests they are the most dominant
III Children’s reactions to child art
Several studies of child art have drawn attention to the 
indifference of children towards their own work (iCatz 1944; Read 
1943; Peel 1934; Subes 1933). This has recently been investigated 
by Voillaume (1963) and by Shields (I969). Both studies found that 
children at any given age tend to prefer the art-work of children 
older than themselves, and to dislike the work of younger children. 
Voillaume (I963) found that adults judgeing the works of children 
placed them in the reverse order. In other words the most 
preferred paintings were by 4-J - 6-g year olds, and the paintings 
of older children were less well liked. There is quite strong 
evidence that children between 7 and 12 years are strongly influenced 
by the pictorial realism that the older children can achieve.
Both studies suggest that children’s expressed preferences are 
closely linked to developmental factors. The younger children 
in preferring the work of older children are probably aspiring 
to the achievements of the older age-group and may even be modelling 
themselves on the apparent effectiveness with which older children 
can reproduce the appearance of things. vJhy they should want to 
do this is not clear. It could be that in schools there is still 
considerable emphasis on perspective and naturalistic drawing, 
and that this is the adult-approved behaviour that young children
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are responding to. Many writers have bemoaned the falling off 
of aesthetic interest in children as they enter adolescence 
(Piaget 1951 ; Read 1943; Peel 1954) when both emotional and 
educational factors change. Kellogg (I969) and Freeman (1972) 
have also noted that children often draw in special ways when 
adults ask them to draw something. Consequently they have a 
notion of 'art for others' and 'art for themselves'. This makes 
the study of children's natural aesthetic development very 
difficult. It is ironic that children should naturally prefer
the kinds of art which many educationalists seek to discourage,
'I
and which are the opposite of what artists prefer, even though 
they are consistent with the preferences of untrained adults.
IV The development of aesthetic appreciation in children.
This is a subject which is not usually discussed in general 
texts on child or developmental psychology, though there is an 
extensive literature on the subject. Most of the books published 
in the area fall under the heading of art education (Read 1943; 
Kellogg 1969; Eisner 1972). Although art is considered by many 
educationalists to be of critical importance in the natural 
development of expression in the young child and is accordingly 
encouraged in primary education, it is definitely not considered 
important in secondary and higher education, except as a special­
ised discipline. Even then, it is considered by many to be a 
'soft-option', (Gardner, Eebden and Adams 1966). Read (1943) and 
Arnheim (1969) have gone so far as to say that the lack of emphasis 
on art in education accounts for much of the ugliness of the world 
we live in. Read did not mince words in putting his case:
'1Some artists have deliberately incorporated child-like qualities 
in their paintings, viz. Picasso, Klee and Miro.
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"The art of the child declines after the age of eleven 
because it is attacked from every direction - not 
merely squeezed out of the curriculum but squeezed out 
of the mind by the logical activities which we call 
arithmetic and geometry, physics and chemistry, history 
and geography, and even literature as it is taught.
The price we pay for this distortion of the adolescent 
mind is mounting up: a civilization of hideous objects 
and mis-shapen human beings, of sick minds and unhappy 
households, of divided societies, armed with weapons 
of mass destruction ... but the creative activities 
which could heal the mind and make beautiful our 
environment, unite man with nature, and nation with 
nation - these we dismiss as idle, irrelevant and 
inane."
(K. Head: Education through
Art, 1943, p. 168-9)
This view may well be emotive and rather extreme, but it is 
I believe, essentially correct. It is yet another symptom of 
psychology’s failure to face up to relevant areas of human 
concern, that it has ignored the development of aesthetic 
appreciation in children. As is so often the case in these 
relevant, ’soft*, humanistic and vague areas the majority of work 
done has been intuitive rather than controlled, imaginative rather than 
systems tic.
The most commonly held view is that children reveal a natural 
development of drawing skills and aesthetic appreciation which is 
maturational. Nearly all the investigators holding this view 
believe that children are naturally aesthetic in their drawings 
but that the processes of growing up and the effects of education 
serve to stamp out the aesthetic disposition of all but a 
minority of children. This view is held by Gestalt-influenced 
writers (Arnheim 1954, 1969; k’erner and Kaplan 1933), psycho­
analytic writers (Ehrenzweig 196?; Kris 1953) and others (Lowen­
fold 1957; Morris 1962; Read 1943). None of these studies have
been based on vigorous experimental investigations, but rather the
1extensive observation of and experience with, child art.
^This is with the exception of Morris (I962) who based his work on 
monkeys and extrapolated to the art of all mankind.
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There have been a large number of (more or less) controlled 
studies of developmental changes in children’s reactions to art 
but very few have attempted to settle the issue of whether these 
changes are maturational or learning-based.
Several studies have concluded that aesthetic development
is maturational because it can develop independently of teaching
in art (Eysenck 1972a) or because attempts to teach artists
appreciation fail (Brandon I96O). Voillaume (1965) has reported
a study in which he found that the majority of children do not
develop aesthetic criteria for judging paintings, though a small
number of them did. This agrees with an earlier study by Cranston
(1952) who concluded that children did not naturally develop
aesthetic criteria. The study by Eysenck can be rejected because
it is based on the separate factor scores derived from his factor
1
analysis of the Maitland Graves Design Judgement Test. Another 
study by Eysenck (1972c) revealed that sensitivity to the KGDJT 
designs was independent of sensitivity to Eornung designs and 
Birkhoff polygons respectively. In the light of this and the 
argument against the use of molecular stimuli presented in chapter 
four of this thesis, Eysenck cannot generalise from developmental 
changes in preferences for these designs to the appreciation of 
all art. Furthermore, St. Clair-Penny (1973) has demonstrated that 
the MGDJT and the Meier Art Test no longer differentiate between 
artists and ncn-artists. As these tests were used by Brandon 
(i960) as pre- and post-training measures, he cannot conclude 
that appreciation cannot be taught as these tests may not be 
sensitive to changes in appreciation. Even if they were sensitive 
to changes in appreciation, they might not have revealed change 
for the simple reason that Brandon’s methods of training were 
ineffective.
^See Eysenck (1967).
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It is harder to reject Voillaume's and Cranston's conclusion 
that the majority of children do not develop aesthetic criteria 
for judgeing paintings. All the studies quoted above v/ho maintain 
that all children are intrinsically aesthetic have concentrated 
on the art products of young children rather than on their judge­
ments of works of art. There is overwhelming evidence that by 
the age of 11 at least most children are responding to paintings 
as illustrations, and are more concerned with realism and depicted 
content than with aesthetic qualities. This does not however 
settle the issue of whether aesthetic development is maturational 
or learning-based. Like the nature-nurture controversy in the 
field of intelligence, testing it is not a question worth the 
trouble of resolving. It is almost certainly a combination of 
both as in the Piagetian frame-work of equilibration. It is also 
futile to establish the relative influence of learning and 
maturation. If appreciation can be taught (as indeed it can ) 
then a purely pragmatic approach can and should be adopted.
On the other hand there is a strong need for systematic investiga­
tions of the qualitative development of aesthetic appreciation 
in children. This should be synchronously to assess the nature 
of the cogniser, and diachronously to assess the nature of the 
development. This work has not yet been undertaken. The vast 
number of unrelated studies of children's reactions to art serve 
only to confuse and restrict our understanding of the nature of 
the development.
In their detailed discussion of perceptual development Pick 
and Pick (1970) conclude that there is an obvious increase with 
age in ability to cope with complex aspects of the environment 
and in particular to respond to stimuli which are functionally 
similar but physically different. This is in accordance with
1
This is discussed in the section below.
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the common interpretation of development as hierarchic integration 
with increasing differentiation, or Gibson's (I969) emphasis on 
'new attention' to properties formerly unnoticed. The changes in 
perceptual abilities with increasing age are, however, very gradual 
unlike the dramatic qualitative changes in the development of say, 
conservation in cognition (Kagan and Kogan 1970). In the absence 
of sensitive and reliable measures of aesthetic reactions in 
children it is impossible to determine whether aesthetic develop­
ment is in accord with.perceptual changes or with cognitive changes 
with age.
V Teaching aesthetic appreciation.
In his discussion of the possibility of teaching appreciation 
in the arts Valentine (196O) argues that allowance must be made 
for innate differences in sensitivity to beauty of colour and 
form, but allows that mere exposure to good paintings has a 
beneficial effect (a rubbing-off phenomena). He also argued that 
the essence of aesthetic apprehension should be explained, and 
that the learner should be alerted to the dangers of intellectual 
infusion, which interferes with the essence of true aesthetic 
appreciation. This sweeping recommendation is a far cry from the 
1875 code of Education which prescribed, e.g. 'for the third and 
last year in school, three hundred lines of poetry, not before 
brought up, repeated, with knowledge of meanings and allusions,'
(in Catty 1921). By contrast to this rather mechanistic approach 
successful training in appreciation should permit someone, hitherto 
unable to do so, to become absorbed in an aesthetic object, 
and to derive pleasure and/or enlightenment from so doing. According 
to Osborne in The Art of Appreciation (Osborne 1970), this 
essentially involves (a) acquisition of new powers of perception,
(b) learning to perceive features which were previously unnoticed; 
and (c) to learn to hold clearly in attention aspects which without 
training in appreciation had only incidentally come on awareness.
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A somewhat similar account has been proffered by the art 
psychologist Howard Gardner (1972b), The terms and concepts are 
different but the meaning is essentially the same. He characterises 
the inexperienced perceiver of art as having 'customary focus 
upon the figure in a display, a highly idiosyncratic and non- 
exhaustive focus, and a persistent object orientation'. Ey 
contrast, 'experienced perceivers have a customary focus which 
includes textural and other non-figural aspects, a wider range of 
potential figures, less object-orientation and comprehensive 
momentary focus'. The problem with definitions such as these 
(and the many others which are similar to them) is that they are 
indistinguishable from definitions of perceptual development or 
perceptual learning in general, (E. J. Gibson 19&3, 19&9; Epstein 
19^7; Wolhwill 1966). For example, Gibson argues that perceptual 
development consists in a progressive increase in sensitivity.
This increase in sensitivity refers to both an increase in resolving 
power with respect to stimulus dimensions and an increase in the 
number of stimulus dimensions to which a person is sensitive. It 
is a question of learning to attend to new relevant properties of 
stimuli. This applies whether it is a question of learning to 
perceive the world about us or the acquisition of highly specific 
perceptual skills such as learning to interpret aerial photography, 
or sex-typing newly hatched chicks, or fault-mending in weaves.
The problem then is to distinguish perceptual development and 
change from the change that is involved in aesthetic appreciation. 
There can be no doubt that aesthetic appreciation involves the 
development and use of the perceptual skills described above, but 
what more? The difference must surely lie in the meaning of the 
experience. Although it may be difficult to define appreciation 
in detail it is not too difficult to recognise when someone is 
appreciating a painting. He will spend longer looking at it; he 
might return to it time and time again; make approving comments; 
he may buy a reproduction of it; he might spend money on it (if only
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in a token economy); or he might be so impressed by it that the
mere sight of it can function as a reward, and so on. Some or all
of these activities suggest that the painting is a meaningful 
perception, Uhat that meaning is, only the observer can tell us, 
insofar as he is capable, or the meaning is communicable in any
form other than the painting itself.
Appreciation then is not something static; it is essentially
subjective and individual. It can be founded in knowledge and
experience, though it is not identical with knowledge. Consequently
it is very difficult to teach. There has been a large number of
experimental attempts to teach or cultivate aesthetic appreciation.
The studies divide naturally into those determining v/hether or not
it is possible to teach appreciation, and the studies which assume
that it can be taught and compare two or more alternative approaches.
Child has shown that formal training in the principles of art
appreciation for children (grades 4 - 8) and college students was
not successful in changing individual's aesthetic preferences
(Child and Schwartz 1966). It appeared that the subjects could
learn to identify the relatively superficial cues by vrhich experts
differentiate between good and poor works without necessarily
developing any genuine aesthetic awareness. In another study
Child and Schwartz (1968) found that mere exposure to poorer and 
1
better art, accompanied by explanations of the difference, did 
result in significant improvement in preferences. However these 
studies do not at the same time prove that the explanation of 
principles, or differential exposure to good and bad art (cf.
Metzger I965) are totally ineffective methods of teaching appreciat­
ion.
4
An interesting study of the 'rubbing-off phenomenon' by Taylor
(1971) revealed that a specially designed, visually rich class­
room significantly improved the quality of art-products by the 
4 and 5 year old children studied. There was however no improve­
ment in their ability to make critical aesthetic judgements, based 
on an ad hoc aesthetic measure.
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Wilson (1966) compared the effects of two methods (developing 
a critical vocabulary and art practice) on a 28-category taxonomy 
of aesthetic responding of v/hich 14 categories showed significant 
improvement in favour of the vocabulary group. The experimental 
training course was based on ideas contained in Arnheim’s book on 
Picasso’s ’Guernica' (Arnheim 1973) and the provision of reading 
material in relation to the progressive illustrations in that 
book. It is hardly surprising in view of the verbal emphasis of 
the training that children should show improvement in a pre- 
and post-training measure which classified verbal descriptions in 
response to paintings. As in the Child and Schwartz (1968) study, 
the children may have incidentally learned to do well on the 
criterion measure rather than to develop genuine appreciation.
An alternative approach is to compare the effects of depth 
and breadth programmes for teaching aesthetic appreciation. The 
former is narrow inrange and intensive whilst the latter is wider 
in range and extensive. Davis (1967) found no clear evidence in 
favour of one method, though an earlier study by Eeittel and 
Burkhart (I963) found that the effectiveness of either approach 
was related to individual differences. Miles (1962) found that a 
breadth approach (ranging across art, music and dance) produced 
significant improvements on a test of aesthetic tolerance, but 
there was no difference in ability to organise visual materials, 
nor any change in physiological or general reactions to art or 
music. Unfortunately Miles did not show that this could not be 
achieved by a well taught non-integrated course. This highlights 
a general problem when comparisons between teaching methods are 
being made. It is essential that both methods be the best possible 
that the conditions will allow. It is no test to compare a good 
example of one method with poor example of another method. The
^New revised edition, first published in 1962.
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best comparison would be between two methods devised and set up 
by two separate investigators in full knowledge of their respective 
interests, involvements and committed attitudes. The courses 
could be run by a third independent person, and all three could 
agree on a wide ranging battery of measures for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the teaching methods in developping aesthetic 
appreciation.
An interesting alternative to the direct teaching of 
appreciation is the attempt to develop in the individual the 
capacities and abilities from which appreciative skills might 
naturally result. This divides into two broad areas, viz. direct 
perceptual training and the development of cognitive skills and 
personality characteristics. McV7hinnie's sweeping attempts to 
'clean up' experimental aesthetics (McVJhinnie I967) has resulted 
in his concentration on 'relevant' factors by which he means 
variables which are specifically related to the production or 
appreciation of art work. Consequently in art education he places 
great stress on the effects of perceptual learning experience 
(McWhinnie 1965, 1966, 1970b) and the perceptual characteristics 
of children, (McV.'hinnie 1970a), e.g. field independence. For 
instance, in an early study McV7hiniiie established a perceptual set 
towards complexity and assymmetry in abstract diagrams, through 
special learning experiences which were designed to draw attention 
to the components of figures based on the factors of complexity 
revealed by hochberg and Brooks (196O), viz. number of angles and 
number of continuous line segments (Mckhinnie I966). Measuring 
the effects of learning on the Welsh Figure Preference Test he 
found that although there was no improvement overall, 6th grade 
children did show some improvement whereas college students did not. 
In this study a matched control group who did practical art work 
instead of the perceptual training showed the same gain in increased 
preference for complexity-asyrnmetry compared to a non-learning 
control group. This is an interesting finding because it seems to
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suggest that children can learn to appreciate aesthetic stimuli 
or rather acquire preferences for greater complexity in abstract 
designs through practice on other material. This does of course 
limit the generalizability of the results and the external validity 
of the experiments. It is a pity that McVThinnie should confine 
himself to the use of standardised tests as aesthetic appreciation 
and that he should limit his stimulus materials to abstract 
diagrams. In the light of research on the ineffectiveness of 
standardised tests in differentiating between artists and non- 
artists, McWhinnie cannot conclude that a change in preference 
in the direction of complexity-asymmetry is necessarily an increase 
in aesthetic appreciation. Again, the training may simply have 
taught the children to do better on the criterion measure without 
any corresponding increase in aesthetic appreciation since the 
training-to-criterion compatability was very high. IlcWhinnie must 
introduce transfer tests which are unrelated to the training given 
(e.g. Child's test of Aesthetic Sensitivity) in order to assess 
the effectiveness of the perceptual training.
More recent work by Mc'wTiinnie (1971b, 1972, 1973) suggests 
that perceptual training is more effective in improving the quality 
of art-work produced by children, rather than their appreciative 
capacities. This agrees with the conclusion reached by Salome 
(1966) in his review of the area, and that of Grossman (1970) who 
concludes his review of research into the teaching of art to 
young children with the argument that art teaching strategies 
should develop children's cognitive and sensory exploration 
abilities by special training. Special perceptual training for 
the development of appreciation has been hinted at by writers on 
art appreciation (Osborne 1969; Reid I969), and has only been 
rarely used by educators, though perceptual training is widely 
used in industry for the improvement or acquisition of perceptual 
skills (Annett 1969; Gibson 1969).
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Perceptual and learning variables are inextricably linked to each 
other (particularly cultural) factors in determining the nature of 
aesthetic appreciation. Even perceptual capacities might be 
environmentally determined (cf. Barry 1957; Segall, Campbell and 
Herskowitz I966). The general concept of personality brings 
together many of these amorphous variables and determinants (cf, 
the work of Child, Barron, Knapp), but none of these studies has 
led directly to recommendations for the teaching (or research into 
the teaching) of art appreciation. A notable exception to this 
is Machotha (1970b). Drawing mainly on his own work and that of 
Child (1965) be lists the factors that correlate with good aesthetic 
appreciation, viz. tolerance of complexity, regression in the 
service of the ego, independence of judgement (Child 1965), tendency 
towards femininity, and skill in perception of visual form; an 
orientation to ’quality’ rather than ’thing’ perception, and 
general psychological activity (Child, Cooperman and b'olowitz I968). 
In addition, Machotha’s own work revealed that aesthetically 
sensitive people are less oriented towards social goals; less 
satisfied with their upbringing; had better understanding of human 
relationships ; and were also cognitively more complex. Machotha 
also speculates that aesthetic appreciation necessarily involves 
an ability to empathise. As a result Machotha recommends an 
indirect approach to teaching appreciation by developping appropriate 
psychic processes (in the cognitive,affective and interpersonal 
areas) at the right age, so that aesthetic appreciation would 
result from them.
This is a tall order because it essentially involves making 
fundamental changes in people as they develop which is notoriously 
difficult to achieve. If affective methods can be found, there are 
probably too many other factors influencing a child’s development
It is interesting to note that Bertrand Russell (l9o1, p. 688) 
has speculated that Kant’s philosophical explanation of space 
might have been different had he lived in the Alps rather than 
the North German Plain.
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which are completely outside the teacher's control, so that it is 
impossible to guarantee that aesthetic appreciation would ensue.
It is curious that Machotha should suggest the formal training of 
many of the things which others (Read 1943; Reid 19&9) have claimed 
follow from aesthetic education particularly with regard to inter­
personal and affective behaviour. It is probably wiser to concen­
trate directly on specific training in perceptual and cognitive 
skills which are directly relevant to the aesthetic perception of 
complex objects. Despite this Machotha's paper has the refreshing 
charm of attempting to apply in a concrete and useful way the 
mass of unordered data that accumulates so readily in experimental 
aesthetics without any subsequent attempt being made to tackle 
concrete problems. Before discussing perceptual training in more 
detail, it is necessary to discuss attempts to teach sensitivity 
to artistic style as this has a direct bearing on the discussion 
that follows.
V.alk (1967) and Tighe (I968) have reported preliminary studies 
in which adults learned the concept of style in art in a problem­
solving exercise in which the subjects had to match previously 
seen paintings with new paintings by the same painters. Walk, in 
a later study (Walk, Karusaitis, Lebowitz and Falbo 1971) 
demonstrated how difficult it is for children to acquire the 
concept of style in paintings. The adults could perform the task 
perfectly (which suggests it might have been too easy) though the 
children found it difficult, especially in the 4 - 8  year old 
group. To prove that this was not due to an inability of young 
children to find similarities among multidimensional stimuli the 
authors quote a study by Kofsky and Osier (19^7) in which children 
were consistently able to sort cards varying in colour, form, 
number and size, though this can hardly be equated with the perception 
of paintings in which a large number of variables interact in almost 
infinite variety. Walk et al (1971) also showed that mere exposure to 
positive instances of style led to far less consistent concept
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acquisition in younger children ( 4 - 8  years) than in adults. 
Further doubt on the efficiency of training by positive instances 
has been presented by Flechtling and Davidson (1970) who gave 
subjects (age ranged 5 years to adult) a task in which they were 
asked to sort paintings into groups of their own choice. The 
results revealed that subject-matter was the strongest determinant 
of children's sorts; only adults showed a higher (but relatively 
small) frequency of sorting by style, and colour was seldom used 
as a basis for sorting by any group. The authors agree with Walk 
et al (1971) that it is not enough to present positive instances 
in order to form a concept 01 style. The authors maintain that 
specific training should be provided to reduce attention to the 
naturally preferred concrete non-aesthetic attributes of paintings, 
before the concept of style can be acquired. This agrees well 
with the approach adopted by Gardner who has carried out the most 
systematic work on the perception of artistic style.
Gardner (1970) has provided useful definitions of style 
and of sensitivity to style in art. He defined the former as 
'Those qualities of line composition and texture which characterises 
a range of work by the same artist, and which remain discernible 
regardless of subject-matter, dominant colour, size or medium', 
(Gardner 1970a). The same also applies to the style of a period 
or country (See Osborne 1963; Zucker 1950) or to specific schools 
of art within any period or country. Sensitivity to style was 
defined as 'the ability to make classifications which isolate 
objects, works or persons possessing sundry qualities from those 
possessing other characteristics,' (Gardner 1970a). Gardner 
devised the match-to-sample task which engages both the perceptual 
and rule-following skills of the individual. In this way he 
could measure performance of 'the sort which involves following 
a set of rules not all of which are known to the perceiver'
(Osborne 1964). By using the task, sensitivity to style could
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be operationally defined as an individual's ability to select 
from an array an additional example of a painter's work once he 
had been exposed to a number of examples, or alternatively to 
select which two, of four paintings, in an array were by the 
same artist.
The paintings provided for inspection were grouped so that 
the children were not able to choose correctly on the basis of 
subject-matter, dominant colour, medium or form. Gardner (1970a) 
found that young children were very influenced by overall Gestalt 
of a painting and highly specific detail, e.g. moustaches, hats, 
etc., whereas some children were not able to do the task at all 
because they claimed the paintings were identical. Some children 
utilised past experience and familiarity. Older children (aged 
11 - 14) began to be sensitive to features of style in that they 
realised that certain qualities characterised a painter and girls 
were better at this than boys. Overall the children were 
influenced in their judgements by dominant figures or content.
Gardner also found that there was no significant developmental 
trend towards spontaneous grouping by style or content when both 
were possible alternatives. Gardner and Gardner (1970) have 
demonstrated that it is the ability to group by style when instructed 
to do so that increases with age, rather than the natural inclination 
to do so. In another experiment Gardner (1970b) attempted to 
overcome these habits by re-arranging the stimuli used in the 
match-to-sample task by inversion of the inspection stimuli, and 
providing one instead of two inspection stimuli to eliminate mis­
leading comparisons. This seemed to improve the scores of older 
children, but to reduce the scores of younger children who were 
confused by the re-arrangements.
As a measure of children's or adult's ability to infer 
stylistic regularities in paintings the match-to-sample task is 
a very useful tool for research, not only because it is close to
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the perceptual skills under study and hence high in ecological 
validity, but also because it is flexible and amenable to 
experimental manipulation. For instance, the task might be 
adopted to measure the ability to select good works from an array 
of aesthetically poor paintings after simple exposure to and 
experience of several good paintings. Alternatively it can be 
used as a pre and post-measure of sensitivity to style in an 
attempt to teach style awareness to young children (Gardner 1972a), 
It could even be used as a training technique in its own right,
VI Perceptual learning
In teaching children to acquire sensitivity to artistic style 
most of the researchers have employed feed-back to the responses 
made by children in their judgement of whether paintings were by 
the same artist. Walk (19&7) and Tighe (19o7) working with adults, 
found that merely telling subjects whether or not two paintings were 
by the same artist is sufficient to develop a concept of style.
This is consistent with the evidence presented by Gibson (19&9) 
which indicates that perceptual learning can occur as a result of 
simple practice in the absence of extrinsic feed-back. In this 
vraj absolute thresholds are lowered and difference thresholds are 
reduced; errors are reduced and there is a general increase in 
the specificity of perception to stimulus variation. There is 
very powerful evidence that intrinsic feed-back (or what Gibson 
calls 'self-knowledge') from one's own performance, is sufficient 
reinforcement for perceptual learning. Although this is largely 
based on detection, discrimination, recognition and identification 
experiments performed under artificial conditions, with mostly 
unidimensional stimuli in a laboratory, there is no evidence that 
this should not occur with complex multivariate stimuli such as 
paintings* It is arguable that full aesthetic appreciation of 
works of art cannot occur until the individual can see paintings 
with the degree of differentiation which also enables them to
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perceive differences in style. In the absence of formal 
perceptual training this probably evolves through a process of 
familiarization among those who choose to expose themselves to 
works of art. Perhaps the first step towards teaching appreciation 
is to teach style discrimination. As this cannot be reduced to 
rules there is no advantage in teaching by rules. Equally as 
verbal descriptions can at their best have only poor correspondence 
to the perceptual experience, verbal methods are unlikely to be 
very effective. This suggests that direct perceptual training 
may be the best answer. Equivalence training and distinctiveness 
training could facilitate the acquisition of sensitivity to style. 
This could be done by the method of ’cueing' or 'anchoring' (cf. 
Annett 19&9) of the correct answer so that the learner is informed 
which of 4 paintings in an array, is by the same painter as a 
target painting, from the moment he sees the array. This saves 
him from groping in the dark as he doesn't know quite what it is 
he is supposed to be looking for. Given a cue or anchor he can 
make the appropriate comparisons etc. while he is directly 
perceiving the paintings, rather than relying on memory when 
reinforcement is subsequently given. This method has worked 
well in training industrial perception skills.
VII Theories of Art and the Teaching of Appreciation
The aims of art education were well formulated by Herbert 
Read. In Education through Art (1943) he argued that there were 
three main areas of activity, viz. (a) sharpening the faculty 
of observation by looking, drawing, recording and memorising; (b) 
giving the individual the satisfaction of communicating thoughts, 
reactions, feelings visually (i.e. the urge to express; and (c) 
developing a strong sense of discrimination and awareness of 
'values in a world of facts'. For Read art education, as we 
have seen, was not only an end in itself but also a means of 
improving the quality of life both for the individual and society
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in general.
In a more restricted account of the function of art in 
education de Bucher (1953) has argued that there are five main 
functions of education which he stipulated as cathartic, character- 
forming, educative, aesthetic, social and idealistic. This view 
is certainly not a new one, A similar approach was outlined by 
Catty in 1921, and by Littlejohns and Needham in 1932, It is a 
view still held (Reid 1969), and is the official doctrine of 
the Department of education and Science (DES 1971), who defined 
the central aim of art education as the development of visual 
awareness and discrimination in art and in everyday life,
Valentine (I96O) expressed the aim simply as the development 
of aesthetic pleasure and the avoidance of ugliness, Gardner 
et al (1966) laid down the possible and alternative aims of art 
education as (a) the continuation of art after school-days as 
a pleasurable activity; (b) better or more complete people; (c) 
the development of aesthetic judgement or taste; (d) development 
of a sensitive visual awareness of the environment; and (e) a 
career in art. Underlying all these possible outcomes is the 
importance of teaching and enlarging discrimination and visual 
sensitivity generally, or what Arnheim calls visual thinking 
(Arnheim 1969)»
It is argued that perceptual training by means of the match- 
to-sample task will facilitate the emergence in each individual 
of criteria and discrimination exercises which will facilitate 
his ability to appreciate other works of art. The studies of 
children's and adults' reactions to paintings have revealed a 
preoccupation for basing evaluative and preference judgements on 
the subject-matter, realism, and dominant colour. Perceptual tasks 
can be designed in such a way that these attentional and perceptual 
habits will be undermined and the individual will be forced to 
base his judgements on other, hopefully aesthetic criteria.
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For children this will involve relinquishing the habit of
attending mainly to the content and the dominant colour, and for
adults, in addition, it will involve breaking down their obsession 
1
with naturalism. It is essential that children (and adults) 
overcome the tendency to be influenced by concrete factors before 
they can acquire the concept of style. It is necessary to have 
acquired sensitivity to artistic style before full appreciation 
and evaluation in art is possible.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have looked at studies of children's 
reactions to art, the reactions of adults, experimental attempts 
to teach artistic appreciation, and very briefly, writings on the 
aims of art education and practical recommendations for teaching 
appreciation.
In a world that is becoming increasingly technological and 
inhuman, aesthetic appreciation is unique as a form of knowledge 
in its capacity to enlarge and enrich awareness of oneself and 
the world about us. Appreciation has been shown to be a very 
complex phenomenon with many facets and complex interrelations 
between them. It would therefore seem undesirable to teach 
appreciation directly. For instance much depends on whether the 
child is being taught generally to see with a 'seeing' instead of 
a 'knowing' eye, or whether he is learning to paint. Most of the 
writers on art education referred to above have mentioned the 
need for knowledge to function as a supplement but not as a 
substitute for appreciation. ¥e have also seen that it can't be 
taught as a set of rules and precepts because it is too dynamic, 
variable and complex. What is needed is a method of acquiring
cf. Read (19^3): 'Nothing in the history of art is so fatal as 
the representational fallacy'.
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appreciation which is not directly taught. Perceptual learning 
exercises would seem to be the best method of achieving this 
end .
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CHAPTER NINE
Meaning and Expression in Art
'He seems to gaze at us with 
such an intense and soulful 
look that it is almost impossible 
to believe that those dreamy eyes 
are only bits of coloured earth 
spread on a rough piece of canvas'
(E. H. Gombrich 1950)^
I Introduction
The previous chapters have dealt with the structure of 
aesthetic responses, and the variables that determine, or correlate 
with, aesthetic reactions. However neither of these areas lend 
themselves to yielding explanatory ideas concerning the nature 
of aesthetic experience. By contrast the problem of meaning in 
visual art is much closer to the critical features of the process 
(cf. Gombrich 1973).
In what sense can a work of art, or elements of a work of art, 
be said to possess meaning? Does a work of art express anything, 
and if so, what? What does it mean to say of a work of art that 
it expresses something? These are questions shared by philosophers, 
artists and psychologists alike. The psychologist, as empirical 
scientist, must ask other questions as well. How can meaning be 
measured in a painting? Are some people more able than others 
to detect (or read) meaning in a painting? Is aesthetic communica­
tion different in kind from other forms of communication (e.g. non­
verbal communication between persons)? Is there a distinctively 
aesthetic reaction to uniquely aesthetic qualities in objects?
It is almost trivial to say that meaning in some form or
^Of Titian's 'Young Englishman' (1340) in the Pitti Palace, 
Florence. Or see Frontispiece.
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another is an essential feature of our experience of art, but it 
is not quite trivial to say this in view of the modern view of 
aesthetics which was discussed in an earlier chapter (see page 263), 
The modern view, in contrast to earlier formulations (Beardsley 
1966; Osborne 19&9) poses a problem,of what is or is not to be 
regarded as aesthetic, or artistic. In this situation we must 
fall back on Saw's recommendations that 'the ultimate test of 
what is to be regarded as a work of art must be comraonsense agreement 
with the sort of things which critics and aestheticians have taken 
to be worthy of agreement’ (Saw I96I), It is in this context that 
the notion of meaning becomes especially important.
In the crudest sense the difference between a coffee pot 
seen as a hot, brown liquid dispenser and the same object seen 
and appreciated as a Georgian silver pot of graceful line, must 
lie in the meaning or significance of coffee-pot as container, and 
the significance of the pot as an object of appreciation. In 
both cases the object is the same but the perception differs.
Meaning is a small word doing a big job; it must be analysed and 
elucidated.
There have been several attempts to classify types of meaning. 
The notion of signs, icons and symbols are well known due to the 
influence of Cgden and Richards (1923) and of Charles Morris (1956). 
Their ideas have been adopted and expounded by Child (1969) within 
the frame-work of the psychology of art.
1
Child distinguishes between referential and expectational types 
of meaning. The former subdivides into conventional reference 
(e.g. the word 'horse'); iconic reference (e.g. a picture of a 
horse); and exemplary reference (when the iconic reference has 
physiognomic qualities). The other type of meaning is expectational 
through (a) syntactic relations between signs; (b) causal relations; 
and (c) pragmatic relations (about the effects of a sign).
According to Child, most people in a western culture see represen­
tational paintings as icons, whereas experts see them as having 
exemplary meaning.
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Unfortunately, having made the classification Child does not use 
it but immediately proceeds to other matters.
As an alternative to establishing logical categories of 
types of meaning it is possible to define meaning in operational 
or behavioural terras. Thus consensus or agreement between people 
can become a criterion of meaning. If several people agree on 
the attributed characteristics or significance of an object then 
to that extent it has shared meaning. At one extreme, words 
(e.g. dog, tree) have almost universal demonstrative meaning within 
a language-culture, whereas the word-salad of schizophrenics has 
no meaning in the ordinary sense, except perhaps to the schizophrenic 
himself. Related to the notion of consensus is the notion of 
meaning as communication. Berlyne (1971) defined communication 
as the occurrence of a signal in one part of a system resulting 
in the above-chance possibility of the signal occurring in another 
part of the system. In other words communication occurs when 
information (meaning) is transmitted. In this sense a painting 
has meaning when an observer interprets it in accordance with the 
intentions of the painter; what transmitter (the artist) and receiver 
(the observer) agree on is the meaning of that painting. This 
conception, however, does not allow for the fact that the 
information extracted from a picture can be quite independent of 
the intentions of its maker. Also by this definition of meaning 
there is no possibility of unique or individual meaning.
These diverse approaches to the meaning of meaning only 
result in confusion for the art psychologist. For his purposes 
fine logical points, and committed viewpoints serve only to confuse 
rather than to clarify. Consequently a simpler, functional 
scheme will be proposed, which not only elucidates the notion of 
meaning in art (albeit at a very basic level), but also reflects 
the contributions that psychology can make to the understanding 
of meaning in art (See Fig. 9-1).
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Fig. 9-1. Types of meaning in art and the respective 
contributions of psychology.
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Fundamentally, there are two kinds of meaning in art, viz, 
semantic or denotative meaning by which some other object, condition 
or state is referred to, e.g. a picture of a horse by Stubbs, or 
a Dutch interior by Vermeer. This we call Representation. This 
terra subsumes Naturalism, mimetic art, illusionism, realism, 
trompe I'oeil art (See Osborne I968). At its most extreme the 
appropriate criterion is that the painting must look sufficiently 
like the depicted objects to be acceptable as an accurate 
illustration of that object according to the prevailing standards 
of a culture.
By contrast Expression in art does not necessarily convey or 
communicate information about the appearance of things but evokes 
in the observer emotions, moods, ideas or feelings. Under this 
category is subsumed the majority of art throughout history.
Nearly all art has expressive qualities whether it be in the form of 
Celtic medieval manuscripts or the paintings of Van Gogh, Cranach 
or Piero della Francesca. The importance of fidelity to the 
depicted objects (Gibson i960) varies, and in some cases is not 
relevant, but they all have in common the fact that they all 
express something other than semantic information. I-îany writers 
(e.g. Croce, Collingwood, Carritt) regard expression as the essence 
of art. The same point could have been made of painting.
Obviously'there is no clear-cut distinction between representa­
tion and expression; they are only clear at extremes. For instance 
some surrealist painters (e.g. Dali, Magritte) represent objects
with great realism except that they are combined in ways which
2
are meant to express subconcious ideas. Similarly the sixteenth 
century German painter, Grünewald paints according to representa­
tional criteria, yet by selection of motif, and concentration on _
Henry Moore has noted that ’the realistic ideal of physical 
beauty in art which sprang from 5th century Greece was only a 
digression from the main world tradition of sculpture’ (The 
Listener, 24 April 1941, p.599)
2
See documentary accounts by Andre Breton in Waldberg I965.
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details of torn flesh, and signs of suffering the paintings are 
highly expressive. Constable's rural scenes are painted 
naturalistically and yet can be said to express serenity and 
tranquillity. However, the distinction between expression and 
representation is valid if only as opposite poles of a continuum.
By contrast with representation which must be concrete, the 
abstract mode must always be expressive if only because by 
definition it cannot 'represent' objects. This art expresses 
purely by the qualities it possesses itself, viz. its line, shape, 
pattern, and colour etc. On the other hand at the other extreme 
Representation as illustration, illusion, or trompe 1 'oeil, must 
be concrete since physical things are depicted. These are signs 
when all they do is refer to objects (i.e. function as illustration) 
but they are symbols if in addition to referring to objects, the 
objects themselves have some additional extraneous meaning, e.g. 
a crucifix, 3t. Jerome's lion, etc., when it is also a symbol.
In between these extremes lie the expressive representations 
described above. These could be referred to as iconic signs or 
as the meeting of representation and expression. In order that 
depicted objects be also expressive they have tended to be 
distorted or changed from their natural depiction, though this is 
not always the case. In its most extreme form this category 
includes Expressionism, but would also include Cubism, Impression­
ism, Futurism and New Realism. In fact, it would include most 
forms.of art that are not either (1 ) purely representational 
(= actual concrete illustration), (e.g. Academic painting at its 
worst) or (2) purely abstract (e.g. Suprematist paintings). 
Consequently there is a continuum of types of art ranging between
'j
The notion of distortion in this scheme refers to qualities in 
the art object itself, and not to the artists intentions. It is 
not implied, for instance, that Egyptian artists 'distorted' their 
motifs or that Giotto distorted what he saw. On the other hand, 
painters who could represent naturalistically may choose deliberately 
to distort their representations in order to be more expressive, 
e.g. Georges Rouault (1871-1938) or Asger Jorn (I9l4- ).
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two extremes (representation and abstract expression) with most 
art falling between, the middle value being represented by 
representational art with expressive qualities. This lies very 
close to the view of Gombrich (1962) who is making the distinction 
that signs communicate and icons express, states that art lies 
somewhere between the extremes of expression and communication.
i’inally we come to the contribution of psychology to the 
question of meaning in art. At one extreme, viz. art as 
representation, the study of pictorial perception is highly 
relevant. We need to know what a picture is in perceptual terms, 
how pictorial depth is perceived and hov; objects represented 
by the painter are recognised by the observer. At the other 
extreme the perception of emotion and feeling in objects and 
people (as well as paintings) is an important though neglected 
field of study which is highly relevant to the psychology of art. 
Between these extremes lies the psychology of artistic style, 
which as yet is a non-existent field of study. We need to know 
how a painting is interpreted, how a concept of style is developed 
and on what basis styles of art are differentiated in psychological 
terms. It is also important to determine whether there is some 
qualitative difference between the aesthetic perception of works 
of art, and the perception of pictures, on the one hand, and.of 
graphically presented emotional qualities, on the other.
II The Perception of Pictures
The dual reality-status of paintings has been discussed 
recently by several writers (Gregory I966, 1970; Pirenne 1970; 
Gibson 1966, 1971). In essence a painting is a flat pigmented 
surface and at the same time gives the appearance of objects
-1
This paper, entitled Expression and Communication can be found 
in Gombrich (I963) pp.50-69.
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depicted in depth. It is both a two-dimensional surface and 
a scene in three dimensions. This is not a new discovery, 
though the significance of the ’picture paradox* has recently 
led to interesting theoretical developments, which have an 
important learning on the psychology of art.
There are five major approaches to the investigation of 
picture perception. It is first necessary to assess their 
respective techniques, value and findings before determining and 
assessing the sum total of research on pictorial perception.
The respective approaches are sometimes complementary, and 
sometimes antagonistic.
(a) Ecological Optics. This is the approach of J. J. Gibson 
who gave only brief mention to pictorial perception in his book. 
The Perception of the Visual World (Gibson 1950), but has since 
expanded and developed his theoretical position in a series of 
publications which the most recent major work is The Senses 
Considered as Perceptual Systems.. In this work pictorial 
perception is given considerable importance (See Gibson I966,
Ch.11). Gibson has also written extensively on pictorial percep­
tion beginning with a formal theory of pictures in 1954, and 
through a succession of articles has refined, changed and developed 
his views.^
Gibson is important for two reasons. First because of his
revolutionary approach to the study of perception, and secondly
because his is the only detailed and formal theory of pictorial
perception which is a functional part of a general theory of 
2perception.
^See especially Gibson 1954, I96O, 1966, 1971#
2
The Gibsonian approach is by now well-known, but it is worth
(continued)
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Gibson’s more direct contribution to the study of the 
perception of pictures is the application of concepts from his 
general theory of perception to a formal analysis of pictures 
and picture-perception, and his analysis of the role of 
perspective in creating what he calls an ’as if» experience, 
liis definition of a picture is a very useful one: ’A picture is 
a surface so treated that a delimited optic array to a point 
of observation is made available that contains the same kind 
of information that is found in the ambient optic arrays of an 
ordinary environment’, (Gibson 1971). This represents an 
instructive revision of his earlier definition in which he defines 
a picture as a ’human artifact which enables another person to 
perceive some aspect of the visible world in the same way that 
the artist, the maker of the picture, has perceived it’, (Gibson 
i960). This makes a picture equivalent to an illusion which is 
indistinguishable from veridical perception of the same object.
Only rarely is this the case as in trompe I ’oeil art. For example 
the peep-show cabinet of S. van Hoogstraaten (1627-78) in the 
National Gallery, London, ensures optimal illusion by restricting 
vision to a stable monocular view which fills the whole visual field.
(continued from overleaf)
noting, if only briefly, the chief characteristics of his position, 
Perception is defined as the means by which we obtain information 
about the world around us. This definition is much more subtle 
than it at first appears. The theory is based on the ’radical 
assumption that light can convey informabion about the world, and 
hence the world does not have to be constructed by the brain out 
of meaningless data. This rests on the conception of light in 
terms of an array at a point of observation; light not considered 
merely as a stimulus but also as a structure’, (Gibson 1971). 
Because the structure of light gives us information directly about 
the world Gibson coined the phrase ’ecological optics’. Gibson 
ta Des not of senses, but of active perceptual systems which seek 
out information about the environment in the structure of light 
without any intellectual mediation. This embraces the concept of 
’sensationless perception’ which means that stimulus information 
can determine perception without having to enter conciousness in 
the form of sensation. In this sense it is possible to have 
sensationless perception but not informationless perception.
3o 8
The illusion may be powerful (just as the Ai'neS demonstration 
are) but the observer is not totally deceived. Consequently 
Gibson's later definition, stressing the information in pictures 
as equivalent though not identical to that given by the real 
objects, is more suitable and closer to experience. In Gibson's 
words, 'the optic array from a picture and the optic array from 
an object can provide the same information without providing 
the same stimulation,' (Gibson 1971). An artist can capture the 
information about something without replicating its sensations.
In his extensive discussions of perspective Gibson examines how 
the artist achieves this.
Pictorial perspective is a sub-class of perspective in
general. It is defined as 'the geometry of the ways in which light
specifies the world of surfaces from which light is reflected'
(Gibson I960). Linear perspective is only one kind, viz. the
perspective of the edges of rectangular objects projected on a 
1
plane surface. There are other types of perspective, viz. textures
1
The principles of linear perspective were first formulated by the 
Florentine architect, Brunelleschi (1377-1446) but were first used 
in painting by Kassaccio (1401-75). This was not, however, the first 
time pictorial depth had been portrayed, for in the l4th century 
Giotto (1266-I337) had rediscovered the art of creating the illusion 
of depth on a flat surface, without perspective, by the then 
revolutionary adoption of a single viewing-point, Prior to Giotto 
artistic problems centred on the arrangement of figures on a flat 
surface (cf. Byzantine art) but after Giotto the arrangement was 
constrained by the need for realism as well. In view of the fact 
that foreshortening was discovered as early as 500 B.C. it is 
surprising that linear perspective which is such a powerful means 
of conveying depth should be discovered so late in the history of 
Western art. (For a history of perspective in art see White's 
The Birth and Re-Birth of Pictorial Space (1937)). There are, of 
course, other monocular cues to depth. These have recently been 
listed and illustrated by Blakemore (1973), viz. position in the 
field (i.e. higher up is further away); linear perspective; texture 
gradients; size of familiar objects; shadow, overlay; and aerial 
perspective (distant objects appear bluish), Blakemore (who 
strangely omits reference to foreshortening as a cue to depth) 
presents physiological explanations of the perception of shape, 
size, movements and binocular depth perception but notes that there 
is no corresponding physiological explanation of monocular depth 
perception, or in other words, perspective effects.
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of individual surface, gradients of texture-density. There are 
also perspectives of change of position, not just perspectives of
position. These perspectives are used to depict on a surface the
world as it appears, because these perspectives are features of 
the 'visual field' (or the pattern of retinal stimulation caused 
when light travels from objects to the eye), Gibson is also at 
pains to show that the surface of a painting can never be treated 
in such a way that its optic array and that of an object can ever 
be identical. First, the range of contrasts of light and colour 
and texture that the eye is sensitive to is infinitely greater than 
can be reproduced by a painter on a canvas. This is not a serious
limitation as the eye is more sensitive to relations than to
absolute values. Hence though it is impossible to produce absolute 
fidelity to the depicted object or scene, functional fidelity 
can be obtained. Pictures do however fail on three points: (a) 
the observer cannot look round the scene (b) he cannot move in it 
(c) their is no binocular parallex, (in addition, though Gibson 
does not mention it, there is no movement in the depicted scene, 
which can provide extra information to reduce ambiguity). Despite 
these limitations Gibson argues that we can perceive the painting 
'as i f  it were the objects depicted, though it would never be 
mistaken for the real objects. This requires a special state of 
mind which Gibson calls the 'Pictorial Attitude' (Gibson I966).
It is because we see objects in the world (the visual world) and 
not projected shapes on a flat surface (equivalent to the visual 
field) that we have to learn to see things as they are projected 
on a surface according to the laws of linear perspective.
Despite the power and functional utility of Gibson's analysis 
there are two major drawbacks. The first is his interpretation 
of abstract art. Gibson admits that an abstract painting is
1For a detailed discussion of perspective gradients as 
determinants of our perception of the world around us, see Gibson
(1930).
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problematic in his scheme of things. He regards them as exercises 
in perception, if not of representation. They contain information, 
but not information about anything other than itself. If this is 
the case it is difficult how non-representational art can inspire 
such elevated thoughts, ideas, and feelings as the work of 
Kandinsky, Mondrian, Ben Nicholson or Jackson Pollock (cf. Head 
1964). Their works, in different ways, aspire to the apprehension 
of transcendent qualities, or in Koestler's phrase, they 'provide 
peep-holes into eternity'. This must surely stem from more than 
a mere exercise in perception.
Gibson's disappointing interpretation of abstract art, stems 
from the other main weaiLness in his position. Possibly for 
reasons of persuasion and advocation of his viewpoint Gibson 
has altogether reflected the role of expectation and familiarity, 
and other non-optical variables in perceiving a representation 
or painting, N'e shall see below that the respective theories of 
Gregory and Gombrich lay great stress on what Gombrich has called 
the 'Beholder's Share' in pictorial perception (Gombrich I960). 
Gibson's view is persuasive and convincing, but it must be 
remembered that it is one-sided. In rejecting orthodox association- 
ist view of perception by which all meaning was derived from 
experience and was attached to otherwise meaningless sense-data, 
Gibson-^gnores the role played by set, memory, familiarity and 
expectation in the perception of pictures, which help to give it 
meaning.
The theories and' ideas of Gibson have been given extensive 
coverage because they are so important in the psychology of 
perception. Two weaknesses have been pointed out which other 
workers in this area compensate for by approaches which are biassed 
in the opposite direction. In addition they cover areas which 
Gibson only glances at, or omits to deal with at all.
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(b) Physiological Optics. This approach is well illustrated 
by the work of Pirenne in his fascinating book 'Optics, Painting 
and Photography' (1970). Gibson had argued that linear perspective 
is not a convention because basically we all see alike, i.e. by 
means of light and the fact that its propagation is rectilinear.
That this is actually the case was directly tested by Pirenne in 
an ingenious series of experiments. To test the validity of 
Euclidian optics Pirenne used the exised albino eye from a rabbit, 
which allows the pattern of strong stimulation to be observed 
through the sclera, as it is transluscent, In this way Pirenne 
demonstrated the retinal convergence of parallel lines of lights, 
and the foreshortened retinal image of straight lines of lights 
seen at an angle. He was able to conclude that the retinal image 
has a point-by—point correspondence to the object, a correspondence 
that is determined by the simple fact that light travels in straight 
lines before entering the eye,
Pirenne also designed a pin-hole camera with which he could 
simulate the perspective projections of objects on the retina.
V/ith this analogue of the retina he was able to demonstrate the 
very large distortions that perspective projections cause. For 
instance spheres become increasingly elliptical in projection as 
they are farther away from the line of gaze. Similarly, columns 
appear fatter at the edge of the visual field than in the centre.
Yet these distortions are not noticed in perception; nor do they 
occur in representational paintings.
Ideally, the perspective view of each painting can be correct 
for only one, preferably monocular, viewing position. But paintings 
will be seen from a variety of positions. It is because of this 
that painters break the rules of perspective projection when the 
shape of the object is already familiar, so that correct linear 
perspective is not relied on to convey the actual shape of some 
objects at an angle. Consequently vases, pots, balustrades and
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other curved familiar objects tend to be painted from a 'new' frontal 
perspective position regardless of the perspective alignment of the 
painting as a whole.
This raises a further question: why don't we see the painting 
as distorted when viewed from the wrong position. Pirenne with 
a wealth of detailed demonstration and argument claims that a 
'subsidiary av/areness of surface' (cf. Polanyi 1970) sets up a 
constancy mechanism. Surface in a painting is indicated at a low 
level of awareness by the lack of retinal disparity which would 
be caused by real objects. Awareness of the shape and position 
of the picture surface causes an uncongious process of psychological 
compensation to take place which restores the correct view when 
the picture is viewed from the wrong position. Although he doesn't 
explain how this mechanism operates, Pirenne provides convincing 
evidence in support of this argument by demonstrating the 
surprisingly large distortions of perspective projection seen in 
pin-hole camera photographs taken from off-centre positions. These 
distortions are not noticed in the perception of paintings when 
viewed at an angle. There is, however, no subsidiary awareness 
of surface in the ceiling of the Church of St. Ignazius in Rome 
(painted by Andrea Pozzo (1642-1709)), because the actual surface 
is too far away from the floor (20m.) Viewed from the correct 
point (marked by a marble disc on the floor) the barrel vaulted 
ceiling appears to be a vertical architectural continuation of the 
walls of the church to a greater height, and part of the roof looks 
as though it is open to the sky where angels are much in evidence. 
V/hen viewed from the wrong perspective view-point it all appears 
grossly distorted though still seen in three dimensions because 
the eye at that distance is functionally monocular. However, when 
seen much closer at a distance of 10 metres the binocular disparity 
causes the impression of depth to disappear and the surface is 
seen as it actually is, viz, cylindrical.
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Pirenne is exceptional in combining rigorous physiological 
experimentation, with sound psychological theorising and a mature 
knowledge of art. His work represents a valuable contribution 
to the study of pictorial perception.
(c) Psychopictories. This is a branch of psychophysics which 
deals with natural images as pictorial stimuli (see Lipkin in 
Lipkin and Rosenfeld 1970). Its fundamental dependent variables 
are (i) detection, the awareness that there is an object present 
which is a sensory process; and (ii) recognition and the complex 
stages of visual processing between the initial detection and the 
final interpretation. Its major independent variables are (i) 
contrast and border; (ii) shape and geometry, and (iii) texture. 
Introspective and phenomenological techniques are positively 
rejected, and the role of cognitive factors is not emphasised.
With such an approach it is difficult to see what psychopictories 
can contribute to an understanding of aesthetic perception which 
is cognitively so complex.
By contrast the experimental study of pictorial perception 
has a lot more to offer. Eye-fixation studies have revealed that 
there are very large differences between individuals in the 
sequence of movements made by their eyes in scanning a picture 
(Buswell 1935; Yarbus 1967). Each individual has a distinct 
sequence which re-cycles at a fixed period of time for each 
person. The individual is not however at the mercy of this 
sequence for instructions to obtain different kinds of information 
from the picture produce very different sequences and patterns 
of fixation. There is a very strong tendency for the eyes to 
fixate an area of high information, or unusual features which 
offer the potential of yielding information. Usually the eyes 
never focus on homogeneous, familiar, or low information areas 
(Buswell 1935; Yarbus 1967; Mackworth and Morandi I966; Pollock 
and Spence I968), Despite very large differences in fixation
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patterns, the phenomenal experience of the picture seems to be 
constant (Kolers 1972), though there is no direct evidence that 
affective or aesthetic reactions to paintings are not related to 
eye-fixations patterns.
A feature of these fixation studies is that there appears 
to be no preliminary systematic scanning of the picture. The 
immediate concentration of fixations on a few areas of high 
information suggests the operation of peripheral scanning outside 
foveal vision. Studies of peripheral vision reveal that pattern 
acuity drops by ^0% for objects placed only 1° from the centre 
of the fovea, and by at 8° from the fovea (Riggs 1965), though
even at 6o° out from fovea information can be utilised which 
reduces processing-time when the same objects come into foveal 
vision (Sanders I963). A recent study by Loftus (1972) has shown 
that pictures seen only in peripheral vision can be recognised 
again. The evidence for pre-attentive processing is very strong 
(Neisser 1967). Although always seen in focus, the greater part 
of a painting is actually out of focus, and some parts of it never 
come into foveal vision. It seems possible that the overall 
aesthetic appeal, or affective impact of a painting could derive not 
from foveal vision but from the diffused, undifferentiated informa­
tion that is constantly present peripherally, despite the ever- 
changing location and input of foveal vision. Eye-fixation studies 
of children (Mackworth and Bruner 1970; Vurpillot I968) reveal 
that their scanning strategies (when compared to adults) are not 
very efficient at extracting the information required in the task 
instruction. Could this be a sign that children's perception is 
naturally aesthetic, in that they do not attend solely to figurai 
qualities as was argued by Arnheim (1954), Ehrenzweig (1967),
Werner (1956) and Gardner (1972), Nickerson (1968). This could 
be systematically tested,
Eye-fixation studies are highly interesting. It is regrettable
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that this objective measure of an individual's selective attention 
has not been correlated with phenomenal measures of the individual's 
feelings and reactions, as well as his overall aesthetic reaction.
It is possible that differential reactions to liked or disliked, 
better or poorer art, could be reflected in eye-fixations. There 
is evidence from Loftus (1972) that higher valued pictures both 
received more fixations and were remembered better than low-valued 
pictures, and when the number of fixations was held constant 
memory performance was independent of value.
There is also evidence that memory for pictures is near 
perfect, and lasts almost indefinitely (Shepard 1967; Nickerson 
1968; Standing, Conezio and Haber 1970; Shaffer and Shiffrin 1972), 
though there is no evidence that it is superior to memory for 
faces. Even so the powerful information-processing capacity for 
pictorial stimuli is a critical feature that must be accommodated 
in an explanation of aesthetic perception. The study by Shaffer 
and Shiffrin is particularly important because they revealed that 
memory for pictures was a function of duration of exposure and 
was not influenced by the interval between exposures, as is the 
case with verbal material. This suggests that rehearsal is not 
necessary in the processing of complex visual material. The 
immediacy of visual pictorial perception has also been revealed 
in a study by Erighouse (l939c) who found correlations of ,82,
.76, and ,80 between aesthetic ratings of stimuli presented 
tachistoscopically (.25 sec) with ratings of the same stimuli 
observed for as long as the three subjects wished,
Cross-Cultural studies of pictorial perception really began 
with the pioneering work of Hudson (196O, I967) and has been 
developed by Dawson (I963), Mundy-Castle (I966) and extensively 
by Deregowski (1972, 1973). Hudson had investigated perceived 
depth in line-drawings based on the cues of size, interposition 
and perspective,, though he did not study texture-gradients. He
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found that most of the rural Africans tested could only see
two-dimensional patterns. However subsequent work revealed that
cultural experience and formal education were important factors
in promoting the perception of pictorial space. Deregowski and
']
Eyth (1970) used Gregory's 'Pandora's Box' to demonstrate that 
three dimensional depth was actually seen, and that responses 
were not just dependent on cue interpretation. In general, cross- 
cultural studies (almost all from Africa) support the view that 
pictorial perception is learned, though a one-subject developmental 
study by Hochberg and Brooks (1962) suggests that it might be 
unlearned. This is consistent with Gibson's (1969) view that 
learning or instruction is not required to see that representations 
with light fidelity are similar to the real objects. Learning is 
only required with pictures of low fidelity. However, fidelity 
may not be the only feature, as Deregowski (1968c) has shown that 
familiar animals can be recognised by people from pictureless 
environments. Gibson (1969) concludes that 'perceptual learning 
beyond what is accomplished in the natural ecological surroundings 
is probably only required for perceiving the meaning of representa­
tions that empty special conventions or distortions, ones that 
are peculiar to the graphic act or to the artist'. There is clearly 
considerable scope and need for research on the development of 
perception for pictures and other graphic representations.
(d) Art History. This approach is exemplified in the 
writings of E. H. Gombrich who as an art historian has drawn 
extensively on the psychology of perception and has integrated it 
with his interpretation of the history of style in art. His 
largest single contribution is the influential Art and Illusion 
(Gombrich I960). In this book Gombrich argues that the reading of 
a representational painting is based on convention. He sees the 
growth of illusionism in painting as a result of the quest for a
1
See Gregory (1970) pp.94-96, for a description of this technique.
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narrative pictorial art. Proceeding from trial and error to 
a process of schema and correction the artist learned to create 
an illusion of three-dimensional scenes on a plane surface.
The discovery of the appearance of things was due not so much to 
careful observation of nature as the discovery of visual effects.
In the same may the observer had to learn to interpret the optical 
effects, and it is only when painter and observer share common 
canons concerning the projection and depiction of objects on a 
plane surface that a painting can represent. The gradual shift 
and development of these shared cannons Gombrich calls the history 
of artistic style.
Gombrich (1972c, 1973) has recently defended the position 
adopted in Art and Illusion that linear perspective is itself 
not a convention though use of it might be. He argues that although 
the world does not look like a picture, a picture can look, like 
the world. Gombrich stresses that linear perspective presents 
appearances rather than actual reality. He sees himself as a 
straight-liner rather than a curvilinearist, to distinguish 
himself from those who believe that a curved or hyperbolic 
perspective is more veridical (cf. Hansen 1973; White 1937).
Gombrich notes that every culture that has discovered, or been 
introduced to, linear perspective has eventually adopted it, 
including the Japanese.
Gombrich's technique combining expert knowledge of art and 
an extensive knowledge of perceptual psychology is a welcome relief 
from the biassed committed newpoints of most approaches to this 
subject. If it is rare for several disciplines relevant to a full 
understanding of art to combine in one mind, then an integrated 
team of diverse experts should serve as a substitute. A less 
good but still valuable way to integrate ideas, techniques and 
concepts from several disciplines is to be eclectic.
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(e) The Eclectic Approach. This is exemplified in the 
writings of Gregory (I966, 1970), Hochberg (1962, I966, 1972), and 
von Fieandt (I966). Much of Gregory's writing on perspective 
coincides closely with Gibson's and that of Pirenne. Gregory's 
definition of perception is slightly different. He sees it as 
an active process of using information to suggest and test 
hypotheses about the world. He sees the world as essentially 
ambiguous, so that knowledge derived from experience is needed to 
choose between alternative interpretations. This is particularly 
true of perspective projections in pictures. He sees the task 
of the painter or draughtsman as making the observer accept 
just one out of the infinite set of possible interpretations that 
are possible from a single perspective projection. It is a feature 
of perspective projection that an allipse inclined at a given 
angle is projected as a circle, and a circle inclined at a certain 
angle is projected as an ellipse. A small object placed close 
to the observer will give the same projected size as an object 
of twice the size at twice the distance from the observer. In 
the absence of binocular cues to depth (convergence, disparity) 
and motion parallex, the artist must use perceptual distance cues 
that are available to the single eye (see Footnote to p308). It 
is here that Gregory departs from the Gibsonian view, and comes 
very close to Gombrich when he stresses the role of familiarity 
and experience in reducing the ambiguity of the depicted objects. 
Gregory goes further and demonstrates that an object which is 
sufficiently familiar can be seen in depth without perspective. 
Perspective (linear or otherwise) is not essential.to the depiction 
of objects. The Egyptians did not use perspective, the Chinese 
used a kind of inverted perspective (see Pickford 1972, p. 173), 
and in medieval and Renaissance painting size was often a function 
of importance (e.g. donors in votive paintings). In The Intelligent 
Eye (1970) Gregory marvels at the ability of perception to make 
remarkably efficient use of strictly inadequate, and so ambiguous, 
information for selecting internally stored hypotheses about the
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current state of the external world. The perception of pictures 
is no less marvellous; 'Pictures are such artificial visual inputs 
that the surprising thing is not that they may appear ambiguous, 
uncertain, paradoxical or distorted representations of objects, 
but that we make anything of them at all*. (Gregory 1970 p.102) 
like Gombrich, Gregory lays great stress on the role of experience 
in interpreting pictures, Gregory has recently attempted to give 
an explanation of abstract and semi-abstract art, (Gregory 1973)*
He argues that, as a result of the power of the visual system to 
select in tentative form-hypotheses and features of hypotheses 
when there is insufficient input to permit correct hypotheses (as 
in abstract art), the observer is given the impression of rich 
experience because he sees more than is before his eyes. This is 
no different from seeing objects in flames, faces in clouds, or 
even Leonardo's seeing battles and landscapes in 'walls splashed 
with a number of stains' (cf. Richter 1932, p.l82).^ Projection 
of this sort probably does play a role in the perception of abstract 
art that is suggestive in the right w^ ay (e.g. Jackson Pollock or 
Mark Rothko), though it is unlikely to play a role in the geometric 
abstract art of Naum Gabo or Antoine Pevsner. This could easily 
be tested empirically. The 'projective potential' of abstract art 
may not distinguish it from non-art objects, though it might be 
shown that because it is seen as a work of art, the observer's 
attitude to it, and experience of it, is different from gazing 
at clouds. This could be tested by comparing the 'projective 
potential of photographs of natural objects (clouds, branches of 
trees, stoney soil, etc.) ivith that of abstract expressionist 
painting, and geometric abstract painting, respectively.
Julian Hochberg (1962, 1972) has developed a theory of 
canonical form in art. He has argued that at any given moment 
most of a picture as we perceive it is not on the retina, nor on 
the plane of the picture but 'in the mind's eye' (Hochberg 1968).
The picture is encoded out of the input to the retina at each 
fixation. What is not encoded and stored is lost to perception
^Leonardo recommended this as a technique 'to increase your talent 
and stimulate various inventions'.
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(e.g. the perspective inconsistencies). Hochberg explains the 
powerful impact of drawings in that they can represent only those 
features that the viewer will encode and store in ways that the 
artist wants us to (cf. Ryan and Schwartz 1959; Jennison 1972). 
Cartoons and caricatures are drawings which produce this effect 
to an extreme degree, by leaving out the redundancies of veridical 
perception that the minds eye doesn't see, and by approximation 
of the drawing to canonical form, i.e. shapes that are close to 
the ways in which these objects are encoded in the mind's eye.
This is perhaps equivalent to Pirenne's (1970) contention that 
familiar objects are presented frontally regardless of their 
legitimate perspective distortion.
Hochberg's theory is speculative and extremely interesting. 
There is clearly a case for research on the nature of caricature 
and the notion implicit in Hochberg's account, viz. that aesthetic 
pleasure is the result of the perceived economy of a drawing to 
achieve its impact on the observer's visual or rather his mental 
coding system. It is doubtful that this could be an explanation 
of all art, but then it is doubtful if a single explanation will 
be adequate for the perception and experience of all kinds of 
art.
von Fieandt is also eclectic combining the approaches and 
findings of Arnheim and Gibson with introspection and a smattering 
of experimental studies. Although not contributing any original 
matter the discussion is important in bringing the problems of 
pictorial and artistic perception strongly within the fold of 
general psychology in a general text-book on perception.
(d) Other Approaches. These include Gestalt, psychoanalytic 
and information-theoretic approaches. In more general terms these 
have been discussed already in chapter three. The Gestalt 
approach does not deal directly with pictorial perception. The 
identification of objects is not important; it is their expressive
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qualities that are aesthetically important. The same is also 
true of the psychoanalytic approach which, as v;e have seen has 
placed most emphasis on latent content of the art objects, and 
also information theory with its stress on quantification of the 
stimulus input and its general neglect of meaning.
Conclusions
There can be no doubt that the illusion of depth in pictures
is very strong, though it is equally true that we are never deluded
or deceived by it. There has not been a great deal of experimental
work with pictures, though there has been considerable speculative
']
emphasis on perspective as a cue to depth. Pirenne (1970) has 
demonstrated directly the validity of Euclidian optics to retinal 
projection, though other writers (especially Gombrich, Kochberg 
and Gregory) stress that perception is a constructive process 
and that the observer does not experience only what is on the 
retina. Consequently, the perspective distortions which arise 
when the canvas is seen at an angle lie outside concious perception. 
Perspective projections appear to be intrinsically ambiguous so 
the correct reading of a painting is dependent on a variety of cues 
both present in the painting and in the observer (Gregory 1970; 
Gombrich 1970). Finally, we do not perceive the world according 
to the rules of perspective, even though it is the means by which 
the visual world is projected on the retina. This is perhaps 
why a painting can be made to look like the visual world, even 
though the visual world does not look like a painting.
Host of this is only indirectly relevant to aesthetic 
perception, except that Arnheiin (1972) has argued that deviation
'I
Studies by Zajac (196I) and Adams (1972) represent rare empirical 
investigations of linear perspective as a cue to pictorial space. 
Both studies reveal systematic but minor inconsistencies between 
the perspective laws and perception of the pictures.
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from the daws of perspective in Western art has permitted the use 
of intrinsically expressive forms which contradict the rules of 
linear perspective. Of more immediate relevance is the 
suggestion by Gregory (1973) that the essence of abstract art 
is object-hypothesis formation to an exaggerated degree, and 
liochberg's (1972) notion of canonical form. Both of these 
notions can be tested and should be further researched. In 
addition Gombrich's 'beholder's share', and Gibson's 'pictorial 
attitude' should both be extensively researched. In general 
there is a serious need for research with real works of art, 
and not just pictures in order to establish whether the perception 
of pictures is qualitatively different from the aesthetic 
perception of painting, or whether there is a continuum from 
documentary photographs, through caricature to great art.
Ill The Expression of Meaning in Art
As noted in Section I expression here has the widest possible 
meaning. It refers to the perception of emotion, feeling and 
ideas in painting which may or may not have any semantic reference 
This includes the notion of form as distinct from content and 
the notion of art as form (Bell 1914). It also includes the 
expressive qualities of elements of paintings, and of paintings 
as a whole. By contrast with pictorial perception there is a 
large amount of experimental work on graphic expression.
1. Experimental Studies: Do paintings have meaning?
A very broad division can be made between studies using 
whole paintings or drawings and studies using molecular stimuli. 
Whereas the latter practice has been discouraged in this thesis 
it is now considered acceptable because of its more direct 
relevance to the expressive qualities of the elements of abstract 
art. Meaning in these studies has been measured in a variety of 
ways.
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(a) Meaning as Agreement (adjectives to images). This 
technique involves the presentation of lines (or colours, or 
shapes) by an experimenter, and the subject is asked to attribute 
qualities to them, usually from an adjective check-list.
Poffenberger and Barrows (1924), used circles and lines varying 
in size, and thickness oX line. Some figures produced complete 
agreement and others almost complete disagreement. Similar 
experiments have been carried out by Israeli (1928) and Hevner 
(1935) with similar large individual differences. More recently 
the technique has been used by Wexner (1934) using colours and 
by Peters and Merrifield (1938) using lines, and also by Beldock 
(1984), Although these authors stress the measures of agreement 
between characteristics of stimuli and attributed adjectives, there 
is considerable individual variation; for instance, with V7exner's 
subjects the colour red was most frequently seen as exciting, or 
stimulating. Yet the same colour shared with brown, blue, black 
and purple the adjectives protective and dependable. As only a 
small number of adjectives are usually supplied, it is not surprising 
that there is agreement when the choice situation is so limited.
In other words these studies are biassed because of inadequate 
response sampling.
(b) Meaning as Agreement (images to adjectives). This is
the opposite technique where the subject is presented with stimulus 
words (usually having emotional reference) and is asked to make a 
drawing or a line to express that word. The experimenter then 
categorises the responses and relates them to the emotion-stimuli. 
This technique has been used by Lundholm (1921), Scheerer and Lyons 
(1939)» and by Peters and Merri field (1938). As vfith the previous 
technique there seems to be a tendency to concentrate on agreement 
only, and to ignore the disagreement and individual differences 
which are clearly present. There is also a tendency to over­
generalise from the results. For instance, Peters and Merrifield 
(1938) go so far as to claim that direction of line (t— > I') 
indicates the social desirability of the behaviour or feeling 
represented by the stimulus-word.
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(c) Meaning as Semantic Differential ratings. This was 
originally used by Tucker (1953)» (in Osgood et al 1937) where
he found that the structure of semantic space of representational 
paintings was the same as for objects in general, except that 
there was a higher loading on the Evaluative Factor. Springbett 
(1980) used the semantic differential to show that abstract 
paintings did have objective neaning, even though Tucker (1933) 
had found that abstract paintings had meaning only for art 
experts, whereas non-artists revealed 'semantic chaos'. Choynowski 
(1988) also used the S.D. technique to revealed the complex 
meaning structure in paintings and an interesting study of the 
connotative meaning of colour was carried out by Wright and 
Rainwater (I982). Factor analysis revealed six clusters of 
adjective-pairs, viz. happiness, showiness, forcefulness, warmth 
elegance, and calmness/strength. Overall the strongest determinant 
of connotative meaning was saturation rather than hue.
(d) Meaning as agreement between artist and observer. This 
embraces the important notion of the artist's intention as a 
factor in appreciation, but as tested experimentally tends to 
involve no more than a correlation between artists' ratings of 
their own works and ratings by other observers. Nidorf and 
Argabrite (1970) developed this technique as a measure of 
physiognomic perception using the Semantic Differential. They 
found that there was more communication mediated through the 
two representational paintings than through the two abstract 
paintings which were used as stimuli in the experiment. However, 
as only one artist's work was used it is difficult to generalise 
these results to abstract and representational paintings in general, 
A similar study was carried out by Siddiqi and Thieme (I989)
again using Semantic Differential judgements by artists of their 
own work, by art students, and by psychology students, but this 
time using a wide variety of paintings. The two groups of 
students showed substantial agreement with each other but very
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little with the Judgements of the artists who painted the vrorlcs. 
This suggests that the students shared a group implicit aesthetic 
theory which v/as not the same as the artists individual aesthetic 
theories as manifested in their works.
(e) Meaning as structured response. Most factor analytic 
studies fall into this category (see Chapter 6 ). Dimensions of 
similarity between paintings, of preferences for paintings can 
be said to represent the meaning of the paintings. Usually, the 
factorial structure has relevance to all the paintings used in 
the study, and by implication, to all painting. The meanings
of an individual painting can be determined by its loading on 
the respective factors making up the total structure. The 
limitations and weaknesses of this approach have already been 
discussed •
(f) Meaning as fittingness. This refers to the assertian 
that paintings are 'just right' in the sense that if they were 
changed in any way they would not look so good, (cf. Koffka 1940). 
This has been specifically tested by Pronko et al (1983). He 
carefully modified photographs of paintings in a vareity of ways, 
e.g. by altering the composition, changing proportions of the 
canvas. When mixed with unaltered paintings subjects were no 
better than chance at identifying the modified paintings. Perhaps 
this was due to the short time (3 seconds) that was allowed for 
each response, for the discrimination task was very difficult. 
Interesting techniques have been devised by Lindauer (I989, 1970) 
to measure 'physiognomic awareness'. In one technique abstract 
paintings were presented to subjects who had to indicate their 
preferred orientation for hanging on a wall. Thirty-five per 
cent of the judgements agreed with the original orientation,
and twenty-give per cent preferred the paintings upside do\m. 
Lindauer takes this as evidence of the intrinsic expressiveness 
of the paintings communicating a sense of orientation to the
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observers. Lindauer in a later experiment asked subjects to 
select the most appropriate title for an abstract painting from 
a choice of four (one of which was the correct title). As in the 
previous experiment there was above-chance agreement with the 
artists' title, but still considerable disagreement overall.
Using a fairly similar task Ross C1986) found that after minimal 
exposure to paintings his subjects were able to identify with 
only IO/0 error which had been reversed on a second showing.
However, when asked which orientation was the 'artist-intended 
orientation', the subjects were influenced more by the initial 
orientation they had seen than by the qualities of the paintings» 
themselves. Thus a painting that had not changed its orientation 
in the two viewings tended to be seen as correct. Ross concluded 
'a painting viewed twice looks good like a painting should*. 
Preferences for paintings in original form compared to their mirror 
images have also been investigated by Swartz and Swartz (1971) 
and Swartz and Hewitt (1970). They found that preferences for 
the original over the mirror image must reached significance.
(g) Meaning as Categorisation. This technique involves 
interpreting the emotional source or the expressive intention 
which is manifested in a painting. For example, Main (19&9) 
collected 25 paintings executed by people in each of 5 categories, 
viz. (a) schizophrenics, (b) neurotics, (c) physically ill people, 
(d) non-hospitalised normals, and (e) children aged 9- Subjects 
were divided into groups, each one having to distinguish between 
schizophrenic paintings and one of the remaining categories.
They could easily discriminate between the schizophrenic paintings 
and each of the other categories with an average error rate of 
only 15/^ . There seems to be a definite ability to identify 
abnormal expression in art.
(h) Meaning as Unverbalisable. Two experiments have shown 
that paintings can be sorted into groups which the subjects are 
unable to describe or identify verbally. Alexander (I980) revealed
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that there was not always agreement between visual dimensions 
(as indicated by sorting behaviour) and introspected verbal 
dimensions. He warns against the use of verbal techniques, 
and stresses the need to collect data which reflects only visual 
behaviour rather than verbal habits. A similar warning is 
implicit in a study by MireIs and Efland (1970) who used a non­
verbal sorting task followed by raultifdimensional scaling analysis 
This is a particularly important point which has been stressed 
by Arnheira in Visual Thinking (19&9) and also by Gibson (1971). 
Visual meaning is freer and less stereotyped than verbal thinking. 
Pictures have no vocabulary of defined meanings, so it is possible 
that thoughts can be visualised which cannot be verbalised.
Ill Theory and Explanation; the expression of emotion in art.
Despite variation in conception, or operational specification 
of meaning, and the great variety of experimental techniques 
two general conclusions can be drawn. First, there can be no 
doubt that non-pictorial stimuli, or the formal aspects of 
pictorial stimuli do have meaning in some sense of that word. 
Secondly, agreement concerning this 'meaning* is by no means 
complete. It is also apparent that some of the attributed 
meaning is the artefactual result of the experimental procedure.
The experiments reviewed above have stressed communal (objective) 
meaning based on a criterion of agreement. They have ignored 
individual (or subjective) meaning, for by their ov/n operational 
definitions (explicit or otherwise) disagreement between people 
implies a lack of meaning. In art idiosyncratic or subjective 
interpretation is valid for an individual even though in 
scientific terms concensus is required to make a judgement valid.
Given that there is some agreement on the meaning of 
nonpictorial stimuli, what explanations have been offered?
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Associationist Approach.
(a) The Theory of Empathy
The theory of empathy was first expounded by Lipps (1903) 
and Worringer (1903) in Germany. The theory was introduced to 
England by Lee (1913) and received an important exposition in 
the work of Langfeld (1920). Although there are many subtle 
variations of enormous import to philosophers, the details by 
which the theories differ are less relevant to a psychology of 
emotional expression in art. Pratt (19&1) has given a useful 
summary of Lipps' theory. In brief it is that in response to a 
work of art an observer feels in himself qualities that are best 
described by words for emotions and feelings. 'The qualities 
are subjective in origin but by a kind of simultaneous association, 
by inference built up by countless repetitions they are seen as 
aspects of objects located outside the body' (Pratt I981). In 
essence the theory of empathy is one of projection of feelings 
originating in the observer to the object observed, It is in 
this way that the object is seen as expressing emotion. The 
observer 'feels into' the observed objects feelings that he is 
in reality experiencing himself.
This theory has enjoyed immense popularity in both philosophy 
and aesthetic theory. There are several reasons why this is so, 
despite very serious weaknesses. Firstly, it is very plausible 
and easy to grasp as an explanation. Secondly, it is readily 
applicable to any situation. Thirdly, and this is probably 
important in terms of its status in philosophy, as it is largely 
consistent with the logical Positivism of Stevenson (1944) and 
Ayer (1946 ). As a theory it remained unchallenged for almost 
40 years, until it was attacked by the Gestalt psychologists.
What then are the weaknesses in this theory as explanation 
of how emotion is perceived in objects? The main limitation is
329
that the theory of empathy doesn't explain anything at all.
It does not say why or how the observer feels the emotion he 
does feel in the first place. It may be true that projection 
of emotion is part of the aesthetic response, but this notion 
does not explain why the emotion arises. The theory of empathy 
describes an aspect of the process but does not explain it.
The other weakness is that the process of 'feeling into' is 
taken to be the essence of the aesthetic experience. If this 
were the case projection of emotion would result in very 
diversified and mood-reflecting reactions. If it were purely 
a matter of individual interpretation and projection the same 
stimuli would suit all people because each individual could 
project v;hatever he chose to. Finally, the notion of empathy 
ignores the power that works of art have over the observer's 
feelings and the changes that can occur as a result of experiencing 
them. Different types of paintings are sought for the effects 
they produce in the observer. If an irritable or anxious person 
be calmed by Matisse's 'Tree near Trivaux Pond' (I916) (See 
PlateX) or a calm person made to grit his teeth at the sight of 
Max Ernst's 'The Beautiful Season' (1925) (Fig. 3-6) it cannot be 
his own feelings he is projecting in his initial reaction.
Finally the theory of empathy does not differentiate between 
aesthetic perception and ordinary every-day perception of objects 
in which projection also occurs.
It is possible that the theory of empathy in all its forms 
(see Kainz I962) has been overinterpreted and over-generalised.
It is certainly interesting that Lipps who first used the theory 
of empathy to explain the effects of illusions also utilised the 
notion of the inner activity of lines comprising the illusion.
Could this have been an anticipation of isomorphism?
(b) The Gestalt Theory of Intrinsic Expression.
Despite the fact that there has not been a major Gestalt
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treatise on aesthetics, the gestalt theory of expression is
likely to have a lasting influence on the psychology of art. The
theory was formulated by Koffka (1935, pp.654-661) and Kohler
(1949, pp.216-247), though Koffha (1940) and Arnheim (1954)
specifically applied it to art. To say that the theory was applied
to art is in a sense misleading. The essential tenet is that
all objects have physiognomic qualities, as 'expression is the
primary content of perception' (Arnheim 1954). All objects
by virtue of their dynamic qualities express emotion intrisically.
Intrinsic expressiveness is a function of the isomorphism that
exists between the structure of physical objects and the structure
of our central nervous sytem. Expression is defined as 'the
psychological counterpart of the dynamic processes which result
in the organisation of perceptual stimuli' (Arnheim 1949). The
dynamic qualities of objects are paralleled by the same dynamic
qualities in the brain. It is the dynamic qualities of the
stimulus that enables the direct perception of emotion. The
artist makes use of the expressive qualities of curves and shapes
and by representing any subject-matter through them, he achieves
artistic expression. By utilising the 'dynamics of expansion,
contraction, conflict and concordance, rising and falling, approach
and withdrawal' he can turn concrete objects into 'symbols of
the forces that shape human destiny' by representing them with
these dynamic qualities (Arnheim 1954). Thus pure form cannot
be without meaning because all shapes, colours etc. have intrinsic
1
meaning as natural signs. The meaning of these curves, shapes, 
masses, etc. are not as trivial as the meaning indicated by. 
the adjective check-lists as they are used by kexner (1954), 
and others. It is much deeper and more fundamental meaning for 
all man-kind. 'Art begins to make sense when it is conceived as 
the most radical attempt to understand the meaning of our existence 
through the shapes and colours and movements that the sense of
1
This view was also held by one of the pioneers of abstract 
painting, Wassily Kandinsky, (l 866-1 944 ).
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sight grasps and interprets', (Arnheira I966),
The theory has many advantages. It does attempt to explain 
the perception of emotion in art though the emphasis on the 
painting as natural sign precludes the possibility of any 
contribution on the part of the observer. Whereas empathy 
logically implies chaos and absence of communal meaning, the 
principle of isomorphism implies more universality and stimulus 
determination than actually exists in experience. The Gestaltists, 
because of their nativism and rejection of associationism, claimed 
like Gibson (1930, 1934) that all emotion in art was intrinsically 
expressed. One extreme position is counteracted by another.
Despite this, the Gestalt approach can also be commended for its 
emphasis on the deeper meaning of art, which is all too rare in 
the psychology of art. Linived with this is the characteristically 
Gestaltist reluctance to shrink from the difficult question of 
'value', Kdhler (1938) developed the notion of 'requiredness* 
which was applied by Koffka (1940) as a 'criterion of quality' in 
art. Koffka claims that a great work of art is a perfect Gestalt, 
for nothing can be changed without altering its beauty. It is 
the fittingness of the dynamics of the depiction to the object 
depicted that determines quality in art.
This criterion is too general to be empirically useful, and 
would be very difficult to apply to complex works of art. It 
may have some relevance to Suprematist or Constructivist types of 
art, but the notion of fittingness of structure to object loses 
meaning as this type of art is free from content in semantic 
terms. Although the criterion has limited value, it is noteworthy 
as the only one in the psychology of art.
(c) Physiognomic Perception
Although not specifically within the framework of Gestalt 
theory there have been a number of (experimental studies on
332
physiognomie perception investigating the effect of the dynamic 
qualities of stimuli on their perception. Werner (1956) contrasted 
the physiognomic mode of perception in which dynamic or expressive 
qualities are seen with the geometric-technic mode of perception 
in which objects are seen as sources of information. Physiognomic 
perception is intrinsic because it characterises the perception 
of children, primitive groups, and also because it is compelling. 
Working within the frame-work of sensory-tonic theory (Werner and 
Wapner 1952) a series of experiments was conducted. Thus figures 
with directional dynamics (drawings of birds, aeroplanes, balloons, 
arrows), systematically shifted the apparent median plane (direction 
of gaze), (Werner and Wapner 1954; Kaden, Werner and Wapner 1955). 
Similarly directional dynamics can be induced in a symmetrical 
stimulus by applying extraneous stimulation to one side of the 
observer (Wapner, Werner and Krus 1957), and the autokinetic 
motion of a spot of light in the dark can be influenced by the 
observer hearing sliding tones (Miller, Werner and Wapner 1958). 
Physiognomic perception is not stimulus bound as similar dynamic 
effects have been obtained with ambiguous stimuli which were 
labelled in different ways (Werner and Wapner 1954; Coma H i , Werner 
and Wapner 1957), and also with words connoting dynamics (Kaden, 
Werner and Wapner 1955). Finally, Comalli (1960) has demonstrated 
an experiential factor in physiognomic perception. He found that 
the effects of dynamic qualities on perception were greater for 
artists than for scientists.
The chief value of these experiments is that they demonstrate 
that both the meaning and the configurational dynamics of a 
stimulus determine the way it is seen. The meaning of a stimulus, 
whether it was derived from its shape, or by suggestion, or by 
its conventional verbal meaning, influenced perception in systematic 
ways. It can therefore be seen that physiognomic here means 
something very different from Koffka's (1940) interpretation.
Thus stimulus characteristics, semantic interpretation, and habitual
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ways of seeing the world affect the influence of dynamic qualities 
on perception. As with many experiments of relevance to aesthetic 
perception it is difficult to generalise from effects obtained 
with diagrammatic stimuli to the perception of complex works of 
art. However these experiments throw doubt on the Gestalt 
contention, and also that of Gibson (1930, 1934) that physiognomic 
qualities are the product of sensory stimulation alone. Perhaps 
the conclusion should be that physiognomic qualities are derived 
from sensory stimulation, and influenced by attributed meaning. 
However, Gombrich would maintain that it is only through attributed 
meaning in a given context.
(d) Expression as a choice between alternatives.
Looking at the problem of expression through the history 
of art, Gombrich rejects the notion of intrinsic expressiveness.
He rejects the notion that colour and shape are inherently charged 
with expressive meaning. He argues that expression functions 
within a range of possibilities. 'Where everything is possible 
and nothing unexpected communication must break down. It is 
because art operates with a structured style governed by technique 
and schemata of tradition that representation could become the 
instrument of expression', (Gombrich I960). Thus it is when we 
know the convention that a deviation becomes meaningful. Gombrich 
builds on Kris' (1932) notion of self-expression as a series of 
decisions between alternatives. In response to works of art, 
a knowledge of the history of art, or familiarity with the 
relevant style creates a context of expectations against which 
new experiences can be evaluated (Gombrich I962). The context 
of expectation created by awareness of style is analogous to 
Kelson's notion of Adaptation-Level(l964). Gombrich does 
not completely reject the notion of physiognomic perception, but 
strives to differentiate it from aesthetic perception. It is 
not equivalent to the perception of children where everything has 
meaning, but it is the first step in an effort to make sense;
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an act of categorisation, which is refined by subsequent 
observation and a frame-work of expectations, 'Without this 
frame-worl: against vihich to test and modify our first impressions 
we are left to the tender mercies of our first projections.' 
(Gombrich I96O). It is because the visual image is a symbolic 
system (rather than a representation of reality) that the 
observer is channelled into a correct reading of it by (a) a 
knowledge of the conventions of the style or period (the code);
(b) the caption to the work; (c) its relation to other works 
of a similar nature based on prior expectations (the content).
All three function to reduce ambiguity (Gombrich 1972d). We 
have seen in the discussion above that the perception of emotional 
expressiveness cannot be either projection only, or be intrinsic 
only. Although not a psychologist, Gombrich has provided the 
best description of the perception of expressive qualities in 
art. Intrinsic expression has a small but important role in 
eliciting a further look because of its immediacy, but this has 
to be distinguished from aesthetic expressiveness. This Gombrich 
sees as perception of the significance of the decisions that have 
made within a known frame-work of possibilities. By this scheme 
the perception of expressive qualities in art is the end product 
of a kind of categorization process (Bruner 1937), In his earlier 
writings on expression Gombrich (196O, 19^2, 19o3i 1972b) did 
not explain how the meaning became attached to the visual images 
by the observer, though in a recent paper on the perception of 
physiognomic qualities in the face, Gombrich (1972a) supports 
an empathy interpretation in which traces of muscular reactions 
from our own experience are projected onto the perceived object. 
Gombrich admits this is not a total explanation but feels that 
it must be contributory.
IV What makes perception aesthetic?
(a) The aesthetic attitude
Before the publication of Bell's theory of significant form
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(Bell 1$14) aesthetic interest was in the art object and not 
in the experienced emotion. In modern aesthetics the notion of 
aesthetic experience as a self-rewarding activity prevails.
There have been many philosophical attempts to define and 
describe the special frame of mind that is required in order 
to perceive objects aesthetically. The special frame of 
mind is usually referred to as the 'aesthetic attitude'.
Hospers (1969) has distinguished three different types of 
aesthetic attitude. The first type sees aesthetic perception 
as non-practical. Perception is indulged in for its own sake 
and not for any practical reason. This is the view of Vernon 
Lee (1913), and is embodied in Puffer's (1905) notion of 
'aesthetic repose*. The second type sees the aesthetic as the 
non-cognitive, i.e. the perceptual characteristics of an object 
are attended to, without any regard to information or knowledge. 
Thirdly, there is the view of the aesthetic as the non-personal; 
there should be no concern for the feelings of the observer or any 
other person. The differences between the three types are slight 
and in psychological terms it is difficult to distinguish different 
processes at work. Equally the diverse accounts of the aesthetic 
attitude as 'disinterested attention* (Kant 1790); *The moment 
of mystical vision'(Berenson 1907); 'psychical distance* (Bullough 
1912); 'aesthetic repose* (Puffer 1905); 'complete absorption *, 
Munsterberg; *the oceanic feeling' (Freud 1922); *that which 
pleases apart from desire' (Kellog 1930); and 'disinterested 
attention' (Stolnitz I96O) seem to differ only in the catch- 
phrases used to characterise the process they regard as aesthetic. 
Fundamentally they are all talking about the same thing. The 
interpretation given by Mace (1972) is a good one. *To adopt 
the aesthetic attitude is to effect, in proportion to our ability 
to do so, all those adaptations and pre-adjustments which facilitate 
the process of extracting satisfaction from the intrinsic character 
of the object of perception', (Mace 1972). In other words, 
practical interest and intellectual curiousity must be suspended.
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The nature of the pre-adjustments etc. must be established by 
empirical research. Dickie (1964) in his evaluation of the 
notion of 'aesthetic attitude* in all its forms, concludes that 
the aesthetic attitude collapses into 'attending closely' which 
tells us nothing new, and certainly doesn't distinguish aesthetic 
from ordinary everyday perception. Dickie also rejects Bullough's 
notion of 'Psychical Distance' as nothing more than a function 
of focussed attention, and Stolnitz's 'disinterested attention* 
as a function of the observer's intention rather than his attention.
If there is any value in the notion of the aesthetic attitude 
it is that the observer's attention is stressed. It emphasises 
that the same object can be looked at in different ways, e.g.
Lee's practical, theoretical and aesthetic modes (Lee 1913).
Even if this were the case the aesthetic attitude leaves unexplained 
why looking at an object 'in and for itself should arouse what 
is identifiable (at least intrespectively) as aesthetic experience. 
If it is purely a question of the way an object is apprehended 
the aesthetic attitude doesn't help us to distinguish good aesthetic 
experiences from less good experiences. It leaves out of 
consideration differences in the objects that are apprehended 
aesthetically. In other words it neglects the correlation of 
the object with the experience. Aesthetic experience results 
from the interaction of object characteristics, person character­
istics and processes in the person resulting from the other two.
The notion of aesthetic attitude is an abstraction.which is too 
general to apply to concrete cases. In psychology, attention 
is a better defined, systematically researched construct. It 
is necessary to investigate the suggestion, arising out of the 
notion of aesthetic attitude, that aesthetic experience involves, 
if not a unique kind of attention, at least a different kind 
from ordinary perception. It would be premature to characterise 
it, but the following can be said:
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(a) it is more intense than everyday attention;
(b) it can involve a loss of self-awareness (i.e. it is 
self-transcendent);
and (c) it is apparently experienced in relation to works of 
art.
These could all be operationally defined and tested. The 
suggestion that aesthetic experience is most commonly (or only?) 
experienced in response to works of art, raises the possibility 
akin to that suggested by Schacter (1964) a generalised physiolo­
gical state of emotional arousal is interpreted by means of 
cognitive cues arising from the situation which appears tko be 
causing the physiological state. By this view the experience of 
the physiological state is regarded as aesthetic because of the 
presence of art objects, and might be called mystic if the observer 
happened to be sitting on top of a mountain (cf. James 1901-2).
This possibility has certainly not been discounted in the 
psychology of art, and should be empirically tested.
I have already referred to the Gestalt theory in which a 
work of art is made with the idea of being a good Gestalt (Koffka 
1940). This is seen by the Gestalt psychologists as a symptom 
of the organisms urge to create the maximum order that limited 
conditions will permit. As a work of art it serves as a source 
of stimulation specifically selected for its effect. Birkhoff's 
notion of maximum aesthetic effect from the highest ratio of 
order to complexity is a similar notion of aesthetic perception 
as facilitated perception (Birkhoff 1933). Similar views have 
been put forward by Chandler (1934); Platt (196I); Valentine (I962); 
Berlyne (1971) and the information-theoretic school, though for 
widely differing- reasons. This contrasts sharply with the view 
expressed by Bruner (I962) that aesthetic perception involves 
'effort* because it is a departure from 'literal and habitual 
ways of perceiving*. Bruner shares with Koestier (1964) the 
view that 'metaphor' is an essential part of aesthetic experience.
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VThere Koestler talks of bisociating ideas and artistic medium, 
Bruner talks of metaphoric activity, though in essence they are 
saying the same thing. Metaphors join dissimilar experiences 
by finding the symbol or the image that unites them at some deeper 
emotional level of meaning. In art there is both metaphor and 
economy. Arnheim*s notion of the fittingness of image to object 
is very close to Bruner's interpretation, especially if we 
disregard the insistence on the good Gestalt as a criterion of 
the aesthetic. In place of a criterion of aesthetic affective- 
ness Bruner argues that there is a 'shock of recognition of the 
fittingness of an object to fill a gap in our experience'. This 
is equivalent to Wittgenstein's notion that a painting 'clicks * 
or doesn't 'click' as an aesthetic object, as the case may be. 
Discursive logic does not permit us to say anything more. Because 
of the non-discursive, non-rational nature of metaphor it is 
unlikely that psychologists can explain the essential features of 
aesthetic experience. This view is held by Bruner (I962), and 
by Gombrich (I96O, I965), both of whom are very ready to accept 
the contribution of psychology to the non-essential aspects of 
aesthetic experience. There would be no need for visual metaphor 
if its meaning could be translated exactly into words. I have 
already argued that it is easy to destroy the essence of what 
is being studied through inappropriate methods, or to alter 
significantly what is being studied, without being aware of this 
happening.
In this discussion I have discussed great art, and its 
meaning and significance in terms of the universels of human 
existence. At this level psychology as empirical science has 
been^behind. But all art is not great art, nor is all great art 
perceived with full-blown aesthetic experience. Paintings can
1
In Barret C1966)
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be looked at and appreciated for a great variety of reasons, 
and at differing levels of attention, interpretation, etc. 
Representational pointings may be enjoyed because the depicted 
content is pleasing to the observer. Alternatively, it may 
be enjoyed because it invites the observer to apply concepts 
which are subtle or profound. The study of differences in 
perceptual behaviour of this kind belong to the domain of 
psychology whereas the operational specification of the metaphoric 
language of great art is not.
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CHAPTER TEN
Concluding Remarks and Summary
The overall contribution of the psychology of art to our
understanding of behaviour and experience in relation to art is
disappointingly small. In earlier chapters the advantages and
the disadvantages of particular approaches to the subject were
assessed. Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the various
approaches is that each one tends to concentrate on one aspect of
the problem to the exclusion of other aspects. Psychoanalysis
has tended to be speculative and has concentrated on the content
or subject-matter of art. By contrast, Gestalt psychology, also
speculative, has concentrated on the characteristics of form
perception and the various branches of experimental psychology
have concentrated on measurable properties, either in the
stimulus (e.g. information theory) or in the person (most
experimental studies). It was argued that the best solution is
to combine the assumptions, techniques and methods of all the
approaches within a single flexible empirical frame-work rather
than to elevate one particular approach as the correct model of 
anct
research^expianation in the psychology of art.
In particular, the following points were made:
(a) The psychology of art should be brought within the mainstream
of 'respectable' psychological research and teaching. This probably 
necessitates a change of heart in psychology as a whole. There 
are signs that this change is already coming about.
(b) The best approach for the psychology of art is a neutral, 
open-minded, multi-disciplinary, attack on real problems of 
experience and behaviour in relation to works of art.
(c) All sources of information and ideas are admissable so long
as they lead to some form of empirical check, test or confirmation.
(d) To this end a model of man closer to that of the man-in-the-
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street should be adopted.
(e) The field of enquiry should be structured by a hierarchy of 
general and subsidiary questions, rather than the formulation 
of ad hoc hypotheses and isolated theories.
(f) Accurate, comprehensive description must precede explanatory 
endeavour, lower forms of explanation and theory are primary 
aims, since it is argued that low-level explanation is better 
than no explanation, or higher level (e.g. causal) explanations 
which are at the same time irrelevant. It is likely that, for 
any given problem, several types of explanation will provide the 
greatest insight and understanding.
(g) All types of measurement are admissible (including that 
derived from introspection), provided that naturalism and ecological 
validity are preserved. As a general rule, the use of molecular 
stimuli is discouraged, as well as objective stimulus specification 
which derives from their use. Phenomenal specification is 
preferred as a stimulus measure.
(h) The dispute concerning the aesthetic criterion as agreement with 
group concensus or expert opinion is considered irrelevant.
They are both important as descriptive measures.
(i) Research studies should be conducted with real paintings 
rather than substitutes, and preferably in natural surroundings. 
Reproductions can be studied either in their own right, or where
it has been proven that responses to them are acceptable equivalents 
to responses to the original works of art.
(j) There is a serious need for the standardisation of a battery 
of stimuli (representative of all types of art and aesthetic 
stimuli) which can be drawn on, in whole or in part. In this way 
comparison between studies would be facilitated, particularly if 
standard procedures are followed. Perhaps then, it will be possible 
to work towards progression and development in the field.
(k) There has been too much emphasis on the study of readily 
available parameters (sex, age, I.Q., personality) and a general 
neglect of more amorphous concepts such as a person's assumptions,
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expectations, opinions and the true nature of aesthetic 
experience. As these are more likely to determine an individual's 
relationship to art (or even whether or not he has one) the 
implicit aesthetic theory was proposed as a frame-work to 
provide a basis for an integrated approach to the psychology 
of art. It was argued that a prime concern of the field was 
the study of inner determinants and that all the 'factual' 
findings of experimental and correlational studies can only 
be meaningful in the context of an individual's implicit theory, 
or a culture's prevailing aesthetic theory.
In the remaining chapters four main areas in the psychology 
of art were discussed:
(i) Attempts to reveal the underlying structure of aesthetic 
experience have resulted in a large number of diverse types, 
factors, dimensions and categories. Amongst the varied approaches, 
it was argued that multidimensional scaling of similarity judgements 
is an effective, if crude and tentative, means of characterising 
which aspects of a painting an individual is responsive to.
Post hoc verbal classifications were also considered acceptable, 
particularly if the categories found were subsequently evaluated 
empirically within the context of individuals' implicit aesthetic 
theories. Concentration in the past on molecular stimuli has led 
to a pre-occupation with complexity as an aesthetic factor, with 
a corresponding general neglect of semantic and meaning factors. 
Studies which utilised molar stimuli have repeatedly revealed a 
sponteneity-deliberateness dimension, though this is a small 
return on the considerable outlay in time and research effort.
Very lev; studies have attempted to assess the validity, psychological 
meaningfulness, or utility of the revealed structure. This should 
be the primary aim, rather than the search for structure as an 
end in itself.
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(ii) The achievements of nearly a hundred years of research 
on the determinants and correlates of aesthetic reactions is 
distressingly small. The traditional psychological variables have 
been studied ad nauseam, and features such as artistic form and 
awareness of style have been almost entirely neglected. The 
psychology of art should primarily be an applied field of psychology, 
rather than a branch of psychology in which aesthetic as opposed
to other kinds of stimuli are employed. There has been too much 
emphasis on single variables in isolation from others. The 
presence of other variables is normal in aesthetic perception 
and may significantly change the meaning of the same variable 
when studied in isolation. There has also been a strange reluctance 
to directly study the aesthetic experience and behaviour of 
artists and other art experts. Instead they are compared with 
non-artists as part of a bi-valent independent variable or used 
as the basis of a criterion of aesthetic quality. Artists and 
other connoisseurs should be studied in their own right.
(iii) The numerous studies of the aesthetic development of 
children have also been disappointing. There is evidence from 
studies of child-art that children's reactions to art may be 
much more complex and subtle than most studies have revealed 
them to be. Attempts to teach aesthetic appreciation were 
discussed and some suggestions about the use of perceptual 
training were made. It was also argued that teaching sensitivity 
to style, and the perceptual differentiation that this entails, 
could facilitate the acquisition of aesthetic appreciation.
(iv) The study of meaning in art divides naturally into
the process by which objects are seen in pictures, and the process 
by which meaning or expressive qualities are perceived pictures. 
Studies of pictorial perception have tended to concentrate on the 
study of perspective, though eye-fixation and information- 
processing studies have provided valuable information on the
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perception of pictures. There have been a large number of 
studies, many of which are methodologically weak, which suggests 
that pictorial elements such as lines, colours and shapes, do 
have some level of measurable meaning. There is no clear-cut 
evidence to decide between the theory of empathy or the theory 
of intrinsic expression, nor is there any real evidence of a 
unique aesthetic emotion. The study of meaning in art is held 
to be critical to the psychology of art.
The psychology of art has a great deal to contribute to 
our understanding of art. By concentrating on both experience 
and behaviour in relation to art it can function as an essential 
adjunct to the other major approaches to the study of art. In 
addition, as an applied field of psychology its weaknesses are 
largely those of psychology in general. The psychologist's 
study of art cannot be considered a priority for research 
because there are more pressing human problems, (mental illness, 
crime, marital relations, alcoholism, etc.) On the other hand, 
if an appropriate psychology does not study man in relation to 
art, an essential feature of man will be ignored.
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Appendix A
The proportion of papers devoted to aesthetics out of the total 
number of papers abstracted each year in Psychological Abstracts,
1927- 1972.
Year Papers Papers on Percent of Papers Critical Works
Abstracted Aesthetics on Aesthetics and Books
1927 2730 18 .66%
1928 3758 42 1.17
1929 5016 60 1 .2
1930 5139 38 .74
1931 5066 32
1932 5088 36 .71
1933 6129 35 .57 Birkhoff; Aesthetic 
Pleasure 
Burt: The Psycholog; 
of Art
1934 6184 42 .75 Chandler: Beauty 
and Human Nature
1935 6056 35 .53
1936 6062 28 .46
1937 6063 33 .54
1938 6693 48 .72
1939 6557 35 .53
1940 6275 42 .67 Koffka: Problems in 
the Psychology of 
Art
1941 5452 59 1.10
1942 5066 4o .78
1943 4323 20 .46
1944 3926 21 .53
1945 3539 21 .55
1946 4936 28 .57
1947 4468 25 .56
1948 5612 53 .94
1949 6530 69 1.22
1950 6563 72 1 .10
1951 8319 102 1 .20
1952 7289 91 1.24
1953 8087 86 1.06
1954 9117 122 1.34 Arnheim: Art and 
Visual Perception
1955 9100 64 .92
1956 G529 94 1 .10
1957 9059 91 1 .00 Eysenck: The 
Psychology of 
Aesthetics
1958 6097 56 .92
1959 11239 79 .70
1960 8521 48 .56
1961 7353 40 .54 Pratt: Aesthetics 
(Ann.Rev.Psychol.)
1962 8500 48 .56 Valentine :
Experimental
Psychology
(continued,•)
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Year Papers Papers on Percent of Papers Critical vjorks
Abstracted Aesthetics on Aesthetics and Books
1963 8381 43 .31
1964 10300 26 .24
1963 10191 33 .34 First International 
Colloquium on 
Experimental 
Aesthetics, Paris
1966 13622 89 .63
1967 17202 150 .87 Arnheim: Towards a 
Psychology of Art
1968 19386 173 .89
1969 18608 173 .94 Child: Aesthetics 
(in Eandbook of 
Social Psychology
1970 21700 247 1.14
1971 22300 209 .94 Berlyne: Aesthetics 
and Psychology
1972 Pickford: Psychology 
and Visual 
Aesthetics 
Child : Esthetics/ 
(Ann.Pev.Psychol.)
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APPETTDIX B
Warr and Knanner's Model of Person Perception
input selector
attributive
responses
stored
stimulus
information
present
context
information
affective
responses
stable 
characteri­
stics 
of perceiver
current 
state of 
perceiver
present
stimulus
information
processing centre
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